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The University of Edinburgh
Plato's Philosophical Terminology
A History ofWords Central to the Ontology of His Middle Dialogues
(Abstract of Thesis)
The purpose of this thesis is to provide preliminaries for a better understanding of central
parts of Plato's philosophy. Its method is a combination of traditional diachronic semantics and
the study of the literary and social contexts of words which may be termed pragmatics. Its
justification, it is hoped, is provided by an application of the results of those studies to a portion
of Platonic text which is, in parts, reinterpreted in the light of some new findings.
The point of departure of the investigation undertaken is a passage from one of the dialogues
of Plato's middle period which is generally assumed to contain the essence of his thoughts on
matters ontological at the time of composition: Phaedo lOOd - 105e. From this text, a number
of significant terms, most of them recurring in other dialogues of similar date, have been
selected: fiSXSXSlV, 7tapstvai, 7tpOG£lV(Xl, fevetvai, sI8ck;, 'l5sa and some of their
cognates; the histories of these terms have been traced, from their earliest occurrence in extant
Greek literature, usually Homer, through the various authors and genres of epic, lyric and tragic
poetry, historical, philosophical, medical and rhetorical writings, to the early dialogues of Plato
himself. In the course of investigation it seemed appropriate to study the nouns 8t§OQ and
'l5ea in greater detail and to a degree approaching comprehensiveness, for two reasons: on the
one hand, their semantic development is more marked and variegated, and therefore deserved
more careful scrutiny; on the other, scholarly opinion, which has been taken into account
throughout, is more divided as to the meaning and senses of these two nouns than with any of
the other terms selected. For the same reason, it was deemed necessary to translate by far the
majority of pre-Platonic occurrences of the two nouns in their contexts - that often required
interpretation and discussion which may at first seem to be mere diversions - a measure not
required in the case of the verbs under consideration. That in itself is a first result: nouns are
more readily employed with extensions in meaning than verbs; they are more likely to acquire a
fixity in application which may amount to a technical terminology. The difference in status and
importance of the nouns over against the verbs is reflected in the separate arrangement of the
material in Parts I and II.
Part III consists of an application of some the results yielded by the semantic studies of the
individual words in Parts I and II. It is in the nature of the exercise that many of the J
developments traced in Parts I and II are not made use of in Part III; however, it was felt that
unless a complete study of all the various actual contexts prior in time were undertaken, it
would not be possible to determine with certainty the meaning and connotations of any given
term in any given text. The effort was not in vain, as it can be shown with fair precision not
only what the terms selected actually meant with Plato but more importantly, which literary
and intellectual contexts Plato derived his philosophical terminology from: being able to
determine to whom Plato reacted in his thoughts, and with whom he was in dialogue in his
writings, is more important than bare linguistic reconstruction of 'meaning'.
We see Plato in the central philosophical passage of the central dialogue Phaedo in interaction
with three at least partly distinct parties of pre-Socratic philosophers: Anaxagoras and his
followers, the Pythagoreans, and Democritus. While most of that conforms with received
opinion, reaction to Democritus at that early a stage in Plato's writing career is not usually
assumed. That in itself, and the use Plato makes of the thoughts of his predecessors in fusing
and correcting their assumptions while adapting their language to his own purposes may
prompt us to reconsider some commonly held views on Plato's ontology.
However, the study here attempted is intended to be preliminary in nature; the application to a
Platonic text in Part III is to be understood as one example only of how the semantic
investigations of Parts I and II may be applied to the dialogues of Plato and other near-
contemporary philosophical texts.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I should like to acknowledge gratefully the constant support, admonition, and
exhortation I have received from my Supervisors Mr. David B. Robinson and Mr J.
Christopher G. Strachan in preparing this thesis; to acknowledge also the stimulation
derived from their weekly seminars on Plato, and the advice and criticism of Miss Ute
Fleischer, formerly of the Department of Classics of Edinburgh University, and Dr.
Paolo Crivelli and Mr. Andonis Hatsistavrou of the Department of Philosophy; to
acknowledge no less the uniquely inspiring atmosphere of the Plato Reading Group of
Dr. Theodore Scaltsas, likewise of the Department of Philosophy of Edinburgh
University. My thanks go to all the above and also to the other staff of the Department
of Classics of Edinburgh University, not least to the departmental secretary Miss
Elaine Hutchison, and to the staff of the Department of Classics and Ancient History
of the University of Wales, Swansea, which provided an almost ideal working
environment from October 1996 to September 1998. Nor should I fail to mention with
gratitude the invaluable help given me freely by Mr J. Gordon Howie and Miss Maria-
Elpiniki Oikonomou of the Department of Classics of Edinburgh University, and by
Dr. Graham Hogg and Dr. Ulrike Moret of the British Antiquarian Division of the
National Library of Scotland, all of whom read drafts of parts of this thesis and
provided comments and criticism. Support of a different sort, given from beginning to
end by Miss Fiona Carmichael and her colleagues at the Language and Humanities
Centre ofEdinburgh University, should not be passed over in silence.
For the first three years of my postgraduate studies I received a Major Scottish
Studentship from The Scottish Office, for which I am grateful.
I should finally like to thank my parents, Frau Hanna and Dr. Fritz-Rudolf
Herrmann, for their support over many years of study at home and abroad. To them,
and to the memory ofmy teacher Siegfried Lohse, this thesis be dedicated.
In accordance with the regulations of the University of Edinburgh I hereby declare
that this work is entirely my own and has not been written in collaboration.
Fritz-Gregor Herrmann
postscriptum: This final version of the thesis has profited greatly from the watchful
eyes and minds of my three examiners, Professor Michael C. Stokes, emeritus
professor of Greek in the Department of Classics, University of Durham; Professor
Richard Stalley of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Glasgow; and
Dr. N. Keith Rutter of the Department of Classics of Edinburgh University. While
some disputes remain unresolved, the reader is spared the unseemly sight ofmany an





I. ll£X£X£tV and participare 17
II. The Syntax of EXELV 18
III. |lST£X£tV in Early Greek Literature 20
IV. £XeLV and pxXEXElV in Plato's Protagoras 29
V. |X£X£X£IV in Other Early Dialogues of Plato 44
VI. Summary 49
riAPOYSIA, IIAPEINAI, nAPATITNESOAI 50
I. JtaQ£LVai in Early Greek Literature 50
II. JtaQOUaCa in Fifth Century Attic Drama 60
III. JtaQayCyVEaOat in Fifth Century Greek Prose 62
IV. JtaQoucua, JtaQEivat, JiaQayCyvEaOat in Plato's Gorgias
and Other Early Dialogues 64
V. JlolQELVai in Plato's Charmides 74
VI. JtaQOUcria, JtaQEivat, JtaQaytyvEcrOai in Plato's Gorgias
- Some Questions 78
VII. JtCXQOUcria in Plato's Lysis 79
VIII. Summary 82
nPOSEINAI, nPOSriTNESOAI 85
I. JtQOCTElVCU and JlQOOyLyV£O0ai in Early Greek Literature 85
II. JtQOaEivat and ^QoaytyV£O0at in Early Dialogues of Plato 95
III. Summary 99
ENEINAI, ETTirNESOAI 101
I. EVELVai and Immanence 101
II. EVEtvat in Early Greek Poetry 102
III. EVEtvat in Presocratic Texts 107
IV. EVELVCtl in the Hippocratic Corpus 110
V. EVEivat in Early Dialogues of Plato 113




I. el8o5 in Homer 122
II. - ElSr)5 in Homer 128
III. 81605 in Hesiod 137
IV. 81605 in Early Non-Epic Greek Poetry 140
V. 81605 in Herodotus 141
VI. 81605 in the Hippocratic Corpus 148
VII. £1,605 in Airs, Waters and Places 150
VIII. 81605 in Airs, Waters and Places XI 158
IX. 81605 in Epidemics I + III 161
X. 81605 111 Herodotus and the Hippocratic Corpus
- a Preliminary Summary 165
XI. 81605 in Empedocles 168
XII. 81605 in Thucydides 173
XIII. £1605 in Early Dialogues of Plato 187
XIV. Etymology and Semantics - Summary 202
IAEA 213
I. I6ea in Post-Homeric Poetry 213
II. I6ea in Fifth Century Greek Literature 217
III. I6ea in Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, Empedocles, Democritus 219
IV. 1&8CX in Herodotus 225
V. I6ea in the Hippocratic Corpus 231
VI. !6ea in Thucydides 236
VII. !6ecc in Aristophanes 242
VIII. !8e(X in Early Dialogues of Plato 244
IX. Summary 246
PART III
PHAEDO 100b - 105e 249
I. Context, Text, Translation 249
II. |I8T8X£IV and Anaxagoras 263
III. xoivoma and the Pythagoreans 268
IV. jcQoaayoQeuo^evr] versus JiQoayiyvo[X£vr| 272
V. Un-Socratic Concerns 273
VI. 81605 and the Pythagoreans 274
VII. 81605 and fXOQ(j)rj in Philolaus 279
VIII. 81605, [tOQ(j)fj and!8ea in Plato's Phaedo 287
IX. On the Ontology of Plato's Phaedo 288
X. el805 and I8ea in the Meno and the Euthyphro
- Discussion in the Early Academy 291
CONCLUSION 293
APPENDIX 1 On AncientMedicine and the Hippocratic Corpus 296
APPENDIX 2 On Laches 191 298
APPENDIX 3 On |TOQc)>fj at Phaedo 103eff. 299





What gave rise to this investigation are those well-known and much discussed pages of
Plato's Phaedo where Socrates - perhaps not for the first time, but certainly in a more
explicit form than in any other dialogue before the Symposium and the Republic -
explains to his friends how and in what ways, from a certain stage in his life onwards, he
thought he should view the world and look for the causes and reasons of why things are
as they are, Phaedo 100b - 105e. It is from there that a number of potentially
philosophically significant terms have been chosen for semantic investigation (Parts I and
II) and subsequent interpretation in the context of the Phaedo (Part III)
The passage as a whole poses difficulties, not so much to a proper comprehension of its
philosophical import and implications, as first and foremost to the understanding of the
text itself; and that not so much because of deficiencies of the transmitted text - though
there are textual uncertainties here as well; nor because of a lack of modem discussion -
for translations and commentaries abound; the difficulty is that there are no translations
of the Greek text available which seem to be sufficient to help understand what Plato's
text meant. That, it seems, is not so much due to inadequacies of translators: there is no
dearth of conventional renderings for each and every word of Plato or indeed any other
author of those times, as manifested not least in that invaluable achievement of
collaborative scholarship and - in its application - that epitome of imposing dogmatism,
the Greek-English Lexicon by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, revised and
augmented throughout by Sir Henry Stuart Jones with the assistance of Roderick
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McKenzie1. It is rather due to our lack of knowledge of Greek usage in the fifth and
fourth centuries B.C. in general.
This state of affairs is compounded by a general ignorance of our ignorance in those
matters. A recent comprehensive and thorough discussion of Plato's early and middle
dialogues expresses that much explicitly. Having discussed four apparently general
features of the Greek language, one of which is "participation as a metaphor for
properties and attributes", C. Kahn concludes: "These [four ways of speaking and
thinking] simply provide part of the pre-theoretical raw material out of which Plato will
construct his theory. And the same is true for the two terms for "form": eidos and idea,
which are well attested in early prose with the meanings "physical appearance," "bodily
form," "shape," "structure," "kind of thing." The pre-Platonic usage of these terms has
been fully studied, and there is no need to return to the subject here, (footnote: For a
survey of the literature on eidos and idea see Ross (1951) 13-16. Ross rightly remarks
that "What was original was not the use of the words, but the status he [Plato] assigned
to the things for which the words stood" (p. 14).)"2
This statement, which I regard as representative of current communis opinio, entails
that all we can know about usage concerning the terms mentioned, and all that is worth
knowing, has been available for forty-five years at least, and that no advance need or
indeed could be made by further study. We know what terms like Tldpeivai and
TrapaytYvecGai, pexs/siv and pexaXapPtiveiv, sl5o<; and 'i8sa meant before
Plato. All that is left to be done is to see what Plato applies them to.
My objection to this view is not in the first place of a theoretical but rather of a
practical nature. I share with Ross and Kahn the primitive and naive view that terms have
meanings, and that often words stand for things, and I will not attempt a justification of
this manner of speaking and thinking. What I am not convinced of is that the
connotations of those and a few other Greek terms recurring in Plato's early and middle
1 H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon. Revised and augmented throughout by H. S. Jones
with the assistance ofR. McKenzie, Oxford 91940; henceforth LSJ.
2 C.H. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue. The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form, Cambridge
1996, p. 334f. with footnote 6. His reference is to: W.D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford 1951.
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dialogues in contexts concerned with ontology, broadly speaking, are sufficiently
understood for a just appreciation of Plato's philosophy. That may have to do with a
different approach to how one can determine the meaning of words and phrases in texts.
II.
In principle, of course, the age of the text or the language it is written in does not make
a difference to how we go about that exercise of determining meaning. The only practical
difference may lie in the circumstances and conditions in which we learn the Classical
languages, namely in a way highly determined by tradition and without any direct means
of checking the validity of the nuances of the information provided. But as long as one is
aware of that, reading Homer and observing differences in usage to fifth and fourth
century Greek texts is, from the point of view of semantics, much the same as reading
Shakespeare and observing differences in usage to nineteenth and twentieth century
texts. Both activities presuppose a basic knowledge of the language of the authors
compared. In both cases one must be wary not to take a meaning attested only later as
the starting point of one's investigation, though given the sparse state of preservation of
Greek literature it is inherently more likely that a meaning or connotation perfectly
common at all times is attested in a late source only.
In both cases it may be helpful to take a word's etymology as one's starting point; that
does, of course, not imply that in the course of the history of a language a word may not
change its meaning beyond recognition by taking on new connotations and losing
inherited ones; nor does it imply that every or any speaker of a language is aware of the
etymology of a word he uses, nor even that he need be awake to the notion of etymology
as such; but leaving aside the question to what extent there was a theoretical awareness
in those matters, we will see examples of word play and folk etymologies bringing
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together words we would call etymologically related, and with those plays on words3
there are connections implied or explicit conclusions drawn which have a bearing on the
content of the text in question, a phenomenon that may be observed from Homer to
Plato and beyond just as much as with Shakespeare; employment in that way of two
terms rightly or wrongly connected by juxtaposition because of some sort of resemblance
may on occasion lead an author to use those terms with higher frequency, or with
additional connotations derived from such etymologizing, or in other ways semantically
altered; in that way etymology does have a role in any study of the usage of a text or an
author, regardless of the relative age of the period of writing.
Knowledge of etymology may also help avoid another danger, that of taking the
meaning of a term to be either what one is led to expect in a certain context from a
modern point of view or simply what accidentally seems to fit the context. An example
may illustrate that: "My DESK is my dearest possession; my life centres around my DESK.
Without my DESK I would be an unhappy man. Only when spent there, is time not
wasted. When I was given my first own DESK, that was like an initiation, it irreversibly
changed the course of my life which henceforth revolved around that precious object
alone." This passage could be elaborated and extended. One would read it as the story of
an industrious, laborious, studious man. One's perception of situation and character
would change were one to learn that the word rendered as or understood to mean DESK
really meant BED. In both cases the text is meaningful, coherent and consistent; that is to
say, the immediate context in itself is not sufficient to determine the meaning of an
individual word recurring in the text. External information is indispensable for a proper
understanding.4 Sometimes a knowledge of a word's etymological connections may be
the only external information available.
3 I use the terms 'word play', 'play on words' and 'pun', if not indiscriminately so at least not with any
implied judgement about the seriousness of a passage under discussion; pun does not imply an intended
joke.
4 It is a potentially serious shortcoming of J. Lyons, Structural Semantics. An Analysis of Part of the
Vocabulary of Plato, Oxford 1969, not to have taken this fully into account; cf. also D.B. Robinson's
review in CR XXI (1971).
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In the fictitious example the confusion of desk and bed relates to words for material,
corporeal objects.5 That type of confusion, however, is not restricted to such objects.
The same sort of inaccuracy may occur in contexts of a different kind: "Aeneas was a
cunning man. His cunning made him respected by other mortals and loved by the
gods. His eventual success can be seen as a reward for his cunning." Again, this
example could be drawn out indefinitely. Not only would the result be a story coherent
and consistent in itself, one could adduce the example of Odysseus as a parallel and
perhaps a model for this Aeneas. It is obvious that our whole evaluation of character and
plot would change with the knowledge that the adjective and noun rendered as or
understood to mean cunning really meant pious and piety.
Though these two examples are fictitious, the matter as such is not. An example from
Homer may serve to illustrate the point. Common belief had assigned to (piA.oc; a
meaning approximating that of the possessive pronoun, and generations of school
children learned it as such; and that despite the fact that there is not only no compelling
need to render the word as anything but 'dear' and 'friend', there is, as D.B. Robinson
has convincingly demonstrated,6 overwhelming evidence within and outside Homer for
that and only that latter meaning. The example of (pl^O^ is particularly instructive. What
prompted modem readers to assign a meaning of 'his' rather than 'dear' to the word was
not founded on any philological evidence: it was simply a reluctance and inability to
realize and acknowledge a way of thinking and speaking different from ours. Whatever
the origins of this manner of expressing oneself, the 'dear heart', 'dear head', 'dear
limbs' addressed or referred to by the Homeric heroes are dear to them and are perceived
as such; it is not only a different manner of speaking, it is a different view of the world,
underlying the text throughout. In order to understand that difference, one has to ask for
the reasons why one's limbs were not just 'one's own limbs' but in fact 'one's dear
limbs'. It is possible that for many terms the ancient texts we have do not provide a
5 i use the words material and corporeal in an unsophisticated way as referring to things existing in
space and time and having matter or body, without committing myself to any particular theory of matter
or physics at large, neither on my part nor on the part of a text discussed.
6 D.B. Robinson, Homeric tplA-OQ, in: E.M. Craik (ed.), Owls to Athens, Oxford 1990
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complete answer, perhaps not even a satisfying answer at all; it is also possible that
retranslating Homer consistently with 'dear' instead of 'his' etc. for cptX,0^ will in the
end make only a slight difference to our appreciation and to our interpretation of the
text. It is, however, conceivable that in some way, from a certain perspective, or for
certain, albeit restricted purposes the difference may prove decisive.
Two more practices of modern linguistics must briefly be considered. The first one is
somehow related to the issue of cplX-Oc; just discussed. The reluctance to call one's limbs
'dear limbs' is paralleled by a reluctance to accept, not only in theory but also in the
practice of translating, that in another language there may be a word for a notion or
concept7 of narrower or wider extension only than that of its nearest equivalents in the
language into which a text is translated, but no single word for a notion or concept of the
same extension; the fact itself is often enough stated, but too often without due
consideration of the necessary consequences for the translator: sometimes it will do to
use the word commonly employed for the wider notion, with the loss, perhaps, of some
connotations, but sometimes that loss of connotations will be too heavy a price, and one
will be forced to use the word usually employed for a concept narrower than the one
referred to in the language of the original text, even if that entails stretching the language
into which one translates beyond the commonly acceptable; a measure, of course, to be
reverted to only in the last resort; examples will be found in the chapters on sISoc; and
'l8sa below.
At this point, mention must be made of a certain cultural prejudice detrimental to
translation. Common examples of the above phenomena of wider and narrower concepts
are, among Hellenists, Kdloc;, among linguists in general, the 'eight words for snow in
some Eskimo language'; the Greeks, we learn, could not differentiate between nice, fine,
handsome and - even - good, because the word KaXo^ could mean all those things;
many confusions are created, we are told, in particular in philosophical arguments in
7 I use the words notion and concept here oblivious of any philosophical theories potentially attached to
them otherwise.
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Plato's dialogues, due to a lack of disambiguation which would have been necessary.
Against that, we hear: 'the Eskimos have eight words for snow'.
Instead, one could say: the English language does not have a word for KaA,6^, just as
the Eskimo language does not have a word for snow. Or else: The English language
cannot differentiate between different sorts of snow in the same way the Eskimo
language can.
At the root of that lies, perhaps, not only a natural focus on one's native language, but
also a sub-, semi- or fully conscious rejection of an idealizing classicistic view of Ancient
Greece and the Greeks to overcome which is the task of any decent, self-respecting
cultural theorist, a rejection paired with a residue of modern admiration for the noble
savage, but also, at the same time, with a certain mechanism of self-defence. The result
of that is that in the case of Greek, a shortcoming is noted on the part of the Greek
language which could not differentiate where English can, but in the case of the Eskimo
language, usually referred to as that, those 'primitive' people are praised while no blame
is incurred by the English language or its speakers. If idealizing classicism is to be
rejected, other cultural prejudices should be avoided on the same grounds.
There is another difficulty in determining the meaning of certain words which has to do
with the extension of notions or concepts in a different respect. The following exemplary
sentences may serve as an introduction: "Of all the things in this garden, it has always
been the old oak tree I cherished most. A chair and table are useful things to have.
Friendship is a fine thing when you have it. Justice is the one thing a state should aim
for." Some commentators and translators, when faced, in any language, with a number of
occurrences of one and the same lexical item in a number of apparently different contexts
react by making statements of the following sort: 'thing' has a number of meanings; in
the first sentence the meaning of 'thing' is 'natural physical object', in the second
'artefact'; in the third, the meaning of 'thing' is 'an emotion, state of mind, or
interpersonal relationship'; in the fourth it is 'a state of affairs obtaining in society as a
whole, potentially by prevailing bilaterally and multilaterally between its members'.
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This fictitious example is, admittedly, painted in stark colours; the principle, however,
of creating different, distinct meanings in that way can readily be observed.8 By contrast,
I would claim, and would not consider it an extravagant claim, that the meaning of
'thing' in all four sentences is the same, but that it is in the nature of so general a term, a
word referring to so general a notion as that referred to by 'thing', that such a word can
be employed as referring to things as different from each other in their ontological status
as a tree, a chair and table, friendship, or justice.9 Implications of that will become clear
in the discussions of the meaning of particular Greek terms below.
In what follows I am not concerned with the words DESK, BED, CUNNING, PIETY,
cpl^O^, Ka^Oc;, 'snow' or 'thing'. The above examples, however, should warn against
letting modern practice and modern prejudices influence our understanding of a word, a
sentence or a text. As with (plA,0^, so with any other word, there is a possibility that we
will not know its meaning at any given time in any given author before we have both
studied its application in context and traced its history as far as possible. The latter of
these two processes will on the whole take precedence. As with (pi^O^ and the other
words adduced above, on the other hand, the outcome must remain uncertain until the
result of the semantic investigations are applied to an interpretation of the texts from
which they took their departure. This application is, for the most part, outside the scope
of the present modest exercise which I see as establishing some preliminaries to Plato's
ontology.
8 For stSog cf. i.a. C. Ritter, Neue Untersuchungen iiber Platon, Miinchen 1910, e.g. p. 322, as
discussed by D. Ross, op. cit., p. 14f.; or K. Weidauer, Thukydides und die Hippokratischen Schriften,
Heidelberg 1954, passim.
9 A 'difference in ontological status' is not meant to say more here than that, e.g., the tree is a natural
corporeal object, the table an artificial one; the tree and the table referred to are corporeal, the friendship
and justice referred to are not. By using the word 'ontologicaf in this context I do not mean to commit
myself to any particular philosophical theory of the world or to any particular ontology.
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III.
Going back to the pronouncement by Kahn quoted in Section I:10 after briefly
discussing some alleged features of common Greek language, he states that they "do not
constitute a theory of Forms in any sense", but that they "simply provide part of the pre-
theoretical raw material out of which Plato will construct his theory. And the same is true
for the two terms for "form": eidos and idea, which are well attested in early prose with
the meanings "physical appearance," "bodily form," "shape," "structure," "kind of thing."
The pre-Platonic usage of these terms has been fully studied, and there is no need to
return to the subject here." Kahn's only point of reference are pp. 13-16 of Ross' Plato's
Theory of Ideas of 1951. Ross' discussion of pre-Platonic and early Platonic use of
e!5o<; and 'iSsa is indeed a good critical summary of the views expressed by Taylor,
Gillespie, Baldry and Ritter,11 combined with Ross' own views on those matters. He
holds, i.a., (p. 14) "that Socrates' inquiries as to 'what virtue is', 'what courage is', and
the like, led Plato to recognize the existence of universals as a distinct class of entity, and
that he took over as names for them the words slSot^ and 'l8sa, which in ordinary Greek
had already begun to be used in the sense of 'quality' or 'characteristic'. What was
original was not the use of the words, but the status he assigned to the things for which
the words stood." Then he summarizes Ritter's views and concludes that his overly
subtle distinctions are not tenable. Instead, he states (p. 15f.), "what we find is that Plato
not seldom uses both words in their original meaning 'visible form', that he uses both
words in various non-technical senses in which they had been used by earlier writers, and
that he uses both words in the two technical senses of 'Idea' and 'class'. While in the
dialogues from the Phaedo onwards, with the exception of the Parmenides, the meaning
'class' is the commonest meaning of sl8o^, it is only rarely that 'l5ea, is used in this
10 C.H. Kahn, op. cit., p. 334f.
11 A.E. Taylor, The Words sldog, iSL'Ct in Pre-Platonic Literature, in: id., Varia Socratica. First Series,
Oxford 1911, pp. 178 - 267; C.M. Gillespie, The Use of ElSog and I8£a in Hippocrates, in: CQ VI
(1912), pp. 179 - 203; H.C. Baldry, Plato's "Technical Terms", in: CQ XXXI (1937), pp. 141 - 150; C.
Ritter, loc. cit. et passim.
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sense. 'l8sa is the more vivid of the two words, and tends to be preferred in the more
highly coloured and imaginative passages. It may be added that Plato often uses oixria
and cptJOl^ as ways of referring to an Idea, and that he so uses yBVO^ in the Sophistes,
and evtic; and |l6va^ in the Philebus." On the following pages (18 - 21), Ross briefly
discusses Plato's use of ot)ola, abxo to and abzd ka9' dbzo in the dialogues he
believes to precede the Phaedo\ towards the end of the book, in his 'Retrospect', Ross
has a very useful list of a significantly larger number of Greek terms connected with the
'Theory of Ideas', together with a substantial, albeit selective table of their occurrences
in Plato's dialogues (pp. 228 - 230).
It may have been noted that when Kahn quotes Ross' preliminary conclusion - "What
was original was not the use of the words, but the status he assigned to the things for
which the words stood." - he forgets to state that Ross means that "sl5oc; and'lSsa (...)
in ordinary Greek had already begun to be used in the sense of 'quality' or
'characteristic'." Therefore Kahn's assertion about "the two terms for "form": eidos and
idea, which are well attested in early prose with the meanings "physical appearance,"
"bodily form," "shape," "structure," "kind of thing" ", must be treated with caution, since
the meanings he presupposes for the two terms do not include the ones assumed by
Ross12 whom he cites as evidence that the terms have been studied sufficiently.
A different but closely related issue is that Ross was not, and did not pretend to be,
exhaustive in his engagement with previous scholarly opinion. Contrariwise, his selection
serves only as a foil to his own views rather than constituting anything approaching
Forschungsgeschichte. Nor do I, for that matter, propose to fill that gap here. Instead, I
will leave discussion of significant passages or aspects of those works to footnotes where
and when appropriate.
12 As shown above, those are, of course, not the only meanings Ross believed etSoc; and l8sa to have
had.
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I will make an exception, though, for A.E. Taylor, The Words sldog, \8scl in Pre-
Platonic Literature, one in a collection of essays by the author, Varia Socratica, Oxford
1911, whose essay, though questioned as to the validity of its conclusions from the very
beginning, has had a lasting impact on Platonic scholarship. Taylor's effort is aptly
characterized in a review of his Varia Socratica by P. Shorey which appeared that same
year.13 In it, Shorey writes: "The central aim that unifies the volume is the attempt to
prove that much more of Platonism than is commonly supposed is Socratic, or may be
traced back even to the Pythagoreans and other pre-Socratics The valuable
concluding study on the words sl8o<^ and tSsct in pre-Platonic literature rests on a
complete collection, we are told, of every occurrence of the words down to Aristotle.
Here again the object is to show that the philosophic use of these words was familiar not
only to Socrates but to Pythagoras and the pre-Socratics Professor Taylor's
collections lay all students of Plato under obligation. But a sound "semantic" of the word
bI8o<; demands more discrimination than he has yet found time to bestow upon the
subject. His contention is that the philosophic meaning of the word goes back through
rhetoric and medicine to Pythagorean geometry. He holds that in Plato it is usually
synonymous with (pUGh^, and even thinks that it is worth while to raise the question
whether in Plato sl8o£ ever means "class" at all - a question which re-reading of the
Euthyphro and the Meno surely will answer, if it be borne in mind that Greek logic is
generally expressed in terms of intension rather than extension. What his examples
establish, I think, is simply that elSo^ in ordinary Greek normally means "form," or
"animal body," or "beauty," but that it might mean a little more abstractly and, in the
infancy of abstraction, somewhat vaguely "kind," "mode," "manner, "species." The
transition from "kind" to a particular kind, substance, element, or nature is no more
surprising than the shift in modem times from species to spice. Professor Taylor properly
emphasizes the significance of the Hippocratean corpus for the study of Greek
philosophy. But I think he makes too much of the anticipation of the terminology of the
13 In: Classical Philology VI (1911), pp. 361 - 365.
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doctrine of ideas in section 15 of the treatise Ttspi 6tp^0LlT|c^ 'iCtxpiKf)^.14 The phrase
abxd S(p SOODXOU is normal Greek idiom, as is the use of KOIVODV81V with the
dative. The use of st8o^ in the sense of element is, as we have seen, a perfectly natural
extension of meaning, and early Greek thought would not distinguish sharply an element
from an elementary quality. All of Plato's language is anticipated in this way by earlier
writers. He was too great an artist in style to coin a Kantian technical terminology. His
originality consists in the use of these and other expressions to denote the substantive
reality which he ascribed and was the first consciously and consistently to ascribe to all
concepts "
I agree with Shorey's characterisation of Taylor's study, and also with much of his
criticism. Taylor's investigation is guided throughout by the overall aim of his studies, to
present a Socratic Plato who inherited his thought from a Pythagorean Socrates.
Shorey's aim, however, is to prove the superiority of Plato over his predecessors (cf. the
remarks on p. 361 of his review) and the unity of Plato's thought. To Shorey's mind, that
thought consists not least of what he states in the last sentence quoted, "[Plato's]
originality consists in the use of these and other expressions to denote the substantive
reality which he ascribed and was the first consciously and consistently to ascribe to all
concepts" - a statement which reminds us that Shorey's own doctoral thesis was a
Munich dissertation of 1884.15
Apart from not agreeing with that last sentence of Shorey's, there is one point of
substance where I am inclined to differ: I would not dismiss out of hand Taylor's
suggestion "that it is worth while to raise the question whether in Plato s!8o<; ever
means "class" at all".
14 For the dating of that Hippocratic treatise see Appendix I below.
15 P. Shorey, De Platonis Idearum Doctrina atque Mentis Humanae Notionibus Commentatio, Miinchen
1884, reprinted with an English translation by R.S.W. Hawtrey, with a Preface by R. Kent Spprague, as:
A Dissertation on Plato's Theory ofForms and on the Concepts of the Human Mind, Pittsburgh 1982.
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IV.
There have been partial treatments of the topic since Taylor's influential essay, some of
them of excellent quality.16 However, Shorey's declaration that a sound 'semantic' of the
word etSoc; is still outstanding is still valid. Part II attempts to provide such as semantic
study of e!5o<; and iSea from Homer to Plato's early and middle dialogues; for the
purpose of this investigation, the Hippias Major will not be considered since its
authenticity is less than certain; to my knowledge this is the first enterprise of that scale
which makes a serious attempt to distinguish between slSot; and 'l8sa. Some repetition
is unavoidable, but the results justify the effort. Although it cannot be denied that there is
a great deal of semantic overlap between the two words in almost all their senses, 'l8sa
may on occasion mean what SlSoc; could not mean; and SlSoc; is employed in some
contexts in which 'l8sa was, to our knowledge, never employed. As will be
demonstrated in Part III, this may affect our reading of Plato in a fundamental way.
Part I, though of equal length as Part II, is in a sense subordinate, due to its subject
matter. Even casual inspection of the verbs selected as connected with Plato's
ontological thoughts will show that there was much less, if any, semantic development
there. For that reason, it was not necessary to translate every instance cited, as was the
case with et8o<; and \8sa. What is of interest regarding the verbs is mostly the context
in which they are employed. The contexts of rhetoric, medicine and philosophy can be
linked with passages in Plato's early dialogues in particular not through subject matter
alone, but in particular by way of comparing choice of expressions. That will become
decisive in the combined application of the collective results of the semantic
16
Notably C.M. Gillespie on The Use ofElSoc and IS£ct in Hippocrates, in: CQ VI (1912), pp. 179 -
203; H.C. Baldry, Plato's "Technical Terms", in: CQ XXXI (1937), pp. 141 - 150; and H. Diller, Zum
Gebrauch von slSof und iSfct in vorplatonischer Zeit, in: Medizingeschichte in unserer Zeit, ed. H.-H.
Euler et al., Stuttgart 1971, pp. 23 - 30. Cf. also G.F. Else, The Terminology of the Ideas, in: HSCP
(1938), pp. 17-51; and P. Brommer, EIAOEet IAEA. Etude semantique et chronologique, Assen
1940 - two works too much determined by preconceived views of what Plato meant and therefore of little
use for our purpose. The thorough study of C. Sandoz, La notion de la forme en Grec ancien, Fribourg
1972, provides a useful collection of material, but slightly lacks focus; Sandoz' interpretations are on
very traditional lines and too much determined by convention.
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investigations in Part III, where I hope to be able to demonstrate that, in the Phaedo,
Plato reacts at once to a number of different pre-Socratic schools of thought, the
Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras and Democritus; while the last may come as a surprise,
another result of the examination of lOOd - 105e is that Hippocratic medicine did not
actually have a role to play at all.
However, even if the results of the final application in Part III are not accepted as valid,
the semantic studies of Parts I and II may be of value in their own right; it is hoped, not
only as collections of material. el5o^ and 'iSsa are terms relevant not only to the
Phaedo within Plato's work, and not only to Plato within Greek philosophy. A
knowledge of their semantic development may be useful to the Aristotelian scholar, the





When in the first half of the dialogue bearing his name Parmenides criticizes Socrates'
notion of on the one hand certain entities which are there by themselves and on the other
hand objects which share in these entities and become in sharing what they share in, a
central point of his critique is the nature of this sharing17.
The Greek words here rendered by sharing are forms of the verbs |dSX8%8lV and
|J.SXaA.afJ.pdV8lV, the one denoting the state of sharing, the other the process of
coming to share.1* To some extent at least, Parmenides' (professed) difficulties are
connected with his (professed) understanding of these words and with the way Socrates
comments on this understanding. Parmenides appears to take the words to mean partake,
participate, a meaning which they may have in certain contexts; but unlike the Latin
parti-cipio, derived from Latin pars, 'part', neither |iexaA,a|J.pdvsiV nor JlSXe^SlV
are inherently or necessarily connected with Jispoc^, the common word for 'part'.19 Only
17 Parmenides 130e ff.
18 The discussion will focus on ]i£x6xsiv. pexaXapP&VSlV plays a subordinate role only; its usage is
always determined by that of JI8X8X81V. Whatever type of 'having' or 'sharing' is denoted by
psxfe^etV in a particular context, pexaXapPdvsiV in this context denotes a 'coming to have' or
'coming to share' with connotations identical to those of p8X8%8lV in the same context; in that, the
relation of |18x£%8lV to |18XdX.OtpPdVSlV is parallel to that of StVdl in its simple and prefixed forms
to the respective simple and prefixed forms of yVyveoSdl; examples of that will be provided below.
19 Since there are differing views on the semantics of pexfe^SlV, let me quote one which I consider
representative in many ways of the majority view; H. Meinhardt, Teilhabe bei Platon,
Freiburg/Miinchen 1968, p. 16f.: " "p8X8%8lV" selbst ist gegeniiber seinen Umschreibungen bereits im
weiteren Gebrauch (i.e. if not applied to 8l8lj / l58dt) abstrakt und fast ohne Bildgehalt. Es ist ein
Compositum aus "S^SIV - haben, halten" und praverbalem "pexd". Die Konstruktion mit partitivem
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if that were the case, would a question like the one of Parmenides be inevitable: oliKOUV
ryuoi 6A,Ol) TOD eiSou^ rj ... ; (13la5). Though this particular weakness
of Parmenides' criticism is well known, his view has frequently played a part in
interpretations not only of Plato's Parmenides, but also of such passages in the dialogues
of the so-called middle period as Phaedo 100b-10 le, Symposium 210e-211b, or
Republic V 476c-d. There as well, certain of the many things surrounding us are said to
be such-and-such as they share in what is such itself. To see if Parmenides' criticism is to
the point or, more generally, how this sharing in something could be understood, it may
be helpful to look at instances of the word JJ.ST£%81V in pre-Platonic literature and
passages in early dialogues which contain examples of sharing, where this sharing in
something is denoted by jlSTS/SlV. The way in which something is shared in there will
help to understand in what manner e.g. beautiful things can be said to share in the
beautiful itself.
II.
It does not make sense to discuss the semantics of JI8T8%81V without having
considered the semantics of 8%81V first, not least because, as is common with prefixed
Genitiv kennt schon das Simplex: etwa Sophokles, Oed. Rex 708f.: "... SOXi OOl (3p6x8lOV obSsv
paVTlKf|(; 8XOV x6xvfi? - es gibt nichts Sterbliches, das die Seherkunst besitzt." - "Jiex£xC0 ist
8X0) mit Partitiv ..., verdeutlicht durch pexa." (Eduard Schwyzer, Griechische Grammatik. 2. Bd.
Miinchen 1950, S. 103.) "Der Partitiv bezeichnet hier den allgemeinen Bereich der Teilnahme, wahrend
ein bestimmter Teil, den jemand erhalt, im Akkusativ steht." (Eduard Schwyzer a.a.O.) Das praverbale
(l8Xd bringt das Moment der Gemeinssamkeit (Vgl. Eduard Schwyzer a.a.O.S. 482.) ("mit,
zusammen") zum Ausdruck. - Beides wird fur den philosophischen Gebrauch wichtig: Alle
Partizipierenden "haben" gemeinsam das Partizipierte, aber "partitiv", einen Teil vom Ganzen, wobei
"Teil" hier natiirlich qualitativ (= in abgeschwachter Weise) und nicht quantitativ zu verstehen ist. -
Gleichbedeutend mit "Ji8x6x8iv" und "|i6x8^lQ" werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit die von der
lateinischen Ubersetzung "participatio" gebildeten Vokabeln "partizipieren" und "Partizipation"
verwandt, auBerdem die deutschen Ubersetzungen "teilhaben" und "Teilhabe"." - The German
equivalents employed by Meinhardt are loan-translations of the Latin words and have as one of their
elements the German for 'part'. 'Teil'. - Cf. also LSJ s.v. (18X8X0) "II. In Platonic Philos., participate in
a universal". E. des Places, Lexique de la langue philosophique et religieuse de Platon, Paris 1964, s.v.
jlSX^XStV " "participer" (a) a) en general; b) a une Idee."
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verbs20 in Greek, the derived word JISTS^SIV, as far as one can judge from the words it
can meaningfully connect, seems to have retained a closeness to the simple S/SIV. In
terms of etymology, 8%£IV goes back to an Indo-European root *segh-, also found in
German 'siegen', defeat; the original meaning of the root may have been something like
'hold down, subdue' and then 'hold (as a possession), have'; it may also go back, at the
same time, to a root *uegh-, meaning 'bear, carry, heave up, lift', preserved in English
'weigh'21, 'way', et al., German 'bewegen', move, 'Weg', Latin 'vehere', carry, convey,
both roots would have yielded an identical proto-Greek *hekh- and, with dissimilation of
aspirates according to Grassmann's Law, zy- ;22 the two roots could have been
collapsed into one all the easier because of the semantic overlap in 'holding down' and
'holding up'; much of that is, of course, speculation.
Already in the Iliad, zyziV can mean 'to have, hold, possess, keep' with reference to
both 'physical and material objects' and 'habits, states and conditions, bodily and
mental'. Partly due to its origin, its application is by no means restricted to the 'having'
of physical objects, things with spatio-temporal extension. Even if one were to posit an
original restriction to a particular class of objects23, it is questionable if that was still felt
even at the relatively early time of the composition of the Iliad. On the contrary, by
comparison it seems that the extension of the word £%SIV, the number and nature of
subjects and objects it can meaningfully connect, is larger than that of its English
counterpart 'have'.
20 I use the term 'prefixed verb' as the modern distinction between 'compound words', i.e. those
'consisting of two or more free morphemes', and 'complex words' , i.e. those 'containing one free and at
least one bound morpheme', does not apply to many prefixed Greek verbs whose first element otherwise
functions as a preposition. In many cases, for example, it is impossible to determine a distinction
between ttdpscxi Xivi and SOXl 7tapd XtVl; cf. Schwyzer II, p. 423. For JiSXd in general cf.
Schwyzer, II, pp. 481-487; for pre-verbal (i£Xa- in particular p. 482.
21 Cf. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, ed. C.T. Onions et al., Oxford 31944, Reset with Revised
Etymologies and Addenda 1973, s.vv. 'way', 'weigh'.
22 Cf. R. Plath, Hauchdissimilation im Mykenischen, in: MSS 48 1987, pp. 187-193.
23 Cf. H. Frisk, s.v. SX®'-
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The concept of syetv, as that of its English counterpart, is so general as just to signify
that there is a relation between two parties24, with the subject referring to the superior or
governing, the object to the inferior or governed party - superior and inferior only
through the emphasis given by the author of an utterance. As the notion of 'having' is at
once so general and so fundamental, it is very difficult to circumscribe or define it;
fortunately, it is not necessary to do so in this context. It is necessary, though, to draw
attention to the difficulties in which any attempted definition of the particular relation of
'having something' which is not a physical or material object would be involved - in the
case of such ordinary and every-day examples as 'having a skill'. The particular nature of
that 'having' seems to depend to a large extent on the nature of the respective object.
The difficulty of defining the verb, though, does not result in a difficulty in understanding
a well-formed sentence containing it, as long as the points of reference of the
grammatical subject and object are known.
III.
These preliminary observations about 8%81V were necessary as a basis of a discussion
of p.ST8%eiV. Before turning to Plato, some passages from authors earlier than and
contemporary with Plato will be considered, selected to illustrate the range of usage and
connotations, and therefore arranged thematically rather than chronologically.
The prologue of Euripides' Heraclidae is spoken by Heracles' long-standing friend and
companion, Iolaos. After a gnomic opening, he introduces himself as an actual example
of his general statement (6): syco yap a'i5oi Kai to ouyyeveg o&Pcov, | e^ov
24 Cf. A. Meillet, Le developpement du verbe "avoir", in: ANTIAQPON. Festschrift Jacob
Wackernagel, Gottingen 1924, pp. 9-13. C.D. Buck, A Dictionary ofSelected Synonyms in the Principal
Indo-European Languages, Chicago/London 1988 = Chicago 1949, pp. 739-749; particularly relevant
for the semantic connections and developments of E'/FAV and related words are ch. 11, sections 11
'HAVE', 12 'OWN, POSSESS', 15 'HOLD', 17 'KEEP, RETAIN'.
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kcit' "Apycx; f|oC>xco<; vaieiv, 7iovcov | kA-sIotcov psxeoxov etc; dvrjp
'
HpaKAsSl, I ox' fjv fJ.80' f||X(DV ... . One man, I had of many toils indeed with
Hercules. Or: I shared in very many toils for Heracles or for the sake of Hercules.
Iolaos 'had of many toils which are not specified. 'Toils' as such are not material
objects, even if they involve physical labour; the emphasis of Ttovoc; is on the process of
'working, exerting oneself. The subject refers to a single person; the one with or for
whom he worked is given in a dativus sociativus, not a dativus commodi. This sentence
of Euripides reflects the original situation. A parallel example is provided by Pindar.
After an enumeration of the vain deceitfulness of a dishonest person, Pindar contrasts
himself with that man and his practices (Pythian II, 83): OU Ol (ISTSyCO Bpdoeoc;- ....
Here it is seen more clearly than with the previous example that the dative is a
sociative.25
A variant to the dative - in terms of the history of the language later in origin - is psxd
with the genitive. An example is found in a Theognidean epigram. 'Poverty, why don't
you visit our neighbour?' (353): ... , pTjSe JJ.S0' rjflSCDV | diet 8l)OXf|VOl) XOUSe
Plot) JlSXe/S. Another example is found at Euthydemus 279e6. Socrates asks Clinias:
xl 8e; oxpaxeuopevoc; pexa Tioxepou av rjSiov xou kiv8i3vou ts Kai
if|<; tu/tk M-Sxsxoic;, pexa aocpou oxpaxriyoi) f| psxa dpaOoix;; - psxa
oocpou. - xi 8s; doBsvcov psxa rcoxspoi) av rjSscoc; kivSuvsdok;, psxa
oocpoi) iaxpou f) psxa dpaGouc;; - psxa oocpou. In this latter example, the
periphrastic construction is prompted by the participle OXpaXSUOJiSVOc; on which
fisxa TCOXSpOD could depend as well; it is, at any rate, less ambiguous than the bare
dative.
In most cases, however, the point of reference of the sociative dative or the genitive
with Jiexd, respectively, would be known from the context; that is why the complement
25 Cf. also Xenophon, Historia Graeca II, 4, 20 (pSXSXStV tepCOV Kal 0UOtCOV TlOt).
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can frequently be omitted altogether, as at Herodotus III, 80: SlSsxs pev yap xf|V
KapPuosco \3ppiv kn' ooov s7is^f|A,0s, psxsoxr|Kaxs 8s Kai xf|c; xou
payoi) l)PpiO(^. Here it is understood from the possessive genitive that it was the
Magus who 'had' the hubris the others experienced together with them. Or Herodotus I,
127: cbe; 8s oi MfjSoi oxpaxsuotipsvoi xoiai Ilspafloi oovspioyov, oi
psv xivsq abxcov bpa%ovxo, oooi pr^ xoo loyoo psxso%ov, o'l 8s
abxop6X,eov 7ipoq xoug Ilspoag, o'l 8s TtXsioxoi £0sX,OKaKsov xs Kal
scpsuyov. Even without a wider context, it is obvious that those who are in the secret
are contrasted with those who are not, or in other words, that those who do not have the
secret do not 'have it together with those who do'.
This may be compared with the beginning of the Euthydemus. Crito asks Socrates with
whom Socrates had a conversation the previous day; Socrates replies (271b6):
Et>0i38r|po<; oSxog soxiv, go Kplxcov, ov spcoxac;, 6 8s Trap' kps
KaO^psvoc; s£, &piaxspa<; &8sX,cpoq xouxod, Aiovi)oo8copo<;- psxsxst 8s
Kal OUXO£ XCOV ^oycov. The only difference between this last sentence and the one
of the previous example is that, in the case of Herodotus, A,6yo^ refers to the content of
the statement while, in the Euthydemus, Socrates refers to the conversation, the process
of talking in which both Socrates' neighbours took part while others were silent by¬
standers.
One final example of this application of psxsystv may suffice. Sappho 68, quoted by
Stobaeus (Florilegium IV, 12): 7ispi &(ppocn3vr|c;- Zarapoix;- 7ipd<; frrcalSsuxov
yuvaiKa- Kax0avoioa 8s Kslasai oi)8s xivi pvapooova os0sv | sctosx'
oi)8s7tox' <s'iq> uoxspov- oi) yap TisS&xeig Ppo8cov | xcov sk riisplac;,
iikTC &cpavr|<; kf|v 'A18a Sopoig | cpoixaosit; TtsS' frpaupcov vskucov
SK7tS7tOXapSVa. In this case, the OCOtppOVS^ who have those 'roses of Pieria' are by
way of contrast tacitly implied in the description of the one addressed who does not have
them.
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That last example is of particular importance in one respect. Although one would
naturally assume that Sappho's admonition is a sensible one in a context where there are
others who do gain fame, with a negative clause in particular one could imagine a
situation in which nobody actually does. If a situation of someone's having something
together with someone else is negated for an individual, there are the three possible cases
of a number of others' having the object, another single individual's having the object,
and no-one else's having the object. This can be extended to positive statements in the
following way: If someone has something together with someone else, 'someone else'
may refer to more than one person or just one person. The next step is to think of a
situation in which many people could have something together with others. For each
individual, one would say that once he has acquired something he 'has of it together
with those others who also have acquired it. To say that, however, does not presuppose
that anyone else actually has acquired it or 'has of it'. If the qualification 'together with
those who have acquired it' is left unexpressed as in the instances quoted, it would seem
a natural extension for the application of the verb (j,8t8%81v to be applied to cases of
only one person's actually 'having of something, if the nature and extent of that having
is left unspecified, and if potentially there could be others who also have of it.
There is a different common type of situation in which }x8ts%81v is employed to
denote the 'having of something together with someone else or, in fact, more frequently,
together with many others.26 Herodotus describes the land of the Massagetae whom
Cyrus wants to subdue after his conquest of Babylon. Having mentioned some
peculiarities of other Caucasian people, he continues (I, 204): xct |j.8v 5lj rcpdg
807ispr|v xf|g GaMooric; xai3xry; xfjg Kao7ur)<; icaA,eo|ievr|g 6
KaoKaoog drcspyei, xa 8e 7ipdg fj© xe Kal fj^iov dvaxeAAovxa
tcs81ov feKSsKsxai 7iXf|0og cmeipov eg cbioxinv. xoo c5v 8ij nsStoo
<xooxoi)> xof) peyaloi) ot>K eA,axicxr|v poipav pexexouoi o'l
26 Cf. Schwyzer, Griechische Grammatik II, p.482.
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Maaaayexai, stx'oOc; o Kupoc; ea%e 7Tpo0i)|jlr|v oxpaxeuaaoGai- ... .
Two different explanations of the syntax are conceivable. Either pOlpdV is taken to be
the direct object of fisxeyeiv, in the accusative because it refers to one concrete,
defined physical object; in that case the genitive would be ad-nominal. Or we have here
an extension of the construction of psxsysiv with genitive. By way of specification,
JlOlpdV is added in the accusative. They had of the plain: not the smallest part.
Although this latter way of construing the sentence may initially seem less plausible, it is
in fact impossible to know with absolute certainty which of the two is the correct
explanation, let alone to say how Herodotus himself would have taken the sentence.
The same difficulty obtains at Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 506f. The herald, the first of the
Greeks returning to Argos to announce the coming of his master, first greets his land: ot>
yap tcox' rju%oi)v xf}5' 'sv 'Apyela yQovi | Gavcov psGs^siv cpiAxaxou
Xticpoi) pspoc;. At his death he will have with <his compatriots> of the dearest burial,
his share. Or will he have his part of the dearest buriall The former may be preferable in
the light of Republic 465el where apparently the same sentiment is expressed: KOli
yepa S&xovxai Ttapa zf\q abxcov tio^scoc; i^&vzeq xs kai
xeXeuxf|oavxe<; xacpf|<; pexexouaiv.
In the case of physical objects or perceptible events concerning physical objects, it does
not matter greatly which way the syntax of these examples is construed. Given the
recession of the free-standing ad-verbal genitive, however, and the comparatively large
number of instances of it, it seems to me to be much rather the case that the accusative
objects pepcx; and jioipav are reinforcements of the older construction, in cases where
it seemed appropriate, than that the many other cases are instances of elliptical
construction. This usage could, of course, be extended to cases to which, in their own
right, it would perhaps not have suggested itself. An example of that may be Thucydides,
I 7327: Kai yap oxe sbpcopev, en cbcpeXia fcKivbuvsusxo, fjq xoi) psv
27 Modelled on that and therefore not to be counted separately is Isocrates, IV, 99: 7t(B£ 8' obK av
Seiva 7t&0oi|i£v, s't xcov kcikcov 7tkeiotov pbpoq psxaoxfivxeq sv xati; xipaig
25
spyoi) pspcx; psxeoxsTB, tod 8s loyou prj Txavxoc;, si it cbcpsX-si,
OTSplOKCOpsBa. If it is correct to take the clause fjg TOD psv spyou pspoq
pSISOXSTS as referring to part of the gain of the Athenian efforts which now the
Spartans and the other Greeks have together with the Athenians, jispoq does here at
least not solely refer to a physical part of a physical object.28
One peculiarity, though, is shared by all the examples of psisysiv (ispo^ tivoq,
namely that there is a flaw in the logic of the construction: if someone 'has of something
and someone else also 'has of it in the way we have encountered that usage so far, they
'have of it together; alternatively one may say: someone has something together with
someone else. If, however, someone has a part of something and someone else also has a
part of it, neither of them has his part together with the other party unless they both
happen to have the same part. That, though, is clearly not the case in Herodotus'
description of the habitat of the Massagetae. When he says that they have not the
smallest part of the plain, and uses flSTSXSlV to express that relation of possession, it is
implied that there are others who live in and possess other parts and not the same part of
the same plain. In the same way, I doubt if the herald in the Agamemnon thinks of
anything but his own burial in his native land, a burial he will have for himself, just as his
compatriots, both those who stayed behind and those who have now returned together
with him, will have their own burials respectively. Even with the last example,
Thucydides I, 73,1 believe it is correct to say that whereas the gain is 'had' by all Greeks
together with each other, each part of it is 'had' by each city on her own.
I do, of course, not suggest that Aeschylus, Herodotus and Thucydides did not know
how to use their own language. The logical difficulty, however, inherent in the notion of
having a part of something together with someone else who has not the same but a
sXazzov exetv d^toGsipsv Kal x6xs 7rpoxax0svx£<; busp d7tdvxcov vbv exbpott;
&KoXoi)0etv dvayKaaxetpsv;
28 Cf., however, how closely material possessions and what could be non-material rights are linked at
Herodotus, iv, 145:8£so0at 8s o'ik6eiv dpa xobxotot poTpd xe xtpscov psxexovxsc; Kal
xf)<; yf|c; (tnoXaxdvzsq.
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different part of the same thing suggests, I think, that the phrase psxeysiv Jispoc;
XlVO£ is in fact an in some way redundant extension of the original and logically flawless
one, jj.sts%siv Xivoc^. That in itself, as we have seen, is an extension of the simple
8%SIV XIVO^, originally for the purpose of making explicit that there are others who
'have of the same thing.
If not chronologically - that could not be established with any certainty - so at least in
terms of a hypothetical semantic development, there are three possible contexts with
jj.8X8/siv Xivoc; which have to be considered in connection with jiexe^slv pepoc;
Xivoq. In cases in which that which one 'has of something is not precisely specified,
there can nevertheless be some kind of adverbial complement, as in e.g. Xenophon,
Hiero, II, 6: xcdv peyioxcov dyaGcov s^d^ioxa pexexouoiv29. Here
sX&XICJXa is clearly adverbial, indicating some sort of degree - it is not precise, as it
would be difficult to measure and quantify the peyiGXa dyaOd precisely. Semi-
adverbial is also the usage in Xenophon, Cyropaedia, VII, 2, 28: p.SXSXSlV XO IOOV
XCDV dyaGcov XlVl. Of course, XO tOOV is not an adverb, but in its application it
amounts to functioning like something between adverb, numeral and demonstrative: to
have 'the equal' of the good <things> with someone.30 In a way, Xenophon's usage
comes close to that of Sophocles at Electra 1168. At the news of Orestes' death, Electra
addresses the urn in which she supposes the ashes of her brother:... XOiyap OD Ss^Ctl
p' 8<; xo oov x68e oxeyog, | xf^v pr|8ev k; xo pr|5ev, cbg ouv ooi
Kdxco | vatco xo A.oi7iov. Kal yap f|vlic' fjo0' avco, | £,uv Got pexeixov
xcov igcov- Kai vuv 7to0(D | xou gou 0avot>oa pr| d7to^ei7ieG0ai
xacpoo.31
29 Pace Kiihner-Gerth, p. 344, who class this example as a case of p£T8%GlV with the accusative.
30 A translation 'to have an equal / the same amount of good things as someone else', I suppose,
prompted LSJ to say - unjustifiedly - pSTSXStV TO tOOV (sc. pepO(^) TCOV dyaGtav TtVt.
31
Incidentally, this latter example shows that contrary to common belief lOOg is not restricted to
meaning 'equal' in a mathematical sense; rather like German 'gleich' which can translate lOOC where
English has 'equal', 'same' or 'identical' respectively.
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It is not a long way from jaST8%8tV TO ICOV TCOV &ya0(OV TlVl to Lysias
XXXI, 5 where he speaks of the true citizens: xofixoic; flSV yap Jisya^a Ta
Siacpepovxa eoxiv so xs 7ipaxxeiv xrjv tioAtv xrjv5e Kat dve7Uxr|§etco<;
5ia xo dvayKaiov ocploiv abxoiq r|yeio0ai elvai pexexsiv xo pepoq
T(DV 581VC0V, (D07t8p Kai TCOV dya0COV pexexoooi. Here TO pspoq, on their
part, can be seen as an addition to an already complete sentence in the same way TO
IOOV, to the same extent, is one in the previous example.
There are, finally, cases of pSTSystV with a direct accusative object. This usage is
confined to few, clearly specifiable situations. With all instances, the object is a precisely,
often quantitatively defined entity. An example is Aristophanes, Plutus, 1144: oi) yap
psxsixsc; zaq loaq 7tX,r|yd<; Sjio'l. The adjective !oo<; defines the object as
something which is known or has occurred already, in this case 'the same number of
strokes'. In the same way, adjectival ai)XO^ is employed by Demosthenes (Lexic. ad
Philemon, gramm. p. 253 Osann.): jiex&xovtsc; xrjv abxfjv 5o^av xoiq
AaxeSaijlOVtoic;. As with the simple 8XSIV, it is a concrete, specified instantiation of
something which - as direct object - is in the accusative. Additionally, one should note
that with the last two examples also those together with whom one has something are
explicitly given in the sentence.
There is a limit to all grammatical analysis, and all classification is to some extent
arbitrary when the objects under consideration are generated according to habit and
custom rather than created according to unchangeable natural laws. A case like
Herodotus VII 16, 3 may therefore be left undecided. There are, however, some clear
and unambiguous cases which prove that (J.SX8XSIV, like 8XSIV, governs the accusative
when the object referred to is something concrete, known and defined, or a particular
instantiation of something. More often it governs the genitive, for the same reason
8XSIV sometimes governs the genitive, when the object, or the relation between subject
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and object expressed by the verb, is in some way undefined or undefinable, lacking
specification, qualification or quantification.
This uncertainty or lack of precision is inherently linked with the notion of 'having
something together with someone else' as such. Other languages, like Latin, English or
German, start from the notion of 'cutting or dividing something up and distributing it
thereafter'. So 'participare' is 'to take a part', where 'pars' - like Greek pspoc; - is
originally that which is granted (and received as such), but in historical times simply
means part32. English 'share' is derived from a root *s-ker which denotes a cutting33.
German 'teilen' is a denominative of 'Teil'34, part, and in contemporary German the verb
can denote both dividing and sharing.
In all these languages, the word for 'share' can imply the 'having of a part' if the
grammatical object denotes something physical and material which can be divided. That
is the case regardless of the etymological origin of the respective verbs. Conversely, if
the grammatical object denotes something immaterial, the notion of divisibility often does
not arise or does not apply at all. Of the examples discussed so far, the following at least
do by their content not qualify for an interpretation in terms of parts and wholes.
Even if Pindar, Pythian II, 83 - 01) Ol p8X8%C0 GpdaSO^- ... , I do not share that
boldness with him, and Theognis' address to Poverty (353) - ... , pr|8e JO.80' f|jJ.8C0V
| diet 8l)OXr|VOD TOuSe Plot) pSXSyS, do not with us have always of this wretched
life - are left aside because the clauses are negative so that it is both indeterminable and
irrelevant if part or whole of the object is had, or rather not had, at Herodotus III, 80 -
£i8ex£ JJ.8V yap xr^v KapPdaeco dPpiv en' octov ene^r^Ge,
pexsOX^Kaxe 88 Kai xf(q XOU ptiyoi) dPpioq, you know to what it came with
Cambyses' hubris, and of the hubris of the Magi you have had yourself - no-one would
assume that Otanes addresses his audience p8X80yf)KdXS (with genitive) because of an
implication that they had (or had experienced) one part of the tyrants insolence, while
32 Cf. Walde-Hofmann II, s.v. pars. Frisk II, s.v. p£pOg.
33 Cf. Walde-Pokorny II, pp. 573ff. Walde-Hofmann I, s.v. caro.
34 'Teil' is equivalent to 'deal' in its old sense of 'part'. Its ultimate etymology is uncertain.
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there was another part they did not have or 'have of. And while it could be argued -
mistakenly, in my view - that Sophocles' Electra implies that while Orestes was alive he
had one part or portion of the same things and she had another (Electra 1168) - KOti
yap f]viK fjo0' avco, | ^dv ool pexeixov tgdv locov- Kal vdv 7io0a> |
TOD OOD 0avODOa pi^ &.7loX,el7l8O0ai xacpOD - it is inconceivable to advance an
argument of that sort for Herodotus I, 127 -... , 01 JJ.8v tivs^ atiXODV fepti/ovto,
oooi pr^ tod ^oyoD psxsoxov, ... , oi 5e nXeiaxoi 808A.ok(xkb6v xe
Kal 8(p8Dyov; those who were 'in the secret' had not heard part of the words or part
of the speech or story, they knew the full story.
IV.
Turning to Plato's dialogues, a suitable passage to begin with may be the myth of
Protagoras, together with its exegesis (Protagoras 320c-328d), as there we find a large
number of instances of both sysiV and psxeysiV, concentrated in one continuous,
closely argued context. I will discuss instances both of the pre-fixed and of the simple
verb in order to demonstrate in detail the validity for Plato's dialogues of claims made
concerning pre-Platonic usage. Some repetition is inevitable. The dialogue Protagoras is
generally considered early, being composed before or shortly after the Gorgias, at a time
when Plato, whatever his thoughts might have been, did not let Socrates hypothesize
about certain entities of independent status. Before we turn to the discussion of the myth,
let me give a brief summary of the part of the dialogue preceding the myth.
In the discussion between Hippocrates and Socrates on their way to the sophist
Protagoras who is on a visit in Athens, Socrates points to the dangers of laying oneself
open to a learning of something about which one does not know what it is or what it is
going to be from someone, a sophist, of whom one does not even know what he is when
he is a sophist (3lie ff.). When they arrive and Socrates states their case, Protagoras
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presents himself eloquently (316c-317d), stating explicitly that he is a sophist, and has
been one for many years (6jJ.oX.oyco xs oocpiaxr|<; eivai Kai TiaiSeoetV
dvOpocmoix; 317b. 7ioX,A,a ye exr| 13813 e'ijj.1 sv xfj xs^vp 317c35). Everything
is arranged for a public display as Protagoras has declared his willingness to show how it
is good for Hippocrates to be together with him (316c). Socrates' more specific question
is what would come of Hippocrates' being together with Protagoras (oxl o6v ai)xcp
&7iopf|0£xai 8&v 001 ouvfl 318a). Soon he gets the answer xo 58 jlti0r||J.(X
soxiv et>Poi)>da Tiepl xa>v o'nceloov, O7ico<; av apioxa xrjv aoxou
oiKiav Sioikoi, Kai 7tepl xoov zr\q noXecoq, oncDq zd xf\q noXeaiq
8l)Vaxc6xaxoq av eirj Kai TtpaxxeiV Kai A,eyeiv (318ef.). To which Socrates'
immediate reply is: dpa ... 87topal ooi) xcd X,oycp; 5oksi<; yap poi X,eyeiv
xfjv 7toA.ixiKf^v xs/vrjv Kai i)7iooxveia0ai noieiv avSpaq hyaQovq
noXizaq (319a). Protagoras agrees to this terminologically specific fixation of his
object of teaching as a specific xs/vt], and Socrates proceeds to explain that and why he
does not think that one can teach what Protagoras claims to be able to teach. He
describes what Protagoras promises to convey as a xs/vr|jj.a to be possessed by
acquisition (kskxt|aai 319a). His reasoning is by analogy: First, about everything that
has to do with a specific profession, art or craft (7l8pl JJ.SV o5v (8v OlOVXai SV
xsyvi) sivai 319c36), only specialists are consulted, while in political matters all are on
a par (kixeiSav Se xi Tispi xd)v xrjq 7i6X,8coc; SioiKifaeox; 8813
Poi)X.ei5oao0ai, oi)jj.poi)A,ei3si at>xoi<; dvioxapevoq Tiepl xouxoov (rcac;)
opolco^ 319c,d) without there being teachers37. Secondly, also in private, the wisest
and best are not able to convey and transfer that (xpexf| which they have (dXXd 'l81a
f|jj/iv o'l aocpcoxaxoi Kai apioxoi xoov koXixcuv xauxriv zf\v dpsxr^v
f|v s%oi)oi ot>x otol xe aXAop; napaSiSovai 3l9e).
35 Note the usage: sivai SV TS/vp Xtvi. That it is the OOCpiOXlKl) XSXVT| will be stated in 317d.
36 This is picking up the phrase used by Protagoras in 317b.
37 For the connection between teachability, teachers, professions and hpsxij/hpsxai cf. Meno, passim;
esp. 89d ff.
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Socrates' speech allowed him in this way to shift from the X£XVT||J.a which one
possesses when one is 'in a profession' (eyed yap XOUXO, c5 Flpoxayopa, ot)K
cppr|v 8i8aKx6v elvai 3l9a,b) to the term &pexr| (e'l 06v sxsig
evapyeoxepov feTiiSsi^ai cog SiSaKxov saxiv f) dpex^, ... 320b,c).
These seem to be the premises of both content and language for the telling of the myth
by Protagoras. Protagoras spoke of his own accord of his OOCptOXlKT^ TZyyv\,
Socrates introduced the term TtoXlXlKT^ XSXVT]. Protagoras has distinguished between
his own activity and that which he conveys to those who do not want to become sophists
themselves (cf. 'Avxlpoipoc; 6 Mev8aio<;, ooTisp ebSoxipsi pa>aoxa xgdv
npoxayopou paGrixcav Kal kTit x&xvu pavGavei, cbc; aocploxriq
soojisvcx^ 315a; cf. also 318e f. supra). Socrates identifies this |j.dGr||j.a Protagoras
claims to teach, the euPouAAa, not Protagoras' own xe^vr), with tioXaxikt^ X8XVT|.
By his phrasing Kal U7ioaxvstoQal ttoisiv avSpag dyaGoix; 7to?dxa<; (319a)
and dpiOXOl XCOV TIO^IXCOV (319e), he can move from XSXVT) to dpsxr^, the noun
connected with dyaGoc; and cognate to dplOXO^. This shift is done in a way which at
least does not provoke any explicit reaction in the dialogue, so that it might be safe to
say that for those present and actively taking part in the discussion this usage sounds
natural. The implications of a potential distinction are at least at this stage of
interpretation not relevant. It must be born in mind, however, that Socrates had
previously in discussion with Hippocrates reached the conclusion (212a,b) that the
education, |I(iGr|Ol^, one could expect to receive from Protagoras would be STll
TtaiSsla, cbg xov 'iSicoxr|v Kai xov s^euGepov Tipsrcei. That, of course, was
contrasted with those teaching and thereby conveying their own profession; nevertheless,
TtaiSela as a broad concept of the training of body and mind does not suggest any
particular X&xvr), not even the TToAdXlKT^ XSXVT], so that the statement about
Protagoras' teaching of that art in 219, even if agreed upon by all present, must be held
against Socrates' initial position in 212.
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The scene being set, Protagoras' myth can now be examined. It is to be noted that
Protagoras had given his audience a choice before his decision to tell a (itjOoc; rather
than a Xoyoc; (320c). In every respect, this alternative choice seems to have affected the
manner of presentation, not the content: the causation and the agents in Protagoras' tale
do not belong to a rational account of how things have come about; Protagoras'
interspersed comments and language, however, could - apart from an occasional poetical
word - equally well belong to an exposition like the Xoyoc, with which he concludes his
speech. At least from 322a3 onwards, it would be difficult to say which words if any
have been chosen because the audience is still hearing a jiC)0O^. Even btKl) and a'lSco^
are not mere mythical or poetical words. Of course, in Hesiodic fashion they suit the
context as goddesses sent and conducted by gods (cf. Op. 197ff.; 248-272); but whether
Hesiod is regarded as writer of myth or philosophy, the two words belong to the regular
vocabulary of Presocratic philosophy38 and are not confined to the sphere of poetry. On
the other hand, 8lK(X.lOGUVr| and ococppoouvrj are used by Protagoras (323a) before
he switches to the mode of Xoyoc,, and in his reply to Protagoras, Socrates can say
s^eyeq yap oxi 6 Zeug xr^v 8iKaioo\3vr|v Kai xr^v a'i8do Ttspyeie xoiq
&v0pamoi<;, Kai au noXXaxov ev xoig A,oyoig elsyexo (mo ooi) f)
SiKaioouvri Kai ooocppooovri Kai doioxriq Kai Tiavxa xauxa cbq sv xi
sir| aoMf|P5r|v, &pexf| (329c), thus having the two, a'i5oc><; and ococppoouvr|,
side by side as synonymous. Similarly, the distribution of OOtpia, (xpsxf| and XSyVT] is
determined by factors of content, not style of the exposition.
To turn to the myth itself: Epimetheus equips all the animals with attributes and abilities
necessary for survival, but through his lack of prudence leaves men unequipped. To
make up for that omission, Prometheus steals a certain wisdom, skill, or knowledge of
Hephaestus and Athena that concerns arts, crafts or skills, together with fire (KA.S7CXSI
'
Hcpaioxou Kai 'A0r|vaq xr\v evxe^vov oocplav oi)v TiDpl 32id) and gives
38 Cf. Diels-Kranz III, Wortregister, s.vv. dtSwq, 8iKr(. It is a different question if Ct'lStOC; and 8'lKT|
are otherwise mere equivalents of 8lKatOo6vr) and OGKppOCSUVq.
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it to man. So man had the wisdom, skill, or knowledge about life, but the political or
social or communal ocxpta or xe^vr) he had not (xrjv jxev ot)V Tiepl XOV ptov
oocpiav avGpamoc; xauxr] eo%ev, xrjv 8e 7io?axiKTjv otnc efyev 32id).
Perhaps in imitation of features of certain archaic myths, the decisive deed is told for a
second time only a few lines later, this time, however phrased differently: (Prometheus,)
stealing the art, craft, or skill that concerns fire which was Hephaestus', and the other
one which was Athena's, gave them to man (KCll K^8\J/a^ XT|V X8 eflTXUpov
X8xvr|v xrjv xou ' Hcpaioxoi) Kat xrjv aXX,r|v xfjv xf|g 'A0r|vd<;
8t8cooiv dvGpamcp 32le).
At this point, Plato lets Protagoras summarize: 6 dvGpCDTCO^ Gsta^ psxeo^S
potpag (322a), man shared the divine lot, portion, share or condition.39 Why does
Protagoras say Gelac; pexeoxe poipa^ rather than Gelav eo^s polpav? Up to
now, when someone was in possession of a X8%Vf| or OOCpiO. (319e, 32Id), 8%81V
with accusative seemed to be the appropriate way of describing the situation. What
difference is there, in the Protagoras, between S)(SIV with accusative and flSXe^SlV
with genitive? - It will again be helpful to see what sort or sorts of objects the verb
8%81V can govern, both in the Protagoras and in other early dialogues.
39 For present purposes it is not important to scrutinize the concept of poTpCl; it is clear from the
context that it has here to do with the OOtpia mentioned twice in the preceding paragraph; this OOCpla
seems to be equivalent to or at least to imply the twin xb^va. Cf. e.g. W. Wayte, Platonis Protagoras,
Cambridge 41883, p. 106. For the sentiment cf. perhaps Pindar, Nemean VI, 1-8
A' sv dvSpcov, sv 0scov ybvoq- ek piat; Se 7tv6opsv
paxpo<; apcpdxspoi- Sieipyei Ss tooa KSKpipbva
8uvapi<;, xo psv oi)86v, 6 8s x^KSoq hapaXeq aisv edoq
pbvsi obpavdg. u/Ad xi Ttpootpspopsv sp7rav f| pbyav
5 v6ov fjxoi cpuoiv dGavdxoic;,
Ka'i7tEp scpapspiav obK e'i86xs<; obSs psxa vuKxaq
dpps Tcdxpoq
avxiv' sypavys 8papsTv rcoxl axdBpav.
(Protagoras 320c,d 0EOl |i£V f)OaV, 0VTlxd 8s ysvr| Ot)K fjv.
32lcXoi7tov ... fjv xo dv0pc67ccov ykvoq.
32lc eSei Kal av0pco7iov fe^isvai sk yfiq s'lq (pd><;.)
The divine lot consists of a share in OOtpia or VOD<^.
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On the first page of the dialogue, Socrates reports that Homer says (309b 1)
Xapisoxaxr|v fjpriv etvai xoo <7ipd>xov> i):tr|vf|xoi), and he adds: r\v vuv
'AA,KlPlti5r|<; 8X81. It is important in this context that the direct object does not
consist of a noun on its own but of a noun with some qualification. The qualification in
the Greek example becomes more obvious if we separate the two clauses: f| XOl)
<7ipcoxov> b7tr|vfixoi) f|pri xapl8°T(*xr| soxiv. xauxr|v xfjv f|Pr(v
'AA,KlPld8r|c; vov SX81- The relative pronoun in the clause f]V VOV A^KlpldSrjc;
8%8l has as its antecedent something more complicated than the simple unqualified noun
TiPrj. Nevertheless, rjPr| is one of the potential direct objects of the verb 8X81V.
Ten pages further on in the dialogue, Socrates tries to explain to Protagoras why he
does not think that &psxf| is SlSctKXOV, teachable or taught. One of his reasons is that
(319el) \8ig fjpiv o'l oocpo&xaxoi Kal apioxoi xcov tioXixgdv xauxrjv
xrjv dpsxrjv f|v exouoiv obx otoi xs a?Aoi<; 7tapa8i8ovai. dpsxf) thus
seems to be another possible word to go with SXSIV in the required construction. Again,
however, it is not simply dpsxrjv but XafxtjV xf|V dpSXtjv which is the antecedent
to the relative pronoun.
The very next sentence is an example of a different but equally possible construction
(319e): b7tei IlepiK^fi<;, o xouxcovi xd>v veavloKCOV nazr\p, xouxoug a
(isv 8i8aoKa>uCOV sixexo KaA,(D(; Kai su ertaiSeuosv, a 8e abxoq ootpoq
soxiv ouxe abzoq TiaiSeuei ouxe xcp aXXco TiapaSiScooiv, .... The relative
pronoun a is probably short for xauxa a where the demonstrative is in the accusative
as the thing taught. As the demonstrative has no antecedent but is qualified by the
relative clause only, the disciplines for which there were the teachers mentioned in the
relative clause are not specified. That is to say, the teachers themselves cannot be named
or described with any further precision. They cannot be specified with regard to either
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number or subject, quantity or quality. That may explain why when they become a direct
object of an active transitive verb they are in the genitive, not in the accusative. Pericles
educated his sons in those <disciplines> which had 'of' teachers. This seems to me to
be a more plausible explanation than that offered by some who postulate an additional,
separate meaning of the verb S/SIV in the face of constructions like the present one;
they translate: "in all that depended upon teachers" and adduce Protagoras 324d and
Meno 93d and 94ab for "both the idiom and the fact"40. In contrast, I maintain that the
genitive is employed solely because of the different nature of the object as it is viewed in
the sentence, its indefiniteness. Sense and meaning of the verb are not affected. For the
purpose of deciding what sort of object the verb S^eiv can have, teachers 'had by a
discipline' fall under a different category from what has gone before as the grammatical
subject here is inanimate.
The next instance of the verb is encountered at the beginning of Protagoras' myth. The
case is slightly different from the previous instances of S^SIV with the accusative.
Protagoras describes how Epimetheus distributes different powers or abilities to different
animals. He then gives the reasoning behind that distribution (321a2): xauxa 8e
8|j.r|xav(xxo eu^aPeiav ex©v jifj xi yevoc; &'ioxcG0eir|. Here the final clause
|J,f| XI ySVOC; tfioxco0slr| is dependent, I think, not on the predicate SJJT|%avaxo
but on the participial phrase siAaPetdV e%CGV, or more restrictedly on the verbal noun
si)X,apsiaV. Thus it modifies that noun. Epimetheus had or took the particular care that
no class <of animals> would be extinguished; i.e. it is again not siAdPsict by itself,
but 'a particular si)X.aPsia'.
A little further down on that same page, Prometheus comes by and sees (32lc4): XCt
jj.8V akXa C,(ba sjipeXcot; Ttavxcov s/ovxa, xov Se &v0pamov yujxvov
... . Some translators and commentators41 state that the phrase SJJ.f!eA.CO(^ 7td.VXCQV
40
Wayte, op. cit., ad loc.; J. Adam, A.M. Adam, Platonis Protagoras, Cambridge 1893, ad loc.
41
E.g. Wayte, Adam, opp. citt., ad loc.
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e/ovxa is to be construed as parallel to e.g. iKavdx; xou Pa0oix; e%ovxa in
Theaetetus 194d2; the two phrases, it is maintained, are to be rendered as "suitably
provided with (literally situated in respect of) all things"42 and "being adequate in
respect of their depth"43. Taken that way, the genitive TtdVTCOV would ultimately
depend on the adverb in the same way that XOO P&0Ol)£ is supposed to
depend on 'iKavcoc;. I doubt that that be so. IKavot; governs an infinitive or an
accusative or a dative or one of a number of prepositional phrases, but not the genitive.
The phrase IKaVtt)^ 8%81V, to be sufficient, can be used absolutely, as at Sophist
245e7 'iKavcoc; 85(8X00, or with a complement as at Republic 430c6 7ipd<; OUV Xtjv
feKSivou £f)Tr)aiv, cbg kycSpai, 'iKavcoq e^ei, Republic 402a7... ypajipaxcov
7tspi TOTS IKavcoc; 81XOJJ.8V ... , or Gorgias 493c5 dvxt XOU dK^fjOXCO^ Kal
dKoX,aoxcoq exovxoc; plot) xov Koapicoq Kat xoiq dsi 7iapof)civ
'iKavdx; Kat &;apKOi3vxco<; e/ovxa ptov eA,eo0ai. If there is a complement, it
is in a form found with the adjective otherwise as well. That the case with Theaetetus
194d2 is a different one may be seen if we adduce Philebus 62a6 dp' o5v ObXOC;
'iKavtdc; 87iiaxf|ja.r|c; s^si, ki3kX,od pev Kal ocpatpag abzr\q xf|g 0eta<;
xov A,oyov e^cov, ... ;
Here fe7llOXf|p.r|<; S^Sl seems to be parallel to XOV X,oyov 8%C0V. The rational
explanation or account is the specific account of <the> circle <itself> and the sphere
itself, the divine one. As something definite, it is in the accusative if and when it is the
direct object of an active transitive verb. The genitive 87UGxf||J.1j£, I suspect, is likewise
dependent on the verb and not on the adverb. The difference in grammatical case is to be
explained by the different nature of the object. Socrates' question is: Does he have
enough (of) knowledge44 who has an account of <the> circle <itself> and the sphere
42
Wayte, loc. cit.
43 Cf. L. Campbell, The Sophist and Politicus ofPlato, Oxford 1867, commentary on Sophist 245e7.
44 Here and elsewhere one must not be misled by the English way to construe enough with the
preposition of which points to an old Germanic genitive.
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itself, the divine one, ...? Here knowledge is not any particular piece of knowledge in the
way the account in the participial phrase is a particular account.
An example of a particular S7XlCXflpr| someone 'has' is Charmides 169de. After an
aporetic attempt to solve the question if there is something like 87llOXTjpr|
S7UOTfl|iri<;, Socrates, "in order that the argument may proceed", proposes - in an act
of hypothesis - to assume that there is such a thing, and asks Critias if on that assumption
one would be able to know what one does and what one does not know. To that, Critias
replies (Charmides 169d9): 7ltivi) ye ... Kai CJUpPalvei ye 7X01), C§ ZcOKptixr|.
e't yap xiq e/ei 87xioxr|pr|v f\ abxrj abxrjv yiyvcooKst, xoiooxoq av
ai)xo^ sir) otoVTiep soxlv o S^Sl. The object fetxiox'fjpriV is qualified by the
relative clause fj abxtj abxi^V yiyvCDOKSl. It is this specific knowledge which
knows itself itself which enables the one who has it to be himself such as to know
himself45. The case is similar to Charmides 170b6: oi)KOUV 8(XV ptj
TxpooeTctoxrjxai ziq xo byieivov Kal xo Sixaiov, tiXX ' 87iioxr|pr|v
povov yiyvcooKtj axs xobxou povov sxcov b7iioxrjpr|v, oxi pev xi
feTxloxaxai Kal oxi 87xioxf|pr|v xiva e^si, s'ikoxcoc; av yiyvcoaxoi Kal
Tispl abxob Kal 7X8pl xcbv aAAcov yap; Here 87iioxr|pr|v as object of
8%81V is in the first case qualified by the demonstrative in the genitive, in the second by
the indefinite pronoun.
In clear contrast with these cases, Socrates refers to knowledge in general, knowledge
without any specification as to its quality or form, at Philebus 62a6: ap' ObV OUXO£
'iKavcog S7XlOXf|pr|<; 8^81, will he sufficiently have of knowledge, is his question.
Likewise the signs at Theaetetus 194dl have of depth sufficiently, i.e. they are deep
45 The clauses following can only partly be analysed in the same way: perhaps one could say that in
OOCTTP.p oxav xdxoq Xlg £Xtl> xaxu^, the noun xdxog denotes not any speed but high speed; the
rest of the sentence, however, Kal oxav Kakkoq, KaXdq, Kal oxav yvcoatv, yiyvCDGKWV,
oxav 8s 8tj yvcooiv abxijv abxijc; xic; sxfi, ytyvcooKcov rcou abxog sauxov x6xs
SOXat, is deliberately construed in syntactical parallelism to make a particular point. Therefore it cannot
be taken to prove anything for the grammar of the common language.
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enough. One could perhaps say, in cases where the grammatical object refers to
something in the abstract it is in the genitive, where it denotes a concrete object it is in
the accusative. Or perhaps: if and when the point of reference of the grammatical object
is a particular instantiation of something, be it a certain age, virtue, skill, or anything else,
it is in the accusative; if and when something is referred to in general, either without
qualification at all or without the notion of a particular instantiation, it can be in the
genitive46.
In the passage in question, Protagoras 321c4, id JJ.8V QLkXCL C,(pa 8|ip.sXcc>^
7iavicov s/ovia, tov 8s av0pa>7iov yujivov ... , the substantival collective
pronoun is both abstract and indefinite; thus as an object it would be expected to be in
the genitive, TttiVTCOV, not in the accusative, Tldvia; the animals 'had of everything' in
a harmonious way, but man was naked. On the level of content, physical attributes,
abilities, and features of behaviour are to be added to the list of things 'which can be
had'.
A few lines later, Protagoras says (321d4): TTjv |48V o6v 7l8pt TOV piov
ootplav av0pco7roq TauTfl eo/ev, irjv 5e 7ioX,niKfjv oi)K el/ev. Again,
oocpla as direct object of 85(81V is qualified as Ttepl TOV (3tov in the first clause, and
as TCO?tlTlKfj in the second47.
46 Cf. also e.g. Philebus 16c2; Aeschylus, Eumenides, 574f., on which see below. A slightly different
interpretation of the presence of the genitive may be required in the case of Lysis 217b4: to pf)te
kcxkov dpa pijx' dyaGov tpiXov ylyvexai too dyaGob 8ta kcckou 7tapoixriav. -
soiksv. - 8fj^ov 8s ys oxt 7xpiv ysvdoGat abxo kcikov bud too kcikou on sxst. Here
it is a particular KOlKdv which is envisaged, what is uncertain or unspecified is the way in which, and
in particular the extent to which it is 'had'; alternatively, or in addition, there may be a simple attraction
of case here.
47 Such a case could be Protagoras 321d4, Tfjv 8s 7toXlXlKljv obK sfysv. It is questionable if a
specifying adjective in itself is enough to determine a generic noun in the required sense. At any rate, in
this negative clause there is no notion of any particular instantiation. Through the first clause, however,
TTjv psv OUV 7iSpl XOV P'lov OOCp'lCtV dvGpC07ro<; xabxjj soysv, there is some pressure
towards a parallel construction in the second clause which could on its own have been strong enough to
prompt the use of the accusative rather than the genitive. - Perhaps, even the accusative TT)V 7tspl XOV
Piov OOCpiav at 321d4 has to be explained simply in terms of the recession of the genitive, but I would
not want to commit myself too strongly here. Cf. also 322b5 - 7.
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Two sentences later, Protagoras summarizes the first part of his myth with the words
quoted above, 6 dvGpCDTioq Gsiaq jiST8GX£ jiotpac; (322a). Here the adjective
Getoc; is possessive, Geia jioipa is jioipa xcov Gbcdv48 , the lot of the gods some of
whom were mentioned in the myth. In that sense, jioipa is not defined or modified by
the adjective as to its content. Moreover, it is not any particular instantiation, no-one's
particular fate which is referred to, as 6 dvGpcono^ is no particular man. Both that
Geia jioipa is not marked as to its quality or quantity and that no particular instance is
referred to in the sentence, are reasons for the object's being in the genitive. In that way,
one can explain the case of the object. It is not determined by the verb alone, and it does
certainly not depend on the presence or absence of a prefix of the verb, but is rather a
consequence of the nature of the object referred to, its relation to the subject, and the
angle from which this relation is viewed.
The difference between e^SlV and fiexe%stv, however, is as yet not accounted for. It
is, I believe, a simple and straightforward one. In all the cases quoted above of 8%siv as
predicate with the grammatical subject referring to an animate being, a human being or
group of human beings - apart from 321d4 where animals are contrasted with human
beings as having something the latter do not have - the point of reference of the subject
was looked at in isolation. 'Alcibiades', 'the wisest and best citizens', 'Epimetheus', 'the
animals', 'man' at 321d4: they are all seen as individuals or groups in isolation, having
something for themselves or having something someone else does not have. At 322a, in
contrast, 'man', i.e. all human beings, has something the gods also have, he has
something 'together with' someone else. This 'having together with' someone else is
expressed in Greek with the prefixed verb jl8X8X8lV. This is confirmed by the
subsequent instances of the word in the text.
48
Perhaps, however, Geia poipa is a standing phrase (cf. various places), and therefore the two words
are to be considered as one single term and no longer as two separate words. Then it would be
unqualifiedly true to say that at 322a the object is not qualified in any way.
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Because, recounts Protagoras, men did not yet have social skills - 7ioX,lXlKT^V yap
TS%VT|V OUT!CO etxov (322b5) - they were neither able to wage war against the
animals nor to live together without doing each other wrong. Zeus fears for the
extinction of the race and sends Hermes to bring a't8©g and 8lKT| to mankind, so that
there be order and chains of friendship bringing them together (322c2). Protagoras
continues (322c3 - 323d2)49:
fepcoxa ouv ' Eppf|g Ala xlva ouv xpo7iov 8olr| 81kt|v Kal ai8©
&v0p©7ioig- "Ttoxspov cbg ai xexvai vevepr|vxai, oi3x© Kal xauxag
velp©; vevepr|vxai 8s c58e- etc; excov 'iaxpiKr\v 7to>Aoig iKavdg
ISicbxaig, Kal oi aXAoi Srjpioupyol- Kal 8iKr|v 8r^ Kai al8© d obx©
0© fev xoig &v0p©7ioig, f| ferci Tiavxag velp©;" - "S7tl 7iavxag," scpr| 6
Zebg, "Kal Ttavxeg pexexovx©v ot> yap av yevoivxo 7i6X.sk;, si
6AAyoi abxcbv pexexotev coortsp aXA©v xsxvcbv- Kal vopov ys 0eg
nap' bpou xov pr^ 8uvapsvov alSoug Kal slkry; pexexsiv Kxslveiv coc;
vooov 7ioX.8Cog." ouxco 8f), © 2©Kpaxeg, Kal 8ia xauxa oi xs aAAoi
Kal'A0r|vaioi, oxav pev rtspl &pexf|g xeKxoviKTjg f| A,oyog f| aXArig
xivog 8r|pioi)pyiKf|g, 6Aiyoig oiovxai pexeivai oi)ppot)X,f|g, Kal eav e
xig feKxdg ©v xcov 6X,ly©v oopPoiAeufl, oi)k dvsxovxai, cog ob cpf|g -
slKoxcog, cog sycb cpr|pi - oxav 8e slg auppouX^v 7to?axiKf|g 323 dpexfjg
icooiv, f(v 8ei sia 8iKaioobvr|g 7iaoav levai Kal ococppoobvrig,
slKoxcog ajtavxog &v8pog dvexovxai, cog Ttavxl 7ipoaf|Kov xabxrig ye
psxsxsiv xf|g &pexf|g f| pf\ stvai 7toX,eig. abxr|, © HcoKpaxeg, xobxou
alxla.
iva 8s pr^ olfl &7iaxao0ai cog x© ovxi fyyobvxai Tiavxeg av0p©7ioi
7iavxa avSpa psxsxsiv SiKaioobvrjg xs Kal xf|g a^Xrig 7to?axiKf|g
49 I quote this passage at length as it contains an agglomeration of relevant material.
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dpexf|<;, xo5e au X,aPe xeKpf|piov. ev yap xaig aXXaiq dpexaig,
oooTcsp ou Xeyeig, eav xig tpf| dya0o<; ai)A,r|xrte etvai, f| aA,A.r|v
fyvxivouv xe^vriv rjv pf| eoxiv, f| KaxayeX-coaiv b f| xa^S7iaivouoiv,
Kai oi oiKeioi 7ipoai6vxe<; vou0exouoiv cog paivopevov- ev 5s
SiKaioauvfl Kai kv xf| dXAfl tcoX,ixikt| dpexf|, eav xiva Kai eiScoaiv
5xi aSiKog eoxiv, eav ouxog abxog Ka0' auxoo xdA.r|0f| X-syi]
bvavxlov noXX&v, o feKsi oco(ppoauvr|v ryyouvxo sivai, xdA,r|0f|
^eyeiv, evxau0a pavlav, Kai cpaoiv Tiavxag 5eiv cpavai etvai
5iKaioog, savxe djoiv bavxe pf), f) palvea0ai xov pf^
icpooxcoioupevov 5iKaioadvr|v50 ■ dx; dvayKaiov c ot>5eva 6vxiv' ob^t
dpcog ye tiox; pex&xsiv abxfjg, f| pr\ etvai ev dv0pcb7ioig.
oxi pev obv Ttavx' avSpa eiKOXCog d7io5exovxai 7iepi xauxr|g xf|g
dpexf|g oupPoulov 5ia xo f|yeio0ai 7iavxi pexeivai abxf|g, xauxa
X,syco- oxi 5e abxr^v ob cpuaei f|youvxai slvai ob5' (mo xou
abxopaxou, (LXXa SiSaKxov xs Kai e£, b7upeX,elac; 7iapayiyvsa0ai cp
av Ttapaylyvrixai, xouxo aoi pexa xobxo rceipaoopai dTioSei^ai. ooa
yap ryyouvxai dX,X,fjX,ouq KaKa s^siv dv0pamoi d cpuoei f| xbxn,
ob5eig 0upobxai ob5e vou0exei ob5e SiSaoKsi ob5e KoX,aCei xoug
xauxa exovxag, ...
Hermes asks first if he should distribute a'lSoog and SlKT), whose status is left
unspecified, the way the XS^vat are distributed. By that it is implied, I think, that -
whatever a'lScoc; and 51kT| be - they are not X8%vai. Hermes then explains to Zeus that
with regard to each of the X8%vai it is sufficient for a large number of people, if some
50 Cobet's seclusion of 8lKaiOo6vT]V would leave Glbxf|g in the next line without antecedent, or
would, respectively, require the reader to supply the notion referred to from b2 after having extrapolated
it there from 8V XT) aXXfl 7roXlTlKf| dpexp.
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one person 'has' it51. But Zeus insists that (XtScoc; and 5lKr| be given to all men, and
that everybody should 'have <of them> together with <everybody else>\ For there
would not be cities if <only> few <men> 'have of them as with the other skills.52
While in the sentences with eyeiv as predicate discussed so far the subject stood in
relation to someone else, individual or group, here the emphasis is on the single members
of the group which is the subject. When Zeus says that all should have of a'lScot; and
SlKTj, he means it distributively and not collectively: each member of the class of human
beings should be endowed with a'l8co^ and SlKtj, so that all men have of them
together. Likewise, in the second sentence (32262), where bWyo\,few, are the subject,
these 'few' are treated severally. In consequence of what has been said above about the
nature of the object, it should be noticed that one of the features of its indefiniteness is
that it is not marked as to quantity or quality. It is only much later (327a5, e2; 328a8)
that Protagoras introduces even the thought of gradation to make the particular point of
its being sensible to hire him as a teacher. Without that interested standpoint of
Protagoras', the story in itself would if anything run counter to differentiation of degrees
of &p8XT|. That is, of course, not to say that with a'l8cO£-and-8lKTj's being the object of
(J.SXS^SIV, one has to think of CtlSco^ as a whole and StKTj as a whole which are both
as wholes being had or possessed by someone; to the contrary, the very notion of part
and whole, completeness and defectiveness, of amount or gradability as such, is absent.
The genitive just states the object, with a minimum of information as to its relational
characteristics and the perspective under which it is viewed.
In passing, a comparison with 6A,iyoi<; OlOVXai (48X81vai Ol)|4f3ouX,f((;, they
believe that 'to few there is' (i.e. 'few have') of counselling (322d7), shows on the one
hand that the prefix pexa- here as well denotes 'together with others' - one of the few is
a co-adviser together with the rest of the few. That becomes plausible from a comparison
51 In accordance with what has been said above, as Hermes has a particular instantiation in mind, an
individual having some one art or craft or skill, C.yj'AV governs the accusative.
52 On the use of 'other' in contexts such as this one, cf. Collinge, Thoughts on the Pragmatics ofAncient
Greek, in: PCPhS 1989, 1 - 13.
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with e.g. Herodotus I, 171: &7ioSsiKvt)Oi 8s sv Mi)X.aooioi Aide; Kaplou
'ipov dpxaiov, xou Muooioi psv Kal Au8oioi psxsaxi cot;
Kaoiyvf|Toioi kouai xoioi Kapot- xov yap AuSov Kat xov Muaov
A,syoixn stvai Kapdc; &8sA,(pout;. xouxoioi psv 8rj pexeaxi, oooi 8s
sovxst; a^Xoi) sGvsog 6p6yX,cooaoi xoioi Kapot sysvovxo, xooxoiai
8s oi) psxa. Here it is the Mysians and the Lydians who have the sanctuary 'together
with' the Karians. The dative Msooioi psv Kal Al)8oiCl is determined purely by
SOXIV and has nothing to do with the prefix53. Just as Stvai with dative is virtually
synonymous with S^SIV, psxsivai with dative is virtually synonymous with
PSXS^SIV. The person or people or things 'with whom' one has something need not be
stated in the sentence, or rather, in most cases they are not. That is important for other
applications of the verbs. On the other hand, the case of psxsivai shows that the
genitive which connotes indefiniteness or non-specificity can function as subject and
object alike and be in the place of nominative or accusative respectively.
The myth is finished now and Protagoras has started with its application. Starting with
the contrasting example of deliberation in matters of arts and crafts as an instance of
which he quotes dpsxrj XSKXOVlKfj, he moves to deliberation of political matters
which he does not call OUpPobXrj xd)V TCO^IXIKCDV but GUpPoiAfj 7loX.lXlKf)^
dpsxfjq, and says that it is beseeming to everyone xatxT)^ ys psxs^SlV xf|<;
&psxf|<;. Everybody together with everybody else should have of it. As to the
indefiniteness of 7loXlXlKT\ fipsxtj, it is true that it is referred to as 'this' one as
opposed to the one of the architect; neither, however, has Protagoras any particular
instantiation in mind, nor is it specified what it is concretely any one has if and when he
'has of frpsxfj. That is made explicit at 323c 1 when he Protagoras says that it is
considered necessary that there should not be anybody who has not in some way of it,
53 One could, but should not, be tempted to think that in this case the dative is the sociative found with
psxd in Homer and early poetry and otherwise with pST6%StV.
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5iKaioo\3vr): cog dvayKaiov ouSeva ovxiv' ot>xi dpoog ye 7icog
|0.8TS/81V at)TT|g . Here dfiobg ys TXOOg is indicative of the indefiniteness.
Finally, at 323c3ff. Protagoras infers that everybody is admitted to public counsels as all
think that to everybody 'there is of' this dpsxtj, and he continues to prove its
teachability by contrasting the behaviour and attitude of men towards those bad qualities
or attributes of which they think that one has them by nature. Here he describes a
concrete example of men criticising particular faults they perceive among themselves and
with each other. These faults are quantified and denoted as countable with the neuter
plural relative boa. As they are the individual possession of individual human beings, the
expression is KOtKd sysiV, the simple verb with the direct object in the accusative.
V.
As regards 8%SIV and |4.8Xe%SlV, the same usage as in the Protagoras is found in
other early dialogues. The Laches starts off as a conversation on the right education of
the young, held in Athens at some time between the battle at Delium in 424 B.C. (cf.
181b) and that of Mantinea in which Laches fell in 418 B.C. The initial question, if it is
useful for youths to learn how to fight in full armour from someone who practises that as
an art form, is turned into an enquiry into the nature of dvSpsia when Socrates enters
the discussion. He does so on commendation by Laches, a renowned general, who
praises Socrates for his prowess in battle. At one point, Laches's opinion that justice is
some sort of perseverance is questioned by Socrates. When conclusions drawn from the
original statement and additional premises held by Laches start to contradict each other,
Socrates urges Laches to be careful (.Laches 193.e.3): 8pycp jXSV ydp, Cflg 801KS,
(pair) av xig f|pag dv8pslag pexexeiv, A,oyco 8', cog feycopai, otnc av, ei
VUV flpOOV dKODOSIS SiaXeyopSVCOV. For, as it seems, someone overhearing our
conversation now may say that in our deeds we share in bravery, but not, as I believe, in
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our words. The point of that remark clearly is that while both Laches and Socrates are
brave in battle, in contrast with others (cf. 181b), they are not able to sustain an
argument in conversation. In conversation they have no share in bravery at all, it seems.
With regard to their deeds, however, Socrates does simply state that they have displayed
courage, not that they are in partial but not full possession of it. In fact, any suggestion
that they be not really or fully courageous would almost defeat the purpose of the
argument at this point. It seems to be unlikely that the author or his character had the
notion of 'part' in mind when employing the 'partitive genitive' &v8p8ia£ here54.
Towards the end of the dialogue Nicias proposes his view of justice as some sort of
s7llotf|jirj or understanding. Laches who is in almost hostile, at least mocking
opposition after having been refuted by Socrates, tries to ridicule Nicias for his semantic
distinction of 'daring' and 'courageous' and believes that he will find Socrates' approval
when he brands it as vain sophistry, not worthy of one entrusted with a leading role in
the city. To that Socrates replies (Laches 197e2): 7tp87l8l jJ.8V 7IOI), co paKCtplS,
tcdv peytoxcov 7ipoaxaxouvxi peyioxriq (ppovf)aeco<; pexsxeiv: Soicei
Se poi NiKiaq a^iot; elvai smoKsyscot;, otioi tcoxs |3X,87icov xouvopa
XOUXO XlGljOl XT^V &v5peiav. It is not necessary for the present purpose to
determine if (ppovijOl^ here denotes practical wisdom as would be required for
governing, ruling or administering a city, or theoretical knowledge like linguistics, or if
Socrates does not differentiate at all between the two, consciously or otherwise. He
advances a general prescription, TtpSTlSt, it is fitting or beseeming. Fitting or beseeming
is sometimes different from what is actually achieved. It is what is aimed at. This is the
54 One could construct an argument to the effect that Socrates posits as an entity Courage, and of that
Courage he and Laches have the part concerned with deeds, but do not have the part concerned with
words. Anything like that, however, does not seem to me to be implied in Socrates' position anywhere in
the dialogue.
Also to be left aside is Laches 199c where Socrates speaks indeed of 'parts of courage'; that, however,
is in an artificial argument contrived to refute Nicias, and I would contend that what Socrates says there
is meant to show that courage - if defined by way of reference to a human beings' reaction to the
external world and its afflictions - does not deal with unchanging objects and is as such different from
the sciences which do, as, for example, medicine which deals with human nature. In what sense courage
could nevertheless be called an kTClOXflptj is not discussed in the dialogue.
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premise for an argument from content: one should aim at having - together with others
who are also capable of having - of the greatest wisdom. One does not aim at having part
of wisdom, even if that is all that is achieved in the end. If Prodicus, Damon and Nicias
all have insight into the distinction between GpttGlJC; and 6,v5peiO£, one can say
pexe^OUGl xauxric; xf|£ cppovi^oscoc;, and the meaning of that is that they have all
understood that distinction, not that each one of them has understood part of it, let alone
each one a different part.
It is to be noted that in the passage under discussion, there is no differentiation as to
degrees of courage. From 196dl, the moment when Socrates starts interrogating Nicias,
onwards, he treats that 87UOXf)pr| which is &v8psia as something which is either
present or absent. Not everybody has it (196d4); a physician or prophet - who each have
their own specific 87UOXf|p.r| - will not be brave 8(XV pf) abxf\V xauxrjv xf\v
&TClOXf|pr|V TlpOoX.&P'p; all animals - which were called dA,oya as we have seen
(Protagoras 321cl) - do not have it. Laches and Lamachus, however, are brave and in
that respect wise. The question if they are brave in one respect but not in another, or
brave but not fully so, is not raised.
The same is true of Charmides 158c4: abxdc; OUV JJ.OI si7ts 7lOX8pOV
6po^oyeic; xcp8e Kai (prfc iKavax; r|8r| ococppoouvry; pexs^siv f|
SvSsT^ Sivai; ... - have you or have you not this quality of temperance? This
translation of Jowett's is not literal but correct as regards the exclusiveness of choice.
Degrees of GG0(ppooi)vr| are at no stage the topic of the dialogue. Instructive in that
respect is its conclusion. After the failure of Charmides', Critias' and Socrates' attempts
to see what GCO(ppool)vr| is, and Socrates' suspicion that it be altogether useless, he
takes back this last verdict turning to Charmides (175e5): xatx' o6v 71&VI) psv
oi)K otopai ouxcoc; s^siv, bXTJ feps cpai)X.ov elvai <^r|xr|xfiv- stis! xf)v
ye ocG(ppoouvr|v peya xi &ya06v etvai, Kai ei7iep ye s^sig auxo,
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jiaKctpiov etvat oe. &XX' opa s'l s/eic; xs Kai pr|8ev Sefl xr\q
ferccpSfig- e'l yap exeig, ....
At the beginning of the conversation - when Charmides was compared with the other
youths of his age and before a discussion of what GCO(ppoauvr| is had been entered into
- (prjt; IKavcog rj8r| OCO(ppoo\jvr|<; pexsystv; asked for his sufficiently 'having of
moderation and health of soul. At the end of the conversation which centred first on
Charmides and then on GCOCppoouvr|, Socrates defines it as peya XI dyaGdv, a
great 'good', and can then address Charmides as an individual who has or has not
something which is at that moment seen as a defined unity: SlTCSp ye syetc; airuo,
... , opa e'l B^Sh; ... , e'l yap s%eic;, ... .55 The choice of pexe^siv with genitive
or e%eiv with accusative is - in all these cases - a matter of perspective and context.
The three instances of pexeyetV in another definitely early dialogue, the Gorgias,
confirm the previous observations. Near the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates' friend
Chaerepho and Gorgias' pupil Polus have a short exchange of words before Socrates and
Gorgias continue to pursue the argument. In Socratic manner, Chaerepho asks Polus for
the profession of Gorgias, and what one should call him accordingly. Polus answers
eloquently (Gorgias 448c5): c5 Xaip8(p(OV, noXXai xb/vai fev &V0pc67TOlc;
e'iGiv £>k xcov fejj.7C£ipicov £}j.7ieipco<; r|t>pr|psvai- epTieipia psv yap
txoisi xov aicova rjpcov TiopeueoGai Kaxa xexvrjv, dTteipia 8e Kaxa
xu/riv. 8KaGxcov 8e xodxcdv pexaXapPavoDGiv aXAoi aXXcov aXXcoq,
xcov 8e dploxcov oi apioxoi- cbv Kai Topylaq sgxiv o8e, Kai pexe%ei
xf|£ KaX,X,lgxtig xcov xeyvcbv. Of course, the phrasing of the statement is highly
rhetorical, and perhaps not too much emphasis should be put on any individual word. If
one takes the words seriously, though, jlSXaA,ajJ.|3dvoi)GlV aA,A,Ol &XX(£>V &XX(£>q
says both that different people take up different arts and crafts and that they do it in
different ways. It is likely that Polus does not mean to imply that in any society any one
55 Cf. Charmides 167 and the discussion in note 45 above.
48
occupation is pursued by one individual only; aAAcoC,, however, could well imply that
each and everyone take up their respective professions in their own way. This
assumption is not necessary, but if granted it would add to the general indefiniteness of
the notion of 'having of something like a T8%vr|. The use of psxa^ajlpdvoiXTl rather
than jJ.eTS%Ol)Ol denotes the process of obtaining something which is prior in time to
the state of having it.
Gorgias 467e is a slightly different case. A distinction has been drawn between what we
do and what we do it for. What we want is the end, not the means to that end.
Everything is good or bad or between the two, neither good nor bad. Socrates continues
(467e6): otncouv A,sysi<; slvai dyaGov jisv oocplav xs Kai byisiav Kai
7i?a)i)Xov Kai tSlXXcl xa xoiauxa, KaKa 8s xdvavxla xouxcov; - eyooys. -
xa 8s |ir|xe dyaGa jj.f|xs KaKa &pa xoiaSs A,sysi<;, a kvioxs psv
psxsxsi xod dyaGoi), svloxs 8s xoi) KaKoi), svioxs 8s oi)8sxspou, oiov
KaGrjaGai Kai PaSi^eiv Kai xps^eiv Kai tt?csiv, Kai otov a£> XrGouq
Kai ^uXa Kai xdAAa xa XOtadxa; Other than with all the examples discussed so
far, the subject of (isxs/siv in the last sentence is not a human being56.
Later on in the dialogue, Callicles enters the discussion and delivers a long speech on
the propriety of philosophy and practical pursuit of political matters. At one point he
summarizes (Gorgias 485a3): bXX otpai XO dpGoxaxov SOXIV dpcpoxspcov
psxaoxsiv. cpiX,ooocpiac; psv oaov ^aiSsiaq x^Plv KaA,ov psxsxeiv,
Kai oi)K aiaxpov psipaKicp ovxi cpiX,oao(psiv- k7isi8av 8s rjSrj
7ipsapdxspog cdv avGpco7ioc; sxi cptX.ooocpfi, Kaxays>.aoxov, cd
SdbKpaxsg, xo xpfipa yiyvsxai, ... . Syntactically, cpi^ooocpla is here treated
like a XSyvij. Again, there is no indication that Callicles intends to suggest that young
men as long as they are young should only 'have a part of philosophical activity.
56 If that constitutes an argument which could be used for relative dating of the dialogues, I am not
going to discuss it here.
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VI.
JIST£%SIV is thus employed with a wide range of objects, but particularly, in Plato,
with non-physical objects from the domain of psychology or characterology. When
governing the genitive, the verb denotes a 'having of something where that relationship
is vague, where no specific qualitative or quantitative portion is specified; this
construction is shared with the simple verb S%SIV which, however, is more often
employed with the accusative, the case referring to objects of a more specified and
delimited nature. Most importantly, |ISTS%81V by itself does not mean 'having a part (of
something); if that meaning is intended, it must be clearly expressed in the context, e.g.
by means of addition of a word for 'part' like JISpOC;. Not only with regard to that, pre-





An investigation into the usage of Ttapouola and Ttapsivat is necessary - if for no
other reason - because of Socrates' use of the word TtapOUOia at Phaedo KXM5.
There, Socrates declares that his explanation for any thing's being KClXov is Oil oi)K
6Xko it Tioist abxd KaX,ov f\ f| bksivoi) xou Ka^ou bits 7xapouoia
61x6 KOlVOOVia 61x6 &7tT| 5kai &7ig0<; frcpooyevopevri. Leaving aside for
the moment the textual difficulty with 7ipOOy6VO|J.evr|, the gist of his statement seems
to be that the relation which holds between xo KCt)c6v on the one hand and any
particular thing which is K0lA,6v on the other is reasonably well described by
7iapoi)Gia. Before looking at the two early instances of that noun in dialogues earlier
than the Phaedo, I will briefly consider instances in earlier Greek literature, not only of
the noun Tiapouoia, but also of the much commoner verbs TtapsiVdl, and
7iapaytyveo0ai, in order to establish their meaning and application in pre-Platonic
usage.
A number of distinct uses of TKxpeiVdl can, I think, sensibly be regarded separately57.
First, Tiapeivai is used of people who are present at an occasion or, in particular, with
other people. This usage is found from the Iliad onwards throughout Greek literature58,
and it is so frequent that I will refrain from giving examples. It is found all over Plato's
dialogues, e.g. Gorgias 447b6, 457b6, 458b6,7, 461c7, dl, 474al, 482bl, 518d3.
57 The order in which I have arranged the different uses is not meant to indicate a semantic development
and is chosen purely for the sake of convenience.
58 Cf. LSJ s.v. rctipetpt (e'tpi sum) I (and IV).
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Secondly, there is an occasional use of impersonal 7tdpSOXl where it could be said to
come close in meaning to S^SOTl59, e.g. Gorgias 448a5 where it could be attributed to
Gorgias' high-flown or poetical style.
Thirdly, it is used of 'the present time'60, with Plato notably in the phrase SV TCp
(VUV) TiapOVTl61 .
Fourthly, Ttapsivai can be used of 'things', in the widest sense of that word, present
to someone62. This usage, again, is found from Homer onwards.
As said above, there was, on all accounts, no single verb for 'having' in Indo-
European63 . Instead, 'being' was used, with the dative of the person to whom something
'was' or belonged or at whose disposal it was. This usage is well preserved in Archaic
and Classical Greek down to Plato's times, as may, exempli gratia, be seen with an
example from the Gorgias (486c,d): £riA,cc)v oi>K sX-BYXOVTCk; &v5pac; TCt
59 Cf. LSJ s.v. 7tdpStpi (s'lp'l sum) m.
60 Cf. LSJ s.v. 7ldp8tpt (e'lpi sum) II. 4.1 would see this as a category distinct from the following one.
61 Cf. L. Brandwood, A Word Index to Plato, Leeds 1976, p. 715. He asserts in a footnote: "7tup6vil:
all instances occur in the phrase 8V TO) 7iap0VTl and its variant 8V TCp VUV 7iap6vTl ... ." Phaedo
59a2 is an exception to that rule.
62 One division of this group is the nominal use of 7tap6viU or 7iape6vTCl. The notion of time is
present here as well, in that there is no distinction made between the circumstances or things present
and the present circumstances or things. Often, the things present or at hand, are contrasted with
U7t6vTU, the things absent. A common exhortation amounts to 'a bird in hand is worth two in the
bush', with all its variations. Echoes of that are Odyssey 1, 140b and Democritus, B191, B224. A
reflection of it is also found at e.g. Gorgias 493c: Zco.- ... xabx' 8TCISIK©<; p6v SOTIV b7t6 Tl
axona, SriAot pr|v o eyco Pot)/.opal aoi svSsi^dpevog, sdv tccoc otdc; is co, trsioai
pexa0£o0ai, dvxi too a7rkf|axcot; Kai dKokdoxcoq exovzoq ptoo xov Kooplcoq Kai
xoic; del rcapoDoiv iKavcbc; Kai sqapKoovxraq 8%ovxa plov bkooOat. Here Socrates tries
to persuade Callicles to choose the P'lO^, the life or way of living (possibly another allusion to the last
words of Callicles' introductory speech) which has enough or is content with those things which are
present or at one's disposition or at hand at any given time. Cf. also Gorgias 499c4: ... , Kai C0C,
eotKSV dvdyKTi poi Kaxa xov rcakaiov kdyov 'to rcapdv so 7toistv' ... , where the
thought is labelled as a proverb or standing phrase. Cf. Dodds, Plato. Gorgias, Oxford 1959,
commentary ad loc.
63 See Section I in the chapter on peTSXSlV above. Cf. also B. Mader in LfgrE II, col. 837.
It is to be noted that mutatis mutandis the same is true for the Semitic languages. 'Having' there is also
expressed by either 'possessing' as in the possession of e.g. land or 'being to someone'. This goes to
show how abstract a notion 'having' is in itself.
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}j,iKpd xauxa, tiXX' o!g eoxiv Kai (3io<; Kat So^a Kat aXXa noXXa
fryaOa.
When this rather general notion of 'being to or for someone' was felt not to express
specifically enough the relation holding between the 'had' and the 'haver', it could be
delimited by the addition of certain adverbs64 which over time became preverbs. The
general meaning of the preverb Ttapa- is 'close by', 'next to'. The emphasis is often on
the immediate closeness and proximity of the object.65
An example of 7iapa in that sense is Odyssey 4, 559. Menelaos relates to Telemachus
what Proteus has told him about Odysseus (4, 555 - 560): UlOc^ Aaspxeco, ' IGdKTJ
svi o'iKia valcov- | xov 8' i8ov ev vrjaco Oa^epov Kaxa Saicpi) %eovxa,
| vupcprjg ev peyapoioi KaX,i)V)/oi)c;, f\ jxiv dvayKfl | loxei- o 8' ot>
8uvaxai fjv 7taxpt8a yaiav iKsaGai. | ot> yap o't rcapa vf|ec; krcipexpoi
xat exaipoi, | oi ksv piv 7t8p.7toi8v 87i' eupsa vcoxa 0aX,dooTjc;. In 558,
we have a good example of syeiV having its old, original force of 'holding subdued' an
adversary66. 559 is a nominal clause without copula.67 'oi) yap o'l vf|8<;
87lf|psxjJ.Ol Kal SXatpot' would have been a complete well-formed sentence. The
addition of Tldpa serves to specify that he did not have anything or anybody 'with' him
or 'at' him or 'by' his side. The subject of the sentence is complex, with an inanimate and
an animate component.
64 Cf. E. Schwyzer, Griechische Grammatik II, Miinchen 1950, pp. 411-432, in particular 41 If., 431f.
Cf. also M. Meier-Briigger, Griechische Sprachwissenschaft I, Berlin 1991, pp. 154-156, with references
to more recent literature.
65 Cf. Schwyzer, op. cit., pp. 491-498. He says on p. 492: "Moglicherweise hat auch Ttupd in einigen
Verwendungen eine alte, nicht sekundare Bedeutung 'vor'; die allgemeine Bedeutung von 7tUpd usw,
ist jedoch '(unmittelbar) neben, nahe' (...). Neben Kasus (Lok., Akk., Abl.) kann jedoch das
Bedeutungsmoment der Nahe verblassen; Ttupd unterstreicht dann als 'bei', 'zu (- hin)', 'von (- her)'
lediglich die Bedeutung, die der Kasus an sich hatte." I would stress that this shift away from expressing
'local closeness' to expressing some sort of more abstract proximity which serves to 'underline the force
of the case' is carried by the preverb as well. In that respect, Schwyzer's paragraph on '7tapd as a
preverb', p. 493, needs slight modification.
66 Cf. on 8X£1v ! |i£XS%SlV note 63 above; cf. German 'siegen'.
67 Cf. Schwyzer, op. cit., p. 64f.
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Comparable is Odyssey 14, 80. Eumaeus, the swine-herd, invites the stranger,
Odysseus: SO01S VUV, c5 %81VS, T(X T8 Sficoeooi Htipeaxiv, ... 68. Historically
speaking, this again is a nominal clause. The difference is that with 'TO. TS 8}J.c6eooi
TCCtpSOTIV' there is a copula, and TtCtpa is bound as a preverb, no longer free as an
adverb.
The two previous examples had physical or material objects for grammatical subjects.
But already with the Iliad, non-physical, immaterial things can function as subjects as
well. At Odyssey 17, 345ff., Telemachus advises the swine-herd, Eumaeus, to tell the
beggar, Odysseus, not to be too shy to ask the suitors for alms. He finishes with the
sententious remark (17, 347): a'lScoc; 5 ' o()K 6ya0rj K8Xpf)jJ.8VCp avSpi
7iapeivai. Bashfulness is not good for a needy man, to be with him. In the particular
case of aiScoc;, it is to be noted that this sort of construction, and the consequent (flScD:;
TtapeOTl, may well be older than any verbalised form like aiSoflOH to express the
presence of awe, reverence, fear or shame69.
That is different with the following Iliadic example. Apollo, the god, has deceived
Achilles, the best and strongest of the Greeks, in the guise of Agenor. When the god
destroys the illusion and mocks Achilles, Achilles replies in angry tones. He could have
taken the life of many Trojans (22, 18): VUV 8' SfJ.8 |ISV psya KuSoc; 6tCp8l^80,
xout; Se oacooat; | prji8icog, S7tei oi) xi xioiv y' e88etoa<; 67rlooco. | fj
o' av xsioaipr|v, ei poi Suvapit; ys 7tapeir|. Suvapig is a verbal noun, both
semantically and by its actual derivation. A conditional like Iliad 1, 393, bX'ka OU, 8'l
8uvaoat ys, 7iepiG)C80 TiaiSot; fefjoc;, Achilles' imploring his mother to help him,
68 For the present purpose, it is of no import how the line following is punctuated.
59 Pace H. Frisk, Griechisches etymologisches Worterbuch I, Heidelberg 1960, s.v. OtISopui. His
assertion, "Von UlSopat, bzw. von einem alteren athematischen Verb stammt at8c6g f. 'Scheu,
Ehrfurcht' ", is not well founded. Rather than positing an athematic verb of the same root whence the
noun be derived, one should be content with stating that both the thematic verb and the - very old - noun
are derived from the same root. Its formulaic occurrence in the Iliad as absolute nominative in
exclamations or exhortations, i.e. in places where a verbal imperative form could have been used just as
well, rather points to the antiquity of the noun; Iliad 5, 787; 8, 228; 13, 95; 15, 502; 16, 422. Cf.
Schwyzer op. cit., p. 65f. I would contest his assertion that in the Homeric lines quoted eoxt is
understood or has to be supplied.
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shows that it was the speaker's choice to give a verbal or a nominal form to his
statement.
While in the case of a'lSco^ it could be argued that 'Al8c6<^ was a goddess like
OoPoq, "Epic;, 'AA-Kf) and 'ICDKf| at Iliad 5, 739f„ or like Kptixot; and BlCt in
Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, and that therefore the above mentioned instances of
a'lScoc; should be counted with the personal use of Ttapeivai, it would be much more
difficult to claim the same in the case of 8uva(Xl(^. And even if in the case of Iliad 22, 18
one could imagine Auvaph; standing by Achilles as did Athena at Iliad 1, 193 - 222 - a
picture, I think, not intended by the poet - the same could not be said of Odyssey 2, 62.
where the half-line Iliad 22, 18b is repeated. There, Telemachus complains to the people
of Ithaka about his situation with the suitors' consuming his father's property and
making a general nuisance of themselves; he declares (2, 60): f|p£l<; 8' OU VU Tl
xoioi &pi)vs|j.£v fj Kai £7i£ixa | A,£i)yaA,£Oi x' £oop£<50a Kai ot>
S£Sar|K6x£<; dA,Kf|v. | fj x' dv dpi)valpr|v, £i poi Suvaplq y£ 7iap£ir|.
Compare with these words, spoken at the height of desperation, what Telemachus says
to his father Odysseus when the suitors are slain. After the complete reversal of the
external and internal situation, Homer lets him use the same words in a statement
indicating his newly gained confidence (23, 127): ... | f|ji£l£ 8' £pp£pad)X£C; ap'
£\|/op£0', o()8£ xi cpripl | &X,Kf|<; S£uf|O£O0ai, oor| Suvaplq y£ 7tdp£OXi.
In these two passages, both &A,Kf|, which is somehow taught and known at 2, 60, and
Suvapic; are practical abilities or properties of human beings.
That is already true of SOvaph; at Iliad 8, 294, from which the last half-line of the
previous example is quoted. Teucer, praised for his skill by Agamemnon, replies (8,
292): 'Axp£i8ri ki38iox£, xi p£ 07t£t38ovxa Kai abxov | 6xpuv£i<;; ot>
|i£V XOl oar) Suvapl;; y£ 7iap£OXl I Txauopai. The sentence shows a clear
development in the usage and application of the phrase nominative with TldpEOXl.
7ldp£OXl, from being an addition to the subject in the nominative and the person in the
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dative, has become more like a real predicate. The person 'to whom' the subject 'is',
though understood from the immediate context, is not - i.e. no longer - expressed.
In lyric poetry and tragedy, a wider range of subjects to 7iapeivai is found. In the
seventh century, Mimnermus says in an elegiac couplet (8 West): ... dA,lj0eir| 8s
7iapeoxco | aol Kat spot, ftdvxcov %pf|pa SiKaioxaxov. A little later,
Theognis declares at the imagined occasion of someone's stealing his verses (21 West):
ot>8e xiq d^d^ei k&kiov xot>o01oo Ttapeovxoq. In one of his political
elegies, Solon says about unjust statesmen (4, 9 West): oi) yap feTUOXavxai
Kaxs/eiv Kopov ot>8e 7iapoooa<; | etxppooovat; Koopeiv Saixoq ev
f]OU/lTj. With him, we also find the sentence that death will take away rich and poor
alike (24 West): loov XOl 7tA.0UX80l)0lV, OXCp TloXCq dpyupoq 80X1 | Kat
XpDooq Kat yf|<; 7iupo(popou 7ieSla | ituioi 0' r|piovol xe, Kat c5i
pova xaoxa raxpeoxi, | yaoxpt xe Kat 7tX,eupaig Kat Ttooiv dPpa
rcaGeiv, | 7rai86c; x' f|8e yuvaiKoq, 87ifjv Kat xaux' dtpiKtycai, | coprj,
GUV 8' fjPr| ytvsxai dppo8ir|. I ... . This is a good example both of how 8GXIV
with dative can be used in parallel, i.e. in this case virtually synonymously, with
TidpeGXIV with dative, and of how physical or material objects can function as
grammatical subjects to TtdpeoxiV side by side with immaterial ones. In the sixth
century, Anacreon gives his version of man's fear of old age and death (50 Page):
rto^iot psv fjpiv f]8ri | Kpoxatpoi Kaprj xs A,suk6v, | %apieooa 8'
obK8x' fjprj | Tiapa, yrjpa^eoi 8' 68ovxeg, | y^ukepoo 8' oOksxi
7ioAAd<; | PlOXOl) xpdvog ^eX-Slnxai. A generation later, Simonides (?) writes in
an elegy part of which Stobaeus quotes under the heading 'About life, that it is short and
cheap and full of concern' (8, 4 West): ... 7idp8GXl yap eKaoxcp |
dv8pd>v, f\ X8 vscov OXtjGeoiV epcposxai. A Theognidean variation of the old
sentence psxpov apioxov is (693f.): 7ioA.A,oug xoi Kopoc; av8pa<; dnco^sosv
dcppaivovxac;- | yvcovai yap xaXendv pexpov, ox' eo0A,a Ttapf).
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Turning to fifth century Athenian tragedy, Aeschylus has in one messenger-speech
alone (Persae 353 - 432) the following three instances: ... cpo|3oc; 8s 7ldoi
papP&poiq rcapf)v | yvcopr|c; dTioocpaXsioiv- ... . (39if.). ... Kal 7tapf|v
opou kA.usiv | 7ioX,A,fjv Popv- '... .' (401f.). ... • cog 8s 7tX.f|0og sv oxsvd)
vscov | rj0poiox' , dpcoyfj 5' ouxig (iXXr^koiq Tiapfjv, | ... . (4l3f.). In each
case, the subject is non-tangible.
The guard who has to inform Creon of the attempt to perform burial rites for the
outlawed Polynices in Sophocles' Antigone explains that he does not know who it could
have been (253): onOdC, 8' 6 7TpG)XO<; f|piv flpspOOKOTTOg | SsiKVOGl, Tiaoi
Oaupa Suoyspsq 7iapf|V. And in Sophocles' late play Electra, Electra admits in a
speech to her sister which began with the statement that no friends are present70 (959ff.):
... f\ napsoxi psv oxsvsiv | rtA,ouxoi) 7iaxpcpoi) Kxfjmv sox8pr|psvr|, |
7tdpeoxi 8' dA/ysiV ... . A little later, the two sisters Electra and Chrysothemis
exchange the following lines (103If.): drt8^08- ool yap dxpsArjOlc; ook evl. -
svsoxiv- dAAa ooi pa0r|oig ot> 7tapa.
Euripides' Hecuba says in reply to the lament of the chorus leader (Hecuba 585): CO
0\3yaxsp, oi)K ol8' s'lg o xi pA.s\|/co KaKGOV, | 7io^Xcov 7iapovxcov- fjv
yap a\|/copal xivog, | xo8' otnc sa ps, 7tapaKaXsi 8' eksi0sv a5 | >u\37iri
Xig aXXr] SldSo^oc; KaKCOV KaKOig. The last two lines are relevant in that they
show that 'the bad <things>' here are subjects to predicates which otherwise have
animate subjects. One could argue, however, that the personification in these lines was
invited by the apposition 7TO)A(OV Ttapovxcov, in which the verb - while perfectly
natural with inanimate things for subjects - could be seen, or re-interpreted, as denoting
the presence of an active agent. Whereas the one bad <thing> touched upon is still
neuter, the grief or pain in its wake is feminine. - It is to be noted that while Greek usage
70 See below on Tiupouoiu.
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allowed for constructions of the type dv0pcO7lO^ Kal xa aA,A,a ^ODO71, aXXoc,
most often denotes another of the same kind. If thus Hecuba uses the phrase X,U7lT| Xlc^
dX,X/T|, she somehow implies that the aforementioned K0tKd are ^UTCCtl of some
description.72
In the Orestes, the following words are exchanged between Electra and her brother
(1177): eyco, Kaolyvr|x', airro xoux'ex8lv Sokoo, | ocoxriplav aol xcpSe
x' sk xpixcov x' fejxol. | - 0sou A,eyei<; Ttpovoiav. dAAa not xo8e; | k7iei
XO OUV8XOV y' ot8a of) V|/uxfl ^aP°v- Electra 'has' salvation, and Orestes knows
that 'the intelligent is present to her soul'. With comparable words, Cadmus addresses
Agaue in the Bacchae (1268): XO 8e 7tXOr|08V X08'8X1 of) Vj/uxfj 7idpa; In both
instances, it is somebody's soul to which something, intelligence and excitement
respectively, is present.
Among the Presocratics, Empedocles addresses his audience at the beginning of one of
his writings (B 114, 1): (8 cpi^oi, olSa |xsv o\3v8K' dA,r|0eir) 7tapa jj.u0oi<;,
syob S^SpSCO* ... . The implications of the difference between Mimnermus 8, ...
dX,T)08lT) §8 napsoxco I ooi Kal SJJ.01, where dXr)0Str) is present to the people,
to Empedocles 114, dX,r)0slr) Tiapa Jn30oic;, cannot be discussed here.
In the context of his physics of mixture and separation, with the ontological premise
that nothing will come out of nothing, Empedocles remarks about fire, water, earth and
air, with strife apart from them and love in amongst them (B 17, 27): xauxa yap lad
xe 7idvxa Kal f)X,iKa yevvav eaoi, | xiji.f)<; 8' aAAr|<; aA,X,o psSsi, Tiapa
8' f)0og 8Kaoxcp, | ev 8e pepsi Kpaxeouoi ^spiTt^opevoio xpdvoio. It is
fairly safe to assume that this usage of Ttdpa 8' f)0oc; SKaoxcp is transferred from
the human to the elementary sphere. At a different point in the same book, Empedocles
draws the conclusion that - as a result of those insights into the physics of the world - no
71 Cf. N.E. Collinge, Thoughts on the Pragmatics ofAncient Greek, in: PCPhS 1989, pp. 1-13.
72
Perhaps, however, not too much weight should be put on this poetic, even though Euripidean, text
when it comes to a comparison with the passages of the Gorgias discussed below in Sections IV - VI.
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wise man will hold (B 15, 3): cbq ocppa pev T£ 010001, TO 8lj PlOTOV
KaA-souoi, | xocppa pev ouv e'tolv, Kal o(piv udpa SeiAa Kat feo0A,a, |
ixplv 8e xcdyev is Ppoxoi Kal <£7iel> X,80ev, obSev ap' 8'toiv. It would be
rash to restrict the reference of dsiXd Kal SO0X,a to material goods as if Empedocles
referred just to poverty and wealth, to the exclusion of pain and pleasure. It should also
be noted that from a fourth, and probably also fifth, century point of view, his diction is
archaic, and when he, like Homer, says SeiA-Ct Kal 8O0Xa, later generations would
sayKaKa Kal dya0a.73
If we can trust our source (Stobaeus III, 18, 35), Democritus declared (B 235): OOOl
dnd yaoxpoq zdq fjSovac; Tioieovxai imepPeP^riKOxeg xov Katpov fercl
Ppcoosotv f| Ttoaeciv fj dtppoSiatoiotv, xoioi 7taoiv a'l pev fjSoval
Ppaxeial xe Kal 8i' 6A,lyou ylvovxai, at 8e Xvnai noXXai. xouxo pev
yap xo £7U0upeiv del xcov abxcov Tiapeaxi Kal dKoxav yevrjxai
okoIcov S7it0i)p8ouoi, 8ta zax&oq xe f| pSovrj tiapolxexat, Kal ot>8ev
ev auxoiot xpfl^ov eaxiv dXX' f| xep\|/i<; Ppa/eia, Kal a60ic; xcov
atixcov Set. That, if genuinely Democritean, is interesting not only because of its
subject matter which betrays a simple pragmatism, attacked by Socrates, but later to be
found with Epicurus, but also because on the one hand TO &7tl0l)p£lV, which could be
said to be close to k7ll0l)pla, just as the Euripidean TO ouvexov could be said to
equal ouveot^, is said to be present, and on the other because Democritus uses the
phrase f| fjSovtj Tiapolxsxai. In Presocratic contexts, however, 7iapolxeo0at is
used as the first member of a temporal sequence Tiapoixopevov, TtapOV, pe^Aov74.
73 Cf. also Empedocles DK 3IB 110: s't yap Ksv ocp' d8tvf|oiv bra) 7rpa7ii8sootv epeiaac |
ebpevecoq KaOapfjotv eramxebopg pekfexpotv | xabxd xe oot pdka raivxa 8t
a'ttovoc; Trapeoovxat, | aXXa xe k6XX' tmo xd>v8' eKXijoeat- .... It is unfortunate that we do
not know if xabxa refers to 'Empedocles' teachings' (Diels) or 'the elemental components' (Mansfeld),
or yet something else.
74
E.g. Gorgias, B 11, 11.
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If that be so, f|8ovrj TtapOl^STCtt would imply that previous to the time referred to
rjSovrj TidpeaTi.
To resume, of the following non-material things it is said that they 'are to, with or at
someone': a'i8coq, 8\3vapi<;, d?a|0eia, to 8O0X-ov, si)cppoo\3vr], dPpa 7ia0eiv,
©pa, fiPrj, £c0X-ti, cpopo<;, kXlsiv Porjv, dp©yf|, 0aupa,
pa0r|oi<;, oxBvsiv and dXyeiv, KctKd Tto^Xd, to ouvstov and to 7iTor|0ev
tfl yuxfl, f\0og, 8eiX-d Kal 8O0M, to k7ll0l)jJ.8lv. Furthermore, it is implied at
two places that X-OTtT] (Euripides, Hecuba 585ff.) and, respectively, T|8ovf| (Democritus
235) are present.
While it is possible that many of those words denoted at some point in time, or else in
certain contexts, gods or divine powers, namely dl8d)£, Suvajllc; (?), dXf|0eia,
ei)(ppoaovr|, ©pa, rjpr|, kXniq, cpoPoq, 0aupa, fj0o<;, it is evident from the
passages quoted that there were other contexts in which that was clearly not the case.
The application, moreover, of the verb to gerunds and substantivised adjectives shows, I
think, conclusively that Ttapsivai did not exclusively or necessarily convey the notion
of a person's or a material object's presence. On the contrary, a whole range of concrete
and abstract things figure as subjects: forces, emotions, states of mind, qualities,
properties, actions and passions75. They are said to be present with the people, or in
some cases (Euripides, Orestes 1177ff.; Bacchae 1268) with their souls. It is difficult and
perhaps not altogether necessary to decide what exact status was or would have been
assigned to things like e.g. stcppoouvrj or 'zklliq, whether the words denote emotions
or states of the mind or of the soul Or of the whole person. Likewise, what is a man's
f|Pri? Is |ld0r|Olc; an action or a faculty or a quality? Is (p6Po£, if present to a crowd of
people, something external to the individual or internal in each of them? I pointed to the
difficulty in deciding whether Empedocles' 8eiA,d Kai SO0)^d are external or internal,
or if the terms cover both the external and the internal.
75 In using these conventional terms, I do not commit myself to claiming the actual existence,
appropriateness or significance of any of them.
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It would be even more difficult to say what this 'presence' signified by Tiapeivat
amounted to. Or perhaps, it is too much already to claim that there is anything
'signified'. What can be claimed with certainty is that, in a broadly speaking
psychological context, TtapeiVdl is employed to connect non-material things with
animate subjects. In addition, Empedocles at least can ascribe an fjBoc;, a 'character' or
'characteristic' to either his forces veiKOt; and (pi^OTTjc;, or even to them and the
elements together76.
II.
As opposed to the verb 7tap8ivai, the noun TtapODOla is absent from Homer,
Hesiod, and the early poets. As far as our sources are concerned, it seems to be an
altogether Attic word. With the tragedians, it usually denotes the presence of a person
with others or at a particular event. As such, it is not very frequent. Its occurrence in that
sense at Sophocles Electra 948 deserves particular attention. In the second line of the
long speech addressed to her sister, Electra declares: TiapouolctV {J.SV otoBa Kat
Ol3 Ttou cpilcov I cbc; OUXig SOXIV, ... . It is one thing to speak of the
presence of friends when friends are present. It is quite another thing to declare about
presence of friends that none is present. Instead of saying : (piA,OU<^ J18V otoGa Kal
OU (bq OVZig f|JllV SOXIV, thus making the friends the object of knowledge, it is
their presence of which Chrysothemis is said to have knowledge. Source or at least
consequence of the nominalisation of TiapeiVOtl is that this 'presence' has become
something in its own right, something one can talk about. Its status approximates that of
76
Empedocles, B 17, 27ff. It is not clear to me if Empedocles at this point refers to the two forces of
'love' and 'strife' and their ruling in turn, or if he is stating more generally that each of the elements
and the forces has its specific place and function in the universe at any given moment. Although not of
ultimate importance, it may be relevant in certain respects to know if he assigned an fj0O<^ only to
NsTkoc; and d>lA.6xr|^ which appear to be personalised, or also to (17, 18) 7Tl)p Kal i38(Op Kal
yaia Kal f|6po<; anXexov UV|/oq, which clearly are not.
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frpcoyri in Aeschylus' Persians where the messenger reports (402): (upcoyTj 5' OUXl^
&A,A,f|A,Ol^ 7iapf|V. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to postulate a new meaning, 'help,
support', for Ttapouoia here. Ttapouoia (ptXcov is the state of affairs obtaining when
cpiA,Ol 7itipsiOlV. Sophocles' sentence: 7iapoi)olav psv otoBa Kal a\3 7TOI)
(piA,COV (bg OUTl^ fjpiv SGXIV, offers the opportunity of asking 'what is the status
of this Tiapoixria which is not but could be there'. One need not suppose that
Sophocles himself thought about that question. Poetical usage serves as preparation for
philosophical speculation without entailing it.
There are only a few cases of TiapOUOia where the noun does not denote the presence
of a person at some place or occasion, but the presence of an object, be it material or
non-material, to either a person or an inanimate object.77 They can be regarded as
straightforward nominalisations of clauses or phrases containing the verb 7l(XpSlV(Xl.
One instance is Euripides Hecuba 227f.: ylyvcOGKB 5' fr^Kljv Kal Tiapouoiav
KCIKCDV | XCOV OCDV. Odysseus advises Hecuba to acknowledge and accept her own
situation: the power of the victor and her own helplessness, her KCtKd which are with
her. A similar case is Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae 1048f. Mnesilochus, attendant
to Euripides, bewails his fate: c5 Kaxtipaxoc; kyc6" Xiq £|ldv ot>K k7lO\|/SXai |
TitiGog frfisyapxov sni KaKtov 7iapoi)Oia; Mnesilochus' style is the tragic style
of Euripides.
7iapoi)Oia before Plato is thus a poetical word, used by the tragedians in contexts
which require a heightened mode of expression. The noun which is comparatively rare
does not betray any semantic development beyond the nominalisation of the verb
77
Sophocles Electra 1250 is a different case. The employment of 7tapOt)Oia there is unusual enough to
have created confusion in some of the manuscripts. Nevertheless, I think TtapODOia may be the correct
reading. Orestes declares that he is aware of Electra's unending suffering from her mother's deed but
has mentioned it despite that: E^otStt Kal xaux' • ilkX oxav 7iapot)ola | q)pdt^T|, x6x' epycuv
xcovbs pepvf)O0ai ypsoiv. Here, 7iapOt)Oia is the present time, the present, which 'indicates it' or
'advises' to think or act in a certain way. This use of the word seems to be unique and confined to this
one place.
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Tcapsivai. With the noun, however, the temporal aspect, always present with
Ttapsivai, is more pronounced.
III.
As opposed to Ttapsivai, 7iapayiyveo0ai seems to be much less frequently used
with subjects other than human beings, individuals or groups78. Stobaeus, notoriously
unreliable as to the wording of his quotations, reports as a saying of Democrates
(Stobaeus IV, 23, 39; Democritus (?) DK 68B108): 5l£r|pevoiOt xdya0d poAdC;
Tiapayivexai, xa §8 KaKa Kal |lfj 5lCr|p8VOlOlV. A little earlier, Stobaeus
quotes a long passage from Antiphon the Sophist '7l8pi OflOVOtCt^' (Stobaeus IV, 22,
II, 66; DK 87B49)79: kv xcp abxcp 5e ye xouxcp, ev0a xo f|8b, eveoxi
7t^r|oiov 7XOU Kat xo Ximripov- ai yap f)8oval oi)K krci ocpcov abxoov
spTiopsuovxai, dAX dKoIou0oboiv abxaic; XbTtai Kai 7tovoi. 'snei Kal
6X,i)|j.7UoviKai Kai 7ri)0ioviKai Kai oi xoiobxoi dycovec; Kai acxpiai
Kai 7taoai r|8oval 8K peyd^cov ^U7ir||idxcov fe0eA,oi)ai 7iapayivso0ai-
xipai yap, a0A,a, 8eA,eaxa, a 6 0eog eScoKev dv0pco7toig, peyataov
ttovcov Kai \8pc6xcov e'lq dvayKaq Ka0ioxaoiv. If the clause knsi ...
7tapayivso0ai is taken on its own, 7iapayiv8O0ai could be said to be as good as
equivalent to yiyV8O0ai. dv0pcb7lOl(^, however, should be understood from the
context as object to the verb. If this text belongs in the fifth century, it is the closest
extant pre-Platonic parallel to the usage of Gorgias 50680.
78 Cf. LSJ s.v. TiapayiyvsoGat. Since Ttapeivai and 7tapayiyveo0at, like pexexetv and
psxaXapPdvstV, are otherwise correlatives in pre-Platonic and Platonic philosophical usage, and
respectively used to denote state and process, I discuss TtUpuy'tyVBoOut here.
79 I start quoting at DK II, p. 358, 8 because of the affinity of the passage with Phaedo 60b, pointed out
by Diels.
80 See below ad loc.
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One doubtful example of 7tapayiyV8O0ai with inanimate subject is Thucydides I, 15:
KctTd yfjv 8e 7i6^ejj.og, 60sv xxq Kai 8i3vapic; raxpsyevexo, obSsiq
%l)V80TTj.81 If the text of the manuscripts is to be kept, it is to be translated 'wars by
land there were none, none at least by which power was acquired,'82 or 'there was no
warfare by land which resulted in the acquisition of an empire'83; i.e. Suvaptc;
7iapsysV8TO is to be taken as absolute, power arose or power came into being or even
there was power, if TlC, KGll Suvapl^ is any power at all, 8uV(X|J.l^ TtapsysvSTO
instead ofSrivajll^ sysvsxo suggest 'to anybody whomsoever'; for that, it is probably
not necessary to change the text by converting Ziq to TIGl, or inserting TlCJl into the
clause somewhere.84
81 Pace W.H. Forbes, Thucydides. Book I. Part II, Oxford 1895, p. 21 note ad loc., p. 118: " ... O08V
Tlcg Kal 8uvapi<; 7iapsy8V8XO ... . These words may also mean, not 'whence any power accrued,'
but 'which brought any considerable force into the field.' 7tapaylyvopat is very common in
Thucydides in the sense 'come into the field,' and is never used by him in the sense of rcpooyiyvoput,
'accrue.' On the other hand Ttapayiyvopat is found in the sense of TtpooyiyVOput in other Attic
prose authors (see Liddell and Scott): and the use of O0SV here (not dj or Stp' OV) and the parallel in
sense with 'toxbv 8s 7tSplS7tOlljoavxo opco^ obK SA(r/iOTr|V just above are in favour of the
interpretation 'power accrued.' Stahl proposes to read 7tSplsy£v8XO, a slight change which removes all
difficulty." If or in what sense it is correct to declare that 'other Attic prose authors' use
'7tapaylyvopat in the sense of 7tpocylyvopat' is another matter; Thucydides does not. Cf. also
E.C. Marchant, Thucydides. Book I, London 1905, p. 160f.; and also A.W. Gomme, A Historical
Commentary on Thucydides I, Oxford 1945, p. 126: "O08V TIC Kal 86vaptC 7tapsysV8TO: O0SV
shows that the result of a war is meant, and we should therefore read 7tepisy8V8TO with Tournier,
Stahl, Hude (1908), or Xiol for Xlt^ with Wilamowitz and Hude (1913); though even with Xiol we
should expect 7lpOOSy8V8XO. Croiset, however, keeping the MSS. reading, translates: "par suite de
laquelle des forces vraiment considerables aient ete mises en ligne"; which is perhaps right."
82
Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by R. Crawley, revised by R. Feetham,
Chicago 1952.
83
Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by R. Warner, London 1954.
84 Another doubtful case is Archytas 47B1 which if the textual tradition were sound would be of
particular importance owing to the alleged influence of the Tarentine on Plato. In a treatise on
Harmonics, Archytas discusses the generation of sound by way of things hitting each other. Some of
those sounds we cannot perceive at all. He continues (DK I, p. 433, 13): XCl p8V 08V 7COXl7t'l7i:XOVXa
7toxl xav alo0aaiv a pev &7to xav nXayav xaxv 7iapayivexai Kal <taxi)pco<;>, o^sa
cpaivexai, xa 8e ppaSecoc Kal aoOevcoc;, Papea Sokoovxi fjpev. The context (cf. in
particular p. 435, 1 - 5), however, suggests very strongly that the correct reading is 7tttpaKlV8lXUl
instead of 7tapaylvsxat.
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With or without dativus commodi, Tiapayly V8O0CM with inanimate subject is not in
frequent use before Plato. It is difficult to say if many examples like Isocrates Philippus
(V, 34), [f| 7toA.ig r| fipsxepa] povr) ... xouq naibaq xd>v cpoPcov xcov del




As would be expected, the different uses of the verb Tiapeival are found in Plato's
early dialogues as well. Most often, naturally, it is people who are present. Second to
that, as said above, the present participle of the verb is used, denoting present time both
in the phrase fev X(8 (VUV) 7iapovxi (passim) and in phrases like f| Ttapouca XUXf|
and I] 7iapOUOa GbpcpOpd (Crito 43c3; 47al). In the early dialogue Ion, Socrates
once refers to those OIC, vote; {lf| 7ldpsoxiV (Ion 534d3). That is comparable to
both Sophocles Electra 1032: bWd. ool pdOljOl^ ob Ttdpd and Euripides Orestes
1180: &Tt£l XO ODV8XOV y' o!8a ofl V|/X>xfj 7iapoV. When Socrates asks Meno
(Meno 77d3): Ttoxspov riyoupsvoc; xd xaKd cocpeA-siv 8K8ivov ro av
ysvr|xai, fj yiyvcboKCOV xd KaKd oxi pX,a7txei q av 7iapf|, that usage of
7iapsivai is like that of Hecuba (Euripides Hecuba 585): (8 Guyaxsp, oi)K ol8'
e'lc; O XI P^8\J/C0 KaK(Sv, I 7toA,X.CDV Tiapovxcov; Plato's usage does not differ
from common Greek usage as far as those applications of the word are concerned.
That may be slightly different with the noun TiapOUOta and the use of the verbs
7iapeivai and rcapayiyVSoGai in connection with the noun. The two contexts in
which TtapODOia occurs in Plato's dialogues before the passage in the Phaedo, Gorgias
85 See below on Gorgias 506dl. Xenophon, Memorabilia IV, II, 2, adopts usage employed by Socrates
and others in Plato's dialogues.
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497f. and Lysis 217f., will therefore now be discussed in turn. By Gorgias 461, rhetoric,
the topic of discussion between Gorgias and Socrates, has been linked with the subject of
justice and injustice. As Gorgias appears to contradict himself, Polus, a younger friend of
Gorgias, takes over and gets involved in an argument whether it is better to suffer or to
do wrong. After a hint at 463, Socrates introduces the categories of beautiful and ugly in
connection with good and bad and pleasure and pain at 474. Socrates manages to obtain
Polus' agreement that it is worse to do than to suffer wrong on the grounds that doing
wrong is 'uglier', and concludes, a little abruptly, that the just man has no real use for the
practice of rhetoric. At that point, at 481b, Callicles, the Athenian host of Gorgias and -
except for 447, the very beginning of the dialogue, and a brief remark at 458 - passive
by-stander to the conversation, enters angrily into the discussion. He introduces the
distinction 'by nature' and 'by law or custom' and maintains that by 'nature' suffering
wrong is both worse and 'uglier' than doing wrong. His second distinction is that
between the weak people who constitute the largest part of the population and are
responsible for law and custom, and those who are capable of having more, the stronger,
more able, better and worthier (483). In his search for who these 'better' people are,
Socrates makes Callicles concur that they are those who are more 'sensible and
knowledgeable' (489e). Callicles is then forced to specify that he means those who are
more 'sensible and knowledgeable' in matters concerning state and society, and who are
'courageous' enough to enforce their views; and further, those who rule and know no
bounds to their rule, be it over others or themselves (491). Callicles position is that
'pleasurable' and 'good' is one and the same, 'understanding' and 'courage', however,
are different from each other and from 'the good' (495d). Socrates first proves this
wrong by showing that while one cannot live well and badly at once, it is possible to
experience pleasure and displeasure at once, and while the latter two may cease to exist
simultaneously, that is not the case with the former two (497).
Socrates then begins an new argument to the same effect with the following words
(497el): xoug &ya0oi)<; ob^i &ya0cov Tiapoixria &ya0ou<; KaX,ei<;, cocmep
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[XOUg] KaX-Oug otg av K&XXoc, 7rapf|; He continues by reminding Callicles of his
calling the brave and sensible good, the cowardly and senseless bad, and showing that
these two groups of people experience pleasure and pain to the same extent. Are then
both the good and the bad both good and bad to the same extent? He resumes (498d2):
oGk 0I0G' on xoug fryaGoug fryaGcov cpflg 7iapouoia sivai fryaGoug,
Kai KaKoug 8s KaK&v; xa 8s fryaGa slvat xag f|8ovag, kaica 8b xag
dviag; - Bycoys. - oGkouv xotg xa^Pouolv ^apboxiv x&yaGa, ai
f|8ovai, BiTtsp /aipouoiv; - 7tcog yap ou; - oGkouv feyaGcov Tiapovxrov
fryaGoi sioiv oi xaipovxsg; - va^- - 8b; xoig dmcopsvoig oG
Tiapsoxtv xa KaKa, ai A-urcai; - rcapsoxiv. - KaKCOv 8s ys 7iapouoia
cpflg ou sivai KaKoug xoug KaKoug- f| oGkbxi cpfig; - Byooys.
The same thought recurs seven pages later in the dialogue. After Callicles has
introduced the distinction 'good pleasures' and 'bad pleasures', Socrates restates what
he established with Polus at 467c - 468e, that everything else is done for the sake of the
good (499e). That includes pleasant things, so that we do 'the pleasant' because of 'the
good', xo f|8u BVSKa xou fryaGou (506c9; cf. 500a2). Socrates continues (506c9):
f|8u 8s soxiv xouxo ou 7iapaysvopsvou r|8opsGa, fryaGov 8s ou
7iapovxog fryaGoi sapsv; - Tiavu ys. - dXXd jir^v fryaGoi ys sopsv
Kai fipsig Kai z&XXa navza oo' &yaGa feaxiv, &psxf|g xivog
7iapaysvop.6vrig; - spoiys Soke? frvayKaiov sivai, & KaA,AAKX,sig. -
(iXXd psv 8^ f| ys frpsxi} SKaoxou, Kai oKsuoug Kai acbpaxog Kai
\(/uxri<; au Kai Ccp00 Tiavxog, oG xcp siKfi KaA,A,iaxa 7iapayiyvsxai, ... ;
This last passage, as can be seen from the presence of TiapayiyvsoGai besides
7tapsivai, deals with the process of becoming in addition to the state of being good.
Tiapouoia at Gorgias 497f. occurs in the context of psychology or characterology or
whatever other term be deemed most suitable. At its first occurrence, a case parallel to
that of the presence of good things is added by way of explanation: Do you not call the
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good <people> good through the presence of good <things>, just as <you call>
beautiful <those> to whom beauty is present? When the statement is repeated a page
later, it is expanded; different types of people, people with differing qualities are
characterised. The reason for their difference is seen in the presence of something or,
respectively, the presence of its opposite. What is present in the one case are &ya0d,
good things, and these good things are then said to be at f)5oval, the pleasures; in the
other case K(XK(X, bad things, are present, and these bad things are Oil dviat or at
X,U7iai, the distresses and griefs or displeasures.
Before one can begin to explore logical implications of this repeated statement, and
draw inferences for the rest of Socrates' argument, it is necessary to see what exactly
Socrates is proposing at this point. Callicles is asked to agree that he call TOl)£
dyaGoOx; dyaGcov Tiapouolqi dyaGofx;, coo7iep kclXovc, otq av K&^og
7tapf|. And he does agree to it. That is at a stage where Callicles still speaks his mind
and does as yet not simply reply 'if it please you', with only little variation in his choice
of words. So, whatever we as modern readers may feel, the addressee of Socrates'
statement takes no offence at the words in their present form. Plato thus presents them as
acceptable. Nevertheless, there is an indication that something is slighdy unusual with the
first part of the sentence: that one calls good people good 'through' or 'by' or 'because
of' the presence of good <things>. If it did not have anything peculiar about it, the
additional clause, just as cone calls> beautiful <those> 'to' or 'with' or 'at' whom
beauty is <present>, would not be necessary. Or, conversely, as there is an additional
clause, its presence must be explained, and I think it is best understood as a necessary
explanation of what is said in the first clause. Necessary because something is not clear in
terms of content, or of language, or of both language and content.
It seems, at least, as if Socrates thought that Callicles would find it easier to understand
or to accept the statement KaX6(^ (S K&XXoc, TiapSGTl, or the generalising and
therefore perhaps slightly stronger one KdXdc, ft) av K&XXoq Ttapf), than the
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other, Ol fryaOol &ya0COV Tcapouola &ya0Ol. If we suppose for the moment that
this latter statement is a semantically and pragmatically fully equivalent linguistic
alternative to 6.ya0O£ CO &ya0d 7iapeoxi, the difference between that and KdXdc,
(8 KdX^og Tidpeoxi is twofold. On the one hand there is the lexical difference of the
predicate adjective of the main clause, dya0O^ versus KClXoc,, on the other the lexical
and grammatical difference of the subject of the relative clause functioning as subject of
the main clause, dya0d versus KaXX.0^. Apparently, Socrates considers the statement
that someone is 'beautiful to whom beauty is present', with the noun K&X,X,0£ in the
singular, as more readily intelligible than that someone is 'good to whom good <things>
are present'. That could be so either because there is a difference in content relevant for
those statements between 'good' and 'beautiful', or between the subject's being a noun
in the singular and, respectively, a neuter adjective in the plural.
Perhaps it is best, however, to start with looking for how Callicles could understand the
sentence in a way which enabled him to agree without question. Callicles says to
Socrates in his first long speech at 484cd that those who concern themselves with
philosophy for too long a time will be unacquainted (drcsipoc;) with all those things with
which to be acquainted (8fl7t8ipo^) is necessary for 'a man who wants to be KCtA-OV
Kdya0OV Kat 81jS6kI|10V'. He then provides a number of examples of what one
should have experience of: 'the laws of the state, the language used in private and public
negotiations, the human pleasures and desires, and altogether the customs'. After a
lengthy exposition on the evils of philosophy when practised excessively, he finishes his
speech by quoting and interpreting some Euripidean lines (486b): KailOl 71C0<;
oocpov xouxo koxiv, (5 ScoKpaxeq, tjtk; eCxpufj XaPouoa xs^vr)
tpcox' 80r|K8 3(siPova> - ; akX\ cbya0s, spot 7rel0ou, nauoai 5s
eXeyxcov, Ttpayjj.axcov 8 eujiouoiav aoKst, kal aoicei 6ti608v
S6£,ei<; cppoveTv, ... • £r]Xcc)v obic kXeyxovxaq avSpag xa piKpa
xauxa, tiXX' otq soxiv Kat ptoc; xat So^a Kai aXXa tioXXcl 6tya0a. For
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how is this <a> wise <thing>, Socrates, an art which taking a well-endowed
man renders him worse ... ? But, my good man, trust me, stop scrutinising words,
exercise the soundness of practical pursuits, and exercise what will make
you seem sensible, ... : do not imitate men scrutinising such small matters, but those 'to
whom is' [i.e.: who have] a living, a reputation, and many other good <things>.
In his last clause, Callicles presumably refers to those men who would fit his earlier
description of being KaA.ol KdyaGol Kal et>8oKl|J.Ol, but here he paraphrases
olg soxiv Kal plog Kal 8o^a Kal a'k'ka noXXa dyaGa. As piog Kal
8o£,a are themselves good things, Callicles' usage suggests indeed that he calls KaX-OOg
KdyaGoug those Oig eaxtv tcoXXcl dyaGa. That is not at all far away from
Socrates' question at 497e: xoog dyaGoog obxl dyaGoov Ttapouola dyaGooc;
KaX-eig, cooTiep Ka^oog otc; av Ka>Ao<; 7iaprj;
I think, therefore, that one need not suppose that Callicles need have interfered at this
point on grounds of the content of Socrates' question which in terms of the dramatics of
the dialogue may even contain a deliberate verbal allusion on Socrates' part to the
closing sentence of Callicles', just as the latter's words are echoed by Socrates at 490e
when he says: dAX e'l pfj xa xoiaoxa Xtysiq, tacog xa xoia8e- otov
yscopyiKOV avSpa rcepl yfjv cppovipov xe Kal KaA,dv Kal dyaGov,
xouxov Srj locog n^eoveKxsiv xcov a7t8ppdxcov Kal cog 7iA,elaxcp
a7t8ppaxi XPfl°Gal s'l£ T11v at'cou yf|V. This part as well of Socrates'
examination begins with an address in the second person singular and is thus phrased in a
way to suggest that 'what Callicles says' is of interest to Socrates. In his search for what
Callicles meant by declaring that 'the better men' had by nature a right to have more,
7l^80V8KXSlV or 7tA,80V 8XSIV, he modifies Callicles' phrase KClXov KdyaGdv
Kal sb8oKifj.ov by saying cppovipov xe Kal KaXdv Kal dyaGov. It is to be
noted, though, that this modification is not distorting, and that although it was Socrates
who at 489e introduced the term cppovipog by asking: ... XOl>g PeXxloug Kal
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Kpelxxoug Ttoxspov xoug cppovijicoxepoug A,sysiC, f) dAAoUg xivag,
Callicles had used cppovsiv in his final exhortation at 486c, and he readily picks up
Socrates' suggestion when he confirms (490a): dAAd xaux' SOXIV a X.syCD. XOUXO
yap olpai kyoo xo SlKatov elvai (pboei, xo PeA-xloo ovxa Kal
cppovipcoxspov Kal ap%etv Kal xclsov e%eiv xoov cpau^oxepcov.
More importantly, if Socrates is in accordance with Callicles' usage and sentiments in
asking (497e): xoug dyaGoug ob%l dyaGcov Ttapouoia dyaGoug KaXsig,
CDOTtsp KaX,obg otc^ av KaAAog Ttapfj, one need not speculate at this point what
Socrates could have meant by dyaGd, or what he wanted Callicles to understand, or
how Callicles understood it. The content of dyaGd need not be specified for Callicles,
since he cannot be expected to find fault at this point with an expression he himself had
used.86 This is not to deny that Socrates knew where he wanted the argument to be
leading to. It is, however, to forestall attacks on Socrates by modern readers of the
dialogue who suggest that Socrates' question is both misconceived and unfair in
suggesting that Callicles calls xoug dyaGoug dyaGcov Ttapouoia dyaGoug87 .
When Socrates asks Callicles (497e): XOUg dyaGoug ob)(l dyaGcov Ttapouoia
dyaGoug KaA,eig, cooTtsp KaXoug otg av KaXAog Ttaprj, he uses dyaGcov
7tapOUOia in just the same way Euripides had used KaKCOV Ttapouoia (Hecuba
227f.). KaWoq Ttapsoxi has its parallel in Anacreon's fj(3r| Ttdpa. Likewise with
Socrates' and Callicles' exchange at 498d2: ot)K oloG' OXI xoug dyaGoug
dyaGcov (prjg Ttapouola etvai dyaGoug, Kal KaKobg 5s KaK&v; xa 5e
dyaGa slvai xag f]5ovag, KaKa 5s xag dvlag; - sycoye. - obKouv xoig
86 Cf. also Gorgias 46ib4: IIQAOZ ... fj otet - on Topyiag fiaxbv0r| oot pi)
7cpoaopo^oyf|oat xov piytoptKov avSpa pi) ob%l Kal xa 5'iKata st86vat Kal xa
Ka7.a Kal xa aya0&, ... ;
87 Pace T. Irwin, Plato. Gorgias, Oxford 1979, p. 203. Cf. E.R. Dodds, op. cit., p. 314. Dodds renders
ayaOcbv 7tapOUOia by "owing to the presence in them of good things". 'In them' seems to me to be
an addition, and it leads to confusion with Irwin who adopts it (loc. cit.).
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Xaipoixnv TKxpsoxiv xdya0a, ai f|5ovai, sinsp xafPol)<nv; - ^cog T^P
ob; - obKOUV dyaBdov Tiapovxcov dyaGoi eiciv oi xa^POVTSG; - va*- -
xi 5s; xoig dvicopevoig oi) Tiapecxiv xa Kaicti, ai X,i)7iat; - 7idpeaxtv.
- KaK&v 5s ys Tiapouaia cpfjg ob etvai KaKobg xobg KaKobg: f\
oi)K8Xl (pf|g; - sycoys. As we have seen, the use of dya0d, KaKa, f)5ovf|, and
X,f)7ir| as subjects to Ttapsivai has its precedents in poetical and philosophical usage.
The same is true with Socrates' second dealing with that topic (Gorgias 506c - 508c).
Socrates declares (506c9): f|5i) 5s bcxiv XOUXO ob Ttapayevopsvoi)
f|5ojj.s0a, dya0ov 5s ob Ttapovxog dyaGoi sapsv; ... bX'kd prjv dyaGoi
ys bapev Kai f|psig Kai xdXka ndvxa oa' dyaGa bcxiv, dpexf|g xivog
7iapayevojj.evr|g; ... b'k'ka psv 5rj f) ys dpexfj sKaaxoi), Kai oKeboug
Kai odopaxog Kai i|/i)xf|g Kai Ccp013 ^avxog, oi) xd> siKT) KaX>aaxa
raxpayiyvexai, ... ; Again, rj50 and dya0ov are present. dpexf|g xivog
rcapaysvopsvrit; and dpsxrj Ttapayiyvsxai, however, are expressions introduced
here for the first time in the dialogue.
The expression dpsxfj Ttapayiyvsxai and the notion connected with it is found
elsewhere in Plato's early dialogues. The opening question of the dialogue Meno is
(70al): e^eig poi sinew, do ZcoKpaxeg, apa SiSaKxdv fj dpsxrj; f| oi)
5i5aKxov dAA' doKrjxov; f| ouxs doKTjxov ouxe pa0r|xov, d'k'kd (pbcsi
Tiapayiyvsxai xoig dv0pd)7toig f| aMtCp Xivi xponcp; This is an elaborate
Gorgianic period, and we learn presently that Meno who asks Socrates this question is
himself a pupil of Gorgias. Socrates explains that, before deciding that, one has to know
what dpsxfj is. When Socrates poses this question for the fifth or sixth time after
various unsuccessful attempts at an answer by Meno, Meno repeats his original request
(Meno 86dl): dXX' eycoye BKSivo av f)5iaxa, onep fpopr|v xo npcoxov,
Kai oK8\)/al|xr|v Kai dKobcaipi, noxepov cog 5i5aKxcp ovxi abxcp 5ei
smxsipeiv, f| dog cpbcei f| cog xivi noxe xponcp Ttapayiyvopevrig xoig
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dv0pCD7TOl£ TTjc; dpsxf|£. Eventually, it is Socrates who summarises their efforts at
the end of the dialogue. He says to Meno (99e2): 81 §8 vuv fipeiq 8v 7tavxi xcp
Xoyco xouxcp Ka^ax; fe^rixfjoapsv xs Kai eA,eyopev, dpexr^ av eir| ouxe
cpuaei ouxe SiSaKxov, (iXXd 0eia poipa 7iapayiyvopevr| aveu vou otg
av 7tapayiyvr|xai, si pf| xiq eir| xoiouxot; xcdv tto>.ixikcov dv8pcov
oio<; Kai aA,X,ov 7lOlf|oai TTO^lXtKOV. The repetition of the words, not only the
thought of dpsxf) Tiapayiyvsxai, suggests that they were a sort of set phrase,
perhaps a stock topic of Gorgias' own teaching.
Earlier than that, in the Protagoras, Protagoras declares in the explanation following his
myth (323c4): oxi psv ouv 7tavx ' avSpa e'lKoxcoq drcoSexovxai Ttepi
xauxiy; xf|q dpexf|<; aupPou^ov 8ia xo f|yeio0at itavxi pexsivai
abxrjg, xauxa Xkym: oxi 8s abxi^v ot> cpuaei r|youvxai etvai oi)8' (mo
xoi) atixopaxou, dXXd SiSaKxov xe Kai e£, kmpe^eiat; 7tapayiyveo0ai
<p av 7tapayiyvr|xai, xouxo aoi psxa xouxo 7teipdoopai d7io8ei£,ai.
That in saying ot> (puosi Protagoras means 'not by nature alone'' is evident from 327b/c
where he admits differences in skill, and analogously dpexfj, according to an individual's
being s(j(pi)f|^ or d(puf|C; respectively. All that is said in what Socrates later (329a,b
etc.) calls a paKpdc; ^oyoc;. In a fragment of one of Protagoras' own writings,
referred to as fieydt; A.oyoc;, Protagoras expresses a similar thought (DK 80B3). oxi
fev xcp sniypacpopsvcp 'peyd^co >w6ycp' 6 Ilpcoxayopaq sine- '(poaeooc;
Kai doKrjoecoq 8i8aaKaXAa Ssixai' Kai 'd7io veoxr|xo<; 8e dp£,dpevo<;
8si pav0dveiv'.
While the Protagoras contains constructive doctrines proposed by the master, the
Euthydemus is full of destructive arguing by two of his adherents88. In their manner of
speaking and, most of all, their usage89 they follow Protagoras, and their program as
well is modelled on his. In the beginning of the dialogue, the younger brother
88 Cf. Euthydemus 286c.
89 Cf. F.G. Herrmann, Wrestling Metaphors in Plato's Theaetetus, in: NIKEPHOROS 8 (1995), 77 -
109, pp. 101 - 106.
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Euthydemus declares (273d8): dpexf|V, Stprj, c5 ScOKpaisq, o'lOJJ.80a OICO 18
eivai 7iapa8ouvai KaAAiox' dv0pco7tcov Kai xaxtoxa. Here Ttapa8oi>vai
is the causative or factitive to 7tapayiyvso0ai; by their action of dpSXTjV
TtapaSouvai they effect dpexfjv 7iapayiyveo0ai. The common prefix Tiapa- is
suggestive of the semantic relation.
While in many respects the Euthydemus is connected with the sophist Protagoras,
Euthydemus' statement a few lines later (274al0), S7t' at)XO y8 XOUXO TtdpSGpev,
c5 ScOKpaxeq, is strongly reminiscent of the opening paragraphs of the Gorgias where
Chaerephon uses the same words in response to Callicles when he says (447b6): 871'
at)XO ye XOl XOUXO Ttdpeopev, even if the context of the remark is a different one.
Reminiscent of the dialogue Gorgias as well, both in usage and in content, is the
following passage from the Euthydemus (280b 1): Ol)VCOpoX,oyr|odp.80a
xe^euxrovxec; otnc ol8' ottcgc; fev KecpaXatco ooxco xooxo e/eiv, ocxpiag
Tiapouoriq, cp av 7iapf|, pr|8sv 7ipoo8eio0ai ebxuxiac;- b7iei5r^ 5e xobxo
oi)vcopoX,oyr|odp80a, 7idA.iv S7iuv0avopr|v abxob xa 7ipoxepov
copoX-oyripeva av r|ptv e/oi. cbpoX,oyf|oap8v yap, ecprjv, ei ripiv
dya0a noXXd 7tapeir|, ebSaipoveiv av Kai e£> Ttpaxxsiv. - oi)vecpr|. -
ap' ouv ebSaipovoipev av 8ia xa 7tapovxa dya0a, ei jir|8ev f|pac;
dxpeXoi f| si dlcpsA-Ol; The substitution of oocpia for dp8XT| had been effected by
Socrates at 237d,e where he moves from dpsxf), the term used by Euthydemus, first to
buoxfjpr|, and then to GOCpla. Otherwise, the affinity of this passage to Gorgias 497f.
and 506f. is remarkable. Incidentally, the statement that ei f|jliv dya0d TtofXd
7iapeir|, sbSatpovetv av Kai eb 7ipdxxeiv <f|pd(;> which is readily agreed
upon here can serve as external confirmation for the conclusion reached above for
reasons internal to the Gorgias, that the similar statement there could be readily
understood by all present.90
90 T. Irwin, op. cit., p. 219, objects to Socrates' argument at Gorgias 506c,d: "Socrates begins with the
over-simplified account of the relation between the presence of a good and a person's being good, which
he used against Callicles at 497de. Here he also claims that the presence of goods produces 'goodness'
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While that passage of the Euthydemus pointed to its connection with the Gorgias, a
related one two pages later suggests the theme of Gorgianic Meno and the Protagoras91
CEuthydemus 282c2): fftivi) pev o6v ef) poi SoKSlc; ?ueyeiv, fj 5' oq. - 81
son ye, co KA,eivia, fjv 5' kycb, f| oocpia 8i5aKx6v, hXXa pr\ kno
xabTopaxou Tiapayiyvexai xoic; &v0pcD7ioi<;- ... .
The thought of dpsxrj rtapayiyvsxai is thus present in the context of Plato's
dialogues with both the Sophist Protagoras and his followers, and the rhetor Gorgias and
his pupils. It is clearly connected with education, and even if in what is reported verbatim
of either Protagoras or Gorgias they do not use those words, I think it can be deduced
with a fair degree of certainty from the four dialogues Gorgias, Protagoras, Meno and
Euthydemus that the phrase dpsxr) Ttapaylyvexai itself was current among the
Sophists.
V.
If all that be so, if Plato's usage at Gorgias 497f. and 506f. has its precedents with
regard to both the semantic and the syntactic conventions of 7iap8ivai, Tiapouola,
and JtapayiyvsoGai, is that to say that there is nothing unusual or new at all with
Socrates' question (497e): xoug ftyaGout; ob^i fryaG&v rcapouaia dyaGouq
(excellence, virtue; arete\ see 457c) in whatever it is present in - an equally implausible claim. The
parallel with 'When pleasure is present, we have pleasure (enjoyment)' should surely be 'When good is
present, we are well off (i.e. it is good for us).'... ." To leave aside the confusion over 'presence in
something' - cf. Section IV. n. 87 above - the objection loses its ground in the light of this statement in
the Euthydemus. If it is at all correct to say that SI f||itV dyctGd KoXXd 7rapSlT|, SU av
7rpdtTXSlV <f|pdc>, and if overall SU 7tpdxxSlV equals sb8cup0VsTv, and if sbSaipoVElV and
dyaGdq Stvai are the same thing, then it is not objectionable to hold with Socrates and Callicles
(506c9) that as f)8u 86 soxiv xouxo ou uapaysvopsvou f|86p.s0a, so dyaGov 8s ou
7iap6vxoc; dya0Ol sopsv. The difficulty for both the ancient and the modern reader does not lie
with the language or the logic of Socrates' argument, but with a basic disagreement over what is good. It
is resolved when the dya0d of the protasis really are dya0d.
91 Cf. also 274d,e.
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KaA,Sig, COOTcep KaA-OCq olq av Kd^X-Og Ttapfl? Is it correct unqualifiedly to
adduce as a similar and comparable case Charmides 158e7, 8f|A,0V yap Oil 81 OOl
Tiapeoxiv ococppoo\3vr|, e^ei? xi 7ispi at>xf|<; So^a^eiv, and to assume that
that is common Greek from Homer onwards?92
In one point, I think, Gorgias 497elf. does differ from both the pre-Platonic examples
discussed above and the early Platonic examples collected in the previous section - but I
am not sure if that is a matter of usage.
When Homer says 81 pot 8uvapi<; ye 7tapelr| (Iliad 22, 20), that is virtually the
same as s'l Sl)valjjt|v ye (cf. Iliad 1, 393). A sentence like Odyssey 17, 347, OtlScoc;
8' oi)K dyaGtj k8%prjjj.ev(p avSpi Tiapeivai, as good as amounts to saying either
aiSeoGai otnc dyaGov Ke^pripsvq) avSpi or ks%pfjpevq) avSpt oi)K
fiyaGov a'lSolcp elvai. In these and most of the other cases cited in the previous
sections, the phrase containing the verb Ttapstvai could be replaced by a phrase
containing an adjective or a verb which expressed the notion denoted by the respective
subjects to the verb Ttdpsivat. In each case it would be difficult to say wherein the
exact difference between the two corresponding clauses lies.
A good example of this apparent semantic equivalence of different ways of phrasing the
same thought is Charmides 158b: 81 pSV OOl fj8r| TtdpsoxiV, ($q Xeyei
Kpma<; 68s, ocotppoouvri Kai el ococppcov iicavctx;, ot>Ssv exi ooi eSei
... .c s'l 8' exi xooxcov kixiSsrjc; stvai 8oksi<;, 'enaozeov Tipo xf|<; rov
(pappaKOi) dooscaq. abrdq ouv poi elite noxepov 6poA,oyei<; reads Kai
(prjq iKavcoc; rj8r| ococppoouvric; pexe%eiv f| fevSerfe slvai; Here it seems as
if to the native Greek speaker, OCOCppCQV el, OCOCppOOUVrj TtdpsoxiV OOl, and
92 Cf. Dodds, op. cit., ad loc. G. Vlastos, The Individual as Object of Love in Plato. Appendix I: Is the
Lysis a Vehicle ofPlatonic Doctrine?, in id., Platonic Studies, Princeton 1973, pp. 35 - 37. Irwin, op.
cit., ad loc. - For Charmides 157a6, cf. the discussion in the chapter on 8yyiyV£O0at and kvBlVCXl
below.
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OCO(ppoOl3vr|<; ^zx&ysxc, were not only describing the same state of affairs, but were
also otherwise fully equivalent.93
All three phrases say something about the person they are predicated of. They say of
Charmides that he is moderate. In the fifth century at least, that does not presuppose
anything about the status of what is predicated. It does not imply anything about
OCO(ppOOl3vr|. If oco(ppoot3vrj TitipeoxiV ooi and ococppcov et are equivalent,
OCO(ppooi3vrj need not be anything in itself.94
Charmides exists, and he is moderate. But does moderation exist? - A native speaker
employing the phrase OCOCppoODVT| 7idpeoxiV need not have thought about
OCO(ppOOl3vr| as something in its own right at all. That is different with Charmides
I58e7: 8f|A,ov yap oxi el ooi Tiapsoxiv ococppoouvri, xi rcspi
auxfjc^ So^ti^eiv. Instead of declaring that "if moderation 'is to' Charmides one can
say something about Charmides", Socrates postulates that "if moderation 'is to'
Charmides one can say something about moderation". - That is Socrates' new and
original assumption.
The question XI SOXt dpexf| can be, and in Platonic dialogues frequently is,
understood as a question about people. It is understood that way notably by Socrates'
interlocutors. As such, it is not Socrates' question but a question which belongs to his
times and circumstances. Only if XI 80X1 &pexf|, or XI koxi OCO(ppOOt3vr|, is
understood as a question about dpsxf) and about OCO(ppoauvr|, and not about people's
being good and people's being moderate, &psxf| and OCO(ppOOUVT| respectively can be
regarded as something in their own right. That, of course, does as yet not tell us anything
about the status assigned to them, it does not even imply that they were thought of as
93 The same could presumably be said of OCDCppOVSiq. Cf. Protagoras 332a - e, with comments by W.
Wieland, Platon und die Formen des Wissens, Gottingen 1982, p. 138f. There, however, it is not clear to
me if imp GGXppoobvriq 7tp&XXStV really is in conformity with common Greek usage, but that does
not affect Wieland's general point. Cf. generally J. Lyons, Structural Semantics. An Analysis of Part of
the Vocabulary ofPlato, Oxford 1969.
94 Cf. Section I above.
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having any particular status. Asking for dpsxf| and acO(ppOOUVr|, however, rather than
for a person's being good or moderate, is a premise to asking what status dpSXTJ and
OCOCppOOUVT] have. Charmides 158e7, 5f|A,OV yap OXl 81 OOl TtapBOXlV
ocotppoouvr), e^stc; xi Tispi abxr\q 8o^d£siv, implies that ooocppoo\3vr| is
something - at least an object of thought.
In the same way, Gorgias 497elf., xoC><; dyaGouc; ob^l dyaGcbv raxpouala
dyaGouc; KaA.sig, c6o;isp KaA,ob(; olq av xaXAoc; 7tapf|, implies that both
dyaGd and KdAAoc; are something. Just as at Charmides 158e7, Socrates assumes that
if one has moderation, one can pronounce an opinion about moderation, so at Gorgias
497el he postulates a relation between good people and something good, between
beautiful people and beauty. Regardless of how that relation is conceived - the
instrumental dative TtapoiXJia suggests a causal relation - for there to be a relation
there have to be relata.
The dyaGd by whose presence good men are called good are something distinct from
those good men. Likewise with the second clause. While KdAAoc; TldpeoxiV ai)XCp
can be said to equal KCtA-O^ SOXIV, in which case nothing is implied as to what
KaXAoc; may be, saying that that person is beautiful 'to whom there is beauty'95 implies
that that beauty is something distinct from that person. As we have seen,96 in the case of
the dyaGd it need not be surprising either to find that they are something distinct97, or
that it is their presence by which people are said to be good. - What is surprising is that
KdAAcx;, beauty, is said to be something distinct in the same way.
95 Note especially that K(X/.AO^ is in the singular and KaAOt)^ in the plural.
96 See Section IV above.
97 Cf. Gorgias 486b.
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VI.
498d2 does not offer anything more specific on the relation between &ya0d and
dya0oi either: otnc oio0' on xobg dya0obg dya0cov cpflg 7tapoi)oia etvai
dya0ob<Kai KaKobg 8s KaKcov; xa 8s dya0a sTvai Tag f|8ovag,
KaKa 8s xag dviag; - eycoye. - otncouv xoig xaipouaiv 7iapeoxiv
xdya0a, ai f|8ovai, si7isp xaipol)Glv'> ~ ^cog yap ob; - obKobv
dya0cov TtapovTOOv dya0oi eiatv oi xaip°VX8?; - va^- - 5s; ^oig
dvicopevoig ol) Ttapecmv xa KaKa, ai A,U7tai; - trdpeaxiv. - KaKOOv 8s
ys 7tapouala tpr^g ob slvai KaKobg xobg KaKobg- ... . Here it is not only
stated that the good are good by the presence of good things, but also that 'to those'
who are cheerful (or: experience pleasure) there are the good things, the pleasures, if
only they are cheerful. That is on the premise that all that is good is pleasure. But on that
assumption, it seems, the two statements that 'someone is good or experiences pleasure'
and 'good things or pleasures 'are to' someone' are materially equivalent: 'those who
experience pleasure experience pleasure if and only if good things or pleasures 'are to'
them'.
Neither this nor the following passage, however, specify the precise nature of the
relation which underlies this concomitance of 'good things being present' and 'people
being good'. Instead, Gorgias 506c9 presents further difficulties. On the newly granted
assumptions that good is not the same as pleasant, and that we do what we do for the
sake of the good, Socrates declares: f|Sb 8e feoxiv xobxo oi) Tiapayevopevoi)
f]8ops0a, dya06v 8e ob Ttapovxog dya0oi eapev; - Ttavi) ye. - tiXXd
pr\v dya0oi ye eopev Kai f)jj.eig Kai xdAAa Ttavxa oo' dya0a eaxiv,
dpexf|g xivog raxpayevojievrig; - epoiye SoKei dvayKaiov elvai, co
KaAAiK^eig. - dAAa pev bt\ f) ye dpexf^ eKaaxou, Kai oKeuoog Kai
ocbpaxog Kai yoxite Kai Ccpol) rcavxog, ob xco eiKr| KaAAioxa
Ttapaylyvexai, ... ;
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The passage gives rise to a number of questions without providing the answers. First, as
noted above, Tiapayiyvexai refers to a process, not to a state of affairs. Something
comes to be present. Does what comes to be present exist before it comes to be present,
or does it not? Secondly, while at 497f. Socrates spoke of dyaGd which are present, at
506 it is dyaGov. This term, the adjective in the neuter singular, was introduced in a
natural way in the context of discussion of the goal of and motivation for our actions.
Does replacing dyaGd by dyaGov make a difference to the content of the statement at
506? Does the introduction of the term dpSTf) make a difference to the argument? And
fourthly, is it the same relation which holds between the dyaGd and the dyaGol at
497f. and that at 506 between the dyaGov on the one hand, the dyaGol and all that is
dyaGd on the other? - Answers to at least some of these questions are suggested by
points raised in the dialogues from the Meno onwards; that is not to suggest, though,
that Plato had an answer ready at the time of composition of the Gorgias.
VII.
The question raised by Socrates half way through the short dialogue Lysis is (212a8):
87iei5dv Tic, xiva cpi^fj, noxspog xcoxspou epilog yiyvsxai, 6 (piXcov
xou (piAoupevou fj o (piA-oupsvot; XOU CplX,ODVXOq. In the course of
answering, investigation is extended to cover the meaning of (piX-O^ in all its
applications. In a conversation with Menexenos, Socrates explores the uses of the word
(piA,Oc; as an active, a passive, and a reciprocal term. Next, in a conversation with Lysis,
he propounds 'the poets' saying' that XO OJIOIOV XCp 6{lOlCp dvdyKT| del CplXov
Stvai (214b3). This is modified since the bad person or thing cannot be friend of or with
anything at all, the good one, on the other hand, seems to be self-sufficient, and therefore
not to be in need of anything or anyone. So, again with a poet's support, the opposite
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opinion is reached, TO SVaVTlOV TOO SVaVTlCD paXlOTa cplA-OV etvai (216a4).
The implications of that appear to be nonsense.
Thus at 216c, Socrates has a new suggestion: that the neither good nor bad is friend of
the good. This is elaborated by way of a medical example (217a,b): the diseased person's
body, being neither good nor bad as a body, longs for and is friend of medicine through
illness, 8ld vooov. From there, Socrates continues (217b4): to pf|Te kcxkov dpa
jirjT' dyaGov cpiXov ylyvsTai tod dyaGou 8ia KaKob napouoiav. -
eolKev. - 8f|X,ov 8s ye oti Tipiv yeveoGai ai)td kokov utio tou
KctKoi) ou exei. ob yap 8fj ye KaKdv yeyovdg c exi av ti too dyaGou
eTiiGupoi xai cpi^ov eiry dSbvaxov yap ecpapev xaKov dyaGcp (piA,ov
elvai. - aSuvaxov yap. - OKe\|/aa6e 8rj o A.eyco. X,eyco yap oti evia
pev, oiov av fj to Tiapov, ToiaoTa eoxi Kai abxd, evia 8e ob. cooTiep
el eGeX,oi Tig xpcbpati tco 6tioov dA,ei\|/ai, Tidpeaxiv tiou too
dA,si(pGevTi to bia^eicpGev. - Tiavo ye. - dp' obv Kai sotiv tots
toiootov xrjv xpoav to d^eicpGev, otov to ctiov;d - ob pavGavco, fj 8'
og. - dX,X' (888, fjv 8' eyco. ei Tig oou ^avGag obaag Tag Tpi^ag
i|/ipuGicp dXeixj/eiev, Tioxepov tot8 X,eoKai eiev f\ cpaivoivT' av; -
cpaivoivT' av, fj 8' og. - Kai prjv Tiapeir| y' av abxaig XeuKOTrig. -
vai. - aXX' opcog obSev ti paAAov av elev XeuKal ticg, dAAa
Tiapobor|g XeuKOTrycog outs ti XeoKai obxe pe^aivai eioiv. - aA,riGf|.
- dXX' oxav Sf|, (8 cplX.8, to yfjpag abxaig Tabxov touto xpcopa
bTiayayr|, tot8 eyevovxo oiovTiep to Tiapov, ^eoKob Tiapouaia e
X,80Kai. - Ticog yap ob; - tooto toivov epcoTco vbv 8fj, ei cp av ti
Tiapfj, toioutov eoxai to e/ov oiov to Tiapov- rj bav pev Kaxa Tiva
Tponov Tiapfj, eaxai, eav 8e pfj, ou; - outco pa^A,ov, scprj. - Kai to
pfpe kokov dpa pf|t' dyaGov evioxe kokou Tiapovxog ooticg kokov
eoTiv, eoTiv 8' ots fjSr) to toioutov yeyovev. - Tiavo ye. - oukouv
oxav pijTico KaKov fj kokou 7iapovTog, auxr) pev f| Tiapouoia dyaGou
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abxd ttoisi k7ii0\)|X8iv f| 8s Kaxov 7iotoboa bjioaxepei abxd xfjg xs
S7xi0D|j.i(xq apa Kai xf|<; cpiAAag xob &ya0ob. ob yap exi saxiv 218 obxs
KaKOV obxe &ya0ov, dAAa KaKov- cpiA-ov 8s dya0q> KaKdv ot>K fjv.
(Having obtained consent on that last point, Socrates resumes the argument after a brief
digression.) 218b6 vbv apa, fjv 8' byco, c5 Aboi Kai Meve^eve, 7tavx6<;
pa?Aov b^euprjKapsv o saxiv xo tptAov Kai ob. cpapev yap abxo, Kai
Kaxa xrjv \)/i)5Ci1v Kai Kaxa xo c aropa Kai Tiavxaxob, xo prjxs KaKov
prjxs 6tya0ov 8ia KaKob Tiapouoiav xob 8tya0ob cpiXov elvai. -
TiavxaTtaoiv bcpaxriv xs Kai oi)vexa)psixr|v obxco xobx' sxsiv.
On the basis of what has been said in the previous sections, this passage can be dealt
with briefly. The KaKOV which is present could be something external or internal. It is
distinct from that 'to which it is'. It affects that 'to which it is' just as if it were
something active (... yiyvexat ... 8ia KaKob 7tapouoiav.... ysvso0ai ... bno
xob KaKOU ob SXSt). As a result, that 'to which it is' may or may not become otov
&V fj XO 7tapOV. In the example of something which by being present does not turn
that 'to which it is' into something which is such as itself, what is present is something
external. That its presence is of an external nature is emphasised by the phrase OlOV XO
bTlOV, in which 7iapOV is replaced by STtOV. In the example of something which by
being present does turn that 'to which it is' into something which is such as itself
(bysvovxo otovTtsp xo Tiapov, X,suKob Tiapouola X,ei)Kai), what is present
is something internal. The distinction between the two cases is being introduced to
answer the question 81 CO CtV XI Tiapfj, XOIOUXOV eoxai XO 8XOV otov XO
7iapov- fj bav psv Kaxa xiva xpo7iov Tiapfj, soxai, sav 8s prj, ob; The
same thing can be present in different ways.98
It is one thing to ask how successful an example 'white' or 'whiteness' in the context of
'real' and 'true' versus 'merely perceived' colour of hair is in the Lysis', and it may be
98 kei)K6xr|<; must therefore be taken as referring always to the colour, and at no place to the paint.
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argued that, because colour is something so inextricably linked to the sense of vision, it is
not a good example after all. It is quite a different matter to claim that Plato was not
aware of the implications of the term Ttapouoia, when composing the early dialogues.
In the Gorgias, the word is used with apparent unconcern, but nevertheless in a fully
conscious way, as analysis of 497f. has shown;99 what is present there is not a physical,
corporeal object; whether what is present there exists at all is a question not raised.
Grammatically, though, TCClpOUOla is treated identically in the Gorgias and in the Lysis.
That is to say, the ox, whose presence meant so much danger to the integrity of
Socrates' character at Euthydemus 301a, would not have threatened Lysis and
Menexenus after their conversation with Socrates.
VIII.
From Homer to Plato, usage of TcapSlVOtl is altogether uniform. Leaving aside
impersonal use - a large number of composites in - SCIIV may be used to denote 'it is
possible' - the verb can refer to the presence of people, at a place, an event, a
conversation; the present or contemporary time; and finally the presence of things, in the
widest sense of that word. The things present may be material objects, but - from Homer
onwards - they may just as well be in-corporeal entities. Present in that way are not only
potentially divine powers, but a whole range of concrete and abstract things: forces,
emotions, states of mind, qualities, properties, actions, passions.
The noun TCapOUOia is narrower in its application; it can denote the presence of the
same sort of things the verb Ttapsivai does; it belongs to a different register, though,
and when used in prose may well have had connotations of poetic style and gravity.
TiapaYtyvsoGai, come to be present, on the other hand, tends to be used mostly with
people in early texts; the rise of sophistic teaching and education, however, made it
necessary to stress the advantages of acquisition of positive characteristics and abilities;
99 Cf. the discussion in Section IV above.
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consequently, the application of the verb was extended in that context so as to cover all
those qualities which were said to 'be present' with someone.
Sophistic education, influence of Gorgias and also Protagoras, is also the context in
which that potentially ontologically significant sentence is pronounced at Gorgias 497el:
toik; ftyaGoOx; ou^t fryaGoov Tiapouola ftyaGoux; KaX,8i^, ajo7iep kolXovc,
Ol(^ av K&XXoq 7tapf|; It cannot be said, however, how abstract a thing either the
fryaGti or KdXXoq were thought to be, and, whether genuine or not, the Hippias
Major should serve as a warning not to assume too readily that either was thought of as
even potentially abstract. An advance towards that distinction is made, though, when
TtapODOia is employed and its meaning and implications discussed at Lysis 217ab,
where it is established, at least partly explicitly, that things can be present in different
ways with different consequences, and that the consequence of the presence of a thing to




Ttpoostvai is not Ttapsivai, 7ipooyiyveo0ai not 7iapayiyveo0ai. irpoceivai
is 'to be besides', 'to be <to something> in addition <to something else>'.
7lpooylyveo0ai is 'to get to besides', do accrue'", do be added to'. In the case of
Ttpooeivai TlVl or JipooyiyvsoGal TlVl, the dative, be it of whatever gender,
depends on -eivai, as with the simplex or any other of its compounds; 7ipoo- may be
taken quasi-adverbially100. The two verbs may occur in Platonic dialogues in the context
of discussion of ontological matters as shorthand for 7ipOG7iap£lvai,
7tpoo7tapayiyveo0ai, two formations not found with Plato, nor, as far as I am aware,
in Greek texts earlier than Plato either. Some confusion is created by a manuscript
reading at Phaedo lOOd, and by the dialogue Hippias Major 01. Since Plato does not
employ either of the two verbs with great frequency, all the occurrences of TtpoosiVCtl
and 7ipooyiyvso0ai in the early dialogues will be discussed in this chapter. Before
that, a few instances of the words in earlier Greek literature.
Aeschylus' Agamemnon is among the earliest extant texts containing either word. The
herald of the army has arrived at Argos and has greeted the land and the gods, and
praised Agamemnon, in the presence of the chorus of elderly citizens. In the ensuing
exchange between the herald and the chorus-leader, the latter's warnings about what has
100 Cf., on 7iapd and 7tup£tVUt, Section I of the chapter on 7tapOl)oia, 7tapeivat, and
7rapayiyV8O0at, with note 65. For 7ip00£tvat and 7tp6^ with locative cf. E. Schwyzer, Griechische
Grammatik II, p. 509, 512f.
101 7tpooyiyvso0at is found as one of the terms in Ross' "group of words implying or suggesting the
immanence of Forms" (Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford 1951, p. 228). He adduces Hippias Major
289d4, 8, e5, 292dl; Phaedo 100d6. As explained in the Introduction, I do not consider the Hippias
Major as genuine; how TTpOOStvat and 7tpocyiyV8O0ai are employed there, is only one of the
contributing factors. On Phaedo 100d6, see Section II of Part III below.
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happened at home in the king's absence pass unheeded. Perceiving only a general air of
lament, the herald gives a general description of the soldier's toils in war. The toil and
hard lodging, JIO/00^ KOll Sl)Oai)XAa, in the narrow ships at sea. And he continues
(558): X(X 8' auxe X8PocP K0^ TCpOofjV TlXtov axvyoq- ... . Then again on
land, there was even greater pain in addition:... , and there follows a description of the
adversities on land. - Toils are mentioned. Some are specified. Then some more are
added to those mentioned already.
In Sophocles' Ajax, Tecmessa replies to Ajax' long speech which he concluded with the
words (478): faAA' rj KaX,cog C,r\v A KaA-ocx; T80vr|K8vai | xov ebyevri xpA
7ldvx' dKTJKOac; A,oyov. It is necessary that a noble man live well, or be dead well.
You have heard the whole speech. Having reminded Ajax of their past, of their son, and
of his parents, Tecmessa declares that in him, there is all that is left for her. And then
(520): bXTf io%8 K&|ioi) jj.vf|oxiv 6tv8pi xoi XP8®V I pvrjpr|v
7tpooeivai, xspicvov si xi tiou 7ia0oi. | x^PK X^Plv Y<*P kaTiv f)
xIkxodo' dsi- | oxoo 8' duoppsi pvfioxit; eu 7iS7iov0oxoq, | o8k av
yevoix' 80' ODXO^ sbyevij^ dvfjp. But have remembrance also ofme: surely, it is
necessary that, to a man, I there is recollection besides, if ever he suffers anything
pleasant. I For grace it is that always brings forth grace: I but if remembrance flows
away from one who has suffered something good, I this will no longer be a noble man.
Ajax' speech ended with a sententious remark on what is necessary for a noble man.
Tecmessa refers to that when she ends her plea. She does not contest what Ajax has said.
But she adds that, besides and in addition to what Ajax claimed, there is something else
which is also necessary for the noble man. He must have remembrance in addition to
whatever else Ajax considers relevant for himself to have.
Later on in the same play, Menelaus reproaches Teucer and commands him not to bury
his brother. He founds his request for obedience on general principles of government. A
city and an army cannot be ruled without a barrier of fear and shame. He continues
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(1077): 6XX' avSpa xpr), Kav ocojia ysvvr|ori peya, | Sokbiv txbosiv av
xav 6.7x6 opiKpou Kaxoi). | beoc, yap cS Txpoosoxiv a'io)(uvr| 0' 6pou, |
acoxripiav e%ovxa xov5' eTxiaxaoo- | otxod 8' bppi^eiv 8pav 0' a
PouXexai Txapf), | xaoxrjv vopt^s xf^v 7xoX.iv XP°VCP 7xoxe | ofcpicov
Spapooaav &C, P\J06v 7XSOSIV. But it is necessary that a man, even if endowed with
a strong body, I is aware that he may fall, even ifonly through a small mishap. I Indeed,
to whom there is fear besides and sense of shame at the same time, I understand him to
be safe: I but where there is insolence and doing as one please, I this city consider - in
time - I to fall from a plain sailing into the depth. Again, the topic is what is necessary
for a good man. Menelaus begins: 'even if he has a strong body'. That is not enough. In
addition he must have fear and sense of shame. Fear and sense of shame must be there in
addition to whatever else there is, otherwise there will not be salvation. Conversely,
regardless of whatever else there is, even if a man has a strong body, 'if there is the
insolence and doing whatever comes to mind on the spur of the moment', there will be
disaster. otxou 8' bPpt^eiV 8pav 0' a pOUXexai 7Xapfl - where there is
insolence and doing as one please, it does not matter whatever else there is, it does not
even matter if there is anything else at all. The passage illustrates well the difference
between 7xpoosivai and 7xapsivai102.
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Or, indeed, between 7tpooeivai and any other compound of sTvat. If, for example, it is true of
something to say 'SVSOXl TlVl', and if there is something else of which that would also be true with
regard to the same thing, one would normally say 7tp6c8GXt rather than 7tpOG8VSOXt. Accordingly,
we find in the Hippocratic Diseases I, 19, in a section on tubercles in the lung: ... U7t0^spuiV8.xai X8
Kal &7to\|/uxsxai, Kal ^uppbet xa (pA.&Pia ev x<p ac6paxi 7tdvxa, axe xou cupaxoq
abXCDV 8KKSKUl)JJ.8VOt) 0710 7tt)pSXC0V, SVtOXS 8s 0710 XP^VOt) XS 7tXf)08O^ Kal
psyfeBsog xf|<; vdoot) Kal xcov evedvxcov KaKcov Kal xtov 7tpoo87ttyiyvop8vcov.... he
is dried up and breathes out his spirit, and all the small vessels in his body close, inasmuch as the blood
from them is burnt out by the fevers, and sometimes also by the extent of time, by the magnitude of the
disease, by the evils first present, and by those added. (Text and translation: P. Potter, Hippocrates V,
Cambridge/Massachusetts and London 1988.) As shown in Sections IV - VI of the chapter on SV8tvai
and 8yyiyvec0ai, these two verbs are common words used in the context of contracting and having a
disease. So it is normal to speak of XCOV SVSpVXCOV KaKtOV. Those added are not 7tpOOeyyiyv6pe-
va but, with pleonastic doubling of the prefix indicating addition, 7tpOG87ttyiyv6)J8Va. For the latter
doubling, cf. Diseases I, 27; there, 87t8A0OVXa is taken up by 7lp0087ltylyvsxai SXSpa, then
87tiyiyvoji£vcov which, by way of a macabre pun, is set side by side with 0t7toy'tyvovxat, the
patients expire.
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While in the last example the contrast was that of an able body which is there already,
and soul or mind which has to be there in addition, the next presupposes that mind or
understanding grows or is acquired when a person grows old. In Sophocles' Antigone,
Creon, the king, tries to establish for himself a position of sovereignty by dissociating
himself from the elders and the rest of the people as ruler, from the members of his own
family as elder. His exchange with his son Haimon is characterized throughout by their
difference in age and generation. Creon's first address to his son commences c5 710.1
(632), Haimon replies Tldxsp, GOC, s'l|TT ... (635), whereupon Creon's long speech to
his son begins with the words (639): ouxcd yap, c5 Ttai, %pf) 8ld axspvcov
s^eiv, | yvcopiy; 7taxpcpac; 7tavx'O7tia0sv soxavai. That way, indeed, child,
things must stand in your mind, I nothing must be of higher rank than your father's
'good judgement'. And for another seven lines he lays down the law on how good
children must behave. Then he turns to his proper subject, Haimon's relation to Antigone
(648); this section, again, starts with an interjectory 'cS TtOl'. The tenor of the whole
exchange is that the son, through lack of authority and position, but above all lack of age
and experience, should submit his judgement to his father's. Haimon's second reply duly
begins 'Ttdxsp' (683), but he continues: 08oi cptouoiv dv0pc£)7ioi<; cppsvag, |
Tttivxoov oo' SOXt xpriptixcov imspxaxov. The gods let understanding grow for
men, I of all the goods we have the highest. Thus insight is not determined by position
and age alone. It is against this background that we have to read the final lines of
Haimon's considerate, prudent, and altogether reverent speech (719): yvcopT] yap SI
xk; k&ti' spot vscoxspou | 7tp6asoxi, (pf|p' sycoys TipsoPsusiv tioIo |
cpuval xiv' avSpa 7tavx' S7iiaxr|pr|<; 7iA,scgv | s'l 8' ouv cpiA,si yap
xotxo pr\ xatxr] psTisiv, | Kal xcdv A-syovxoov su> Ka^ov xo
|iav0avstv. If, indeed, any 'good judgement' is also with me, the younger, I should
certainly say that it would be by far the best thing that each and every man were by
nature full of understanding: but since, indeed, it usually does not turn out that way, it
is also a fine thing to learn when someone speaks well. After an interspersed comment
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by the chorus, Creon's answer is (726): Ot xr|A.tKOl8s Kdt 8l8a£,6{J,SO0a 8t^ |
cppovsiv 7xp6g &v8po<; Trj^lKOuSe xr^v (p\3oiV; Of such an age, we should
learn proper understanding from a man of his age? The last words, XT^V CpUOlV, refer
back to Haimon's cpuvai. Haimon requests that, though on the assumption of his father
knowledge is something added to one's being only with age, Creon should grant the
possibility of his having yvcojir), 'good judgement', a phrase borrowed from Creon's
speech, despite his youth. Good judgement 'is to' the elder, it could 'be to' the younger
'in addition'. It is to be noted that, instead of the simple dative, Sophocles uses the
prepositional phrase 87ll Spot). From the point of view of Haimon, yVCOpT] STISOTl.
But since he wants to grant Creon 'good judgement' and imply that his father does have
'goodjudgement', he declares: but in addition to you I have it as well. KCli 87tl, not 87U
on its own, balances 7tpO(^.
A different case is Euripides Phoenissae 528. Iocaste admonishes her son: c5 XSKVOV,
ot>x a7tavxa xtp yripa Kaicti, | 'ExeoK^sec;, Tipoosoxiv- f|p7teipla
| 8%Sl XI A,s£,(Xl XGDV V8CDV GOtpcoxspov. Child, not everything there is in
addition to old age is bad, Eteocles: but experience can say something wiser than the
young. ot>X cntavxa X(p yripa KaKa Ttpoasoxiv - there are things which
accompany old age when a woman has old age. Those things she has in addition to old
age. The dative XCp yf|pct depends on the prefix TtpOO- . The dative of the person 'to
whom those things are' in addition to old age is left unexpressed.
A comparable construction is found with Kritias' sentence (DK 88B7): fjv
AaKeSaipovioq, XlX,cov oocpoq, oq xa8' 8^e£,e- | pr|8sv ayav- xaipco
7T(XVXa TtpOOSOXl Ka^a. Once there was a Spartan, Chilon the sage, who spake
thus: Nothing too much! Everything fine is there in addition to the right moment. Here
as well, all that is fine is there for a human being, but that is not stated. Everything fine is
there at the same time with, and in that way in addition to, the right moment. When the
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right time has come, nothing else than that which it brings with it will be needed in
addition.
In fifth century prose as well, Tipoosivai is 'being there in addition'. At the beginning
of II 99, Herodotus summarizes: pe%pl psv tootol) 6\\f\q TS Kal yvcopr)
Kal 'loxopiri xaoxa Xeyouoa feoxi, to 8s tino xouSe A'lyimxioix;
ep/opai X,oyooc; fepscov Kaxa xa tjkodov- Tipoosoxai 8s xi abxoioi
Kat xf|£ Spf)^ 6\j/loq. Up to now, what is said is what I have seen myself and my
own judgement and experience, but from now on I proceed relating Egyptian stories
according to what I have heard: but in addition to that, there will also be something of
what I have seen myself There is a story he has heard. Besides, he adds a story from
what he has seen. As with the poetical examples, what is there in addition is somehow of
the same nature or status as that which is there already.
Likewise, at VII 173, when Herodotus recounts on the occasion of the gathering of a
collected Greek army in defence of their country in Thessaly where a dispatchment of
their infantry was sent by sea: evGauxa SGTpaxcmsSeuoVTO tcov ' EA,A,f|va>v
Kaxa fiupiooc; dtiX-lxaq ouAAeyevxeg, icai otpi 7ipoor|v fj 0eaoaA,a>v
itttto^. There, nearly ten thousand Greek hoplites, gathered together, took up position,
and with them was in addition the Thessalian cavalry. There were soldiers; and in
addition there were more soldiers. Again, what is there in addition is of somewhat like
nature with what had been said to be there first.
This latter usage, Tipooeivai as well as rtpooyiyVSO0ai in a military context, seems
to have been, if not technical, at least customary. So at V 103, Herodotus relates how
the Ionians after having been defeated by the Persians did not cease in their efforts,
though bereft of the Athenian symmachy. On the contrary, they added various cities to
their alliance: Kat yap xr\v Kaovov Tipoxepov oi) PoiAojievriv
ouppaxseiv, cbc; 8V87ipr|oav zaq Zapdiq, xoxe ocpi Kai amr\
Ttpoasysvsxo. 104 KuTtpioi 8s feGsXovxat otpi Tiavxst; Ttpoosyevovxo
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nXf\V 'AjiaBouolcov ... . And while Caunus first did not want to be an ally, now
that they had burnt down Sardis even she 'added herself' to them. And all the Cyprian
cities 'added themselves' willingly except for Amathousia. 7ipoaytyV8O0ai as 'to add
oneself to' can naturally be used in the context of 'joining one's own forces with
someone else's', or 'becoming an ally'.
Another instance of that is Thucydides VI 6; he has just given the catalogue of the
Sicilian cities, their origin and inhabitants, and summarizes: xooauxa 80VTj
'
EXAf|vcov Kat pappapoov HiKS^lav cpKei, Kal 87il xoof|v8e oCoav
abxrjv o'l 'A0r|vaioi axpaxeueiv coppijvxo, ecpiepevoi pev xfj
&X.r|0eoxaxri Tipotpaosi xf|<; tiaar]q ap£,ai, Por|0eiv 5e apa et>7rpe7id><;
PoiAopevoi xoic; eauxoov ^uyyevsoi Kai xoig Tipooyeyevrjpevoiq
^uppaxoiq. paXroxa 5 ' atixofx; fe^oopprjcav 'Eyeoxaicov TtpsoPsiq
7iapOVX8c; Kal 7tpo0up6xspov 87tlKaX,Ol3pevOl. Those were the Greek and
foreign people who settled in Sicily, and against her, being that strong, the Athenians
urged to send an army, desiring - that was in truth their reason - to rule over all of
Sicily, at the same time wishing in a comely way to help their kinsmen, and the allies
who had attached themselves besides. Most of all urged them the ambassadors of the
Egestaeans, who were present and called for help rather eagerly. Again, the general
difference between Ttpoaeivai/TipooylyV8O0ai and Ttapeivai/rcapayiyV8O0ai is
apparent. The ambassadors from Egesta are present and call for help. They are with the
Athenians. Their 'being close by' makes them napovxs^. An altogether different
situation is characterized in the previous sentence. The Athenians have kinsmen in Sicily
with whom they are naturally allied; over time, other allies have come into being and
added their forces to the Athenians in addition to the Athenians' own and those allied
forces already in existence. Since they have been added or have added themselves as
allies, they are characterized as TipoaysysvTjpevoi ^uppa^oi.
This usage of 7tpoo8lvai in a military context may also be the explanation of the
occurrence of the verb in Aristophanes' Clouds. In the epirrhema after the parabasis,
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the coryphaeus addresses the audience and reproaches them for not showing due
reverence for the Clouds, the only gods who consistently try to help the city (575 - 580).
When the Athenians meant to elect Cleon as CTCpaxiyyo^, general in command, it was
the Elements who sent their warnings with thunder and lightning. Even the Sun, reports
the chorus-leader, withdrew (586): ... | ot) (paveiv S(paOK8V bpiv, 81
axpaxr|yr|oei KA-scov. | opco<; eiA,so0e xouxov. (paal yap
SuoPouAAav | xfjSe xfi 7i6A,ei Tipooeivai, xabxa pevxoi xobq Gsobt; |
axx'av bpeig &;apapxr|x', kni xo peVtiov xperceiv. And he said he would
not shine for you if Cleon should be general. But yet you chose him. They say, indeed,
that ill counsel 'is an ally' to the city, yet that the gods turn to the better whatever you
get wrong. The context is that of election to a military office. There, it is not unusual to
have 5l)oPouAAa, ill counsel, or AbOpOuAla, Folly, present as ally. The other allies,
^b{ipa)(Ol, are mentioned, quite naturally, a few lines later (609). Having AuoPouAAa
as a daimon or divine power, if that is felt necessary for this sort of explanation, would
not be irritating in comedy, particularly in a passage with a number of gods not usually
thus conceived: the Clouds themselves, A'lGfjp (570), 'Ava7TVOf| and 'Af)p (627).
It is to be noted that in the case of allies adding themselves, it is always the case that
like is added to like, soldiers to soldiers, one military unit to another military unit, a
person - man or god - to a group of people, one thing to another thing or group of
things. This is also the case with an argument of Zeno of Elea, reported by Simplicius
(.Physica 139,5 = DK29B2): sv 8e xouxcd SsIkvdoiv oxi ob jx^xs psysGoq
pfjxs 7itixo<; fii^xs oyKog pr|Geic; eoxiv, ob8' av eir| xobxo. "e'l yap
aXXco ovxi", (pr]oi, "7ipooyevoixo, obSev av pei^ov 7ioif)asi8v
peyeGoix; yap ppSevoc; ovxog, Tipooysvopsvou 8e, obSev olov xe 8'k;
peyeGot; 87iiSobvai. Kat obxcoc; av fj8r| xo Tipooyivopevov obSev eirj.
s'l 8e &7ioyivopevou xo exspov pr|8ev sXaxxov eoxai prjSe ab
npoayivopsvoi) ab^osxai, SpA-ov oxi xo rcpooyevopevov obSsv fjv
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oi)5s TO &7loyiyvojJ.SVOV." In that <book> he shows that of whatever there is
neither size nor thickness nor weight: that <thing> would not 'be' either. "If indeed",
he says, "it got besides something else which is, it would make <that other thing>
bigger in nothing: if indeed it is of no size, and it got besides, it can not give anything
to the size on top of what is there. And in that way already, that which gets besides
would be nothing. And if something will be smaller in nothing when a thing gets away,
nor again will it increase when a thing gets besides, it is clear that that which got
besides is nothing, and likewise that which got away. Something of a certain size gets
besides something else of a certain size, and something of a certain size gets away from
something else of a certain size. In that they are of a certain size, those things have the
same status. On the implicit assumption that everything there is has a certain size, Zeno
states that if anything that gets besides or gets away without changing the size of that
besides which it got or from which it got away, that thing will not 'be', or does not exist,
at all. Regardless of how one evaluates this statement, in each case, Zeno speaks of two
things which have in common that they are of the sort of things which exist and have
size. In that case, one of them can get besides the other.
Part of the same discussion, with time as an additional factor, is an argument by
Melissus, likewise reported by Simplicius. That which is, TO OV, "is everlasting,
unlimited, one, and like throughout". It cannot suffer anything since in the event a
previous state would be other than an ensuing state so that that which is would no longer
be one and like throughout. And he continues (Physica 111, 18 = DK30B7): ... . ilklf
oi)8e |a.gTaKoojir)0f|vai &vdotov 6 yap kogjioc; 6 npooGsv fetbv otnc
&7toX,X,i)tai ooT8 6 pr^ scov yivsTai. ots 5s pfjts 7ipooylvsTai pr|8sv
jjY|ts hnofkmai pf|TS STepoioiruai, rcoog av psTaKoopr|0ev todv
SOVTCOV eir|; ... . But neither is it possible for it to be restructured. The structure,
indeed, which is there beforehand, does not perish, nor does the one which 'is not' get
there. But if nothing gets besides, and nothing perishes, and nothing alters, how would
there be something restructured among what 'is'? And it does not feel pain since what
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feels pain and what is healthy do not have the same power, that feeling pain being
deficient and not everlasting: ot>5' av 6p.Olov Sir), 81 hXysoi* &7ioyiVOjJ.8VOU
yap xeu av hXytoi rj 7ipooyivojj.evou, ko()k av exi bpoiov sir). And it
would not be similar, if it felt pain: pain it would feel, indeed, if something got away or
something got besides, and it would no longer be like.
While Zeno's was a physical argument, Melissus' is a logical one. The concept of
alteration, that is to say the introduction of time together with the - perhaps unwittingly -
assumed position of the timeless spectator, opens up the possibility of lifting the
restriction to physical elements as elements of structure which can be added or
subtracted. The example, however, of change of health, conceived as addition or
subtraction of something, seems to revert to a model of physical components making up
the structure which is the whole. Within that model, what is being added or gets there
besides is again of the same status as that which is there already - one structural element
is added to another one, or to a group of others.
As always, things are slightly different when it comes to negations. In order to say that
it is not the case that 'to or for someone or something, something is there in addition', it
need not be presupposed that anything is there already, nor that that of which it is said
that it need not be there exist itself at all, nor even that it would be possible for
something to be there in the first place. An example is Sophocles Trachiniae 250f.: ... .
xot) Xoyou 5' ot> xpf\ cpGovov, | yuvai, npoosivai, Zetiq oxou
TtpaKXCDp cpavf). Grudgefelt against the word must not be there in addition, my lady,
where Zeus appears as the doer <of the deed>. When Zeus does something, anything,
there must not be grudge, ill-will, discontent. To a deed of Zeus, nothing need be added,
no comment or anger must be there in addition. In a negative clause, as opposed to a
positive clause, lin addition'' need not presuppose that anything else lis there for' or ' to'
the thing already.
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In all the different genres of literature before Plato in which the words are used at all, in
poetry and prose alike, there is a remarkable uniformity and constancy in the semantics
of the verbs 7lpOOSlvai and 7ipooyiyVSO0at, to be and to get besides or in addition.
With the exclusion of negation which always is a special case, that which is there in
addition is somehow like something which is there already. That which is there already is
either mentioned explicitly or can be deduced from the immediate context. Ttpoosivai
and TlpooylyV8O0ai are not simply to be there and to get there.
H.
Comparing common usage with that of Plato's early dialogues, I cannot detect any
difference in meaning. At Gorgias 469c, Polus asks Socrates if he would want to be a
tyrant, someone who, in his city, has the power to kill or exile whomsoever he please,
doing all that just according to his own opinion. Socrates decides to answer with a story
(469dl): e'i yap feycb fev dyopa 7iA,r)Got3cTi X,aPc6v utto pa^rig
syxeipl§iov A-eyoipi rcpdg as on "c5 Ilco^e, spot 8uvaplc; Tig teal
xupavvtg Gaupaala apxi 7tpoayeyoV8V ... . If indeed, I said to you, having
taken a dagger under the arm in the market place when it is filled with people: Polus, to
me, a power and marvellous tyranny has just accrued, ... . Socrates, as human being, has
certain Suvdpeig, powers, faculties, or abilities. He takes a weapon. Now he has
power in addition to that he had before. The new power has come into being for him in
addition to those in existence, those he had already.
At the beginning of the Charmides, Socrates who has just returned from the battle at
Potidaea, asks Chaerepho, Critias, and their companions in the palaestra of Taureus,
about the state of philosophy among them in general, and in particular if among the
young there were any distinguished in wisdom, or beauty, or both. This inspires Critias
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to praise the physical beauty of his nephew Charmides who at that very moment is
entering the palaestra with a number of friends. Socrates is impressed by his stature and
beauty, and so are all the others present. They agree with Chaerephon when he tells
Socrates just to wait until he undresses (154d5): OUTCO^ TO st8oc; 7idyKaA,6^
SCTUIV, so altogether beautiful is he as to his appearance. And Socrates continues:
Kdydb,' HpdK^sig, ecprjv, coc; dpa%ov A,eyexe xov avSpa, ei exi afixco
ev 8rj povov xoyxdvei 7ipooov opiKpov xi. - xl; ecprj 6 Kpixlat;. - si
xrjv XI/UX^V, fjv 8' sycb, xuyxavsi 81) 7l8(pi)Kft)<;. And I said: Heracles, how
invincible you describe the man, if only yet one more small thing there 'were to him in
addition- What?, said Critias. - If he happened to be, I said, well-grown as to his
soul.
Charmides has a beautiful appearance, or, as the Greeks would say, 'to Charmides there
is a beautiful appearance'. Socrates demands that, 'in addition, something else should be
to him', he should have something else besides. Of the two things a man should have
Socrates enquired about in the beginning, wisdom and beauty, Charmides has one; does
he have the other in addition, is Socrates' question. The prefixed 7ipo^- makes sense
only in a context in which it is implicitly or explicitly stated that something else is, or is
supposed to be, there already.
Several times, Meno tries to answer in a way Socrates would accept the question what
dpsxfj, goodness, is. After Socrates has made it clear, with the help of examples, how
he conceives an answer according to and stemming from the whole of the subject, KCtxd
6X,Ol) s'lTCCOV &psxf|<; TtSpl OXl ecxiv (Meno 77a), not from one of its parts or
aspects, Meno declares in a final effort that, with 'the poet', he thinks that 'goodness is
that someone desiring fine things, KoAd, has the power to obtain them'. Socrates
obtains Meno's consent that everybody always wants what is fine and good, so that a
difference in goodness would lie exclusively with the power to obtain fine or good
things. Only then, he asks Meno if by 'good things', dyaGd, he means things like health
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and riches. Meno agrees and adds gold and silver to the list; only such things are good.
Thereupon Socrates asks (78dl): etsv. XPUOIOV Ka^ dpyuplOV Ttopl^SO0ai
&p8Tfj 80TIV, ... . TlOTSpOV 7tpOOTl08lc; TOUTCp TCQ 7tOpCG, c5 MSVCOV, TO
8iKalco<; Kai 6oiax;, f| oi)8ev 001 Siacpepei, tiXXd Kav dSiKccx; xk;
at)Ta 7topl^T|xai, dpolcoq oO) abxa &pexr\v Kalsig; Well then. To manage to
obtain silver and gold is goodness, .... Is it that you add to that obtention, Meno, 'justly
and piously', or does it not make any difference for you, and even if someone manages
to obtain all that unjustly, would you likewise call that goodness? And when Meno
agrees that that would be KOlKta, badness, Socrates concludes (78d7): 8si dpa, COC,
soiks, tout© Tcp 7topcp SiKatoouvr|v f| ococppooi3vr|v rj 6oi6xrjxa
7ipoosivai, f| a^X,o xi popiov dpsxriq- si 8s pri, oi)k soxat dpexf),
KOtlTISp SKTtopi^ouoa xdya0a. So it is necessary, as it seems, that to that
obtention, justice and moderation and piety be there in addition, or another part of
goodness: otherwise, it will not be goodness even if enabling to obtain the good things.
On the level of description of the world with language, Socrates asks Meno if he does
not want to add something to his thesis, his 0SOl£, which amounts to saying that to be
able to obtain things of the sort specified as good things is goodness. He asks Ttoxspov
7ipo<m08i<; xouxcd tcp Tiopco ... to sikottcog Kai 6oico^. 7ipooxl0rija.i, to
lay down or set up in addition demarcates Meno's definition as his own product. He can
modify it by laying down something in addition to what he has laid down already.
Correspondingly, looking at the reality thus described, Socrates asks if when a man has
TtOpOC,, the obtention of the good things he desires, that is sufficient, or if he must have
something else in addition. His question, Set dpa ... TOUTCp TCQ TtOpCp
SiKaiooovrjv f| ococppoo8vr|v r) 6oioxrixa Tipoosivai, rj aXXo xi
jlOplOV dpsxfjg, is parallel in terms of usage to the construction of Euripides
Phoenissae 528 discussed in Section I above. There, it was old age to which it was said
that other things were present in addition, when the situation was that of an woman's
having old age and something else, experience, in addition. Here, it is Tiopo^, obtention,
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to which it is said that there is something else in addition, when the situation is that of a
man having obtention of good things and needing something else in addition. As said
above, this part of the working or pragmatics of the language does not affect the range
ofmeaning or the semantics of the verb Ttpoosivai.
Subsequent to Meno's failure in that last attempt to answer Socrates' question, and to
his professed confusion how anybody can at all find out anything he does not know,
Socrates tries to demonstrate the possibility of learning and discovery under guidance by
letting a slave of Meno's find out the way of geometrically doubling a square. Having in
that way restored Meno to his spirits, Socrates wants to start afresh, but Meno
interposes and demands to go back to his original question if goodness is taught and
teachable or comes about by nature. Socrates, thus pressed, restates that of something of
which he does not know what it is, he cannot say if it is such or such; but if Meno
granted him an assumption about goodness, he would proceed to discuss if it is teachable
or if it is not on that assumption. They agree that if goodness is one of the things about
the soul which is like understanding, it is teachable and taught since what is teachable
and taught is understanding and what is understanding is teachable and taught. They also
agree that through goodness we are good, and that goodness is beneficial for us. If there
is anything which is good and beneficial besides understanding, goodness need not be
understanding. In an exclusive process, it is shown first of the good things previously so
called by Meno, namely health, beauty, and riches, that they are beneficial only if used
and employed correctly. Then Socrates turns to the things about the soul, namely
moderation, justice, courage, intelligence, memory, magnanimity, and all such things.
Socrates asks (88b 1): okotisi 8f|, XOUXCDV axxa ool SoKSl krciOXf|pr|
slvai (lXX ' aAAo S7iioxf)jj.Tjc;, e'l ot>xi toxs psv pXoutxsi, xoxs 8s
cbcpsXsT; otov &vSpsia, s'l prj soxi cppovr|oiq rj &v8psia hXX' otov
Gtippot; xi- oi)x oxav psv avsu vou 9appf| avOpamoc;, pA,a7ixsxai,
oxav 8s GUV vcd, cbcps^sixai; Now consider, of those, those which do not seem to
you to be understanding but something other than understanding, if they do not
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sometimes harm, at other times benefit? As with courage, if it is not reason but like a
certain daring: is it not that whenever a man is daring without thought, he gets harmed,
but whenever with thought, he benefits?
On this occasion, Socrates separates courage, moderation and intelligence from reason
and understanding, as far as we can tell in accordance with common practice, and obtains
Meno's consent that they can be exercised with or without thought. Any engagement of
the soul, if governed by reason, is beneficial. Socrates draws the conclusion (88c4): s'l
apa &pexr\ xcov ev xf| v|/uxf) xl eoxiv Kal dvayicaiov atucp cocpe^ipq)
eTvat, (ppovrjoiv abxd 8ei elvai, k7iei8f}7iep rcavxa xa tcaxa xf^v
\)/uxf^v at>xa pev Ka0' auxa ouxe dxpeAxpa ouxe pA,apepti feoxiv,
7tpooyevopevr|c; 5e cppovfjoeccx; f) &(ppoat3vr|c; pA,aPepd xe Kai
ft>cp8X,ipa yiyvexai. Kaxa 5r\ xouxov xov Xoyov dxpsX-ipov ye oucav
XT^V &pexr|V (ppovX|OlV 881 xiv' stvai. So, if goodness is one of the things in the
soul, and if it is necessary that it is something beneficial, it is necessary that it is
reason, since all the things pertaining to the soul are for themselves neither beneficial
nor harmful, but if reason is added or unreasonableness, they become harmful or
beneficial. According to this argument, it is necessary that goodness as something
beneficial is reason of some sort. A man can have courage, moderation and intelligence.
He benefits from them only if he uses them with understanding and thought. He needs
reason in addition. If reason gets there in addition, exercising the other qualities will be
beneficial and he will be good.
III.
What was postulated at the beginning of Section I above is borne out by the evidence,
Ttpooeivai and 7ipooyiyv8O0ai do indeed always denote a 'being besides' or 'being
in addition'. The uniformity in application noted with regard to pre-Platonic usage is also
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found with Plato's employment of the two verbs Tlpooeivai and 7lpooyiyvea0ai in
the early dialogues. When something 'is' or 'comes to be' in a certain area or sphere,
regardless of which compound of the simplicia stvai and yiyvsaBai applies, and





In the discussion between Socrates, Cebes, and Simmias at Phaedo 100b - 105e, it
looks as if a lot of Socrates' final proof that the soul is immortal hinges on the fact that
certain things like the beautiful itself, the good itself, and the large itself are in us and the
other objects of this world, and determine what anything is, and what it is called, by
being in them. SVStVGll and eyyiyV8G0ai are terms used to denote that relation at
103b and 105b,c, but etvai SV is found much more frequently, with reference to the
same sort of relation.
That has led students of Plato - to use conventional terminology - to postulate that
'forms are in particulars', or, more precisely, when 'forms', or 'ideas' are mentioned, one
of the ways in which they are talked about suggests that they are in particulars. One
representative opinion on Phaedo 102d7 is that "Socrates proceeds to point out that not
only cannot an Idea itself be characterized by its opposite, but also the particularisation
of one Idea in a particular thing cannot be characterized by the opposite Idea"; he also
lists sv, elvai sv, sveivai, syyiyveoGai, K8io0ai ev, as the first sub-group of
that "group of words implying or suggesting the immanence of the Forms". It is clear
from the context that 'immanence' here is used as an ontological, not an epistemological
term.103
103 W.D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford 1951, pp. 30, 228. - Ross seems to me to be a good
guide to the communis opinio of his time, and for the points he discusses, communis opinio generally has
not changed over the past 45 years. Cf. e.g. E.R. Dodds, Plato. Gorgias, Oxford 1959, p. 314; G.
Vlastos, An ambiguity in the Sophist, in: id., Platonic Studies, Princeton 1973, p. 298f.; T. Irwin, Plato.
Gorgias, Oxford 1979, p. 203.; cf. also G. Fine, On Ideas, Oxford 1993, pp. 50f., 52 with n. 33.
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II.
Before turning to Plato, I will look at the uses of the words eveivai, elvai SV, and
syyiyvsoGai in early Greek literature, to see what sorts of subject and object they
could connect, and what sort of relation the verbs were used to denote. Then I will
adduce instances of the verbs in early dialogues of Plato, and ask if there is anything in
their employment there suggestive of a semantic development.
First, the purely spatial usage of the words will very briefly be considered. Whether or
not we regard it as primary in origin, spatial usage is the example against which all other
usages seem metaphorical. An early instance of the verb evsivai - as opposed to Slvai
fev - in that spatial application is Odyssey 10, 45. On their way home from the island of
Aeolus, Odysseus has fallen asleep. Since he had given strict orders not to touch the
wine-skin entrusted to him by their host, his comrades expect it to contain a wealthy gift,
and their leader addresses them: ... iikX ays Bdooov l8cO|J.80a, OXXl xa8'
kaxiv, | 0(5(50q ziq %puo6<; xs Kai dpyupog daiccp eveaxiv. Come, let us
see quickly, what that is, how much gold and silver there is in the wineskin.
Similarly, out of the eight occurrences of the word in Herodotus' Histories, five denote
spatial 'being in'. People, animals, treasures are in houses or ships, the ring of Polycrates
is in the belly of the fish. And Hecataeus, in many ways Herodotus' predecessor, says in
a description of a foreign country (292 J.): 8V XOIOIV oupeai SsvSpsa SVl
dypia, there are wild trees in those mountains.
There are trees in the mountains. Should one say that this spatial use of SVSlvai
already is metaphorical? - That is perhaps not appropriate. It is worth noting, though,
that there are two distinct concepts of 'being in'. Two different sorts of situation can be
thought of and described in the same terms of 'being in'; for those trees are certainly not
in the same way in the mountains as pieces of gold are in a wineskin, or a man in a house,
or a ring in the belly of a fish.
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Earlier than that, however, earlier even than the first attested usage of the verb
connecting two material things, is an instance of a different kind of extension. In Book
24 of the Iliad, Priam scolds the Trojans who have gathered in his palace and sends them
away with the words (XXIV 239): 8pp8X8 Xco|3r|xf|pe<; 8^ey%8Sc;- OU VI) KCti
upiv I OIKOl 8V8CXI yOO<;, Oil p' fjX,0ST8 KT|8f|aOVTe<;; Go, worthless
cowards: Is not there now wailing in the house also for you, that you come distressing
me? There is wailing in the house. Of course, one could say one of two things; either:
what is meant is that there are people wailing in the house, and in that sense wailing is in
the house; or: Toocj was a god or daimon, like 'AlStbc; at Odyssey XVII 347, or like
<I>6{3cx;, 'Epig, 'AA,kfj and 'IcokTI at Iliad V 739f., or like Kptixot; and Bid in
Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, and that therefore the example is just one of a person
being in a house. If the need of explication is felt at all, however, if the clause 'there is
wailing in the house for you as well' is felt to require interpretation, a different kind of
metonymy seems to be closer at hand: there is cause for wailing in your houses, too.104
That would, if anything, be more abstract a notion. Quite apart from the interpretation of
what yooq signifies in this particular case, though, introducing a noun of the class of
words which can denote states of the mind of individuals, expressions or personal
characteristics or qualities, opens up the possibility of using the same sort of thing as
subject of the verb in other situations.
While it cannot be ruled out altogether that JOOC, with Homer is a daimon or spirit, the
same could not be said of the next example. Early in the sixth century BC, Solon wrote
in one of his elegies, in a tone of scornful exhortation, that men must not blame the gods
for grief they suffer by their own fault, in this case tyrannical government. 'Each one of
you', says Solon, 'looks for his own individual advantage' (11, 6): OUpTTOtOlV 5' upiv
yauvoc; SVSOXl vooc;, in all of you together, however, there is a porous, empty
mind. Here mind, whatever else it may be, is neither a person nor a physical object, as
104
Note, however, Zsi)C, (Ays' sScOKS in the next line; what is the ontological status of GtAysu?
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CpprjV, for example, could be said to be. And mind is said to be in a person or in a group
of people.
This usage - something like mind being in someone - is common with the tragedians of
the fifth century.105 On one occasion, Aeschylus has material and non-material things as
subjects to SVSlvai side by side (Sisyphus, frg. 229f.): KOli <ydp> Gavovxoov lotv
ouk svbox iKpaq, I ooi 5' ot>k bvboxi kikuq ot>8' aipoppuxoi | tp^ePeq.
For in the sinews of the dead there is no moisture, and in you there is no vigour, nor
veins flowing with blood.
It is difficult to say if the range of subjects to SVSlvat was extended first to a person's
qualities or characteristics, like KlKl)£, vigour, or to temporary states or actions of a
person, like yoo^, wailing. In some cases, it is hard to attribute that which is in someone
to one of these categories at all. When Orestes says (Electra 1244), opa yB JJ.6V Stj
K&V yuvat^iv G0£ "Apr)^ I 6V6GXIV, I see that Ares is in women as well, what is
Ares? A general characteristic? A passing state? A set of thoughts or actions? Or, again,
a god? This last possibility must be taken seriously, though it would lead too far to
exploit it fully.
With Sophocles, at any rate, actions are prevailing as points of reference of the subjects
of &VStV(Xl. When Deianeira and her attendants hear of Heracles' imminent return at the
beginning of Sophocles' Trachiniae, they rejoice. Deianeira, however, modifies
cautiously (296): opccx; 8' SVSOXt XOIOIV SU GK07t0l)J46V0l<; | xapPsiv xov
sC 7tpaGGOVXa ptj OtpaXf) TtOXS. Yet there is fearing' in those who consider well
the one who does well: lest he fall one day, and she continues Bpoi ydp oIkXO^
Ssivoq siospri, cpilai, for powerful pity comes upon me, friends, which seems to
imply that pity, having entered her, is now in her.
105 See, e.g., Sophocles, Electra 1328.
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But as we have seen with Solon's VOl)^, it is not only emotions which are in men. So, a
few scenes later in the same play, Deianeira declares before carrying out her plan to win
back Heracles (591): OUTCOg 8/51 y' f| tugxk;, ©g to pev 5oK8lV | 8V8GTI,
7tslpa 8' ot) 7ipOG©plX,r|Od 71©. Such is <my> trust <in what has been done>
that there is 'believing' in <me>, yet so far I have not engaged with experience.
Admittedly, it is conceivable that in this last case 'believing' is in the situation or the
circumstances; I think that less likely, though.
Use of SV80TI in the sense of 'it is possible' will be passed over. There are cases
where it seems that like 8GTTV, e£,80Tl, and sometimes 7ldpSGTl, 8V8GTI could be
employed that way, but a case such as Antigone 213, VOp© 8e %pf|O0ai 7iavxl
Ttou y' evsoxi ooi | Kai x©v 0avovx©v Ttspi, in you,
(Creon,) it is to use every law, both about the dead and about us who live, makes it
difficult to assert that the force of SVSGTl OOI is just to denote possibility, it is possible
for you to use every law. Alternatively one could render: 'the using every law is in you'
which would not be English but serves to bring out the parallel to the foregoing
examples. Then one could compare the grammatical subjects of 8V8GTI and say that
while in the previous passage 5oK8lV as denoting an action can be seen as referring to a
mental state, something internal, the last example shows an extension of the potential
point of reference of the subject of SVSlVdl to action of whatever sort. The using of the
law which is in Creon potentially refers to an externally manifested action.
A characteristic whose effects are external is found side by side with one whose effects
are internal in Sophocles' late play Electra, a play also otherwise rich in constructions
with both fevsivai and TtapsiVdl. When Electra understands her sister to refuse help,
she reproaches her (1032): aneXBs- OOl yap ©CpS^ljOh; oi)K 8VI. Away, for in
you there is no aiding. To which Chrysothemis replies: 8VSOXIV hXXd aoi
jld0r|Oiq ot) Tldpa. There is in <me>. But with you there is no learning. It should be
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noted that in this particular context, in the realm of personal qualities, 8V8CXIV and
TtdpsOTIV seem to be interchangeable.
Before I leave Sophocles, let me mention one further case which may become important
in a later context. With it, we leave the sphere of human beings as things in which
something else is. The sort of characteristics we found as being in men can also be said
to be in A,oyoi, words, or sentences, or speeches, or perhaps thoughts. Again it is the
late play Electra from which the first example is drawn. After a heated exchange between
the two sisters, the chorus of attendants admonishes them to refrain from anger (369):
cog XOig ^oyotg I 8V8GXIV dpcpoiv K8p5og, ... . As in your thoughts there is
profitfor both of <you>, ... .
Likewise, we read in a fragment the general advice (frg. 259.1 Radt): 8V8GXI yap
xig Kai A,oyoioiv fiSovi4), | X,^0rjv oxav rcoicooi xcov ovxcov Kaxcov ....
For there is pleasure even in words, when they make you forget what is bad ... .
KSp5og, profit, and f|8ovf|, pleasure, are said to be in the words. In both cases, it is
not a consideration of or thought about 'profit' or 'pleasure' mentioned in the speeches,
but the words 'have it in them' to be profitable or pleasurable.
To say that profit or pleasure are in the words, of course, may just be a manner of
speaking, just as the A,oyoi in the fragment are said to make or produce something,
namely forgetfulness - grammarians could say the X,oyoi are personified - and just as in
the Euthydemus Socrates is told off for saying that 'a sentence wants to say something',
where Dionysodorus exploits a colloquial expression by pretending that language is a
logical construct (287c - e).
So long, however, as no other way of expressing a thought like 'words can afford
consolation' is in use at all, one has to reckon with the possibility that in saying 'pleasure
is in the words' the speaker thinks of 'pleasure in the words', literally, and not of 'words
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referring to' or 'reflecting' or 'causing pleasure', just as one must not exclude the
possibility of Orestes' referring to a god when he says that 'Ares is in women, too'.106
III.
Two more distinct applications ofSVStvai have to be mentioned before we can turn to
Plato: certain Presocratics, notably Anaxagoras, say that the elements they posit are in
something, or something is in the elements. Simplicius reports (Physica 155, 23; DK
59B1): oxi 8s ' Ava£,ayopa<; evog plypaxoc; &7ieipa xco 7iA.f|0ei
6poio|j.epf| &7ioKpivsa0at cprioiv Ttavxcov jxev &v Tiavxi evovxcov,
BKdoxou 8e Kaxa xo s7UKpaxouv xapaKxipi^opsvoi), Sr|A,oi 8ia xou
7ipcoxoi) xcdv (puoiKCDV A-sycov 6lk' &p%f\q- "6p.ou Tiavxa xprjpaxa fjv,
arceipa Kai 7i^f|0O(; Kai opiKpoxr|xa- Kai yap xo opiKpov a7ieipov
fjv. Kai 7tavxcov 6jiou kovxcov obSsv evSrj^ov fjv imo opiKpoxrixoc;-
navxa yap 6tf|p xs Kai al0fjp Kaxsi^sv, fepcpoxepa a7teipa sovxa-
xauxa yap psyioxa sveaxiv kv xoig aopTiaoi Kai 7tA,rj0ei Kai
fj.eys08l", that Anaxagoras says that 'homoiomera', indefinite in amount, separate
themselves out of one mixture, while all things are in everything, that each one of them
is characterized by what is prevailing <in it>, may become clear from what he says at
the beginning of his first book of Physics where he says: "Together were all things,
indefinite both as to their amount and their smallness: for also the small was indefinite.
And while all things were together, nothing was clear<ly discernible> through their
smallness: for mist and aether held everything down, both of them being indefinite: for
those are the biggest and most in all the things together, both as to their amount and as
to their largeness."
,06 For f|8ovf| as a goddess, cf. Crates 8, 9 Bergck.
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If the identification of the last lines as genuine words of Anaxagoras is correct, he
himself used the word SV80XIV to describe the relation he supposed to hold between
individual elements and the whole of his KOOJ-IO^. Considering what else is reported of
him, this seems to be altogether likely, feveivai also occurs in two other passages in
Simplicius commonly recognized as a genuine Anaxagorean fragments, Physica 34, 28;
DK 59B4: XOUXCDV 8s OUTCOC; 8XOVTCDV SOKSIV 8VSIVCII TtoAAd TS
Kai 7tavxoia sv rtaoi xoig ouyKpivopsvou; Kai cmeppaxa 7tavxcov
Xpripaxcov xai i8ea<; Tiavxoiac; e%ovxa Kai XP0l(*? Kai f|8ova<;. ...
Tipiv 8s dixoKpiGrivai xauxa navxcov 6poi> feovxoov oi)8e xpoif\
8vSr|X,oc; fjv ot>8epia- d7ieKc6A,i)e yap f] o\3ppd;ic; Ttavxcov xpfipaxcov,
xoi) xs 8iepoi> Kai xoi) ^rpoi) Kai xoi) Gsppoi) Kai xoi) \|/uxpoi) Kai
xoi) ^apTipoi) Kai xoi) ^otpepou, Kaf 7toXX,f\<; svsouariq Kai
O7ieppdxcov djcsipcov TiXrjGoc; oi)8ev soikoxcov d>,X,f|>LOiq. ob8e yap
xcov aXAcov obSev eoiK8 xo sxspov xcp sxepcp. xobxcnv 8s obxax;
sxovxcov fev xcdi obprcavxi %pr^ Soksiv bveivai Ttavxa xp^ipaxa. If that
be so, it is necessary to believe that in everything combined there are many and varied
<things>, namely seeds of all objects, having varied guises and colours and tastes, ...
But before those were separated off, while everything was together, not a single colour
was apparent: for the mixture of all things forbade that, of the moist and the dry, the
warm and the cold, the bright and the sombre; and much earth was therein, and seeds
unlimited in number, alike in nothing. For neither was any of the other things in
anything like one another. If that be so, it is necessary to believe that in the all, all
objects are in.
With that, one can compare Simplicius Physica 164, 25 (DK 59B6): Kai oxs Ss
ioai poipai e'loi xoi) xs peydA,ou Kai xoi) opiKpoi) nX-fiGog, Kai
oi3xco<; av sir| fev rcavxi Tiavxa- oi)8s xcopig soxiv elvat, tikfa Tiavxa
Tiavxoc; poipav pex&xsi. oxe xobMxioxov pr^ soxiv eivai, o6k av
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8ovaixo xcopio0f|vai, ot>8' av etp' eauxoi) yeveoGai, dAA' OTtcooTiep
dpx^v elvai Kai vuv rcavxa opou. ev Tiaoi Se noXXti eveaxi Kai xcov
&7ioKpivop8VC0V toa 7x^fj0o^ fev xoiq pei^ooi xs Kai eXaaooai. And
when there are equal parts of the big and the small, as to their amount, also in that way
everything would be in everything: nor is there being apart, but everything has a part of
everything <together with everything else>. When there is nothing which is the smallest,
no 'being parted' is possible, nor coming to be by itself, but as it was in the beginning,
so now everything is together. And in everything there are many things of those
separated off, equal in amount in the bigger and the smaller <things>.
The same use of SVSlvai in the context of physics is found with Diogenes of
Apollonia, as with Anaxagoras both in the doxography and in what is recognized as his
genuine words. (Aristotle, de respiratione, 2. 471a 3: Aloy8VT|c; 5' oxav dtpcoai
[oi ixGtiec;] xo i)8oop 8ia xcov Ppayxicov sk xoi) 7tepi xo oxopa
Ttepieaxcoxoq oSaxog eX,K8iv xcp Kevcp xcp fcv xcp oxopaxi xov depa
00^ kvovxoc, 8V xcdl u8axi depO<^ ... .) Again, it is Simplicius who preserves
extensive extracts, among which we find the following (Physica 151): Kat JXOI 5oK8l
xo xr\v vor|<nv exov elvai 6 dr^p Ka^oupevoq bnd xcov dvGpccmcov,
xai i)7io xouxoo Tiavxac; Kai ki)Pspvaa0ai Kai rcavxcov Kpaxeiv at>xo
yap poi xouxo 0eo<; Soksi eivai Kai ferci rtav dcpixGai Kai 7idvxa
SiaxiGevai Kai ev Tiavxi eveivai. Kai eoxiv oi)Se ev o xi |ir| pexexsi
xobxou- jiexexsi 8s ob8e ev dpoicoq xo exepov xcp exepcp, d^X,a
TioMoi xponoi Kai abxoi) xoi) depoq Kai xf)<g vor|oi6<; e'loiv. eaxi
yap tcoMxpotok;, Kai 0epp6xepo<; Kai \j/i)Xpoxepo<; Kai ^rpoxepog
Kai bypoxepoq Kai oxaoipcoxepoc; Kai 6^i)xepr|v Klvr|cnv excov, Kai
aXlai 7ioAAai exepoicooieq eveioi Kai f|8ovf|c; Kai XPolfl? arceipoi.
And to me it seems that that which has understanding is what is called air by men, and
that by it everything is governed, and that it has power over everything: and even that
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seems to me to be god who has got to everything, who orders all things, and who is in
everything; and there is not one thing that does not 'have of' it: but not one thing has
<ofit> in like wise with a single other one, but there are many ways both ofair and of
understanding. For it is manifold: warmer and colder, drier and moister, stiller and
having quicker motion, and there are many alterations of taste and colour in it,
unlimited.
We see that as Anaxagoras had his many elements in everything, and VOl)£ in some, so
Diogenes has his one &fjp in everything. Diogenes here seems to be dependent on
Anaxagoras. If there are many things it makes more sense to say that everything is in
everything, since while it is not nonsensical to say that the one thing which in its
undifferentiated form underlies everything is in all the differentiated things, this manner
of speaking is more easily understood as transferred from a model of explanation of the
world where there are many different things which can be said to be in the various things
there are.
IV.
The other area abundant in SVStvai, and moreover syyiyV8G0ai, is medicine. A
brief glance at the entries of the two verbs in the new Index Hippocraticus107 will suffice.
About the general usage the editors comment: "saepe de signis, velut 6Sl5vr|, 81\|/a,
&Y|/l)%ir|, pf|^, \J7lVOC;, KaC)(J.a", pain, thirst, fainting, cough, sleep, fever.
In Airs, Waters and Places, for example, the author declares about cities exposed to
cold winds (4, 33): Toiot Ss 7tai8ioioiv i58pcD7ie<; byyiyvovxai hv xoictiv
opxeoiv, scog optxpa fj- STteixa, 7ipoiouor|<; xf|g f|A,ndr|(;,
107 J.H. Kiihn, U. Fleischer (eds.), Index Hippocraticus, Gottingen 1986/89.
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fapavl^OVTai. 'Children suffer from dropsies in the testicles while they are little,
which disappear as they grow older. '108
But since the various authors of the treatises were physicists as well as physicians, we
also find physical elements being in the body as in e.g. the Nature of Man (1,5): outs
yap to 7idp.7xav f|spa ^eyco xov avGpamov slvai, outs 7iup, outs
u8cop, outs yfjv, out' ak\o oi)5sv, o tt \if\ tpavspov eoxiv svsov sv
to) 6tV0pd)7lcp. For I do not say that man is wholly air, nor fire, nor water, nor earth,
nor anything else which is not apparent as being in man. And the author continues a
little later (2, 13): 7loX,Xd yap sotiv sv tcp OCOpaTl kveovxa, for many things
are in the body.
Countless examples could be added for all those uses, but instead of pursuing further
differentiations in application I will now turn to Plato. In the various early dialogues,
syytyVSO0ai and svsivai occur in connection with subjects and objects taken from
all the different groups of words mentioned. As would be expected, the two words are
not all too common (42 instances in the early dialogues up to and including the
Symposium). I will leave aside - as not relevant at present - first, occasional purely spatial
use without consequences of any sort to the argument; secondly, occurrences in
quotations from poetry if the clause containing the words is not subsequently discussed;
thirdly, though slightly reluctantly, casual occurrences of common expressions like VOU<^
evecrciv.
Even common expressions like that are regularly analysed and on that basis
reinterpreted by Plato. Ion 534b is a case in point. Socrates declares at 533d that, in
explaining Homer, people like Ion do not exercise a skill, but that a godly, divine power
moves them, or that a power, 8\3vap.iq, is put into them (SVTiOljGl, 533d). In 534a,
the state of being 8V0SO£, enthused, is contrasted with the normal one of being
Sficppoov, mindful, or in one's right mind. In that latter state a poet is unable to make
108 Text and translation from W.H.S. Jones, Hippocrates I, Cambridge, Mass. 1923.
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poetry; and Socrates continues (534b): Kai oi) TtpOTSpOV oloc; XS TUOISIV npiv
av sv0soq xs yevr|xai Kai SKtppcov Kai 6 vote; fj,r|Kexi fev abxcp svfj-
ecoc; 5' av xooxi e^Tl T° Kxfjpa, &86vaxoc; Tiac; 7ioieiv av0pamo<; eoxiv
Kai XP^I^CpSsiV. And he will not be able to compose until he becomes enthused and
'out of his mind' and until the mind is no longer in him: but so long as he has this
possession, a man is incapable of composing or foretelling. This, of course, is an
interpretation of the words SV0SO<;, SKCppcov, mindless, or out of one's mind, and
VOUc; SVSOXIV SV XlVl, mind is in someone, someone is mindful or in his right mind.
The phrases are taken literally and reinterpreted. Mind becomes something in itself. As
governing one's thoughts it is here in opposition to the god. Both mind and god seem to
be something separate in principle, something other than the person they relate to at any
given moment. This is apparent a short while later in the text (534c,d) when Socrates
declares 6 08Og S^aipouptSVOt; XOUXCOV XOV VOUV, that the god takes the mind
out of the poets, and that it is not the poets who speak, olc, VOUc; |J.T^ 7ldp80XlV,
tlXX' 6 0ed<; abxoc; fecxiv 6 X-eycov, to whom there is no mind, but that it is the
god himself who speaks. VOXjC, TiapsoxiV, rather than 8VSOXIV, is the marginally
commoner phrase, employed here after the pun on the alternative expression.
To be sure, Plato does not make anything of that in the Ion in terms of a theory of
mind. The example goes to show, however, that Plato wilfully plays with the language
when it is to his advantage. It is this sort of serious pun which often makes it difficult to
assess the full implications of certain phrases or colloquial expressions, or again of
analogies adduced from other spheres of life, as for example the sciences. It also makes it
difficult to judge whether any given term is part of an in any way fixed terminology of
Plato's, or used on the spur of the moment to illustrate a particular point.
113
V.
In the light of that, I will now comment on a few passages in a number of dialogues also
otherwise of particular importance to anyone interested in Plato's ontology, namely the
Gorgias and Charmides. Protagoras, Meno, and Euthyphro all contain either SVSlVCtl,
or syyiveoGai, or at least elvai 8V, in contexts which by some are considered
relevant to the 'theory of forms', but at close examination all these occurrences turn out
to be of a common nature; they can either be explained on the lines drawn out above, or
they are similar to those instances at which I will now look in detail.
For readers of Plato familiar with the Phaedo, Plato's usage at Gorgias 497ff. is
reminiscent of the 'Theory of Forms or Ideas', and scholarly opinion is divided as to the
significance of that phenomenon. It is notably the use of TiapOUOia and 7iapsivai
there that gives rise to differing interpretations.109 In this environment towards the end of
the dialogue Gorgias, we find four occurrences of kyytyveoGai in close proximity. Is
their occurrence there connected with that of the other words suggestive of Plato's later
ontological statements? - Socrates and Callicles have just returned to the original
question of what rhetoric is, and then if it aims at the good or at the pleasant; and
Socrates had tried to persuade Callicles that the two are distinct. Callicles holds that
there were rhetors in the past in possession of what Socrates requires: their aim was 'that
109 For a detailed discussion of the passage, see Section IV to VI of the chapter on 7tapOUOla,
7tap8tvai, and 7UXpayiyV8O0ai above. Cf. E.R. Dodds, Plato. Gorgias, Oxford 1959, commentary on
497e, roue; dyuOof)^ obyi dyaGwv 7tapotxm dyaGobt; Kaksic, coaTisp xotx Kakofx;
otg &V KUAAOC 7tupfl; Don't you call the good men good: " "owing to the presence in them of good
things". In Callicles' view these "good things" are pleasures (498d3). In later dialogues Plato used
7capOtxria in a half-technical sense to describe the "presence" of a Form in a particular; but the use of
the plural &ya0<BV, here and at 498d2, is sufficient to show that the Theory of Forms is not
presupposed. We find a similar use of Ttapstvat at Charmides 158e7, 81 OOl ftdpeoxiV
ococppoouvri, e/SlC; XI 7repi ubxtjc; Soqdtyuv, and elsewhere." Likewise at Gorgias 506dl, T|8o
8e eoxiv xouxo ou 7iapayevop6vou f]86pe0a, dyaGov 8s ou 7rap6vxo<; dyaGol
80JJ8V; Is not pleasant that: when it is there, we are pleased; but good that: when it is there, we are
good? Dodds comments: "This sounds like the language of the theory of Forms. But see above on 497el
and 503el " At 503el the expression d7ToPk67ICOV TTpOC XI, looking at something, receives
Dodds' attention.
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the souls of the audience be as good as possible.' Socrates remains sceptical. Then, at
503e, he makes some remarks as to the method of finding out if one of those named
really had the soul of his audience in mind. He maintains that a good man, one who says
what is best, does not speak at random, &XX' &7TOpX.87lCDV Tipoc; XI, but looking at
something, just as all the other craftsmen look each at his own work or task, not
randomly, but so that what they produce have a certain form.
In his usual fashion, Socrates then lists a number of other professions: the painters, the
builders, the shipwrights, whomsoever you like, and he continues that one can see that
each of them s'lq T&^IV xiva ... XlGljOlV O av XtGf), sets what he sets in a
certain arrangement, and fits one thing together with the other, 504al aV XO aTlCLV
ai)oxriar|xai xexaypevov xe teal KeKoopevov rcpaypa, until each one thing
stays together as one well-arranged and ordered object. Likewise, the craftsmen
concerned with the body, sports coaches and physicians, KOCJpOLOl XO GCOpa Kal
ouvxaxxouoiv, order and arrange the body. xdlqlC, and KOCpo^, declares Socrates,
is their aim. He obtains Callicles' consent that that is true for the soul as well as the body.
Then he asks for the name of that order and good arrangement in the body (504b7): xl
ouv ovopti soxiv kv xcp ocopaxi xcp sk xfjg xa^scoc; xs Kai xou
KOOpou yiyVOpSYCp; What, then, is the name in the case of the body for that which
results from the arrangement and order? - I would, by the way, emend the text here to
xi o5v ovopti soxiv xtp sv xcp ooopaxi sk xrjq xa^sax; xe Kai xou
KOGpOl) ytyvopSVCp; What, then, is the name for that which results from the
arrangement and order in the body? Fortunately, the difference of whether ylyvopai
SV XIvl occurs here already, or only in Socrates' next sentence as syylyvopat, does
not matter greatly. - Callicles replies (504b9): bylsiav Kai ioyuv lOCOc; }.ty&iq,
perhaps you mean health and strength. Socrates: sycoys. XI 8s au X(p 8V XT|
eyyiyvopevcp sk xf|<; xa^scoc; Kai xoi) Koopoo; Yes. And what <is
the name> for that which comes into (or comes into being in) the soul from
arrangement and order? Callicles does not answer, and Socrates has to explain (504c7):
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s|j.ol yap Soksi xaig pev xou aoopaxot; xa^eoiv ovopa slvai
uyisivov, 8$, 06 sv auxcp r| uyteia ylyvexat Kat f| aAArj frpexij xou
acopaxoq d xaiq 8e ye xf|<; vj/D^riq xa^eoi Kat Kooprjasoiv vopijiov
xs Kat vojioc;, 60SV Kat vopipoi ytyvovxai Kat Koopioi- xauxa 5'
eaxiv 8iKaioo\3vr| xe Kat oaxppoauvr| d5 obKouv Tipdq xauxa
P^stcodv 6 prjxcop eKeivog, 6 X8%vik6<; xe Kat hyaQoq, ... <fepsi> ... ,d9
7ipd<; xouxo itst xov vouv 8xcdv, oxccot; av abxco xoiq noAAxaK;
5iKaioouvr| pev ev xaiq yvxaiq yiyvrycai,
&5iKla Se &7taA,A,axxr|Tai,
Kat ococppoouvrj pev £yytyvr|xai,
&KoIaaia 5s 6,7iaX.Iaxxr|xai,
Kat fj a?cA,r| frpexrj kyyiyviyxai,
KaKia 58 ^LTtlT].
It is impossible not to perceive the Gorgianic antithetical couples at the end of
Socrates' exposition.110 But not only the last paragraph of that section is imitation of
Gorgias; and it is not only the style that is Gorgianic. For, while it is correct to state that
Plato has Socrates also elsewhere draw parallels between the health of the body and the
health of the soul, and while one is justified in pointing to Gorgias 447e - 449e where
Socrates already spoke of medicine and justice, and of bad states of body and soul, side
by side, there are elements in the discussion of Gorgias 503e - 507c which cannot be
explained in so general a way.111 504ff. in particular has seemed so striking to
110 The sole function of the layout is to emphasize that structure.
111 On 504d in particular, cf. W.H. Thompson, The Gorgias of Plato, London 1905, p. XXf.: " This
description, if we compare it with those given in the purely Socratic dialogues, the Laches, for instance,
the Charmides, or the Protagoras, will be seen to mark an epoch in Plato's mental growth, or, what is
the same thing, in the History of Moral Science. Order or Harmony is the germinal idea of the Republic,
as it gives unity and coherence to the parts, otherwise ill-connected, of the present dialogue." Dodds as
well has the Gorgias late in Group I of Plato's dialogues, close in doctrine to the Meno and the Phaedo.
A judgement on those lines seems to underlie interpretation and subsequent relative dating of the
dialogues to the present day.
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commentators that is has been marked as a watershed in Plato's development. But while
it may be true that Socrates argues un-Socratically here, what is perceived as un-Socratic
is mostly not advanced Platonic thought but conscious discussion of Gorgianic tenets.
When does Plato adduce the painter as primary example of a craftsmen who looks, not
at the physical objects surrounding him, but at a certain order so that his work have a
certain form? Compare, for example, the passage about the painter in Republic 10,
starting at 596a, and culminating at 598a in Socrates' question (597el0): SITES 5s poi
Tispi xou ^Goypatpoi) to5s- jcoxspa biceivo at>xd to fcv ttj cpuaei
SKaoTov 5oksi ooi STiixsipsiv pipeioGai rj xa tcdv Sripioupycov spya;
Tell me about the painter the following: if he seems to you to try to represent that itself
<which we have mentioned>, that in nature, or those works of the craftsmen? And a
little later, 598b, Socrates asks if the painter represents what is or what seems to be; the
answer is obvious.112
Starting a list of dTjJllOUpyoi with painters, however, makes good sense as a reaction
against Gorgias' own picture of the methods of ypacpsTc;, painters, in his Encomium on
Helen, where painters are characterized thus (18): hXXd JJ.f|V 01 ypacpsi^ OTav
sk noXXatv xpoopaxcov ocopaxcov sv odjpa kai a^ripa xe^eiooc;
6t7lspydO(DVTai xspjiouoi xf|v 6\)/lV. But painters please the eye when in a
finished manner they construct, from many colours and bodies, one body and shape.
112 Cf. M. Kardaun, Der Mimesisbegriff in der griechischen Antike, Verhandelingen der Koninklijke
Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, deel 153, Amsterdam/
New York/Oxford/Tokyo 1993, pp. 63ff.
It would be wrong to adduce "Republic 400d - 401a where f) ypatptKl) TS^VTI is listed as a
8r|pr)YOpia", or "for painting as a T£%VT] ... Ion 532e - 533a" in order to prove that Plato thought
otherwise elsewhere, since at the former place Socrates says how things should be but are not, and at the
latter he draws a parallel between the visual arts and poetry only to establish a point against Ion. Pace P.
Murray, Plato on Poetry, Cambridge 1996. At Phaedrus 248d, where 8qpiOt)pyoi are classed below
7EOlf|Tat, a possible explanation of the different order is that Socrates refers to those who are commonly
called craftsmen, those who just go through a set of motions and rules they have copied from their
elders.
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This is in a speech which commences with the words (1): KOOpO^ 7l6)*£l p£V
si)av8pta, ocopaxi 8s K&XXoq, $s oocpla, Ttpaypaxi 8s frpsxf),
A,oyco 8s dXrjGsia- xa 8s svavxta xouxcov dKoopla. Order far a city is
being well-bemanned, far a body it is beauty, far a soul wisdom, far an object goodness,
for a speech truth: but the opposites of these are disorder.
Here, KOOpoc; is what makes something, anything, good and praiseworthy.113 The
order of the body is found side by side with the order of the soul. And later on in the
same speech, Gorgias declares (14): XOV abxov 8s ^oyov S%Sl f\ XOU Pcoyoi)
Suvapit; Ttpog xr)v xfjq v|/uxf|<; xti^iv f| xs xa>v cpappaKoov xa^h; Tipoq
Xtjv XOOV OCOp&XCOV cpuOlV. The power of a speech has the same ratio to the
arrangement, T&flC,, of the soul as prescription, X&^l^, ofmedicine has to the nature
of the body.
Here, we see that Gorgias not only drew a parallel between the order of the body and
the order of the soul, he also compared the influence of speech on soul with the influence
of medicine on body. Seen under that perspective, it appears natural for Plato - in a
passage in which Socrates implicitly criticizes and attacks Gorgias in general and in
matters of detail, using the very examples Gorgias had advanced - to elaborate on those
examples, to take over the language of Gorgias, and to take Gorgias' comparisons
further. Having adopted the Gorgianic - though not necessarily exclusively Gorgianic -
notion of the KOOpo^ and X&^lC, of body and soul, Socrates proceeds to talk of health
coming to be in a body, and subsequently moderation and justice coming to be in a soul,
using the medical terminology of SyylyVOpai. &7iaA,^&XXOpai as well is regularly
used of the disappearing of diseases or symptoms in the Hippocratic Corpus.- The
same language is used in the summary of the present passage at 506d5 - e4.
113 M.C. Stokes suggested in reading this passage that, in Gorgias' Helen, Kbopo^ means 'adornment'
rather than 'order', and, accordingly, &KOO)iia 'lack of adornment'; however this matter is decided, it
does, to my mind, not affect the subsequent argument.
114 J.H. Kiihn, U. Fleischer (eds.), Index Hippocraticus, Gottingen 1986/89, s.v. (l7za\\&OOG).
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Consequently, what can be observed is that the medical usage of syylyV8O0ai with
health and diseases as order and disorder coming to be in the body gave rise to the use of
the word with moderation and justice and their opposites as order or disorder coming to
be in the soul. Plato is in that way developing imagery and patterns of comparison used
previously by Gorgias whose views he attempts to disprove, using the opponent's own
language and methods. The language of medicine, by the way, is also the explanation of
the repeated occurrence of 'something's' being in something else, e.g. health and
strength being in man and women,' at the beginning of the Meno (72f.); Meno, we recall,
is presented as a pupil of Gorgias.
VI.
In the Charmides, the situation is not altogether dissimilar from that in the Gorgias.
Again it is a context of approximately three pages, this time near the beginning of the
dialogue, where eyyiyVSO0ai, and subsequently svetvat, are employed repeatedly.
Socrates, returning from a military campaign, is eager to get to know young men of
philosophical disposition, and he asks his friends if there are any. In an attempt to enter
unobtrusively into a conversation with the youth Charmides, he uses his uncle Critias'
advice to pretend to be a medical man in possession of a cure for Charmides' headache.
For a moment it looks as if Socrates would not get far at all with his plan, since
Charmides knows who Socrates is. But Socrates can proceed despite that. He knows a
magic spell, he says, but just as - as the doctors rightly say - one cannot cure a part of the
body, for example the head, by itself, so one cannot cure the body without the soul. At
156c, the phrase used of 'the head by itself, ai)T^V S(p ' sai)lf|^, is used by
Anaxagoras and can thus be associated with scientific terminology. After it has been
stated that it would be wrong to treat the head atiTTjv scp' eai)Tf|£, Socrates repeats
that his teacher Zalmoxis emphasizes that it would be wrong to try and treat the body
alone (157a): 0£pa,7i£uso0ai 8e xrjv V|/uxi1v stpr|, c5 paicapie, 87icp5ai<;
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tigiv, xdq 8' fe7tq)8dc; xauxaq xoug Jioyouq etvai xoug kclXovc,- fek 5s
xcov xoiouxcov ^oyoov ev xaig \j/u%ai<; aco(ppoo6vr|v kyyiyveoBai, fjc;
syysvopsvr|(; Kai 7iapo6or|<; |bd5iov r[5ri eivai xr\v byleiav Kai xf|
KS(paX,fl Kai xcp dAAcp OCOjiaXl Tiopi^siv. He said that <it is necessary> to
treat the soul with spells, but that those spells are the speeches, namely the beautiful
ones: from speeches of that sort, moderation would come into being in the soul: when it
has got there and is close by, it is easier already to procure health both for the head
andfor the rest of the body.
Up to that point, there is nothing unusual with Plato's usage. Following the same
pattern as in the Gorgias, Plato has Socrates use eyyiyveoBai, the common word for
diseases' being in the body, for OCOCppOCWrj being in the soul. It is only two pages
later, when the matter is taken up again, that we can see Plato making a slightly distinct
point while apparently simply repeating what he has stated already. At first, Socrates
simply restates at I58b5: ei psv ooi rj8r| 7tapsoxiv, ooc; A,eyei Kpixiat; o8e,
ococppoouvr| Kai si ocbcppcov iKavcoq, ot>8ev exi ooi e5ei ouxe x&v
ZaXjxo^iSoq ouxe xcov' APapiSoc; xou 'YitepPopeou 87icp5d)v, ... .If it is
already with you, as Critias here says, moderation, and ifyou are moderate, you are no
longer in need ofspells, be it ofZalmoxis or ofAbaridos the Hyperborean,
This is again ordinary Greek usage. OCOCppoouVT] Ttdpeoxi gol and el OCOtppCOV
can be two different ways of saying the same thing.115 The picture changes slightly a few
lines later. Charmides is hesitant about praising himself, and Socrates proposes to
conduct an investigation. He says at 158e: xf|8e xoivuv, 8(pr|V feycb, 5oK8l jj.oi
(teXxiGxri eivai rj ok8\j/k; rcepi abxou. 5f|A,ov yap oxi ei ooi Ttapeoxiv
ocDtppoouvr), e^si? xi Tiepi atoxic So^a^eiv. 159 dvayKr| yap tiou
evouoav at>xf|v, eiiiep eveoxiv, aio0r|oiv xiva 7tapexeiv, e£, fjq 8o^a
av xiq ooi ruepi abxfic; eirj oxi eoxiv Kai 671010v xi f) oftxppoouvrj- f|
115 See Section I of the chapter on 7tapOl)Oia, ... above; cf. J. Lyons, Structural Semantics, Oxford
1969, passim, esp. Chapter VII, pl39f.
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ouk otsi; ... iva xoivuv xoTxaocopev eixe 001 evsoxiv eixe jit), erne,
fjv 5' kycb, xi (pr^q elvai ooo(ppooi3vr|v tcaxa xrjv orjv 5o^av. in this way,
I said, an investigation into that seems to me to be best. For it is clear that if
moderation is with you, you can give an opinion about it. For it is necessary that being
in, if it is in, it affords some perception, from which there would be an opinion at your
disposal, what and how (= of what sort) moderation is. ... Therefore, so that we may
guess now if it is in you or not, tell me, I said, what you say moderation is according to
your own opinion,116
In the same way as in the passage from the Ion quoted above, Socrates moves from a
natural expression to an unwarranted conclusion, this time mediated by an additional
step. Between 'moderation is with you' and 'therefore you must know what it is',
Socrates inserts: 'so it must yield some perception'. Perception, it may be noted, leads to
opinion, here already, not to knowledge. (That distinction, again, goes back at least to
Gorgias, this time his Palamedes.) In each case, one could say, a compound verb-phrase
representing a monadic, one-place or monovalent predicate is interpreted as a dyadic,
two-place, or bivalent predicate, stating a relation between two relata. The soul, or the
particular human being on the one hand, and moderation on the other. The significance
this has for subsequent discussion in the Charmides need not be considered here.
Finally, whereas the being in someone of StKaioauvr) and OGOCppOOUVT) in Gorgias
and Charmides are introduced by way of medical examples, and whereas in both cases
initially the process of reaching a state is described with eyylyV8O0(Xl, there are places
in both the Protagoras (352b) and the Meno (85c; 86a) where STClOXfjJJ.r| or &X,rj08l£
86£,ai are said to be in people, without further ado. It is just conceivable that those
expressions were close enough in content to VOU£ or (ppovsiv SVSOXIV to pass
unheeded, whereas few people besides Socrates would accept a construction with one of
116 Cf. discussion of Charmides 157f. in Section V of the chapter on 7tapOt)Ota, etc., above.
121
the traditional virtues in place of some sort of knowledge, and that therefore an
introduction is needed in those cases. More importantly, we have seen that, in the
Charmides and more pointedly in the Gorgias, Plato uses the language of those whose
views he discusses or attacks; but that is not to say that he makes that language part of
his own terminology henceforth; not even that he is committed to it at the time he
employs it.
VII.
Of all the composite verbs derived from stvai and yiyVCoGai, svsivai and
syyiyvsoOat are the widest and most general in their application, due to the nature of
the semantic vagueness of 8V-, in. They can connect things in a purely physical, spatial
way, but can also refer to the mind's or thoughts' being in a person, or to certain
qualities' being in words; because the relation expressed by the two verbs lacks
specificity, they were found suitable in particular in physical theory and speculation as
that of Anaxagoras, just as much as in medicine, where syytyVSG0ai and eveiVdl
(with the dative of the person affected) became the standard terms for 'contracting' and
'having' a disease respectively. In this latter context, the verbs are encountered on more





The earliest occurrence of the noun st8o^ in extant Greek literature is at Iliad II, 58.
Zeus has sent a pernicious dream to Agamemnon. About the dream it is said (20): oxt)
8' dp' bTtsp KecpaXfy; Nr|X,rjicp uli soikon;, | Neaxopi, xov pa paA,ioxa
yepovxcov xf 'Ayapepvcov | xcp piv ssiodpevoc; 7ipooecpc6vee Gsiog
'Ovetpog- | ... . He stood above <Agamemnon's> head, being like the son ofNeleus,
Nestor, whom Agamemnon esteemed most highly ofall elder men; looking like him, the
godly dream addressed him: ... . The dream's speech follows. This is reported to the
council of kings by Agamemnon the following morning (56): ka.ux8, cpiA-ol* 0SIOC;
pot bvoTivtov fjX,0ev "Oveipoc; | &pPpooir|v Sid voKxa- ptiXioxa 8s
Neoxopi Step | e!86<; xs peys06<; xe cpurjv x' dy^toxa kpKei- | ... .
Listen, friends: a godly dream came to me during the ambrosian night: being most like
Nestor in guise and size and growth. And Agamemnon reports what the dream, standing
by his head, has told him.
The dream was like Nestor in sISoc;, |lsys0O(^, cpof|. The verbs used to express this
likeness are 80lKa and SlSopai, to be like. Both verbs have strong visual connotations.
80lKa seems to be a more general word for 'being likebut 'that which is like', the
s'lkcov, is in the first place something visual, a picture. And though SlSopat xivi, in
particular its participle s'todpsvo^, could be 'being like', or rather 'appearing like' in
other respects as well - e.g. (p0oyyf| at Iliad II, 791 and XIII, 216, epeovf) at XX, 81- it
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is originally the visual aspect which is the point of comparison, as at Odyssey I, 105 after
the description of the visible attributes of Athena's disguise, or at Odyssey II, 267f., ...
OX85608V 8s oi fjA,0sv 'A0r|vr|, | Msvxopi s'i5ojj.svr| f|psv Sspac; f|5s
Kai ab8r|V, to him came Athena, appearing like Mentor in build and also in voice.
Here, as at XIII, 45 where it is said of Poseidon: s'lO(X|iSVO(; KdX%avxi Ssjiac;
Kat dxsipsa cpcovfiv, appearing like Calchas in build and unwearied voice, (pcovrj
is added because in each case the god is to say something presently; even where that is
the case, however, s'lodpsvo^ suggests the likeness in appearance, in guise, in 'looks',
in the first place.
st8o<; is derived from the same root *ueid-, 'see', as SlSojiCtl, 'appear, seem, give
oneself the appearance, appear like', and as \8siV, stSoV, 'see', used in suppletion as
aorist to 6pdco, 'see'. sl8o^ is 'that which looks at' and 'that which is seen'. With
Homer, however, it is always the stSoc^ of someone 'which looks at' or 'which is seen'
by someone else; 'that which looks at' in the sense of 'that which is facing' the spectator.
At Iliad II, 58 quoted above, the el5o^ of Nestor is set side by side with, and thereby
distinguished from, his psy£0OC; and his cpufj. Those two aspects of Nestor's were, of
course, visible and seen as well, stboc; must therefore be more specific than just 'that
which is seen by someone else'. |i.sys0O^ is 'size' straightforwardly, cprifj is something
like 'growth' in that old sense of the word, which encompasses 'stature'. At Iliad XX,
370, it is again found side by side with sl8o<^. After Achilles has slain Hector, the other
Greeks rush forward: oi Kai 0r|rjoavxo tpurjv Kal siSoq dyrjxov I
"EKXOpoq. And they looked at the admirable stature and appearance of Hector. At
Iliad I, 115, Agamemnon is furious about Calchas' proposal to hand Chryseis back to
her father, her, whom he wants to take home since she is no worse than his wife
Clytaemnestra, ob Sspac; oi)5s (purjv, oux' ap cppsvaq ouxs XI spya, not in
build nor in growth, nor yet in wits nor in any of her works. Sspac;, the noun to SsjICD,
build, is 'build'. It is, for the present, not necessary to determine with precision what
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exactly (pufj, growth or stature, is when it is contrasted with 'size', 'guise' and 'build'; it
seems as if whenever it is found with one or two of them it could bear connotations of
the other.
Sspa^, on the other hand, which we have seen in opposition to (puf|, is on occasion set
against sl5o^ as well. When Priam sets off to ransom the body of Hector at night when
other men are asleep, Hermes, sent by Zeus, declares that he will give Priam safe
conduct, (ptx,cp 58 OS Ttaxpt felOKCO, for I liken you to my father (371). To him
replies godlike Priam, IlpiajJ.O^ GsosiSfj^, that a benevolent god must have sent such
a guard and leader (376): ... otoc; 5f\ OU Sspag Kal slSoq dyryuoc;, |
TtSKVUOai TS VOCp, ... . You, how admirable in build and guise, you are endowed
with mind, ....
From the Odyssey, one may adduce Calypso's usage when in a last attempt she tries to
persuade Odysseus to stay with her. She knows that he is longing to see his wife,
\|isip6jj.sv6<; 7tep 'iSeoGai or\v a>-OXOV (Odyssey V, 209f.). But she, Calypso, is
no worse than her (212): ot> Sepac; ot>8e cpurjv, 87tsi ov ncoq oi)8e soiks |
Ovrixaq dGavaxfloi Sepag Kal st8o<; Spl^SlV. Neither in build nor in growth,
since it is not seemly in any way that mortals strive with immortals as to build and
guise. To that, Odysseus replies (215): ... • otSci Kal abzdq \ Ttavxa fi&A,',
ouvsKa osio Tteplcppcov nrjv8X,67t8ia | eTSoc; 6tKi8vox8pr| psysGoq x'
8'ioavxa 'iSsoGai. I knowfull well myself that against you, thoughtful Penelope seems
rather weak in guise and in size, when looked at. In this passage of a dozen lines,
'tSsoGai and stSot^ are the two terms repeated in the comparison of the two women. I
have no doubts that in line 217, 8l8oq &Kl8voxspr| psyeGoc; x' s'lodvxa
'iSsoGai, the poet relies on the reader's realizing the etymological connection of the first
and last words of that verse.117
117 That does, of course, not imply that the poet had a notion of etymology necessarily equivalent to our
own.
125
The potential differences between external appearance and other characteristics of a
person, underlying the debate with Calypso, are dealt with more explicitly later on in the
Odyssey.11* When in Scheria Odysseus is taunted by Eurylaus (VIII, 164): oi)8'
6t0X,r|Tf|pl eoiKOtg, you are not like a fighter, Odysseus retorts (167): OUXCDg ot>
7iavx800i Geol %aplevxa 8i8ouoiv | &v8paoiv, ouxe cpur^v oux' ap'
cppevag oux' &yopr|xuv. | aXXoq pev yap etSog (naSvoxepog TteXei
&vf|p, | h'k'kd 0edg popcpr\v e7ieai oxecpei, o'l 8e x' fee; abxov |
xsp7topsvoi A,euoaouaiv 6 8' &G(paA,scog ftyopeuei | a'lSot peiX,i%lr|,
pexa 8e rcpexcei frypopevoioiv, | epxopevov 8' &va aoxu Osov cog
s'loopocooiv. | alXog 8' au e!8og pev &A,tyKiog (xGavaxoioiv, |
ou o'l X^Pl(^ frpcpircepiaxecpexai knesooiv, | cog Kal aol el8og pev
6tpiTtp87i8g, oi)8e ksv aXAoog | ou8e 0eog xeu^eie, voov 8' &7iocpc6?a6g
sool. Not in one way do the gods give pleasing things to all men, neither as to growth
nor yet mind nor eloquence. One man, indeed, is ofweak guise, but god wreathes shape
around his words, and the other men look at him, delighted; but he speaks unfailingly
with soothing reverence; he is conspicuous among those who are gathered, just as if
they looked at a god walking through the city. Again, another man resembles the gods
as to his guise, butfor him, no grace is wreathed around his words; just so you are very
stately as to look, even a god could not fit it otherwise; as to mind, however, you are
useless. Odysseus names three characteristics of a man, (pufj, growth, eppsveg, wits,
&yoprjXUg, 'speaking-in-public'. The first one of these, growth, seems to contribute to
how one looks, one's look or guise, 8l8og. It is difficult to say if the positive qualities of
the eloquent man are to be attributed exclusively to his fryoprjXUg, the ability to speak
well, or if that is somehow subordinated to his cppSVSg, his wits, which in that way
contribute to his speaking 'with soothing reverence'. Regardless of how that matter is
decided, however, these two internal qualities or characteristics are strictly separated
118 Other aspects of this passage are discussed below in APPENDIX 4 on 'popcpf| in Archaic Greek
Literature'.
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from the external appearance; and if, with regard to both the Iliad and the Odyssey, some
commentators may feel inclined to postulate a relation in Homer's mind between the
good look of a hero and other positive and valuable attributes, this passage clearly shows
that while beautiful appearance is something positive in itself, the poet was capable of
separating and isolating that characteristic as something external, and he probably
expected his audience to do so, too.
Against the objection that this is the poet of the Odyssey, while the poet of the Iliad did
not so distinguish between the external and the internal characteristics of a person, it is
worthwhile to compare that passage from the Iliad on which this last passage, and the
related one in Book XI of the Odyssey, are clearly modelled. In Book III of the Iliad,
Helen is on the tower of the Scaean gate, overlooking the battlefield, together with the
old men of Troy. Priam asks her to identify various Greek leaders. First he sees
Agamemnon and inquires who he is. Next, he asks for Odysseus whom he describes as
shorter but broader than Agamemnon. Helen replies that it is Odysseus, £l5co<;
Travxoioix; XS 56A,OlKal Jlf|8sa 7U)KVd, who knows various crafts and dense
cunning (202). This is confirmed by Antenor who once was host to Odysseus and
Menelaos when the two came on an embassy to negotiate terms for a return of Helen
without armed conflict. Antenor declares (208): dpcpoxspCDV 8s (pl)Tjv k8dr|V KGti
Jlf|8£0t 7ll)KVd. Of both, I then learned their growth and dense cunning. Standing up,
Menelaos made the stronger impression, sitting down it was Odysseus, and Antenor
continues (212): blX oxe 5rj puGouc; Kal prj5ea 7taoiv ixpaivov, | rjxoi
jj.8v MeveA,ao<; femxpoxdSriv dyopeue, | Tiaopa pev, tiXXa paA,a
?ayeco<;, fcnel oi) noMpuGoc; | ot>5' dcpapapxoeTrrjc;- fj Kal yevei
ooTspog f)ev. | dAX oxe 5rj 7toA,t3pr|xi(; dva'l^siev 'OSuoaeuq- |
cxaoKev, UTial 5s 15sok8 Kaxa 3cg°vo? oppaxa Ttrj^ag, | ... | ... | cpalijg
ks ^aKoxov xs xiv' eppevai acppova x amcuq. | hXX' oxe 8rj OTia xs
p8ydX,rjv 8K oxfjOsot; sir| | Kal 87iea vicpa8soaiv eoiKoxa xsipsplrjoiv,
| oi)K av STisix' 'O5oof|i y' eplooeie Ppoxog aXXoq- \ ob xoxs y' 655'
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'05uof|0<; 6.yaoodja.S0' slSoc^ 'iSovxs^.119 But when they wove their words and
cunning for all of us, verily, Menelaus spoke fluently; little, but very clearly; a man
neither wordy nor missing the point; and that while he was later by birth. But when
Odysseus, of much cunning, got up: he stood there; he looked down, fixing his eyes to
the ground, .... You would have said that he were full of ill-will, and witless, too; but
when he sent forth his big voice from his chest, and words like snow-bearing winter-
storms, then no other man would have rivalled Odysseus: and not so did we wonder
when we saw his guise. There cannot be any doubt that both Menelaus and Odysseus are
of kingly appearance. Odysseus is broader than Agamemnon, and Menelaos broader still.
Yet, Odysseus is more awe-inspiring when sitting. The description of the two is positive
throughout. It is against this background that the closing remark of Antenor is to be
seen. The Trojans were amazed when they saw the two kings. But their amazement when
they heard Odysseus speak was not related to, and not rivalled by, that other one which
resulted merely from the impression of his look, his Sl8o^, which for the poet of the
Iliad was just as much something purely external, which did not tell the spectator
anything about what is inside a person, as it was for the poet of the Odyssey. It should be
noted as well that the et8o^, the look, or guise, of a person, is not the same as his habits
or gestures either; just as Agamemnon could recognize the figure of the god-sent Dream
as that of Nestor in the first place because it was like in look.
So, el5oq is derived from a root meaning 'see'. It was felt by Homer to be thus
connected. It is always the 'Si8o(^ of a person' which is talked of. Of the visible
characteristics of human beings, sl8o(^ is contrasted with (IsysGoc^, size, cpi)f|, growth
or stature, and Ssjia^, build; as a physical, external attribute, it is also contrasted with
non-physical attributes like (ppsvs^ and vote;. It can safely be rendered 'guise', 'look',
'looks', 'appearance', perhaps 'complexion' and 'countenance', but it is doubtful
whether it should at any given place be reduced to 'the appearance or complexion of the
119 Here, etboc; l86vxs^ need not, but may be another case of the poet's showing awareness of an
etymological connection.
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face'. Nor is there, on the other hand, any indication that sISoc; has come to mean
'body' with Homer.
II.
These general words have to be modified in two ways. First, there is one, and only one,
case in which sl8o^ is applied not to a human being but to an animal. In Odyssey XVII,
Odysseus returns to his palace after having been absent for twenty years. He is disguised
as a beggar. When he arrives in the company of the swineherd Eumaeus, Argos, his dog,
whom he had left when he went to Troy, recognizes him, but is too weak to leave his
position on the dung-hill where the negligence of the house-maids has banished him.
Odysseus hides a tear and asks the swineherd (306): Eujiai', f| |i&A.a Gaujia KUCOV
oSe kbit' evl KOTtpcp. | Ka^dc; jxsv 8e|iac; koxiv, (reap xo8e y' oi)
atitpa otSa, | f| 8f\ Kai xayvq eoice Gesiv 87tl elSei xcpSe, | ... ; Eumaeus,
what a wondrous thing that this dog lies in the dung. Surely, he is beautiful in build,
though that I do not know for sure, if he has speed to run on top of this appearance120.
Considering that the term sl8o^ has its particular application in the context of
description of animals later on in Greek literature, this passage has attracted particular
attention. The whole characterisation of the dog Argos, however, portrays him as, if
anything, more human than the other human beings.121 If the passage cannot be used in
this respect, it nevertheless serves as confirmation that the poet of the Odyssey in
particular draws a sharp line between outward appearance and other qualities. As at
VIII, 167ff., it is (pi)f|, growth, which contributes to the elSoc; of a person, here it is
KCtXdv 8sjI(X(^, beautiful build, to which in the first place XoSs elSoc; refers. Perhaps
it is necessary to stress that though, undoubtedly, the whole description of the dog is
120
£711 sI8si xcp8e, on top of this appearance, could perhaps be rendered a little more freely as
matching his appearance.
121 Cf. e.g. U. Holscher, Die Odyssee, Miinchen 1988, p. 193f.
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meant to be positive, it is not ei8o<; on its own which picks up Ka^oc; JJ.SV Sepac;
koilv as a somehow inherently positively inclined term, but elSot; l68s, this particular
etSoq, which refers to something positive just because the point of reference of the
demonstrative phrase is something positive.122
So, while this occurrence of el8o<^ can probably not be counted as a proper exception
to the general observation that elSoc; in Homer is always 'the sl8o(^ of a person', the
following consideration may compel one to postulate a semantic extension of the noun
beyond 'the guise', 'the look (of somebody)': There is a group of adjectives in -SlSfj^,
which is derived from the noun sT8o^. In Iliad and Odyssey it is represented by
eGeiSfjg, f|eposi8fj<;, GeosiSlfc, 'loeiSlfc, and |J.uA,0£l8fj<;. If what has been said
about el8o<; above is correct without qualification, one would expect these words to
mean 'of beautiful or handsome guise', 'of good look' or 'of good looks', 'of the guise
or look ofhr\p', 'of the guise or look of a god', 'of the guise or look of violets' and 'of
the guise or look ofa mill-stone', respectively.
Now, that is, for example, clearly the case with the one instance of et>Sl8f|<; in the
Homeric epics, Iliad III, 48, yuvaiK' SUSlSs' &vf|Ye£, you abducted a good-looking
woman. Hector, who says these words to Paris, had begun his speech with the words
(39): AuOTCO.pi, elSog apiGXS, wretched Paris, best of look, and had added that the
Greeks now laugh at him (44), (p&VT£c; &plOxf|a TEpOjlOV 8|4.pevai, OUVSKa
KaX,dv | et8o<; sti', &AX oinc eoxi ptrj (ppeoi oi)8s xic; &A,icrj,
<previously> thinking ofyou as a champion of the foremost rank, because 'to you, there
122 Pace e.g. H. Diller, Zum Gebrauch von Sldog and l8£(X in vorplatonischer Zeit, in:
Medizingeschichte in unserer Zeit, ed. H.-H. Euler et al., Stuttgart 1971, p. 24f.
Though it is certainly correct that when a hero is praised, one of the objects of praise can be his et8o^,
and though most Homeric heroes are both strong and beautiful, the examples discussed above, and
perhaps already the counter-examples adduced by Diller himself, should serve as a warning against
seeing SlSo^ as anything but the vox media or neutral term it is in both Iliad and Odyssey.
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is'123 a beautiful guise, but there is no force to your wits, nor any strength. And a little
later he pictures a fight of Paris with Menelaus (54): oi)K &V TOl /patcjj.'l]
Kl0api<; xa T8 8d>p' 'Acppo8ixr|<;, | f| is Koprj to ts elSog, ox' ev
KOVlTjOl piyslrj^. Then the cithara and the gifts of Aphrodite, your hair and guise,
would hardly be ofany use to you, when you were mixed with the dust. This reference to
Paris' good looks is taken up two lines later in the formulaic line of reply (58): XOV 8'
a{i>T8 TtpooSSlTtSV 'Als^avSpOC; 0sO8lSf|^. To him, again, replied Alexander of
the guise of a god. Since physical beauty is one of the topics of this passage, and, in
particular, physical beauty in contrast with other characteristics which are not positive in
the same way, it seems appropriate to take et>ei8f|^ and GsosiSf)^ as referring just to
'look', or 'guise', here. The other occurrences of 08OSlSf|<^ in Iliad and Odyssey may all
likewise refer to 'the guise or look of a god' only, as opposed to any other of the god's
characteristics; one may think of &Vxl0SO^ or 08OSIK8^C>£ as comprising those other
characteristics as well; it is difficult to prove the matter either way.
l08lSf|£ is used as an epithet to TtOVXCN^ at Iliad XI, 298 and Odyssey V, 56 and XI,
107. f)epoei8r|c; occurs much more frequently; sometimes likewise with 7lOVXO£, as
for example at Iliad XXIII, 744 and Odyssey XII, 285;124 but it is also epithet to the
cave and rock of Scylla at Odyssey XII, 80 and 233, and to a lovely grotto, sacred to the
nymphs, on Ithaca at Odyssey XIII, 103. The only instance of JJA)Aoei8f|£, derived from
jJ.oX.T], millstone, is at Iliad VII, 270. The scene is the duel between Hector and Ajax.
Both send forth their spears and run atilt at each other. Hector, though wounded, then
lifts a stone (264): &A.A,' dva/aoaapevot; Ai0ov eiA.exo xeipi naxeir\ |
Ksipsvov sv 7is81cp jj.8A.ava xprpp3v xs peyav xe* | tcd PaA,ev Aiavxog
8sivov aaKoc; 87XxaPo8iov | peaoov 87iop(paA.iov, jcspif|xrlC5SV §' &pa
XaA-KOt;. | 8ei3xepo<; aox' Aiac; tio?A> pel^ova A,aav delpac; | fjK'
123
S7tSOXl where one could also expect TtdpsOTlV.
124
Probably also at Iliad V, 770 - despite the wide hyperbaton.
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87ii8ivr|oag, STtepsias 5s IV hneXsQpov, | sioco 5' &C7ii5' sa^s paX-cov
p.l)A,OSl8si TISIpCp, | ... . But driven back he lifted, with his broad hand, a stone
which lay on the ground, black and rough and big. With it, he hit the mighty seven-
hided shield ofAjax right on the boss, and loud echoed the bronze-frame. Second came
Ajax, lifting a much bigger rock and whirling it about, and he applied vast strength to
it: in he broke the shield hitting it with a boulder 'of the guise ofa mill-stone', ....
There is a fundamental difference on the one hand between ei)Sl8f|£ and the other
compounds in - SlStjc^, on the other hand between the pair sij£lSf|^ and 0SOSt8f|^, and
the remaining three, f)SpO-, 'lO-, and JJ.uX.OSlSlfe. st>St8f|(; is derived from an adverb,
not, like all the other adjectives in - SlSlj^, from a noun. In itself, it does not provide any
information pertaining to a potential semantic development of StSo<^; whatever St8o^
may be, anyone or anything sl)£l5f|C; has a good stSoc;.125
At its one and only occurrence, however, it is applied to a person, as is always the case
with 0soei8fj<;. Now, if anybody looks like anybody else, there is no restriction to the
degree of resemblance in look. It is conceivable that two distinct human beings look
perfectly alike. It is certainly implied in the tale of the Dream appearing to Agamemnon
that the Dream looked quite like Nestor. That is not to say that Homer or his audience
thought of the degree of resemblance at all. If, on the other hand, 0SOSl5f|^ is 'of the
guise of a god', it is not necessary to know what a god looks like. Perfect resemblance
should be possible in this case as well.
This is clearly not the case with 'lOSlSfj^. If the sea is 'of the look of a violet', that
must refer to colour or shading or brightness, somehow - however different from ours
the Greek concept of colour may have been; the sea does not have shape or size of a
125 The parallel case of sbcoStj^, 'good of smell', shows that these early formations could retain their
original meaning regardless of the later more general use of - Sl8T|£ and - CO§T|^ as means of forming
denominal adjectives.
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violet, and does not otherwise look like it in those respects.126 That is, of course,
understood whenever the word is used. It does not require explanation.
|J.l)A.oeiSf|^ is a less transparent case. Any stone of approximately adequate
composition may perfectly resemble a mill-stone in look. But is that what is intended?
Colour is probably irrelevant; it may be that of a mill-stone. Shape, perhaps, does not
matter greatly; a boulder washed down in centuries may be perfectly circular. But did the
stone Ajax lifted and threw have a hole equivalent to the one of the netherstone into
which the mill-rind would have been fitted? - Perfect resemblance in look or guise is not
excluded, but it is much more likely that the stone only partly resembled a mill-stone,
namely first and foremost in size, and further, given that the stone Hector had lifted is
described as AAGoV fJ.sA.ava TpTf^UV IS fisyav TS, a stone, black and rough and
big, perhaps also in roughness or even colour; it is possible that the poet also thought of
resemblance in shape. That is something we could not possibly know. But while
speculation of that sort is permitted and in itself of little consequence, translation is a
different matter. All the above assumptions as to reference were made on the basis of
translating puA*OSt8f|£ as 'of the guise or look of a mill-stone'. "Of the size of a mill¬
stone', 'large as a mill-stone', or 'of the shape of a mill-stone', are not translations of
the word jj.l)A.08l5f|£, but interpretations of the whole context. In a poetic translation of
a text that may be permissible; a dictionary, or philological commentary, should be more
precise.127 Even a translation 'like a mill-stone' implies more than can be proved with
any degree of certainty.128 -Sl8r|<; in both ei)£l8f|<; and GeosiSfl^, occurring in the
same text, is frequently rendered with reference to 'guise' or 'look'. As we have seen,
the correct translation of EfsiSf)^ is 'good-looking' or one of its semantic
126 In this context it is relevant that lOV first denoted the flower 'violet', and only secondarily the
colour. Vid. H. Frisk, Griechisches Etymologisches Worterbuch I, Heidelberg 1960, s.v. Cf. also M.L.
West, Hesiod: Theogony, Oxford 1966, p. 152f., ad 1. 3.
127
Pace, e.g., H.W. Nordheier in: Lexikon des friihgriechischen Epos III, Gottingen 1993, col. 281, s.v.:
"von der Gestalt eines Miihlsteines, grofi wie ein M(Uhlstein)".
128 Pace LSJ s.v.: "like a mill-stone"\ H. Frisk, Griechisches Etymologisches Worterbuch II, Heidelberg
1970, s.v. pbkfl: "puko- Sl5f|q 'wie ein Miihlstein' (H 270 ...)".
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equivalents.129 0SO£l§f|C; is bound to be 'looking like a god' at least in some cases, and
it is doubtful if it can safely be rendered 'godlike' anywhere in Homer.130
Thus, in order to render |J.U^O£l5f|C; by 'like a mill-stone' one has to postulate that -
Sl8r|<; as a means of deriving adjectives from nouns has lost its original force, the
reference to the 'guise' or 'look' of the thing. That could have happened under the
influence of the verb derived from SlSoc;, SlSofldl, which, as we have seen, could refer
to 'resemblance in voice' as well as 'look'. But in order to postulate this semantic
development for Homer already, one would want positive, compelling evidence of some
sort. That, however, is not provided by the instances of words in - Sl5Tj<; adduced and
discussed above.
For f|sposi8f|(^, one could construct a case parallel to that of puA,OSl8f|£. &f|p is
'haze' or 'mist'.131 In order to see in what way objects are called 'of the look of haze' or
'of the look ofmist', it is necessary to see what it is in the look of haze that is paralleled
in the look of the object which is surnamed fjSpOSl8f|£. Since we do not even know
exactly what sort of 'haze' or 'mist' was referred to by (tf|p, that is only possible by
comparing occurrences of f|£pO£l8r|£ in their context.
At Odyssey XII, 260, Odysseus and most of his comrades have just escaped Scylla and
Charybdis. Although they are all tired, Odysseus intends to avoid the island of Helius
with his cattle, and wants to sail all through the night. Eurylochus scolds him and says
that he should let his tired comrades rest; and he continues (284): ... | bXX (XUTCO^
129 Pace LSJ s.v.: "well-shaped, comely".
130
Cf., e.g., H.W. Nordheier in: Lexikon des friihgriechischen Epos II, Gottingen 1991, col. 996, s.v.:
"mit dem Aussehen e. Gottes, gottlich schon"-, the latter is, again, interpretation. Since 'mit dem
Aussehen eines Gottes', however, is literal, while 'von der Gestalt eines Muhlsteines, grofi wie ein
Miihlstein' for piAoEl8f|^ is not, Nordheier may in the latter case have been influenced in his
translation by the scholiast he quotes: sch. D zSt.: GXpoyy£A(p, f| Xpa/£l.
With 0£O£l8f|Q in Iliad and Odyssey, 'looking like a god', cf. later usage at, e.g. Phaedo 95c, where
V[/t)yf|, the soul, is called 0£O£l86^ (XI), something godlike-, there 'godlike' is appropriate, since
\|/U%f| has otherwise been said to be 0£tOV and Ct6puxov, something godly and something invisible, so
that 'looking like a god.' is ruled out as translation for 0£OEl8f|C here.
131 Vid. H. Frisk, Griechisches Etymologisches Worterbuch I, Heidelberg 1960, s.v., with
bibliographical references.
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5id vuKia 0or\v tXaXr\aQai avcoyac; | vfjoou &7tO7tA,ayx0evxa<; kv
f|epoei8ei 7i6vx(p. | bk vukxcov 8' avepoi ^aXeTrol, Sr|A,f|paxa vr|cov, |
yiyvovxav rcf| kbv xiq imsKcpuyoi aiTiuv 6A,e0pov, | fjv tico<; e^arclvric;
8^,0T] dvepoio 0ueX.A,a, | f| Noxou f| Zecpupoio Suoasog, oixe pa^ioxa
| vf|a Siappaiouai 08G)V &8Kr|Xl &V(XKXCOV. ... But you order us all the same to
steer away from the island and err through the fast-setting night, on the sea looking like
haze. And from the nights, harsh winds come into being, banes of the ships: how could
anyone escape utter destruction, if in some way suddenly there came a burst of wind,
either the Notus or stormy Zephyrus, which - above all - rip apart ships against the will
of the ruling gods. f|8p08t8f|^ is here epithet to the sea; but the situation is that of an
imagined storm at sea; is there a relation between the storm at sea and the sea's quality
of 'looking like haze'?132 In that case, it may also be relevant to decide whether as an
attribute f)ep08l8f|(^ denotes a permanent or a transitory characteristic.
Most of the time, f|8p08lSr|^ is an epithet to TtOVXOC^. TIOVXO^, the sea, has other
epithets as well; we find, for example, svl OlVOTXl TtOVXCp, in the sea looking like
wine, at Iliad XXIII, 316; (8V0ops) jlsiX,avi 7tOVXCp, (she threw herself into) the
black sea, at Iliad XXIV, 79. These are two cases of colour-terms133 serving as epithets
to TCOVXO^. The noun does, of course, also occur on its own; as, for example, at Iliad
VIII 478f.: xa veiaxa Tisipaxa ... yalrjc; Kai 7iovxoio, the lowest bounds of
land and sea. But while there cannot be any doubt that 7IOVXOC, meant 'sea' for Homer
as for the Greeks of later days, it is relevant that having lost the Indo-European word
cognate to Latin mare, the Greeks employed a great number of different terms of
different provenance to denote the sea; and their etymological origin may be relevant as
well, in particular when the word or a cognate form was otherwise still in use. An
obvious case in point is KeX,8l)0O£ and the neuter plural KsX.8l)0a, track. Since the
132
Tentatively suggested as a possibility by W. Beck in: Lexikon des friihgriechischen Epos i, Gottingen
1979, col. 898, s.v.
133 If OtVOV)/ is always 'looking like wine', or at least sometimes 7ike wine as to his or her or its gaze',
'wine-eyed', is not relevant here.
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word is also otherwise in use in the general sense of 'track', it is necessary to distinguish
its application to the sea by the addition of epithets, foypd KSX,Sl)0a, the wet tracks,
and 'l%0l)6svxa K8^8U0a, the fishy tracks, denote the sea, while Xdyecov dvspcov
tan\|/r|pd KsA.8U0a, the swift tracks of loud winds, are situated in a different region.
Likewise with 7IOVTOC;. 7lOVTO£, derived from a root *pnth-, is an old word for a
path.134 The phrase TtOVTOCJ ClXog 7TC)X,lf|C;, the path of the grey sea, at Iliad XXI,
59, serves as an indication that rcovxoc; meant a 'path' even at a time when aXg had
already come to mean 'sea'; for, on the one hand, even in poetry it would not make
sense to say 'the sea of the grey sea', on the other, aXc, does show a qualification not
only in having the attribute 'grey' but also in being feminine here, while aXg meaning
'salt' is always masculine; that is how Homer can connect the two words allegedly both
denoting 'sea' in the one phrase 'the path of the grey salt-water'135. TXOVTOc^, like
KsXevQa, needs some qualification to be applicable to the sea. Only after having been in
use in that way for a long time, and in particular when the word is no longer used with a
different application, can that sort of qualification be dropped, as at Iliad VIII 479.136
Accordingly, we find dTtsiplTO^ TlOVTOg, the path without boundary, at Odyssey 10,
195; or jJ.8Y(XKf|T'r|£ TlOVTO^, the mighty-monstered path, at Odyssey III, 158; and
also phrases like 'the black path', 'the wine-looking path', 'the path of the look of
violets', or 'the path of the look ofhaze', TCOVTO^ f|8pOSlSf|£.
134 Cf. H. Frisk, Griechisches Etymologisches Worterbuch II, Heidelberg 1970, s.v. 7t6vxo^.
135 Or 'the path of the grey salts', if uXc, is feminine as a collective; cf. H. Frisk, Griechisches
Etymologisches Worterbuch I, Heidelberg 1960, s.v. 7t6vxog: "Als urspr. Bed. ist 'ungebahnter, durch
Gelande, Wasser usw. fUhrender Weg' anzusetzen; vgl. Benveniste in: Word 10, 256f.; 7l6vxog ist
somit eig. "Fahrwasser" (vgl. bypct KSkeoOa) mit Beziehung auf eine fur ein seefahrendes Volk
primare Funktion des Meeres. Vgl. zu Ttskayoc and Qu.Xu.COa." Pace D.H.F. Gray, Homeric Epithets
for Things, in: CQ 41, 1947, p. 112.
136 It is in accordance with this assumption when, as stated and amply illustrated by LSJ, s.v., 7x6vxog
is "common from Horn, downwards, exc. in Prose, where it is chiefly used of special seas". If not only in
Indo-European but also in early Greek times 7t6vi0g was a 'track' or 'way', it would be natural that the
name of a location is added when the word is applied to a water-way. In expressions like 6 A'lyaiOg
7r6vxo<;, there is a univocal qualification as to which track is referred to.
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When one walks on land, the path is solid and non-transparent. When one fares at sea,
the path is not solid and nearly transparent, depending on the grade of perturbation, in
the same way mist or haze are not solid and nearly transparent. But is it the look of haze
which distinguishes the sea as a path from other paths? Or is it the quality of being
penetrable like mist or haze? If it is the former, f|8p08l5f|^ could be classed alongside
other colour-terms, if the latter, alongside other qualitative adjectives like firtslpiTO^
or peyaK^xrit;. Can one adduce in support of the former interpretation application of
f]spoei8rj<; to a cave or a grotto, probably on the strength of the look of their openings
which, especially at the seaside, are likely to be misty?137
It is very difficult to decide if jI\jXosi8f|^ and TjSpOSlSf)^, of the guise of a mill¬
stone and of the look of haze, mean to say that the objects to which they are attributed
have the visual appearance of a mill-stone or haze, respectively, or some other quality or
function of the objects denoted by the nouns the adjectives are derived from, or both.
More important, perhaps, than to decide this question, is to note that unlike etfSlSlfe
and GeoeiStfj^, the other three Homeric adjectives in - SlStjc;, lOSl8f|C;, f|epoeiSf|£,
and puX,08l5r|g, serve as attributes to nouns denoting objects, not people. Once
adjectives in - SlSlj^ are derived from nouns denoting objects in that sense, and are
applied to objects, too, it is no longer perfect resemblance in look, but partial
resemblance of some sort, which is referred to. When adjectives in - 8l5lj£ are applied
where there is partial resemblance between the look of one thing and the look of another
thing, but also partial resemblance in some other quality or function, like the lack of
solidity or the purpose of crushing and grinding, it is only a short step from using those
adjectives in - SlSrjc^ no longer exclusively as signifying 'of the look of and 'looking
like', but also in the more general sense of 'being like'. In a way, this extension, at least
prefigured in Homer, is parallel to that of the verb SlSopai, with which 'appearing like'
137 The rock of Scylla at Odyssey XII, 233, can be neglected, I should think, since it is the rock with the
cave which bears its epithet only because it was the epithet of the cave at XII, 80. But cf. A, Heubeck -
A. Hoekstra, A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey II, Oxford 1989, p.171, on Odyssey XIII, 103.
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first must have referred to visual appearance only, but then could encompass other
aspects of the appearance of a person, too. With Homer, there always seems to be a
visual element in the likeness referred to by the verb or one of the adjectives. These
words, however, show in which way the noun el5o<; will change from referring to
'visual look and appearance', if this expression be granted, to 'look and appearance' in a
more general sense. This semantic development of elSoc;, however, does not set in
immediately.
III.
While for the most part in concord with Homeric usage as far as sl8o^ is concerned,
the works of Hesiod show the first stages of a different semantic development of the
noun. Of the four instances of the word in Hesiod's Theogony, the first can be directly
compared to the description of Odysseus' dog Argos at Odyssey 306 - 308: after an
enumeration of the attributes of the hundred-handed Giants it is said (153): tO^UC; 8'
a7lX,r|TO£ Kpaxsptj psya^Cp STti SlSsi. Immense mighty strength on top of big
appearance. That is resumed in the description of the Titanomachy, when the three
Hundred-Handers are mentioned again at 617ff. Their father had imprisoned them (619):
f)vop8T"|v imepcmA-ov frycopevot; f|Se Kal stSot; | Kat psysOoq, in awe of
their overweening manliness, as well as their guise and size.l3S Not unprecedented
either is the use of sl8o^ in a passage of the Works and Days: at 714, Hesiod concludes
a paragraph of admonition to his brother with the words: ... , OS 8s pf) Tl VOOV
KaTS^eyx&TCD st8o^. ... let your disposition not disgrace your appearance,139 This
138 Cf. M.L. West, Hesiod. Theogony, Oxford 1966, commentary ad loc.: "cf. h. Dem. 275 psysOoc
Kal d8o<; apet\|/e....".
139 Translation by M.L. West, Hesiod. Works and Days, Oxford 1978, commentary ad loc. He continues:
"i.e. let it match it. Tyrt. 10. 9 a'taxhvet is ykvoc, Kaxa 8' hykadv eT8o<; S^feyxei; Pind. O.
8. 19 f]v 8' soopav KUa6c, epycp l' oh Kaxa eT8o<; s7.syxcov. The same dichotomy appears
in Od. 8. 176f. cog Kal ool etSoq psv &pi7rpe7r&; ... v6ov 8' 6t7tocpc67.i6<; soot, 17. 454
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opposition of external and internal characteristics, SlSoc; and VOOC;, is parallel to that of
Odyssey VIII, 164ff., or Iliad III, 212ff., discussed above.
At Theogony 259, in the middle of the catalogue of sea-nymphs, one of them140 is
introduced thus: Ei)&pVT] XS cpuf|V x' kpaxfj Kat etSoq dpcopog. Euarne, of
lovely growth as well as blameless guise. While there is nothing new in this usage, it
should be noted again that etSoc; can refer to the look of a woman just as well as to the
look of a man; naturally, due to their subject matter, that is frequently the case in the
Hesiodic fragments known as 'HoTai. One principal context in that work is that of
comparison of mortal and immortal females, of which Calypso's comparison of herself
and Penelope at Odyssey V, 212ff., quoted above, is both example and model. A
standard line is: ... fj slSoc; epf|piGX' dGavdlTJOl, ... who competed with the
immortals as to guise (e.g. frgs. 23a, 16; 180, 14 Merkelbach - West). Another oft-
repeated half-line, applicable to any female character, is: ... STtf|pa.XOV elSoc;
sxouoav, having loveable look (e.g. frg. 25, 39 M. - W.); a metrically slightly different
variant thereof is: ... 7loX,UT|paxov slSoc^ SXOUOOtV (e.g. Theogony 908). Just
because slSo<^ can refer to the guise of a woman as well as to that of a man, however,
one must not be led to render it 'beauty' instead of 'guise', 'look', or 'appearance'. That
also applies to cases like Ibycus, frg. la (Page). The poet sings of the Greeks who
destroyed Troy, [^ajvGac; ' E^evac; 7iepi eiSsi | [Sfjjpiv 7ioXuupvov
SXOVXS^, having a much-besung struggle about the looks of Helen (5). The war was
about Helen. The poet can say that it was about the looks of Helen. Of course, Helen
was good-looking; everybody knew that; so Ibycus can talk of her 'looks' and need not
mention her 'beauty' explicitly.141
obK apa oo'l y' CTtl St5et Kal (ppsveq fjaav; epitaph of Scipio Barbatus (Dessau, ILS I) 3
quoius forma uirtutei parisumafuit."
140 But cf. M.L. West, Works andDays, commentary ad loc.
141 Pace M.L. West, Greek Lyric Poetry, Oxford 1993, p. 96.
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Related to the type of comparison of divine and human females discussed above is also
the first of the two occurrences of et8o^ in Hesiod's Works and Days. Pandora is
created and equipped by the gods. Zeus orders Hephaestus (62): ... 6.0avd.T]j£ 8s
0ef|<; e'i<; dima feiOKev | 7tap0sviKf|<; Ka^ov e!8oc; bifjpaTov- that
he liken the beautiful loveable appearance of the maiden to the immortal goddesses as
to face.142 This sentence serves as a confirmation that stSoc; denotes 'appearance',
'look', in general; by the phrase s'lg c5rca it is specified which part of the body should
be like that of goddesses in appearance; the attribute KCtXov indicates in a similar way
that sISoc; in itself does not mean beauty.
In one respect, however, Works and Days 62 is different from the other Hesiodic
comparisons of mortals with immortals. cl8o<^ is here direct accusative object, not
accusative of respect. That is significant since an extension of the ways in which a word
can be employed syntactically regularly precedes, and often implies, a change in the
semantics of that word. The noun etSoc; occurred almost exclusively as an accusative of
respect143, as a modal complement to a clause; here it denotes the direct object. That is
why one can think of translating the whole clause '... that he liken her to immortal
goddesses as to her face, the beautiful loveable appearance of a maiden'144, which
would give 'appearance' a status different from that of a mere attribute.145
At Hesiod/rg. 43a (Merkelbach-West), 70ff., ctSoc^ is the subject. The context there is
somehow similar to that of Works and Days 60ff. Athena teaches her skills to a maiden,
142 Cf. also M.L. West, Hesiod. Works and Days, Oxford 1978, commentary ad loc. He suggests to
punctuate differently, '... &0av&Tfl<; 8e 0sf|<g s'tq amu feiOKSV, | 7tap08VlKfjq K(lko\' 8t5oc;
87lljpaxov- ... .' If I understand his commentary correctly, that would amount to something like: '...
that he liken her to immortal goddesses as to herface, the beautiful loveable appearance of a maiden.'
If one accepts that as possible, this would be the first instance of st8oq where the noun does not refer to
'the appearance of a named individual', person or animal, but as a general term to 'an appearance', 'a
figure'. That would not only be unprecedented, but also difficult to explain in the Hesiodic context of
language and thought. There are no temporally close parallels to this usage.
143 Or an equivalent transformation, e.g. as an accusative object of a verb like 8%CO.
144 Cf. note 142.
145 One indication of this is that, using traditional grammatical terminology, one would speak of a
possessive genitive in the phrase 'the appearance of this maiden' or 'this maiden's appearance', while in
the case of the phrase 'an appearance of a maiden', as against 'an appearance of a youth', one would
speak of a qualitative genitive.
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perhaps Eurynome146. Hesiod continues (72): ... , v08gk8 yap toa 0ef|ol | [xf|£
Kal bind /pjoifiq eipaxot; frpyucpeoio | [A-tipxp' olov xe] 08oi3
/aplsv x' &tco sl8o<^ (xrjxo- I ... . She equalled, goddesses in thought, and
brightness beamed from her skin and silver cloth as of a god, and graceful look
breathed from her. Here el8o<^, like K&A,X.O(^ in the probably related passage in the
Hymn to Demeter147, is active subject of a clause. This new syntactical position of slSo<^
will play a role in fifth century usage.
IV.
In non-epic archaic poetry, the noun ei8o^ generally denotes guise or outward
appearance.148 In Attic tragedy, there are two occurrences of sl8o^ in the extant works
of Aeschylus; in both cases the word refers to the external appearance or guise.149 Of the
two instances in Sophocles' tragedies as we have them, the first one, in the early play
Trachiniae, refers straightforwardly to Heracles' disfigured guise (1069); the second one
is found in the late play Electra. Orestes returns in disguise and asks Electra who has
received the urn which allegedly contains his ashes (1177): fj GOV XO ka,SIVOV
sl5o^ 'HA,8KXpa<; XoSs; Is yours here Electra's renowned guise? As with Works
146 For the sake of readability, I will give West's reconstruction of the text. Cf. R. Merkelbach - M.L.
West, Fragmenta Hesiodea, Oxford 1967, apparatus ad loc. They also adduce h. Cer. 278 (misprint for
276) as a parallel.
147 In the Hymn to Demeter it is described how the goddess lifts her disguise (275): 01c; SlTtOtXKX 0sd
peysGoq Kal et8o<; apsivj/s | yf|pac; 6t7taioaj46vr), uspl x' dpcpi xe vidXloc, ar|xo- |
68pr) 5' 'tpspdsooa 0ur|6vxcDV duo kskXcov | OKlSvaxo, xf|ks 5s (pfeyyoc; duo xpooc;
aGavdxoto | kdp7T8 Qsaq, ^av0al 8e Kdpat Kaxevf|vo0sv copouq, | abyf|<; 8' h7iif|o0r|
TtDKlVOC^ Sdpoc daxep07Xf)C COC,. Having said that, the goddess changed her size and guise,
pushing away her age, and about and around her breathed beauty. Charming odours are spread from
her fragrant peplos, far shone splendour from the skin of the immortal goddess, auburn hair lay upon
her shoulders, and sparkling brightness filled the house like lightning.
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E.g. Archilochus 196a. 7 (West); Tyrtaeus 10. 9; Alcman 1. 58 (Page); Ibycus 1. 5 (cf. sectio ii
supra); id. SI66. 26; Simonides 50. 4.
149 Seven Against Thebes 507; frg. 393.
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and Days 62f.150, it is difficult to decide if slSoc; is just the external appearance of a
named individual; or rather the whole person, metonymically. With Euripides, too, the
use of the word as denoting the external, perceptible guise or appearance is
predominant.151
V.
With Herodotus, the semantic range of elSog widens and becomes more
differentiated.152 Of course, there are enough cases where Sl8o^ is used of a person and
just denotes guise, appearance, looks.153 That is also the case when sl5o(^ is in the
150 Cf. note 142 above.
151 Nine times sTSoq denotes the guise of a person: Electra 1062, Alcestis 333, Hecuba 269, Suppliants
889, Helena 263, Trojan Women 929, frgs. 15. 2; 690 (Bacchae 53 should be considered in the context
of the discussion of JiOptpij in Appendix 4 below). Once stSog is used of the guise of things: Io 585.
For discussion of Iphigeneia in Tauris 817, see Section XII on Thucydides below.
152 For this and the following sections, I make use of the by no means complete, but on the whole
representative, collections of instances of sl8og in fifth and fourth century prose authors compiled by
A.E. Taylor in his essay The Words SlSoc, iSfa in Pre-Platonic Literature, in: id., Varia Socratica.
First Series, Oxford 1911, pp. 178-267. Since he quotes most of the passages fairly fully, there is no
need to give the same material in full here.
Taylor's extensive treatment of st8o^ and'l86ot in the Hippocratic Corpus in particular (pp. 212 - 248)
ha's received immediate discussion and criticism from P. Shorey in a review in Classical Philology VI
(1911), pp. 361 - 365; and from C.M. Gillespie, The Use ofElSog and ISfct in Hippocrates, Classical
Quarterly VI (1912), pp. 179 - 203. Cf. more recently H. Diller, Zum Gebrauch von sISoc und 'iSfa in
vorplatonischer Zeit, in: Medizingeschichte in unserer Zeit, Stuttgart 1971, pp. 23 - 30. Cf. section VI
on the Hippocratic writings below.
153 Pace Taylor, p. 184 - 186; he is right, though, in emphasizing that stSoc, here as elsewhere, does
not refer to the complexion or beauty of the face alone. Herodotus I, 8 (2x); I, 196; I, 199; III, 24; III, 61
(2x) - while Taylor comments: "The likeness meant is, of course, of physique in general, not merely of
features, though this is included." I should reply: The likeness meant is, of course, of look in general,
not merely of the appearance of physique or features, though that is included; VI, 61 (3x) - here the
reason for the look's not being beautiful is Suopopcp'td; naturally, the body's shape, fiOpcpf], is one of
the factors determining one's look; VI, 127; VII, 70: there are two different Aethiopian tribes; in
comparing the ones in the East with those in the West, Herodotus says: SiaXkd000VX8g elSog JI8V
0b8ev XOlOt SXSpOlOl, (pmvtjv 8s Kai Xpr/copa pobvov, they differ in nothing from the
others in guise, only in voice [language] and hair, from that, no more can be inferred than that voice, or
language, and hair, or fashion of carrying one's hair, is here not thought of belonging to one's sl8o^;
Taylor's interpretation 'body' is again over-interpretation (cf. VII, 56: someone addresses Xerxes who
has crossed the Hellespont: (5 Zst), xi 8f| dvSpl s'lSopBVO^ ITSpot] Kal OUVOpu dvxl AlOC
Hsp£,r|v Ofepsvoc; avdoxuxov xijv ' EkkdSa deieiq 7toifiaai, ... ; Zeus, why do you liken
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plural, as at II, 53: in II, 52, Herodotus declares that the Pelasgians did not have names
for their gods (... , S7icovufitr|v 5s oi)8' ouvopa 87ioi8Uvxo oi)8evt abxcov);
later on they adopted foreign names for their gods; those names were then taken over by
the Greeks; Herodotus continues: O08V 8e eyevovxo SKdOXOC; xcov 0800V, 81X8
a'lei fjaav Tidvxsg, 6koio1 xs xiveq154 xa eiSea, oi)K f|7iioxeaxo pexpi
ou 7ipcor|v xs Kai yQ&q e'lrceiv Xoyco. ... [' Haio8o<; yap Kal
"Opripoq] s'ioi o'l noifjoavxeq 08oyovlriv "EX,^r(oi Kat xoioi 0eoToi
zdq 87icovujj.ia^ 8ovxe<; Kai xiptic; xe Kai xexvaq SieXovzeq Kai eiSea
abxdov oriprivavxsq. But whence each of the gods stems, or if they were always
there, and how which of them was with regard to their looks, <all that> was not known
until yesterday or the day before, so to speak. ... [Hesiod, indeed, and Homer] were the
ones who made the theogony for the Greeks, gave the gods their benamings, divided the
honours and skills for each of them, and gave notice what be their looks. Even at VIII,
113, I would maintain, stSo^ is used in its original sense of 'looks', 'appearance',
'guise': once he has reached Thessaly, Mardonius employs the entire armies of some of
the nations following the Persians: 8K Ss X00V dA,^C0V auppdxcov fe^e^eysxo
Kax' 6XAyout;, xoiai eiSsa xs t>7if|pxe Sia^sycov Kai s'l xsoioi xi
XprjOXOV Ol)Vf|8ss Tt87tOlTjJISVOV- ... . From the other allies he selected few,
choosing those who had the looks, or of whom he knew that they had done something
worthy. Here it is a matter of pragmatics, not semantics, to observe that any evaluatively
neutral word may adopt positive or negative connotations when it is in a certain position
in the sentence, or when it has the appropriate emphasis, or when it is marked with other
specific devices, or when it occurs in a certain context - in many a language155.
yourself to a Persian man and assume the name Xerxes instead ofZeus when you want to subdue Greece
... ? Here 8l86pEVO^ refers to 'Zeus' ' likening himself to a Persian in guise, in external appearance,
even if that includes voice - it is set against OUVOgU ... 08|iSVOQ; VIII, 105.
154 I prefer this accentuation to OKOto'l xb TIVSC;, the one usually adopted.
1 In the English language, the definite article is one of the devices employed to achieve this pragmatic
transformation: 'Mardonius chose those men who had the looks, or about whom he knew that they had
done something worthy.' may be said instead of 'Mardonius chose those men who were of strong looks,
or about whom he knew that they had done something worthy.'
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Appearance, guise, look, is also denoted by 81805 in the context of animal
description.156 Herodotus states in writing about Egyptian animals (II, 69):
KpoKoSeiXoix; Se'Ioovsc; obvopaoiv, e'lKciCovxec; abxcov xa eiSsa xoioi
7tapd otpiot yiyvopevoioi KpOKo8slA,OlGl. The Ionians called them
crocodiles, however, in likening their appearances to the crocodiles which occur in
their country. In a description of Arabia, we read (III, 107): XCt yap 8sv8psa xauxa
xa AdPavouxocpopa ocpiet; brcoTtxepoi, apiicpoi xa peyaGea, tioiki^oi
xa slSea, (puMaoouai ti^Gei txoAAoi Tispl 8ev8pov eicaoxov, ... .
Winged snakes, small in size, varicoloured in look, guard these frankincense-bearing
trees, many in number about each tree. - The last translation differs in one point of
grammar from the original; as with all the examples so far quoted from Herodotus, here
as well e!So<; is in the plural. Homer used stSo^ in descriptions of named individuals;
there it was, naturally, in the singular. As we observed, the usage of Hesiod and the early
lyric poets does not differ from that of Homer in that respect. That Herodotus has StSoc;
in the plural when it comes to animal description, may be taken as an indication that it
still denotes the look, the guise, the appearance of the individual animal, not of a species
of animal. 'The winged snakes have varicoloured appearances' does not show the same
degree of abstraction as 'the winged snake has a varicoloured appearance' when this
sentence refers to a type of snake, not an individual one.
Sentences of this general type, however, are also frequent with Herodotus. In
comparing them to the ants of Greece, he says about a gigantic breed of Indian ants
which are not as large as dogs, pey&Gsa (plural!) s/ovxs^ kuvcov jj.sv
8X,tiaoova, but larger than foxes (III, 102): ooxol c5v o'l jJ.uppr|Ke<;
Tioieupevoi oiKrjoiv, imd yqv ftvacpopsouoi xr^v \|/tippov Kaxa 7tep oi
sv xoioi"E?lA,t]gi p\3pjir|Ke<; Kaxa xov abxov xpo7iov, e'tol 8s xal xo
elSoq 6)IOl6xaxoi. Now, these ants, in building their habitation, carry up sand from
156 For Herodotus II, 76, cf. Section IV of the chapter on 'tSea below.
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under the earth, just as the ants with the Greeks; they are, after all, most similar also as
far as their look is concerned. Here sT8o^ may still refer just to the outward
appearance. The statement, however, that the gigantic ants look like the normal ants in
Greece is made after a remark about their activities. The clause s'tol 8e Kal TO
sl8o(^ OpotOTdTOl has explanatory force, 8s K(*t almost causal function. And
although it is not an individual animal, and though in talking about their size Herodotus
has the plural )J.syd0sa, the stboc; which is the tertium comparationis of the Greek and
the Indian ants is in the singular. The Greek ants have one sl5o^, and the Indian ants
have one stSoc;; with regard to that sl8o(^ the members of the one group are most
similar to those of the other group; the functions all these ants perform are identical; the
only difference mentioned is the difference in size.
Does Herodotus mean to say that as far as their 'species' is concerned, the two groups
of ants are most similar? - I do not think one can safely assume that much. When
Herodotus has in mind this biological distinction, he uses ysvoc;, as at III, 113, where he
talks about the wonders of Arabia: Sbo 8e ysvea 6lC0V ocpt 8GTI GcDjiaioq
a^ia, ... . They have two kinds of sheep worth marvelling at. Against that, the
statement about the ants, Slot Ss Kat TO elSo^ 6|lOl6T(XTOl, seems to refer to the
look of the animals, even if a connection between look and bodily functions is implied in
the description.
The same use of etSoc; as at III, 102 recurs in the section following (III, 103): TO flSV
81^ etSoc; 6koiov ti e^ei f] Kd|ir|X,o<;, bTUOTapevoiai Toiai"EX,^r|ai ob
ouyypatpco- to 8b prj bmoTeaTai abTfjq, tooto cppdoco. Kapri^ot; ev
toioi dmoGioioi okb^boi 8%ei xeooepag pripobq xai yobvaxa
Teoospa, Ta ts a'i8oia 8ia toov bTtioGicov oks^scov npog xfjv obpfjv
TSTpappeva. Now, what appearance the camel has I will not write down for the
Greeks who know; but as to what is not known of it [i.e. the camel], let me say this: at its
hind legs, the camel has four thighs and four knees, and its genitals are stretched out
between the hind legs towards the tail. Here again, the singular, this time of both the
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animal and its sl5o^, is used in the description, not of an individual animal, but - as we
would say - of a type, or of a species. As to the meaning of el5oc;, however, there
cannot be any doubt that the word refers to external appearance or guise or look: non-
apparent features, common to the whole species, are contrasted with the visible sl5o(^.
We observe that in the context of animal description, Herodotus can talk about
members157 of one species, of one YSVO<;, as he would say, and use the plural form both
of the name of the animal and of sl8o£; or he can talk about the appearance of an
animal, having both sISoc^ and the name of the animal in the singular, while referring to
the species and specific, not individual, characteristics. The latter implies a higher degree
of abstraction, not necessarily conscious on Herodotus' part, and represents at the same
time a semantic extension, in that the 'look', 'guise', or 'appearance' is no longer bound
to be 'the look of an individual'.
That use is also found once in the context of description of human beings. Various
peoples, 80vsa, follow the Persians against the Greeks. Among them are the
Aethiopians. Of them, there are two different sections.158 In comparing the Aethiopians
in the East with those in the West, Herodotus says (VII, 70): 8iaA,A,&OGOVTS£ sl8o<^
|xsv oi)5ev xoioi sxspoioi, cpcovf^v 5s Kat xpixcopa jxouvov, they differ in
nothing from the others in guise, only in voice [language] and hair. Here, the people
compared with each other, belonging to two groups, are many; the appearance of any
one member of one group does not differ from that of any one member of the other
group. They all have one appearance. Ethnography is thus the other, closely related, area
besides zoology where reference to an Sl5o^ need not be reference to the slSoc; of an
individual person.
The third such context is, naturally, one in which neither human nor other animate
beings are described. It is necessary to regard employment in that sphere separately. To
157 In talking about members of one species Herodotus does not differentiate if he refers to many or to all
members of that species; but it is clear from the context that the latter is to be assumed.
158 Cf. note 153 above.
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talk of the eiSo^ of a thing is a new development. A simple case with Herodotus is IV
185, where he describes salt production in western Libya: 6 8s ifkc, at>TO0l Kal
X,8l)Kd<; Kai Ttopcpupeoc; TO sT8o<; 6pi3oaexai. The salt dug there is white as
well as purple in look. Of worked up minerals, the main visible distinguishing mark is
colour. So, for someone whose emphasis is clearly on relating and depicting things at
home and abroad, it is natural to mention the colour of a mineral while describing its
appearance.159
The other instance of elSoc; as not referring to the sl8o<; of something animate carries
far wider implications. In I 94, Herodotus relates that the Lydians have more or less the
same habits and customs as the Greeks. They were, however, the first to coin gold and
silver; the first to become merchants; and, he relates, they say that also the games,
Ttaiyviat, now common in their place and with the Greeks, were their invention. Once,
at a time of dearth, they had to find a way to pass their time without thinking of food.
k£,si)p80rivai 5r^ cSv tots Kai xa>v kdPcdv Kal xcqv ftoxpayaXcov Kai
xf|q ocpaiprjt; Kai xoov srov Tiaoecov Tiaiyvisov xa ei8ea, 7x^v
Tieoaaiv- xouxouv yap c5v xf^v fe^eupeoiv oi)K o'lKrjouvxai Ai)8oi. Then
were invented: of cubes and ankle-bones160 and of the ball and of all other games the
appearances,161 except for draughts; indeed, now, the invention of those, the Lydians
do not appropriate.
159 Pace Taylor, op. cit., p. 185f.
160 Both Kl3Pot and UGXptiyukot are what we call dice, the ones cubical, the others tetrahedrical; it
seems to be implied that the rules of the games played with the respective sets of dice were different.
161 Face Taylor, op. cit., p. 184. Taylor quotes 8^8l)p80fivai §1^ (3v t6t8 Kal XtOV KlJpCDV ...
Kal XCQV dkkccov 7iaa£oov Ttatyvirav xa stbsa (the figures, shapes, of all sorts of toys)". This
is remarkable even for Taylor. Misreading TttttyviCDV for 7taiyvi6cov, the genitive plural of the neuter
noun 7raiyvtOV, plaything or toy, for the genitive plural of the feminine noun 7tatyvia, play, game,
pastime, is an easy oversight in other contexts. Here, the accusative plural xdc; 7tatyviu<^ had occurred
only a few lines before, and the adjectival genitive plural feminine 7taO8C0V makes 7tUiyvtC0V
impossible. 7taiyvla, on the other hand, cannot anywhere, to my knowledge, mean toy. - It is
conceivable that reading something like 'then it was that ofcubical dice and of tetrahedrical dice and of
the spherical ball ...' suggested to Taylor that the emphasis of Herodotus' statement lay on the
distinction of geometrical figures and shapes, and that Taylor was thus mislead to think of the toys
rather than the games played with them.
The other mistake Taylor shares with many interpreters and commentators of this passage. They
translate as if Herodotus had said Kal XCOV 7tatyvisa>V xa dkka Sl8sa Ttdvxa, that being
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If Herodotus were speaking of the toys, the playthings, which the Lydians invented, id
BlSea could be the looks or guise or appearance of these implements. Now, in the case
at hand, the games played bear the names of those gadgets they are played with. But in
what way could T(DV 7taiyvi8C0V id StSect refer to 'the appearances of the games'?
- If it is 'appearance over time', i.e. what creates the impression one gets while watching
the games being played, or that impression itself, that would be a decidedly different
application of 'appearance', reflecting a decidedly different application of sl8o<;:
application to a process or action.
Since, however, Herodotus speaks of the invention of games, it is more than doubtful if
he is thinking of 'appearance' at all. What is invented is on the one hand, indeed, the
implements, the toys; on the other hand, the rules which determine the way the game is
to take place. In a sense, the 'appearance' of something happening or being done seems
to be closely connected with the 'way' something happens or is done. The invention,
however, is invention of the rules, of the way of the game, not of the appearance which is
the outcome of the application of the rules.
To decide what prompted that shift in the application of 8i5oc^, and how it came about,
is by no means a simple and straightforward matter. sl5o(^ as 'the way (something
happens or is done)' could have arisen as consequence of a transfer from 'the appearance
of an individual', person or thing, to 'the appearance of an action'.
There are thus two distinct, though not necessarily strictly separate, developments in
the semantics of etSoc; which can be traced for the first time with Herodotus. In Book I,
the plural SlSsa seems once to refer to 'the ways (things happen or develop or come
about or are done)'. In various places in Books II and III, in the context of animal
description, siSoc; refers collectively to the appearance all members of one species have
in common. In that context, comparisons of animals contain phrases like 'most similar in
allegedly 'all other sorts of games', rather than KCtl TCOV aXlkOiV TtUOBCOV 7raiyvt£&>v ta
8l5ea, and ofall other games the appearances. - For further discussion of this passage of Herodotus see
end of Section X below.
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St5oc;\ and it is implied that identity in etSoc; is somehow connected with identity in
ysvoq - that, though, is not made explicit.162
VI.
For all we know, some Hippocratic writings antedate Thucydides, and the sections on
s!8o<; in early Hippocratic literature will therefore precede that on Thucydides.163 It will
also precede the brief section on the use of el8o^ by pre-Socratic philosophers, some of
whom are certainly earlier than anything in the Hippocratic writings; that is because the
Hippocratic writings form a corpus large enough for drawing definite conclusions about
semantic developments, a basis not provided by the scanty fragments of the pre-
Socratics.164
There seems to be no general agreement as to when exactly any one Hippocratic treatise
was written.165 Any selection of writings of the Corpus as pre-Platonic will be arbitrary
162 See below section XII on Thucydides.
163 On the chronology of Thucydides and various Hippocratic treatises cf. e.g. K. Weidauer, Thukydides
und die Hippokratischen Schriften, Heidelberg 1954, and more recently G. Rechenauer, Thukydides und
die hippokratische Medizin, Hildesheim 1991, with bibliography and discussion of pertinent literature.
164 See section XI below.
165 On the question of assignment of authorship and date of composition of treatises of the Hippocratic
Corpus cf. the methodological remarks by G.E.R. Lloyd, The Hippocratic Question, Classical Quarterly,
N.S. XXV (1975), pp. 171 - 192. He begins his survey by saying: "The question of determining the
genuine works of Hippocrates, a topic already much discussed by the ancient commentators, still
continues to be actively debated, although the disagreements among scholars remain, it seems, almost as
wide as ever." Lloyd has a bibliography of 86 titles on this question, "the most important contributions
since 1930", as he says.
Cf. also, e.g., the opening remarks of the introduction of a recent edition of Affections, Diseases I - III,
Internal Affections, Regimen in Acute Diseases {Appendix), P. Potter, Hippocrates V/VI, Cambridge
Massachusetts/London 1988, p. IX, XI: "These volumes contain the most important Hippocratic works
on the pathology of internal diseases. ... About the Treatises' interdependencies, authors, and relative
dates of composition, nothing can be said with any degree of certainty. There is neither I any evidence
that would confirm, nor any evidence that would call into doubt, their traditional time of origin about
400 B.C."
Since, however, it is decisive for the present purpose if any one treatise concerned was written just
before or just after a Platonic dialogue exhibiting similarities in usage, I will restrict myself to
considering only those Hippocratic writings against whose composition at a time early enough for Plato
to have read them no serious objections have been raised.
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to some extent. The following works at least, however, seem to be generally agreed to
be of an early date: Tispt &SpCGV, t)8dX(jOV, XOTICDV, On Airs, Waters, Places,
TCpOYVCOOTlKOV, Prognostic, S7ll5r||lia)V a', Y, Epidemics I + III, Kai
'irixpeiov, In the Surgery, Ttept &YJJ.G0V, On Fractures, 7tspl apGpcov (fe|Xp0^f|^),
On Joints, (lOy^lKOV, Instruments of Reduction, Tispt Humours, 7X8pl
cpuaioc; &V0pCD7lOl), Nature of Man, and 7l£pl 'ispfjc; VOOOU, The Sacred
Disease.166 The Nature of Man will be discussed in the Section V of the chapter on
'l8sa. I do not at all think it safe to regard either Tispl (piXKDV, Breaths,161 or the
potentially highly important, but actually highly controversial, Jtspt dpyalr)^
VqxpiKfiq, On Ancient Medicine,168 as pre-Platonic, and will therefore not discuss its
usage here.
166 The order of the titles is that in which they occur in Littre's edition, adopted here only for the sake of
simplicity.
167 W.H.S. Jones, Hippocrates II, Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1923, p. 221ff., n. 2, writes in his
introduction to Breaths which he holds to be a "sophistic essay": "Breaths shows a tendency to similes
and highly metaphorical language which Plato attributes (.Protagoras 337C-338A) to Hippias I do
not suggest that Hippias was the author, but I do hold that the book must have been written at a time
when the sophistry he represented was a living force.),... ." He seems to imply that with Plato sophistry
and public display associated with it came to a sudden end.
For a date of composition of Breaths in the fourth century cf. also F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit
I2, Leipzig 1887, p. 89, adduced by Diller, Hippokratische Medizin, p. 393, n. 1.
The passages from Plato's dialogues which F. Poschenrieder, Die platonischen Dialoge in ihrem
Verhaltnisse zu den hippokratischen Schriften, Metten 1882, pp. 42, 46ff., adduces as parallels to what
is said in Breaths display, apart from the different wording, similarities in content of too general a
nature to be conclusive in any way; Poschenrieder's extensive comparison of passages from Breaths with
Eryximachus' remarks in the Symposium, pp. 60 - 66, if taken to convey more than the communis opinio
of the time, suggests a common source for both rather than dependency of one on the other, since either
one contains relevant medical material not found in the other.
For the view that the relative chronology of Breaths and the Platonic dialogues cannot be established
with certainty, vid. also A. Nelson, Die hippokratische Schrift TTspi (pVOCOV. Text und Studien,
Uppsala 1909, p. 92f., thus adduced by J. Jouanna, Hippocrate. L'ancienne medecine, Paris 1990, p. 81,
n. 3.
168 On Ancient Medicine has received attention in connection with Plato's philosophy for a long time.




Turning to Airs, Waters, and Places, the first point to be noticed is the relative
frequency with which the word sT8o^ occurs in this treatise.169 On the assumption that
stSoc;, as from Homer onwards, denotes appearance, guise, look, in the first place, that
would seem natural since the author's task is to describe what sort of environment has
what sort of influence on people in different regions, and for him that includes a
description of the people he has met in those regions. One of the first things, however,
even a layman notes when coming to an inhabited foreign country is if the people there
look different from the ones at home. It is also natural that - while Homer predicates a
man's appearance as excellent, godlike, or most beseeming - a medical man draws
attention to different distinctions.
So we read in section III170 about men living in cities exposed to hot winds in winter:
xti T8 8l5sa &Ttl TO 7tX,f|0oc; abxdov frxovcoxepa elvat- ... . Their guises are,
for the most part, rather slack.
About those in eastward facing cities with hot winds in summer we learn in section V:
xti xs elSea xcov &v0pama)v euxpoti xs Kal &v0r|pa eaxi paXA,ov f|
&A,A,T] f|V XIC, VOUOO^ KC0X,6T]. The appearances of the people are of good
colour andflowering more than elsewhere, unless some disease prevents this.
In section XII we are told about a mild region in Asia Minor: TOU£ XS &V0pCOTtO\j(^
ebxpacpeac; elvai Kal xa ei5ea KaX-Xloxoog Kal |j.sye0ei psyloxouc;
Kal rjKioxa 5ta(popou<; ec; xa xe eiSea abxcov Kal xa peye0ea- ... . The
people are well-nourished, most beautiful as to their looks, very tall of size, very little
different <from one another> as to their looks as well as their size.
169 The term is found 19 times, or in twelve passages, on 34 Loeb pages.
170 If not stated otherwise, I give the text and chapter/section numbers of the Loeb editions of the
Hippocratic texts by Jones, Withington and Potter.
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A general statement concludes section XIII: Land is affected by the changes of the
seasons, and so, in the same way, are human beings, too. s'lol yap (pUOlS^ ai |4SV
opsoiv soiKbiai 8sv8pc68soi xs Kai scpuSpoioiv, ai 8s X,S7ixoioi xe
Kal dvu8poi<;, ai 8s ^sipaicsoxspoK; xs Kai sA,c68sai, ai 8s 7is8icp xs
[Kai]171 \j/iA,f| Kai ^r)pf| yf|. a'l yap d5pai ai psxaAAaoaouoai xf|<;
jiopcpfjc; xr^v cpuotv sioi Siacpopoi. f|v 8s Siacpopoi scoot psya acpscov
ai)XSO)V, Siacpopai Kai 7lX,si0VS<; yivovxai XOlt; SlSsai. There are, indeed,
natures172 which are like mountains, the ones wooded and bewatered, others light and
unwatered, others rather meadowy and marshy, then again those which are like a bare
plain and dry land. The seasons, indeed, which change the nature of the shape are
different; but whenever they are very different from one another, the differences will
also become larger for the appearances. Si8o^ here is apparently a term more general
than ji.opcpf|, which refers to the shape of the body alone.
There is much fog in Phasis, the author reports in section XV, and he continues: Sid
xauxaq br\ zdq rrpocpaoiac; xa siSsa dTtri^aypsva xcov X,ot7tdc>v
dvGpocmcov s/odgiv oi <I>aoir|voi- xa xs yap psysGsa psyaXoi, xa
7ia/sa 8' U7isp7iaxT]xsq, apGpov xs Kaxa8r|A,ov oi)8sv oi)8s (pX.s\|/- xr|v
xs xpoir^v d>xpi\v sxoaaiv (DOTisp i)7io 'iKxspou sxopsvoi- cpGsyyovxai
xs Papuxaxov dvGpdmcov, xa> f|spi xpscopsvoi oi) A,ap7ipcp, dX,X,a
voxcoSsi Kai Go^spcp- 7ipo<; xs xaXai7icopsiv xd oajpa dpyoxspoi
TlSCpUKaoiV. Due to those causes, then, the Phasians have looks different from all
other people. As to their sizes, they are tall, as to being fat, they are overly fat, and no
joint is visible, nor vein. They have a pale colour, as though they were affected by
171
Something seems to be wrong with the text. I omit Kai.
172 Note the absolute use of (pooiC, nature-, 'a nature' is a human being of a certain nature, both
individually and collectively. For cpdoiQ in Hippocratic writings and beyond, cf. e.g. the recent, very full
treatment of the topic by G. Rechenauer, Thukydides und die hippokratische Medizin, Hildesheim 1991,
pp. 112 - 258, especially 167 - 174.
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jaundice; they sound deepest of <all> men, since the air they use is not clear, but moist
and thick. They are rather idle as to straining their bodies.
In section XX of the same treatise, it is said that the Scythians are of moist constitution.
... xa 8e 0r)Xsa Gaufxaoxov otov po'iKa soil xe Kal P7,a8sa173 xa etSea.
... as to the female children, it is astonishing how crooked and soft they are as to looks.
By way of summary, the author states in section XXIII that, as against Asia, in Europe
except for Scythia, there are violent seasonal changes, different in different regions. He
continues: Sioxi xti ei8sa 8ni7,A,a%Gai vopi^co xcov 'Eupcemalcov paAAov
f| xcov 'Aoir|V(Sv Kat xa peysGea Siacpopcoxaxa abxa fecouxoig slvai
Kaxa Tl67.IV SKtXGXTjV. Therefore, I believe, differ the appearances of Europeans
more than those of the Asians, and their 'sizes' are most different from one another
according to each state.
As with Homer, elSog co-occurs several times with, or is employed in the vicinity of,
peysGog; people are predicated K&AAlOXOl xd etSsa; the slSog itself is etjypCOV
or dvGrjpov which though not attested would be feasible with Homer. Predicates like
axovov, slack, poiKOV, crooked, P7,a86, soft, on the other hand, point to the
particular interests of the physician. Yet, those latter adjectives as well all belong to the
visible sphere, and can be part of someone's appearance.174 When in section XV ofAirs,
173 P^aSea Coray (Kiihlewein, Taylor) : Ppa86a mss. For all the rarity of the word, pX.a8t>Q, soft,
seems to fit the context much better. One's choice will, of course, partly be determined by one's
preconceptions about elSog, since if SlSog can mean body, it is possible to predicate it PpaSu, slow, if,
on the other hand, st8og still has strong visual connotations, and at the same time is, as here, the
'stSog of a person', that would seem more difficult; I wonder how well-attested the meaning "heavy",
given in the abridged version of Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon of 1926, is for Ppa8u.
H. Diller, who in his personal copy of Jones' edition underlines Coray's emendation, has "P7.a86a"
also in the margin of line 3 of the same page, where he wants to read: pOlKa 8s ylvstai Kal
PXaSsa, ... , thus suggesting repetition of the same two adjectives in line 20f. That, to my mind, would
give more weight to the phrase 0Ut)p.UC5Tdv OlOV of line 20. The author of Airs, Waters, and Places
would then say: the bodies, cc6|iaxa, of the Scythians are crooked and soft, pOlKCX Kal P/.uSea; and
their girls' appearance is so par excellence.
174 Cf. also Airs, Waters, and Places XIX, where in a brief passage Sl8sa occurs three times, twice with
a possessive genitive, once as an accusative of respect; £l8ea is predicated Ttaysa Kal aapKCoSsa
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Waters and Places it is said of the Phasians that they have an sl8o^ different from that
of the rest of mankind, and when that statement is followed by a reference first to their
size, their volume, their colour, and then their 'sounding deep', it need not be inferred
from that that the author thought of someone's eiSoc; as also comprising voice; starting
from his usual point of departure, he lists a number of factors contributing to the
difference in guise or appearance, and then, I suppose, names an additional distinction,
that in voice.
It is to be noticed that in all the examples quoted sTSck; is in the plural. Many people of
one S0VO£, one race or nation, or at least one cpC)X.OV, one tribe, are described, and so
the author refers to their BlSsa, just as the Ionian Herodotus talked of the 8l5ea of
animals of one species.
The noun ei8o^ in Airs, Waters, and Places, however, is not always either accusative
of respect, or a direct object accusative to a verb of having, or has a genitive of a noun
denoting a human being depending on it.175 The following may be an example of an
absolute use of el8o^:
In section X, it is reported that in years with dry winters and rainy spring, various
diseases are likely to occur. Kai SDGBVXBplaq s'ikoc; sail yivsaGai Kai xfjoi
yuvai^l Kai xotq eiSsai xoig bypoxtixoiai. It is also probable that dysentries
occur, both with the women and with the moistest 'appearances'.
This usage recalls Hesiod's Works and Days 62.176 After the creation of Pandora, Zeus
gives orders to Hephaestus. As an alternative to &0avd.XTl£ 8s 0sfj(^ Biq (hnCL
felOKSV I 7iap0£VlKfj<; KaA,ov slSoc; fe7if|paxov that he liken the
Kai avapGpa Kai bypa Kai axova, fat and fleshy and. without joints <showing> and moist and
slack.
175 Cf. note 143 above. - In Airs, Waters, and Places XIII quoted above, stSo^ in the clause Stacpopal
Kai 7tA,eiovs^ ylvovxat tote; ElSsot falls under the category of 'someone's st8og'; for the sake
of the peculiar comparison of lands and people, the otherwise required qualifications, here of s!8og, in
the previous line of poptpf], are omitted.
176 Cf. Section III above, with notes 142 and 145. Cf. also, on a similarly absolute use of (puot^, note
172 above.
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beautiful loveable appearance of the maiden to the immortal goddesses as to face' it
was suggested to punctuate differently, and to read and translate ' ... dGavdxrjq 5c
Gefjq e'iq dma kiaKsv, | 7iap0eviKf|<; KaX,ov eiSo<; fejcipaxov ... .,that
he liken her to immortal goddesses as to her face, the beautiful loveable appearance of
a maiden.' This suggestion, while perhaps leading to an anachronistic result in the case
of Hesiod, was possible in the light of a usage like that of the Hippocratic author. In his
case, it seems obvious from the grammar of the sentence that etSoc; does not refer to
'the appearance of a person' but to 'a person', the same shift in application which took
place with the English word 'appearance' in the context of inanimate objects, when, for
example, E. King writes in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society II, 1667:
"White and clean appearances ... all figur'd like the lesser sort of Birds Eggs."177 There,
the objects themselves, not their impressions they make, or the perceptions they provoke,
are called 'appearances', and it is in that way that xd eiSsa xa bypoxaxa, the
wettest, or perhaps softest, 'appearances', can be co-ordinate with dl yuvaiKS^, the
women.
One must, on the other hand, not judge rashly as to the absolute and independent status
s!8oq has acquired. The final section ofAirs, Waters, and Places contains six instances
of the plural 8l8sa in different grammatical contexts, and it is most difficult to decide if -
in those cases in which the word neither is accusative of respect nor has a possessive
genitive depending on it - one has to supply 'of the people' with Sl8s(X, or what the
word is supposed to mean when standing on its own.
In section XXIV, the author has finished his description of Europe and Asia,
eveioi 5e kal kv xfj Ebpdmrj cpuXa Siacpopa sxepa sxepoiai kat xd
peyeGea Kai zdq popcpac; Kai xac; dvSpeiag. xd 8e 5ia>Adoaovxa
xabxa feoxiv, a Kai knl xcov 7ipoxepov etptjxai. exi 8s aatpeaxspov
cppdoco. 6kogoi pev xcoprjv 6peivf|v xs o'iksouoi Kai xpri/eiav Kai
i)V|/r|Xfjv Kai evu8pov, Kai ai pexaPoA,ai abxoioi yivovxat xcov
177
Quoted in The Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford 1933, s.v. "Appearance. 14.".
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cbpscov psya 8id(popoi, svxabBa s'iko<; slSsa psyaX-a slvai kal Tipdc;
xd xaXalrccopov Kal xo dv8psiov su TiscpuKoxa, Kal xo xs aypiov Kal
xo 6ipico5s<; ai xoiabxai cpboisg ot>% fjKioxa sxouoiv. ... (KoiA,a
Xcopla)... . e't psvxoi Tioxapol psv prj eirjoav, xd 5s \38axa >.ipvaid xs
Kal axaoipa 7ilvoisv Kal sA,d>5sa, dvayKr| xd xoiauxa sl5sa
7ipoyaaxpoxspa Kal cmA.r|vc68sa slvai. 6koooi 5s ovi/r^v xs
o'iksouoi %c6pr|v Kal X,slr|v Kal dvspcoSsa Kal svi)5pov, slsv av si8sa
psyaA,oi Kal scouxoiai 7tapa7i;A,f|aioi- dvavSpoxspai 5s Kal
f|pspcoxspai ai yvcopat. 6kogoi 5s X-STixa xs Kal avu5pa Kal \j/\X&,
xfjoi psxapo^fjoi xd>v copscov o()k suKprjxa, sv xauxfl xf| xcopfl xd
si8sa s'iKoq oKX/ppa xs stvai Kal svxova Kal ^avGoxspa f|
psA,avxspa Kal xd fjBsa Kal zaq 6pyac; ai)6d8sag xs Kal
'iSioyvcopovac;. okou yap ai psxaPoX,al s'ioi TibKvoxaxai xcov cbpsa)v
Kal 7tX.sioxov 5iacpopoi abxal scouxfioiv, sksi Kal xd sl5sa Kal xd
rjBsa Kal zdq (puoiag sbprjosiq 7iX,siaxov Siacpspouoaq.
psyioxai psv ouv s'ioiv auxai xrjg (p\3aio<; ai 5iaXAayai, STtsixa 5s
Kal f] sv f) av xk; xpscpr|xai Kal xd i35axa. supposa; yap S7il
xo TtXriBoq xf|g xcopr|<; xf| cpuasi dKoA,oi)6sovxa Kal xd sl5sa xdw
dvBpdmaw Kal xobg xpoTtoog.
In translating this passage, it will be helpful to discuss its language paragraph by
paragraph as the author's style is as rough and rugged as some of the regions he
describes. Numerous inconcinnities and anacoluthous constructions in a text laconic and
terse make it difficult to determine if a particular occurrence of slSo^ marks a semantic
development or is just an instance of an elliptical or merely careless construction.
In Europe as well, there are tribes different from one another as to size, as to shape,
and as to manliness. The points of difference are just those which I have indicated on
the preceding <pages>. I will, however, describe them yet more clearly. All those who
inhabit a mountainous, rough, high, and bewatered country - and if the changes of the
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seasons are great with them - there it is probable that 'appearances' are tall and by
nature tending to 'the hard-working' and 'the manly', and such 'natures' do not least
have 'the wild' and 'the brutish'.118
It seems as though at least in this one instance, the phrase '£l8sa |lsyaX.a sTvai
Kai 7tpo<; to xaXaiTioopov Kai to &v8psiov eu TtecpuKoxa', el8o<; is to be
taken as absolute in the above said sense. This, one could argue, is most telling due to
the way the sentence is continued, again by way of change of grammatical construction:
Kai to T8 aypiov Kai to GipicoSec; ai Toiauxai (puoiec; ot>x TjKiaTa
syouotV; in that latter clause, cpijOlS^, natures, is the subject. It seems as if just as a
person of a certain tpuoic; or nature can be referred to as a certain (puoi£, so a person
of a certain stSoc;, appearance, can be referred to as a certain sISoc^. But whereas in
English that same semantic shift has taken place in the case of 'nature', perhaps furthered
by authors of a Classical education, it has not in the case of 'appearance'. There would,
consequently, be a difficulty for the translator in how to render si8o£ in such a context.
'Appearance' would be possible in the case of things, inanimate objects. It is, though, not
commonly considered suitable as a word that covers in its application both things and
people.
There is, though, a different way to construe the same phrase. One could see the clause
in question, there it is probable that 'appearances' are tall and by nature tending to
'the hard-working' and 'the manly', as parallel to a hypothetical 'there it is probable that
eyeballs are shortened and by nature tending to 'the short-sighted", or some such clause
referring to the make-up of any particular part of the body. eiSsa and CpUOtS^ would
then simply refer to the appearances and natures of the people described. etSo^ would
not be 'an appearance' in the sense of 'a person appearing', but simply 'appearance',
namely of a person, in the accustomed way. I do not see any way to choose between
these two alternatives if the sentence is considered in isolation. It may be stated, though,
that if one decides for the latter, conservative way of construing the text, one can at the
178 I have deliberately refrained from an idiomatic rendering to point to the employment of
substantivized neuters in the context of character depiction in a fifth century text.
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same time see how from contexts such as this one the former, semantically innovative
absolute use of el8o^ as 'an appearance' may arise.
To resume translation: after a few general remarks about the influence which hollow
regions have on their inhabitants, regions where rivers render the water healthy,179 the
author continues:
Certainly, though, if there were no rivers and thus they180 drank waters mery, stagnant
and marshy, it would be necessary that such 'appearances' were pot-bellied and with
enlarged milt.
Though at first this sentence seems to resolve the issue just discussed in favour of an
absolute use, since in the phrase TOiatia BlSsa the determining 'such' is apparently
anaphoric in a way which prevents 'such appearances' from referring to anything else
but the people just implicitly referred to by the main verb of the second part of the
protasis, it can again not be excluded that 'such appearances' is simply a shorthand for
'the appearances of such people', a case parallel to what was suggested for TOiaUTCtl
(pl3ai8£ above. Taking the phrase that way may be supported by the next occurrence of
elSoq:
People, however, who inhabit land high, light, windy, and bewatered, are tall as to
<their> appearances, and very much like one another: their minds rather unmanly and
tame.
In this instance, el8o^ is clearly accusative of respect. The very next sentence, though,
a case of anacoluthous construction, presents the same ambiguities which were
encountered above, though the grammatical context is a little more complicated.
People <who inhabit land> thin, unwatered, bare, and not well-balanced as to the
changes of the seasons - in that land it is probable that the 'appearances' be hard and
intense, fair rather than dark, and the characters and tempers wilful and independent.
Indeed, where the changes of the seasons are most frequent, and <the seasons> most
179 I have not quoted these lines since they are not relevant for the point at issue.
180 Note the repeated unmediated change of subject.
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differentfrom one another, there you will also find the appearances and the characters
and the natures as differing most widely.
Here, it is impossible to decide if in the sentence 'OKOOOl 5s A.£7txd X£ KCtl
avu8pa Kal \|/tX,a, xr|ai psxaPo^fioi xcov cbpscov ot>K euKprjxa, fev
xamfl xfi %copfl T(* si5sa s'lKoq OK>apd xe slvai Kal svxova Kal
^avOoxepa fj psXavxspa Kal xd rj0£a Kal xdq bpydq abBaSeaq xs Kal
\8loyvc6povac;', there is to be a caesura after £UKpr|xa so that xd £l8sa ... Kal
Xa f]0£a Kal xa^ 6pya^ were to be the subjects of the accusative with infinitive, or
if xoaouxouq or xouxouc; or the like is to be supplied so that xd £l8£a ... Kal xa
fj0£a Kal Xac, bpy&C, were accusatives of respect,181 as is clearly the case in the
preceding sentence.
These, now, are the greatest differences in nature, then also the land in which someone
is reared, and the waters. You will find, indeed, that for the most part the appearances
and the ways of the people follow the nature of the land. In that concluding sentence, xd
£l§£a XffiV dvGpdmCDV, the appearances of the people, is unambiguous again, due to
the presence of the possessive genitive. It is, thus, possible, but by no means certain or
necessarily the case, that the plural £l8£a refers to persons as 'appearances' in Airs,
Waters, and Places XXIV. I would maintain, though, that - partly due to the author's
obscure style - external confirmation would be required before a final verdict could be
pronounced.182
VIII.
Once in Airs, Waters, and Places, £l5o<; is in the singular. In section XI of the treatise,
it is stated that changes of season especially, but also other astronomical events, have
181
Jones, loc. cit., if taken literally, seems to construe the sentence in this latter way.
182 Cf. in general Section IX; for Airs, Waters, and Places XXIV, cf. also Section II of the chapter on
'i8ea.
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serious consequences for the diseased. T& XS yap VOOSUJiaxa jiaAxoxa fev
xaoxrjoi xrjoiv fipsp^oiv Kplvexai. Kai xa psv djcocpGivsi, xa 8s
A,r|ysi, xa 8s aXXa 7tavxa psGioxaxai 'eg sxspov slSog Kai sxspr|v
KaxaaxaoiV. And mostly, indeed, the diseases are decided in those days. And some
die away, others calm down, all the others change to another appearance and another
condition.
The sentence containing st8oq seems to admit of several interpretations.183 One is to
say that here, stSoq is not the 'stSoq of a person' but 'the sl8o<; of a disease'. A
disease, one could infer, has at any stage of its occurrence an slSoq, an appearance or
guise. One is reminded of the words of Sir William Temple, who says in his Health &
Long Life: "Both [diseases] were thought to appear in many various Guises."184
In view of general Hippocratic tenets, on the other hand, one could take the sentence
'Kai xa jisv &7io(p0ivsi, xa 8s ^rjysi, xa 8s aXXa Tiavxa psGtaxaxai
fee; sxspov stSoq Kai sxsprjv Kaxaoxaoiv' to mean that the disease in question
gives way to another disease altogether. For this use of [XS0ioxao0ai, one could
adduce, e.g., Diseases I, 29. Overheating of the upper cavity is given as a cause for
vomiting. Then it is added: 8ld XOUXO 8' ai)XO Kai fcq 7TSpiTC?uSU|J.OVir|V SK
183
Taylor, Varia Socratica, p. 219, comments: "The context shows that the meaning is "and the rest
pass into a different phase." stSoq = a distinct stage in an illness marked by special symptoms, a sense
derivative from that of "shape," "structure."
Gillespie, The Use of EtSof and I8£(Z in Hippocrates, p. 186f., remarks that Taylor does not
recognize the advancement of stSoq "in the direction of the purely logical meaning of kind or class". A
"divisory or classificatory suggestion is found in the numerous examples where eiSoq and iSsa is
conjoined with no'kvg, aAAoq, or STEpoq, 7iavxoioq, or 7tavxo8a7c6q." One of the examples is
"7tspl htptov 11, I. 53 K. xa pev (voosbpaxa) drcocpBivsi, xa 5s kf)ysi, xa 8s aXXa
7cdvxa psGloxaxai '&q sxspov sTSoq Kai sxsppv Kaxdoxaoiv. T. 'phase,' but this is
inaccurate: the writer does not think of the disease as persisting in another shape, but as passing into
another disease or another form of disease; see 7tspl TlttOcov 8, vi. 216 L. KplvsoOut 8s SOXIV SV
xf)oi vouootoiv, oxav au^covxai a'l vouooi f| papalvrovxat f| psxa7i:l7txcooiv sq
sxspov vouoripa ri xsksuxraovv."
Jones, Hippocrates I, p. 105, translates the sentence of Airs, Waters, and Places XI: "For it is
especially at these times that diseases come to a crisis. Some prove fatal, some come to an end, all
others change to anotherform and another constitution."
184 W. Temple, Works I, 1720, p. 283, quoted in The Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford 1933, s.v.
"Guise. 5."
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Kaooou is Kai Ti^eupixiSoc; |id>aoxa |ie0ioxaxai xa voof||iaxa- ... .
For that same reason, too, diseases often change from fever and pleurisy to
pneumonia,185
For the question of the meaning of in the sentence from Airs, Waters, and
Places XI, Kai xa pev &7io(p0iv8i, xa 8s X,f|y8i, xa 8e aXXa navxa
ps0ioxaxai sq exepov eiSoq Kai sxsprjv Kaxaoxaoiv, one has to decide
between the two possibilities outlined above. A clue may lie in the proper understanding
of what is signified by Kaxdoxaoig.186
As for the use of Kaxacxaci^ as applied to the seasons, one may compare Prognostic
XXV. First, some general medical advice is given to those who want to forecast
accurately; then it is added: XP^l §£ Kai zdq cpopac; xdov voorijiaxcov xoov
aiei ferciSripsovxcov xaxsooc; &v0u|j.eia0ai Kai pf\ ^av0avsiv zr\v xf|<;
copriq KaxaoxaoiV. But it is also necessary quickly to give thought to attacks of
diseases which are at any given time epidemic, and not to forget the constitution of the
season. The application to the season seems to be excluded, though, since on the one
hand the point of talking about change of season at all seems to be to draw attention to
the change of weather conditions that goes with it; on the other hand, it would be
awkward to have different points of reference for elSoc;, namely the diseases, and
Kaxaoxaatc;, namely the astronomico-meteorological situation.
As for the use of Kaxdaxaoi^ as applied to a disease, one may compare Prognostic
XX. There, it is declared that there are certain critical days for fevers. They are not
always easy to make out. dX,X.a XP*1 7tpcoxr|<; f|fi8pr|<; sv0i)|a.eio0ai
Kai Ka0' 8Kdaxr(v xexpaSa 7tpooxt0ep.8vr|v GKS7tX8O0ai Kai oi) A,f)oei,
185 vdoripa seems to be 'someone's being ill' rather than a named disease.
186 Cf. Jones, Hippocrates I, p. 141, n. 1, in the Introduction to Epidemics I: " "Constitution" is the
traditional translation of KaxdoiUOlC, climatic conditions of such a marked type as to give a
distinguishing character to a period of time. The word is also used of diseases, and so on, to denote a
fixed type prevalent at any particular time."
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&tct| xpeysxai. ytvsxat 5s kal xcbv xsxapxalcov f\ Kaxdaxaoig sk
XOUXOU XOl) KOOJXOU. But it is necessary to give thought to <the matter> from the
first day and at each additional fourth day - and you will not fail to see where things
turn. The constitution also ofquartan fevers develops out of this order. Now, the author
of Airs, Waters, and Places does not always write in the clearest style. His grammar is
not always coherent. Yet, if each and every disease of which it is not correct to say either
drcocpGivsi or X-fjysi, whatever the exact meaning of those two words be, turns to a
different condition, and that condition is a different 'constitution of disease', then -
though 'xd Ss aXXa ndvxa psGioxaxai sq sxspov s!8og Kal sxsprjv
Kaxaaxaaiv' need not imply anything about the disease's being the same or not - one
could argue in terms of pragmatics in the sense that one provides the reader with what is
relevant: a different disease implies a different constitution anyway; therefore, if it is
stressed that the disease passes into a different constitution with change of season, it
must be the same disease.
But that, I think, is not a cogent line of argumentation. The context of Airs, Waters,
and Places XI is ambiguous. Neither the point of reference of sl8o^ nor the meaning of
the word there can be determined with any degree of certainty.187
IX.
There are five instances of elSo^ in Epidemics I and III; in all of them, the word seems
to be employed in the same way, marking a transition to a new meaning of BlSoc;.
Epidemics I, section 19: 7t^f|Goc; psv o6v xodv vooripaxcov sysvsxo. £k 8s
xd>v Kapvovxcov dixsGvflOKov jidA,iaxa psipaKia, vsoi, dKjj.aCovxs<;,
X-sioi, (moXsuKoxpcoxsg, 'iGuxpi^sg, psXavoxpixec;, jisA,avo(pGaA,poi, o'l
187
Taking bg STSpOV slhog Kal 8TSpT|V Kuxdoxuoiv as a sort of SV- 8ld- 8l)OlV, or hendiadys,
'the diseases turn to a different appearance, and that is to say a different constitution', does not decide
the matter either.
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e'lKfj Kai krci to pa0opov pePicoKoxet;, 'toxvocpcovoi, xprixbcpcovoi,
xpaoA,ot, 6pylA,oi. Kat yovaiKec; 7ta.eioxai £k xobxoo too eiSeoc;
&7180vt]okov. 'Now the number of illnesses was great. And of the patients there died
chiefly striplings, young people, people in their prime, the smooth, the fair-skinned, the
straight-haired, the black-haired, the black-eyed, those who had lived recklessly and
carelessly, the thin-voiced, the rough-voiced, the lispers, the passionate.'1** Very many
women, too, of this type died.
The list of types of people includes some which are mutually exclusive, such as the age
groups and, probably, some of the types of voice. It is therefore people who displayed
one or more, not all, of the said characteristics, who were most likely to die. 'And not
only the male', the author adds; this is not because the adjectives used for the description
of the diseased are of masculine gender; it is his common practice to remark how women
were affected by the several diseases occurring in a given constitution.189 When he
declares 'Kat yuvaiKeg Ti^eioxai £k tootoo too eiseog &7te0v]}OKOv', he
does not seem to draw a line between the age classes and the other characteristics either;
among the characteristics, moreover, 'those who had lived recklessly and carelessly'
does refer to a style of life rather than to any personal features, appearance, or guise. The
author, therefore, does not seem to say: 'women of that appearance died', but more
likely something like 'women of that type'.
Epidemics I, 20: Ol pSV o5v 7l>.eiOTOl XCDV voor|otivtcov 8v XT|
Kaxaaxdoet xamr\ xouxcp xa> xpo7tco 8ievoor|aav, Kat oi)8sva ol8a
xcov Tiepiysvopsvcov, cSxivi obx t>7t8axps\|/av at Kaxa A,oyov
brcooxpotpal yevopevai, Kai Sieocp^ovxo Tiavxsq, out; K&yco oT8a,
otoiv a'l bTioaxpocpai Sia too eiSeoc; xouxoo yevolaxo. otoSe xcov
Siavoorjaavxcov Sia xouxoo too xporuoo ot>8evi oi8a OTcoaxpotprjv
188
Up to this point, the translation is Jones'.
189
E.g. Epidemics i, 1, 12, 16.
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ysvojj.SVr|v 7ldA.IV. Now, most of the diseased in this particular season went through
their disease in that way, and I do not know any one of those who recovered, whom the
relapses did not affect according to the list I have set out, and all were saved, ofwhom I
know, whom relapses affected of this type. And I do not know of anyone going through
their disease whom relapse did not affect in that way.
If there is a difference in sense between TOUTCp TCp Tporap, an instrumental dative,
and the modal-cum-instrumental prepositional phrase 8ld TOUTOU TOU xponoi), it is
a very slight one.190 The force of the phrase 8ld TOU SlSeoc; TOUTOU should be
modal-cum-instrumental in the same way.191 It may well be that slSoc; is chosen mainly
for the sake of variation, since otherwise TpOTiOc; would occur three times in succession
in a context which appears to be redundant anyway. While I think that possible, I do not
think that one would have to assume that it is thereby implied that elSoc; and XpOTtO^
are synonymous here, xporto^ is the turn something takes, the way something goes.192
elSog is here appearance, in the sense of how a thing - object, person, or event -
habitually or typically appears: 'all those I know were saved when the relapses affected
them in that guise'. It is because relapses coming about in one guise were fatal, relapses
coming about in a different guise were not fatal, that et5o^, guise, could come to be
applied in cases where one would tend to translate 'type'.
The three instances of st8o£ in Epidemics III, are again in the 'constitution', not in one
of the 'cases'. Several diseases are named which occurred in this period. Then it is said
(III, 3): xd psv fe7ti8r||a.f|oavxa voof|jiaxa xauxa. SKdoxou 8e xoov
U7ioyeypajj.ja.8VG)v e'i8scov fjoav o'l Kapvovxet; kai 80vt|okov 7ioaaot.
190 The author of Epidemics uses TpbttO^ regularly to refer to 'the way' of a disease, i.e. the way in
which particular symptoms occur in a particular order, e.g. Epidemics I, 1,2, 3; in I, 10, KOtKOljOea
Tpbrcov, an accusative of respect, means in a bad way.
191 8la as a preposition is, to my knowledge, otherwise not at all frequent with either St8o^ or
Tp67toc;.
192 a somewhat different interpretation of the use of Tp67tO^ in the Hippocratic corpus is given by
Gillespie, p. 183f. Discussing its implications here would lead too far astray.
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CUVSTCITCXS 5' 8(p' SKCtOTOlOl XOUXCOV (58e. Now, those were the epidemic
diseases <in this constitutions And of each of the above-said types there were patients
and died many. As symptoms occurred, with each of those, the following. An
enumeration of the symptoms follows.
After a description of other diseases, including ardent fevers, in the preceding sections,
section 12 begins: noXXd 8e Kai aXXa jxupexcov fe7Es8fjpr|oev 8i5sa,
xpixatcov, xexapxatcov, vuKxepivcov, ouvexscov, paKpcov,
7tS7l^aVT|p8VCOV, 6.0CoSecOV, 6tKaxaoxa.XCOV. But also many other types offevers
were epidemic, 'tertians, quartans, night fevers, fevers continuous, protracted,
irregular, fevers attended with nausea, fevers of no definite character.,m In both these
cases, translating et8o^ by 'guise' would be just possible, but stretching the language
beyond what is commonly acceptable. It seems more natural to talk of 'these' and 'other
types of fever'.
In section 13 we learn that 'consumption' was the worst and most widespread disease
of that constitution. Its symptoms and development are described in detail. Then section
14 commences: elSoq 5s XCDV (pGtVOOSscOV fjv XO X.810V, XO t>7t6A,8l)KOV, xo
(paKffiSsg, xo imepuGpov, xo xaP07Iov, ^suKocp^eypaxiai, 7ixepi)yc6-
Sseg- Kal yovaiKS^ OIJXCO. But the type of the consumptive people was: the
smooth, the whitish, the lentil-coloured, the reddish, the bright-eyed; leuco-phlegmatous
people, those with shoulder-blades projecting like wings. And the women likewise.
It is impossible to say whether sl8oc; here is meant to refer just to the external
appearance or guise of the people affected by consumption, or whether it is the type of
those affected which is characterized;194 and the characterisations happen to be
externally visible. Against the latter position, it could be objected that since among the
193 The latter part of the translation is Jones'.
194 Jones translates: "The physical characteristics of the consumptives were: - skin smooth, whitish,
lentil-coloured, reddish; bright eyes; a leucophlegmatic condition; shoulder-blades projecting like wings.
Women too so ([note 3:] This brief phrase seems to mean that the same characteristics marked
consumptive women as consumptive men.)".
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characteristics are found A-8l)KO(pA,8Y(J,axlai and TTCSpuycoSse^, both denoting
people,195 the author must speak of a type or types, not about appearance or
appearances. To that it could be replied that that is not certain since these two types of
people come last; they could be added inconcinnously to the list of appearances.
While this last case may be left undecided, the extension which took place with the
application of the noun stSo^ cannot be called into question. In Epidemics I + III, there
are instances of elSot; which a translation of the word with 'appearance' or 'guise'
would perhaps not render unintelligible, but at least potentially misleading for the
uninitiated. Translating el8o^ as 'type' seems to preserve the sense of the passages
quoted in every case. One must bear in mind, however, that to the Greek ear it was still
the same word etSoc; which was employed in each case; and Epidemics I + III shows
that, at least in some cases, the same clause seems to admit of two alternative renderings,
with 'guise' or 'appearance', or with 'type'. While the two English words 'guise' and
'type' stand quite apart, I wonder if the question if the author had meant 'guise' or 'type'
could have been asked at the time of composition of the treatise.
X.
Nothing is gained by accumulating more instances and showing in each case that the
above observations are confirmed in one way or another. Neither, I believe, is there new
or substantially different evidence which would tell against the interpretations offered in
the preceding sections, nor do I detect a further semantic development. 'Type' seems to
be firmly established as a meaning of SlSo^ separate from, and co-existing with, 'guise,
appearance'. With all the instances of slSo(^ in the treatises In the Surgery, On
Fractures, On Joints, Instruments of Reduction, Humours, and The Sacred Disease,196
195 This, I believe, was overlooked by Jones.
196 There are no instances of £t8oc in either Prognostics or On Fractures.
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the word seems to denote either 'guise, appearance' or 'type', in the ways outlined
above.197
The last instance of sT5o<; in the Histories of Herodotus discussed in the section V
above was that of I, 94: fe^sup80f|vai 5rj cSv TOTS Kat TCDV KUpCOV Kal xcov
6toxpaydA,cov Kat zr\q ocpaipriq Kai xcov hlXkcov Tiaoecov rcaiyviecov
xa etSea, TiXrjv tisoocov* xouxcdv yap o5v xrjv &;supeaiv ot)K
OlKTjlOUVXai AuSol. Then were invented: of cubes and ankle-bones and of the ball
and ofall other games the appearances, exceptfor draughts; for, the invention of those,
the Lydians do not appropriate. stSo^ there appeared to be applied to how the games
were played: i.e. either to the process, something not static but dynamic, or to the rules;
but definitely not to a material object. 'xcov hfkk(£>V Tiaoscov TiaiyvietDV xa
Sl8ea' could not mean 'all other sorts of games'.
A clue to what it could mean is furnished by the use of st8oc; in some of the early
Hippocratic treatises. There, 8l5o£ is applied to things characterised by any set of
197 There are, naturally, some cases like those of Epidemics discussed above which mark a transitional
state; attribution of them to one or the other group will to some extent be arbitrary.
'Guise, appearance' is denoted by sTSot; at In the Surgery Illb, Vlld; Instruments of Reduction Ia,b,
VI; Humours I.
'Type' is denoted by 8lSo<; at In the Surgery Ilia, VIIa,b,c, VIII, XIX; On Joints XXVII, XXXIV; The
Sacred Disease IV, XVI (cf. the chapter on popcpf) above).
I admit that I do not fully understand Humours XIII. Gillespie, The Use of ElSog and 18fa in
Hippocrates, p. 189, adduces it in a collection of "passages in which the classificatory notion seems
more or less important", and writes: "TtSpi 13> v- 494 l- °xav ouv Kal f)p ooxgx;
dydyp (sc. v|/6xsa £K 0aX.7tscov Kai 0dX7tOQ gk v(/6xsot;, the characteristic of cpBivducopoi;,
which gives rise to iKxepot, jaundice), Kal fjpoc; ytvovxat tKxspoi- syybxaxto yap auxr) f|
kIvtiok; xf| copp Kaxa xouxo xd el5o; soxiv. Apparently = f)v ouxcot; dydyp. This
affection, when it takes this form, is most akin to the season. Not in T[aylor]." If that be so, the passage
would belong to the second group.
Let me add here that the one occurrence of slSo; in TtSpi Sialxtjc; oqbcov, Regimen in Acute
Diseases, which is sometimes thought early, or even 'by Hippocrates', likewise belongs to that second
group. When the author reminds his less knowledgeable colleagues in section 43 cbcg XP^I
5tayivc6aK8iv ... ooa xs ppscov f| cpfatc Kal f\ sqt; sKdoxoiotv fkxskvoi 7td0ea
Kal e.tSea Tcavxota, that latter phrase is short for Kal Sl8ea 7tavxota TtaOscoV: that it is
necessary to understand... which affections our nature and habit engender, and that there are manifold
types <of affectionsx Cf. also Gillespie, p. 186f.; pace Taylor, p. 220.
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characteristics, visible or not visible, commonly, the noun sISoc; would appear in a
genitival phrase of the type 'a person of that elSoc;', 'a disease of that stScx^'. In these
cases, 'type' suggested itself as a translation of st8o^. The reverse phrase is also found:
'these and other types of disease', 'two types of something'.198 But there is also a
possibility of referring to diseases or patients characterised as to 'the above-said Sl8sa',
or again by declaring: 'the elSoc; of them was this or that'. In those cases, neither 'type'
nor 'guise, appearance' would be fully appropriate as a rendering of sTSot;; it is not that
either word would necessarily be incorrect as a translation, but in each case the context
shows that the connotations of etSoc; are slightly different from those of its English
renderings; the difference becomes apparent in the differing syntactical relations sISoc;
can enter. Bearing that in mind, 'of all other games the types' may be acceptable as a
translation of'tcov (iXXkatv Ttaoecov 7iaiyviea>v xa eiSea'.
In the same way, the passage discussed at the end of section VIII above could be
explained, if not translated. At Airs, Waters, and Places XI, it is declared: Kal T(X (4.8V
ftjuocpGlvei, xa 8e A,fjyei, xa 8e aXXa rcavxa j480ioxaxai e<; exepov
etSot; Kal 8X8pr|V Kaxaoxaaiv. That could now be understood as meaning: "And
the ones die away, others calm down, all the others change to another type and another
condition'. Considering the usage of Epidemics I and III, and also, as I think, of
Herodotus, this rendering in itself would not presuppose a decision as to whether the
author has in mind the same disease or a different, new one.
In the Hippocratic corpus, sl8oc; is used with a high degree of abstraction. What
determines an slSoc; and what is referred to by el8o^ need not have a visual component
at all; the noun in either singular or plural can be applied to something - person, object,
state or event - marked by one or more than one characteristic. Syntactically, elSoq
appears to be more versatile than either 'guise, appearance' or 'type', in that in all its
198 '8uo SlSsa' is a phrase of particular frequency in In the Surgery, there, it is used somewhat
stereotypically.
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senses it seems to be employable with any one of the constructions possible with any of
the English renderings.
XI.
Among the pre-Socratic philosophers, it is Empedocles who employs st8o<; with any
frequency or significance.199 If Plutarch, De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 926d (DK
31B27), quotes accurately, a line by Empedocles contains the formulaic fjeAAoiO ...
iiyXctdv el5o<;, the bright appearance of the sun.200
s!8o<; as 'the appearance of something' is found once more, though with slightly
different emphasis. In B71 (4ff.), the 815t| of mortals are opposed to their /poia, and in
this context the question of Greek concepts of colour and colours may be relevant: 81
199 The few other instances of the word in pre-Socratic philosophical or sophistic texts can all be
subsumed under one of the categories discussed above: Gorgias (DK 82B22) contrasts the St6oc;, guise,
appearance, of a woman with her 86^(1, here reputation rather than judgement or opinion. With Critias
(DK 88B48), sT8og likewise denotes guise, external appearance.
When Melissus discusses that there is only one, SV p6vov 80XIV (DK 30B8), he constructs as one of
the absurdities which follow from the opposite assumption that while we say that we perceive and
comprehend rightly or correctly, 6p0CO£, nevertheless we see again and again that things are one thing
and its opposite, whence it follows that we neither see nor recognize what is; that does not agree with the
initial assumption. He continues (B8, 4): cpap6voiq yap slvai nofka Kal diSta (?) Kal eI8r|
xs Kal 'toxuv sxovxa, Ttdvxa sxepoiouaGai fiptv 5oK8i Kal psxa7d.7t:xeiv sk xou
8KdoXOXS 6pcop6vou. Indeed, to us, when we say that there are many eternal things, having
appearances and power, all things seem to alter and change, from what is being seen at any one given
time. Here having appearances and power refers to the assumed objects' having their own, distinct
appearance and power or strength; that stSoq is appearance is partly confirmed by the participle
6pcop6vou, indicating that the evidence adduced is in the sphere of what manifests itself visibly.
For Philolaus DK 44B5, see the discussion of Phaedo 100b - 105e, Part III below.
200 It is impossible to determine if the genitive f|8k'lOlO is a genitivus possessivus or an appositivus (cf.
Kiihner-Gerth, Griechische Grammatik I, pp. 264f., 280f.; Schwyzer, Griechische Grammatik II, p.
121 f.). If it be the latter, TjsXioiO ... ttykaov elSoQ would amount to 'the bright appearance which
is the sun'; a potential line of linguistic development could then be constructed thus: 'I see the bright
sun', 'I see the sun bright in appearance', 'I see the sun's bright appearance', 'I see the bright
appearance which is the sun'; a next potential step in that line could be the dropping of the qualification:
'I see a bright appearance'. In the last sentence, the adjective could then be changed, or perhaps even
left out altogether. This hypothetical absolute use of 'appearance' would be similar to what is found with
some of the medical writers (vid. Section VII above).
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56 xl ooi Txepi xcov5e ^17i6^,dA,o(; 87tA,exo tuoxk;, | n&q i)8axo<; yair|<;
xs Kai aiBspoq f|sX,loi) x8 | Kipvapevcov ei8r| xe yevolaxo xP°ft* Te
9vr|xcov | xooo', ooa vuv yeyaaoi ouvappoaGsvx' 'Acppo81xr] ... . But if
trust concerning those things be in any way deficientfor you: howfrom water and earth
and aether and sun, when they are mixed, appearances and colours of mortal beings
come about, whichever have come about now, fitted through Aphrodite ... . Translating
xpoia as colour suggests itself, especially as it is found side by side with 8i5o£ which
could then be shape or form201.
It may, however, be worth bearing in mind that - though admittedly more than half a
century later and in a predominantly Attic context - an opposition of colour and shape
was expressed as that of XpCOfia or XPOCl and 0X^lPa> not That is all the more
significant as in that text, Meno 73e -76e, Socrates states that Meno as a follower of
Gorgias accepts and adheres to the views of Empedocles (76c). But elsewhere in pre-
Socratic philosophy as well, axfipa, rather than et5o^, seems to be the term firmly
established to denote physical shape or form.202 It is, therefore, rash to see an opposition
of form versus colour in Empedocles B71. StSo^, appearance, as a term for the more
general concept may be followed in any description of a thing by any term for a concept
which strictly speaking forms part of it; colour does belong to appearance, as well as to
'an appearance'; appearance, as well as 'an appearance', comprises colour: that does not
rule out the slightly redundant wording of 'appearances and colours of mortal beings
come into being', neither in verse nor in prose.
In B22, as most other extant lines of Empedocles preserved by Simplicius, the world we
live in is described as containing on the one hand things in concord with their parts,
201 Provided one accepts Diels-Kranz I, p.338, apparatus ad loc.: "ypotu wohl Neutr. Plur. neben
Xpotd, XP^? wie qAoia (Hes. s.v. 7rixupa) neben cp^oid, (pX6oc;" - on conventional lines of
interpretation, however, St8T| Kal XP°ta could just as well be bodies and skins, or bodies and bodies,
or appearances and appearances (vid. lsj s.vv. st5o^, XpOtd, XP®^).
202 Not an absolutely compelling argument, as Plato might as well - here as elsewhere - have changed
the terminology, if only in this one point; cf., however, for examples: Diels-Kranz III (index) s.v.
oxripa.
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namely the sun, the earth, the sky, and the sea; then those mixed well and fittingly,
likewise in concord; and, he concludes: sxgpd <§' &> tlxeioxov 6.71' &XA,fjX.C0V
Sisxodoi ptiAxoxa | yevvi] xe Kpf|oei xs Kai ei5eoiv eKpcucxoioi, |
Ttavxp OUyyivsoBat 6f|0sa ... . But those which stand furthest apart from one
another are most hostile to birth and mixture and moulded appearances, wholly
unaccustomed to get together ... ,203 Here, sl8o^ is used absolutely; 'an appearance' in
the sense of 'a thing that appears'. The same usage is found in two more fragments. B73
as well belongs to a physical or cosmological context (4f.): ... | (PC, 8s xoxs ygova
Kujcpic;, 87ib1 x' feSirjvev ev opPpco, | ei8ea 7toi7tvuoi)oa Go© 7ii)pi
ScOKS Kpaxuvai. ... and how at that time Cypris, when she had moistened earth in
rain, eagerly making appearances, gave them to swift fire to strengthen them. As with
B22, the product of a process of ysvsoi^, of becoming and coming into being, that
which as a result appears as distinct, is called an appearance. Such a distinct result of a
process is also the picture a painter produces; the work and craftsmanship of painters is
described in B23 (7ff.): Oix' ^7X81 o6v papvj/cooi 7ioMxpoa (pappaKa
Xepoiv, | dppovifl pei^avxe xa psv tx>«8Co, aXka 5' sMaoco, | sk xcov
eiSsa 7iaoiv &XtyKia 7iopoi3voixn, | SsvSpea xe Kxi^ovxe Kai frvepac;
f|5e yuvaiKag | Gfipaq x' oicovoi)^ xs Kai uSaxoGpsppovaq i^Gix;. Now,
when they grasp with their hands drugs of varied colour, mixing with fitting measure
more of the one, less of the other, they prepare from them appearances similar to all the
things, creating trees and men and women, animals and birds and fish, nourished by the
203 For this way of construing the syntax cf. J. Mansfeld, Die Vorsokratiker, Stuttgart 1987, p.413: "Am
feindlichsten dem Entstehen und der Mischung und den ausgepragten Gestalten [...] sind jene [Teile],
die am meisten voneinander verschieden sind, ganz und gar ungewohnt, zusammenzutreten, ... ." A
different, but to my mind less satisfactory, solution is proposed by e.g. Diels-Kranz: "Feindlich dagegen
ist am meisten, was am meisten voneinander absteht in Ursprung, Mischung und ausgepragten
Gestalten, ganzlich ungewohnt der Verbindung ... ", also adopted by e.g. J. Barnes, Early Greek
Philosophy, Harmondsworth 1987, p. 168f.: "But most hostile are the things which differ most from one
another I in birth and blending and moulded shape, I quite unaccustomed to come together ... ".
171
water. It should be noted that painters do not just create shapes or forms, but indeed
reproduce the whole appearance of the things they set out to represent.204
The case is different with the three remaining instances of Sl8o^, different in the same
way some of the instances of sl8o^ in the medical writers discussed above were
different. And it may not be irrelevant that at least one of the three contexts, B98 (1 Iff.),
while certainly part of a cosmological discussion, is distinctly physiological or medical205 :
r| 8s xouxotoiv lor) ouveKupos pid^ioxa, |' Hcpaioxcp x' oja.Ppcp
xs Kal a'iGepi Tiapxpavocovxi | KunpiSoq 6pp.ia0eioa xsA,sloi<; kv
A-ipsveoaiv, | six' 6Aiyov psi^cov eixe 7iA,s6veoaiv k^aoooov- | sk
XCOV alpti XS ysvxo Kai SlSsa oapKOq. But earth, most equal with
them, met them, Hephaestus and rain and all-shining aether, anchoring in the perfect
harbour of Cypris; be there a little more or a little more less: from those, blood came
into being, and also the types of other flesh. The various types of flesh, whatever they
are,206 would 'appear' differently; in that sense they could be said to be different, distinct
'appearances'. But in the same way as with the examples discussed above, the
grammatical construction, stSoc; in the plural, with a dependent genitive, indicates the
transition to a separate new sense of etSoc; as 'type', whether or not that development
would immediately have been perceived as such. I do, however, think, that the semantic
development outlined took place in a non-poetic context and was only afterwards
employed in Empedocles' verse. The irreducibly ambiguous transitional occurrences of
the word found in the professedly medical writers are absent from Empedocles. That is,
204 Use of stSog in this sort of context may be seen as paving the way for the semantic development
seen at e.g. Thucydides, 3.82.2.3 and Euripides, Iphigenia in Tauris 817; vid. section XII below.
205 In this context one is reminded of the report on Empedocles by Diogenes Laertius (VIII, 58 = DK
31A1): cprjol 8e Sdxupog sv xotq P'totc; oxt Kal 'taxpoq fjv Kal ptjxcop aptoxog. And
Satyros in the Lives says that he was a physician as well as an excellent orator. Cf. M. Schofield (in:
G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge 21983, p. 282) who in
commenting on A1 adduces B147 as potential indication of Empedocles' affiliations with the medical
profession.
206 That is to say, leaving aside the question if utpu was, or was not, seen as one type of flesh; an
interpretation of the line which is grammatically possible.
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of course, not to say that there are not varying degrees of abstraction in Empedocles as
well; in B98 Sl8r| clearly refers to types of things visibly different, and so does B115 (53
ff.): Salpovec; oi'xe jiaKpaicovoq X,eA,axaci ploio, | xpit; piv puplac;
obpag (mo paicapcov &A,aX,r|o0ai, | cpuojisvoix; 7tavxoia 8ia xpovou
e!8ea 0vr|xcov | (tpya'ktaq pioxoio psxaXXaooovxa KeX,e\30oix;. It's an
old law that demons who have committed a crime must wander about a long time,
growing (or living) as manifold types of mortal beings, with time exchanging the
toilsome ways of life.
In B125 (2f.) the appearances of the two types of things in question are different as
well. I think, though, that here, perhaps for the first time, el8o<; is used absolutely, that
is to say without the qualification of e.g. a genitive, with the meaning of type.: SK JJ.8V
yap £a>c6v £xi0ei veKpa ei8e' frpetpcov, | <£k 8e veKpcov I;dbovxa>.
From living bodies he (or: she) made dead, exchanging the types, <and from dead
living>.201 The context of this line, though, is too uncertain to reach a firm conclusion.
But even if B125 is left aside altogether, it cannot be doubted that Empedocles
employed elSoc; in the sense of 'type' without comment, explanation, or even only the
slightest indication that this usage reflects a very recent semantic development. The
observations made on the occasion of our discussion of the Hippocratic writings above
are therefore to be seen as systematic rather than narrowly chronological; to our
knowledge, Empedocles' verses were written down before any of the Hippocratic
writings were; both the authors of the latter and Empedocles, however, used material
which had been used before, describing and setting it out in a language which had
gradually evolved in a way suited to that material. It is not surprising that all stages of
linguistic development should coexist in one and the same text, or collection of texts as is
the Hippocratic Corpus, especially when the text in question is composed in a way as
207 Not: From living beings he made dead bodies, changing <them>, ... . Pace J. Mansfeld, op. cit.,
p.473. J. Barnes, op. cit., p. 197: "From living things he made corpses, changing theirforms", too, seems
to mean something different from what is proposed above.
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conservative as we must assume the Hippocratic Corpus to have been. Oral traditions of
the secret craft of medicine can be expected to be riddled with archaisms - or, at least,
layers of old or antiquated diction - in the same way legal or religious texts are. Thus,
when we considered a supposed development of eiSo<; within selected Hippocratic
writings, that need not necessarily imply that that development took place for the first
time in those chance survivals under scrutiny; it is rather the case that what has been
reconstructed as a potential semantic development is reflected or survives in the passages
discussed; they are a reflection of a development which seems to have taken place, and in
a sense come to a conclusion, by the time Empedocles composed his poem or poems.
XII.
In all of Thucydides, there are six instances of the word sl8o^. His usage does not
seem to be markedly different from what could be observed so far. There is, however, a
slight development. On occasion, eT8o<; refers to the appearance, not of an object but of
an action: Towards the end of his account of the fifth year of the war, in relating the
events of the summer of 427 B.C., Thucydides comments on how GXaoic;, civil strife,
had become more common in communities all over Greece after Athens and Sparta had
gone to war, since the opposing parties in the cities, democrats and oligarchs, could rely
on help from those two cities respectively, as both of them were in need of allies.
Thucydides continues (III 82.2): Kai £71871808 7ioX.X,d Kal %a^87ld Kaxa
oxaoiv xaig 7i6X,eot, yiyvopeva pev Kai aisi eoopeva, scoc; av f|
abxrj cpuoi<; dvGpccmcov fj, jj.aX,X,ov 8e Kai f|ouxatxspa Kai xoiq eiSeoi
Sir^Xaypeva, (be, av SKaoxai ai pexa|3oA,ai xd>v ^i)vxi)%id)v
scpioxcovxai. ev pev yap e'lpfjvri Kai dyaGoiq 7tpdypaoiv ai xe 7ioX.ei<;
Kai o'l 'i8i(5xai dpelvoEc; xa<; yvcopag 8%oixn 8ia xo pfj dKouoiout;
dvayKac; 7U7ixetv 6 Se 7ioX,8pog b(psX,cov xfjv eimopiav xoi) Ka0'
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tllispav ptaiog 8i5aoKaA,o<; Kat 7ipo<; xa Tiapovxa xac; bpyaq xd>v
7IoAAg0V OflOlOl. And many hardships befell the cities in civil strife, as always come
about and always will, as long as the nature ofmen remains the same, yet more so, or
quieter, or changed in their appearances, according to how all the several changes of
fortune occur. Indeed, in peace and when things are well, both cities and individuals
have better judgement because they do notfall into involuntary need; but war that takes
away well-being of everyday life is a violent teacher and assimilates to current
circumstances the emotions of the many. The way in which circumstances, events that
occur, appear as different, according to fortune, are the s!8r|, 'the appearances', of
those events which are said to have changed.
This usage is in some ways parallel to Euripides, Iphigenia in Tauris, 817. Orestes has
just disclosed his identity to Iphigenia. Disbelieving, she demands proof of identity.
Orestes reports what, he says, he has been told by Electra: Iphigenia once wove a
garment depicting the quarrel of their ancestors Atreus and Thyestes. Iphigenia agrees,
and Orestes continues (816): e'lKG) x' 8V 'lOXOlc; f]X,lOU psxdoxaoiv. - IO.
ucpriva Kai x65' etSoc; eupixoic; 7t^OKai<;. Orestes And you depicted on the
loom the sun's reversal. - Iphigenia I wove also that 'appearance' with fine-threaded
twinings.
We see how once clScx^ has been established with its absolute sense of 'an
appearance', the word can be employed to refer to any thing thus denoted, the point of
reference need not be a single object or a single living being; with Euripides, it is the
appearance of an action, a snapshot of an event, which is referred to.208
While there is, I believe, no principal difference in usage with the Thucydidean example,
it is nevertheless worth observing that in the case of Thucydides on the one hand what is
referred to as being capable of different appearances has previously, at the beginning of
the sentence, been denoted by a neuter plural adjective, i.e. the diction of the passage as
a whole is in itself inherently more abstract; secondly, and more importantly, the events,
208 For this usage, cf. also the forth-century poet Timotheus 15 (Persae), 136.
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yiyvojxeva, are many, and the syntax is undecided as to whether each and every event
is different according to circumstances, or whether there are several types of events, a
possibility which may be suggested by the way the next sentence continues that thought.
Use of et8o<; as 'the appearance (of an action)209 ' is not far from that of elSoc; as 'the
type (of an action)' and thus 'the way (something happens)'. Accordingly, one could
translate: Kat fe7i87iso8 noXXd Kal %a^ercd Kaxa oxaoiv xaT<; Tto^eoi, ...
^iaX,Xov 8e Kat f|ouxatxspa Kai xoit; eiSeai 5ir|X.A,aypsva, dx; av
8Kaoxai a'l pexapoXat XCOV ^UVXl)Xld)V etpioxcovxai. And many hardships
befell the cities in civil strife, ... yet more so, or quieter, or changed in their 'ways',
according to how all the several changes offortune occur.
What may appear as a further extension of the semantics of st80(^, 'way' in addition to
'appearance' and 'type', is much less so than the use of a completely different word as a
rendering of the Greek might at first suggest. The innovation in usage is application of
the word etSoc; to an action or event, something dynamic, rather than to a physical or
corporeal body, object or thing. This move has not to the same extent taken place in
English, so that in the majority of cases 'appearance' or 'appearances' would not serve
as an idiomatic translation.210
It is, on the other hand, not surprising that clear cases of this new application occur at a
time when elScx^ as 'type' is firmly established; in speaking of 'types' of things, one
need not exclusively, or as may be not at all, refer to visual features of the things
discussed. When el8oc; is used to denote 'the way' things happen, there may be a visual
element to the action, event or scene referred to, as was the case with Euripides,
Iphigenia in Tauris, 817; that, however, need not be so, and in the case of Thucydides
III 82.2 the difference in Sl8tj of the hardships occurring is probably not primarily one of
209 As elsewhere, brackets indicate that the terms in parentheses are not part of the meaning of the word
under consideration but are supplied in the text. The terms in parentheses are given solely to indicate
application, i.e. immediate context, of the words discussed and translated.
210 Cf. above end of Section V on Herodotus 194.
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visual appearance. In that, application of SlSo<^ to events is more abstract and less
concrete than the original application of the word to physical objects. This degree of
abstraction is also found with the use of el5o^ as referring to 'type'. Extension of
applicability from things to events may have been prompted, but was definitely facilitated
by the more abstract meaning slSoc; had acquired in denoting 'type'.
The next instance of st8o^ I will discuss has previously been taken as evidence for a
peculiar, separate meaning of the word. This, I believe, resulted from looking at a very
small portion of text and trying to interpret it in isolation. However, in order to
understand Thucydides III 62, the wider context of the passage has to be taken into
account. The scene is that of the confrontation of Theban and Plataean opinion after the
defeat of Plataea at the hands of the Spartans and their Theban allies. The Thebans plead
for harsh punishment, rejecting the historical account given by the Plataeans to justify
their allegiances. Having summarized events before the Persian wars, the Thebans
continue: fenciSfj 8s Kai 6 PapPapoq fjA,0sv STii xfjv ' EAAaSa, cpaol
povoi Boicoxcov ob pr|8ioat, Kai xobxcp paXxoxa abxoi xs
dya^ovxai Kai f]jj.a<; XoiSopoboiv. r|psic; Ss pr|8iaai psv abxobq ob
cpapsv 8ioxi ob8' 'A0r|vatoi)<;, xfj psvxoi abxf| 'iSsa baxepov 'iovxcov
'A0r(vala)v S7ti xobq "EAArivag povoug ab Boicoxcbv dxxiKiaai.
Kaixoi OK8\)/ao0s sv oicp si8si SKaxspoi f|pcov xobxo srcpa^av.
fjpiv psv yap f] 7i6X,ic; xoxs bxbyxavsv obxs Kax' 6Xxyapxiav
'toovopov 7ioX,ixsboi)aa obxs Kaxa 8r|poKpaxiav- onsp 8s soxi
vopoi<; psv Kai xa> ococppovsaxaxcp svavxicoxaxov, syyuxaxcp 8s
xapavvou, Suvaoxsia bAAyoov dv8pd)v stx^ td Tipaypaxa.
'Subsequently, during the foreign invasion of Hellas, they say that they were the only
state in Boeotia which did not collaborate with the Persians. This is the point which
they use mostfrequently for their self-glorification andfor deriding us. We say that the
only reason why they did not collaborate was because the Athenians did not do so
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either, and, following up the same principle, we shall find that when the Athenians
began to attack the liberties of Hellas, Plataea was the only state in Boeotia which
collaborated with Athens.
Consider, too, what type of government we each had at the time of these events. Our
constitution then was not an oligarchy, giving all men equal rights before the law, nor
was it a democracy: power was in the hands ofa small group ofpowerful men, and this
is the form ofgovernment nearest to dictatorship andfarthest removedfrom law and the
virtues ofmoderation. '2n
I quote this translation because it seems to me to represent a majority opinion on the
meaning of elSo^ in this passage. The Greek sentence in question, Katxoi OKS\|/ao08
bv olco e\5si BKaxepoi f|pa>V xouxo ertpa^av, is rendered on the basis of the
immediately following statement as: Consider, too, what type of government we each
had at the time of these events. A reasoning behind this translation may run on the
following lines: The Thebans, in giving their version of events, try to justify their actions
during the Persian wars two generations ago, contrasting their own situation with that of
the Plataeans who, they say, were 'atticizing' then as they are now. They, the Thebans,
however, had hard times. KOilTOl OKS\|/ao08 kv olcp e\Sei 8Ktixepoi flpCDV
XOUXO STtpa^av. Yet, see also in what sort of sIScx^ each of us [two states] acted.
This announcement is followed by an account of constitutional matters at Thebes at the
time, and therefore el8oc; here must mean something like 'type of government',
'constitution'.212
211 Translation by R. Warner, Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War, Harmondsworth, 1954, p. 198.
212 For this passage cf. in particular K. Weidauer, Thukydides und die Hippokratischen Schriften,
Heidelberg 1954, pp. 21-31. In an elaborate attempt, Weidauer tries to establish a meaning 'Zustand,
Verfassung', which may approximately be rendered 'state (of affairs), constitution (of things)', a
meaning Thucydides has allegedly taken from Hippocratic usage. In sections VI-X above, I arrived at a
different conclusion for the usage of the medical writers; in what follows, I hope to show why
Weidauer's position is not tenable for Thucydides either. G. Rechenauer, Thukydides und die
hippokratische Medizin, Hildesheim 1991, does not make his meaning sufficiently clear. He seems to
reject Weidauer's further conclusions, but seems to accept his interpretation of Thucydides III 62.
Rechenauer claims (p. 20f.): "Eine weitere methodologische Gemeinsamkeit zwischen Thukydides und
der hippokratischen Medizin bildet das semeiotische Verfahren, der SchluB mittels Indizien
(TSKpijpia, OT|psia) auf Verborgenes. Wie der Arzt nach dem Prinzip OV|/l<^ Ct8f|^0)V xd
(paivbpsva [footnote 39] aus den sichtbaren Symptomen die gesamte "Verfassung" (etSOQ) [n. 40]
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If that were so, we would be justified in our expectation to find next a contrasting
description of the 'constitution' of the Plataeans at the time, since the Thebans had
announced that they would show in what et8o^ each of the two parties acted. As we
read on, however, we find nothing of the sort, apart, perhaps, from the one phrase not
central to the Theban argumentation, that the Plataeans acted s^ovtsc; ... tou£
VOJIOl)^ OUOTISp jisxpt tou Ssupo, having just those laws which you have to this
day (64, 3). While, I maintain, this phrase is not central to their argumentation, its
context provides the point the Thebans want to stress, the point to which they have led
up from 62, 3 onwards. In 64, 3, the Thebans criticize the involvement on the part of the
Plataeans in action against Aegina, where they supported the Athenians instead of
preventing the campaign: Kai Tauxa outs &kovtsc; s^ovis*; xs xouq vopoug
ouoTtsp psxpi tod Ssupo Kai oi)8svd<; bpaq Piaoapsvou djarcep fjpac;.
erkennt und, falls moglich, die Krankheitsursache bestimmt, so schlieBt Thukydides an Hand von
Indizien aus der Gegenwart auf die Vergangenheit zuriick [n. 41] und erkennt, indem er die
geschichtlichen Ereignisse in ihren Wirkungszusammenhangen zuriickverfolgt, die tiefere Ursache der
Geschehnisverkettung [n. 42]." I.e., Rechenauer seems to posit a meaning 'Verfassung', 'constitution
(?)' for ei8o^ in the Hippocratic corpus and Thucydides at large; that, however, seems to be something
different from what Weidauer tries to establish for Thucydides III 62, for Rechenauer's footnote 40 on p.
21 reads; "Fur nicht uberzeugend halte ich die Untersuchung Weidauers iiber den Begriff dSoQ (a.a.O.,
S. 21-31). Zu der aus den hippokratischen Schriften erschlossenen Bedeutung ei8o<^ = "Gesamte
Verfassung" findet sich nur eine einzige Parallele in einem nebensachlichen Zusammenhang bei
Thukydides (III 62, 3)." Be that as it may, neither 'Verfassung' nor 'Gesamte Verfassung', neither in
the general sense of 'constitution (of a thing)' nor in the particular one of 'constitution of a state', seem
to me to be justified on the basis of the texts we have. -1 therefore cannot agree with S. Hornblower, A
Commentary on Thucydides I, Oxford 1991, whose judgements on stSoc; and in particular \8su are
more judicious than those of other commentators. On p. 455, he translates III 62, 3, KCllTOl
OK^Vj/aoGs sv o'tcp etSsi eK&XepOt fipcov XOUXO 87tpaqav, "But think how different were the
circumstances in which we and they acted." This suggests stSoc has, and therefore has acquired, a very
general meaning; and that, of course, would require an explanation of how the word came to have that
general meaning. But Hornblower continues immediately: "For SlSsi ('circumstances') here see
Weidauer (...), 21 ff.: the word for which see 82. 2n. below, here means almost 'constitution' - in Greek,
as in English, a word with medical associations. See my nn. on vi. 77. 2, viii. 56. 2, and 90. 1 (where
Andrewes's nn. are inadequate; Dover on vi. 77. 2 is better). In all these passages the notion of a
'political arrangement' is present, most clearly at viii. 90; in the other passages it has travelled further,
and can almost be rendered 'policy' or 'plan'. It is interesting to find 8lSst used here in a political sense
so soon after the closely related word \S6a (2n. above) has been used of political motives." - If it can be
shown that SlSoc at III 62, 3 does not carry those alleged political connotations, Hornblower's note on
82, 2, as well as on the other passages he adduces, would have to be reconsidered as well; see also the
discussion of Thucydides I 109, 1 in Section VI of the chapter on 'lS6a below.
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And that [you did] not unwillingly, and having just those laws which you have to this
day, and while there was nobody forcing you as was the case with us. The double
opposition central to this part of the Thebans' speech is that of 8KOVX8£ - (XKOVXe^
and ot) pia^OjlSVOl - Pia^OJlSVOl, willingly - unwillingly and not forced - forced. It
culminates in the sentence concluding this section of the argument (64, 5): id JJ.8V oCv
sq XOV f](i,STSp6v XS dKOUOlOV JJT|5lOJi.dv Kal XOV UJJ.SX8POV 8KOUOIOV
dlTlKlOpov xotauxa d7IOCpalvop.SV. Such are the things we advance as to our
unwilling Medizing and your willing Atticizing. This point has been carefully prepared
in the intervening section of the text. At 62, 4, the Thebans claim with regard to their
own city:... iced f] ^ujjjtaoa tioXk; oi)K atoxoKpaxoop ouoa eai)xf|<; xoux'
STCpa^ev, ... and that the city did, as a whole not exercising power over its own affairs.
In this sentence, ot>K alruoKpaxcop oSoa eauxf|c; is equivalent to cbcovxec; Kai
Pia^OjlSVOl. The word (XKOVXec; itself occurs a few paragraphs later, when the
Plataeans are accused of collaboration; had they entered into an alliance with the
Athenians solely for purposes of defence against Thebes, they could have refrained from
joining aggressive Athenian ventures and could have counted on Spartan help since they
had been allies of the Spartans from the time of the Persian wars; the Thebans allege the
Plataeans would have done so: 81 XI Kal aKOVXeg 7ipoOT]y8O08 Im
'A0r[vaicov, if in any way you were brought forward by the Athenians against your
will. And in the next sentence that is reinforced by: bXX SKOVXS^ Kal Ol)
Pia^opsvoi 8X1 8l>wSa0S JJ.a>Aov xa 'A0r|valcov. But willingly and not forced
you chose rather the side ofAthens.
This, then, is the context in which the statement 'KaiXOl OK8\|/ao0S SV OlCp SlSei
SKaxspoi f|jJ.C0V XOUXO 87tpa^av' must be read. The argument of the Thebans is:
where we acted against Greece, that happened involuntarily and when we were forced to
do so; where the Plataeans acted together with the Athenians against Greece, that
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happened voluntarily and without anybody forcing them to do so.213 Thus, the Thebans'
introductory advice to the Spartans is: Yet, consider in which 'way' each one of us did
that. Constitutional considerations play only a subordinate role in an argument that
serves to establish that one party acted in a voluntary manner, the other forced by one
thing or another. Use of SlSoc; as 'the way' in which something happens or is done is the
same as that observed at III 82, 2. SlSoc; at III, 62, 3 does neither refer to the 'situation'
of the two parties involved in general, nor to their 'type of government' or 'constitution'
in particular.
We have seen that Thucydides on occasion uses stSo^ in the sense of 'manner' or 'way
(in which something is done)', and how this usage may have developed on the one hand
by extension of application from 'appearance (of a thing)' to 'appearance (of an action)',
prompted on the other hand by the presence of use of elSo^ meaning 'type (of person)',
'type (of thing)' from which could be derived, again by way of extension of application,
'type (of action)', 'manner or way (of acting)'.
On that basis, the two instances of sl8o^ in Book II present no difficulties, bearing in
mind that what in translation may suggest two, three, or more different meanings of the
one word sl8o^ need not have been viewed as such by Thucydides and his original
readership. By II 50, 1, Thucydides has given a detailed account of the way the epidemic
of 430 B.C. affected people, giving both the symptoms of the disease and in particular
the order in which they occurred. Those who survived an attack did so only with loss of
limbs or of eye-sight or of memory. He continues: yevojISVOV yap KpsiOOOV
A,oyou to el8o<; xf\q voaou, xa xs aXXa %aA.£7icoxepcog rj Korea xf^v
&V0pG)7lSiaV (ptioiv 7tpOGS7U7CT£V SKaOTCp KGtl sv xce>8e e8f)X,coos
213 It may be worth comparing Gorgias' Defence of Helen for the type of argument; in his speech,
Gorgias outlines four possible reasons for why Helen acted as she did; P'ta, force, plays a prominent part
in two of them and is mentioned in connection with the third; if Helen was forced, she is excused; this
must be considered a valid argument even if Gorgias' speech as a whole is a 7iaiyvtOV. The speech by
the Thebans is constructed along the lines of contemporary sophistic technique, as was that of the
Plataeans.
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JiaA,lOXa aXXo Xl OV f| XCOV ^uvxpocpcov XI* ... . Indeed, the way of the
disease having become greater than could be said, it also otherwise befell everybody
harder than is fit for human nature, but in the following <respect> it was most clear
that it was something other than any of the indigenous <diseases>: ... . I take
yevopevov yap Kpsioaov Aoyou xo st5oc; xf|<; vooou as a free nominative
preceding the main clause whose subject is VOOOt^, with Tcp0087Tl7lX£V as predicate,
that is to say, the disease befell the people, not the etSoc; of the disease. The etSoc; of
the disease is here on the one hand the 'way' it took, on the other hand its 'appearance'
in the sense of its manifestation in the various symptoms so vividly and visually described
by Thucydides in the preceding paragraphs.214 (It would perhaps not be absolutely
incorrect to translate XO stSoc; xf|£ VOOOU as the type of the disease', one would have
to bear in mind, though, that 'type' on the whole is a much more abstract term in English
than el8o<; is here.) II 50, 1 is a particularly good example of how and why translation is
impossible; 'way', 'manner', 'appearance', 'type', all capture aspects of what el8oc;
entails, and it can be demonstrated with a fair degree of precision how the word came to
denote all those things; nevertheless, not one of the English terms has remotely the same
range of connotations the Greek word has.
The following occurrence of BlSo^ may at first seem slightly less straightforward. Half
way through his funeral oration (II 35 - 46), Pericles captures what is to him the essence
of Athenian nature and culture (II 41, 1): £,uvsa,c0v xs xsycd Xt^v x8 Tiaoav
7ioA.iv zr\q' EA,A.a8o<; 7tai8eoaiv etvai Kal Ka0' stcaaxov Soksiv av
poi xov atoxov avSpa Trap' f|jjcov ferci TtA-eiox' av eiSrj Kat pexa
XaptxGov jj.aA.iox' av ebxpaTteXcoq xo ooopa auxapicet; 7tapsxeo0ai. And,
in summary, I declare that the whole city is an education to Greece, and that it seems to
214
Regarding the two faces of TO kISoc TT|^ v6ooi), the dynamic or processual and the static aspects
of the disease, one could render the phrase with the German medical terms "Krankheitsverlauf' and
"KrankheitsbilcT respectively; the latter, however, Krankheitsbild, does not capture the purely static,
visual aspects alone; Bild, like slSot^, can refer to a whole scene, either at one moment in time or
evolving over a period time.
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me that with us, in each and every case, the same man possesses a body in <the> most
ways <possible>215 and, with grace, most seemingly216 self-sufficient. In this sentence,
S7lt TlXeiOx' &V s18t| ... atJiapKsg could, I believe, either mean 'in the most ways
possible... self-sufficient' or, construing the preposition more strictly, 'self-sufficient for
the most 8l5lj'; if the latter were a possible way of construing the sentence, one would
have to posit absolute use of stSo^, or at least of the plural 6l8r|; the word would have
acquired a meaning like 'type(s) of action' or 'way(s) of acting', or else 'type(s) of task'
or 'type(s) of situation', i.e. what was supplied in the text with the examples discussed
above has here become part of the meaning of the word itself. Since, however, there is
no necessity of construing the sentence this way, I am inclined to refrain from accepting
this explanation, which would require positing a major semantic development, unless and
until unambiguous instances of this usage occur.
That stage of semantic development may have been reached towards the end of
Thucydides' work, assuming that, roughly speaking, composition of the account of the
war proceeded on the whole from the first to the last book. The same idiomatic
expression containing el8o<; is found once at VI 77, 2 and once at VIII 56, 2. At VI 77,
2, Hermocrates from Syracuse declares in a speech at Camarina that all Sicilians should
oppose Athens together; he presents the alternative in form of a question: f| psvojiev
ectx; av SKaoxoi Korea Tto^en; A,r|(p0a>|j.ev, e'iSoxeg oxi xauxi} povov
6tX,coxol sopsv Kai dpcovxsg abxobq sttI xouxo xo e!8o<; xpe7ropevouc;
ajoxe xoik; pev Coyote; fipd>v Suoxavai, xouq 8s ^uppaxcov feX,Tci8i
feK7ioX,spouv 7xpoc; xoig 8s dx; kKtiaxoi<; xi tipoorjvsc;
Xsyovx&q 8\3vavxai KaKOUpyetV; Or should we wait until all of us are defeated,
city by city, knowing that in that way alone we are conquerable and seeing them turning
215 I translate 'in the most possible ways' rather than 'in most ways' because Thucydides' point is not
that Athenian men are self-sufficient in most, but not in all ways; rather, comparison is made with men
from other cities who are not self-sufficient in as many ways as Athenian men are.
216 ei)Tpa7t6A,(Oq encapsulates both 'versatility' and 'beseeming behaviour'.
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to just that way, < namely> that some of us they make oppose each other with the help
ofwords, some they make fight each other creating the expectation ofmilitary support,
some they manage to harm by saying something soothing to each of them. At VIII 56, 2,
the Athenian general Peisander arrives at the camp of the Persian satrap Tissaphernes
after Athenian victory over Chios; Alcibiades, who is with Tissaphernes, wants to return
to Athens, but sees that his time has not come yet since Tissaphemes is likely not to take
side against Sparta as yet: 'AA,KlPld8r|<; 8s - oi) yap abxcp 7idvi) zd 6lko
Tiooatpepvoix; PsPaia f|v, (poPoupevou xoix; neA,07iovvr|aiouc; pa>Aov
Kal ext poiAopevou, Ka0d7iep Kat im' feiceivou eSiSaaicexo, xpipeiv
dpcpoxepoix; - xpsnexai S7it xoiov5s etSoc; cdots xov Tiooa(pepvr|v dx;
peyioxa a'lxouvxa Tiapa xd>v 'A0rjvaia)v pr^ £,upPf|vai. But Alcibiades -
indeed, things from Tissaphernes' side did not seem quite decided to him (who was
fearing the Peloponnesians more than he still wanted <to act>, also according to what
he himself had taught <Tissaphernes>: to let them [Athens and Sparta] extirpate each
other - Alcibiades turned to such a way, <namely> that Tissaphernes would not get
together with the Athenians by demanding too much from them.
Obviously, translating SlSo^ with 'way' here is not wholly satisfactory; 'way of action'
or 'way of acting' would probably make the meaning clearer. A planned, considered
'way of acting', a sequence of actions in that sense, may be called a 'scheme', and
perhaps 'scheme' is acceptable as translation for SlSoc; in these two cases where a
phrase fexxi xouxo xo stSoc; xpenopsvout; or xp87isxai ferci xoiov8e stSoq is
followed by (ocxs, rendered above as 'namely that'; in both cases the subordinate clause
is factative rather than consecutive, the cogxs clause states the content of the el8o^ to
which people turn, which is the content of their intentions and actions, rather than giving
the consequence or resulting event or state of affairs which comes about after people
have turned to a certain sTSo^.
In a sense, it does not matter if one settles for 'way of acting' or 'way of action', or
rather for 'scheme'; the latter, however, has the advantage of being one word rather than
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a phrase, and therefore, if it could be shown that sl8o^ had in some contexts the
connotations of 'scheme', that word may be preferable as a translation which could help
preserve not only the general meaning, but also the tone of a passage.
Confirmation that the meaning of sl5o(^ could indeed approximate 'scheme' is
provided by the remaining instance of 8i5oc; in Thucydides. In his account of the events
of the summer of 411, Thucydides outlines the various considerations different factions
of the Four Hundred held when it looked as if Alcibiades' return to Athens were
imminent. Many tried to dissociate themselves from the radical regime, so that, although
being part of the oligarchic government, they would be considered as reformers and
would, by introducing a real rule of the Fife Thousand, be immune from punishment.
But, so says Thucydides, most of them proposed that for the sake of their own political
advancement alone, as is typical with oligarchies; looking at Alcibiades, they themselves
wanted to achieve a position of sole ruler. There were others who wanted to uphold the
current system. Over against the reform party and their plans, these others are
characterized by Thucydides in the following words (VIII 90, 1): Ol 8s XCOV
TsxpaKOGicov pa>/ioxa kvavxioi ovxeg xa> xoiouxcd ei5st Kai
TipOBOXCOXS^, ... . But those of the forty who were most opposed to such a way of
acting, and their leaders, .... And he continues by relating that that faction sent for help
to Sparta, and that they fortified portions of the city walls.217
217 For the sake of easy reference, I provide here the full text of what has just been summarized, together
with R. Warner's translation. VIII 89, 3:
fjv Ss xobxo to axf|pa 7toktxiKbv ion Xdyov abxou;, xax' i8ia<; 8s
(ptkoxipiac; o't jrokXoi abxwv xa> xotobxcp 7tpoosK8tvxo, bv (Susp Kai
pdktoxa oAtyap-/ta sk SripoKpaxtac ysvopsvij andXXvxai- ndvxeq yap
abOtjpspov d^toboiv oby otcaq toot, dXXd Kai noXv xpcdxoq abxoq
SKaoxoq stvat- sk 8s 8r)poKpaxiac aipeosax; ytyvopsviy; paov xa
&7t:opaivovxa aq obK hud xcbv dpolcov skaooobpsvbt; xiq tpbpst. aacpbaxaxa
8' abxobq snips xa sv xf| 2dpcp xov 'AkKtPtd8ot) ioxopa ovxa Kai oxt
abxotq obK s86ksi pdvtpov xo xfyg oktyapxiaq sosoGat- fjycovi^sxo o£v sic;
SKaaxoi; abxoc; npcoxoi; npooxdxTp xov 8f)pou ysvsoBat. (90, l) oi 8s xcov
xsxpaKoatcov pdA-taxa svavxiot ovxsq xa> xotobxcp si8st Kai nposoxcoxst;,
^pbvtxdt; xs, oc; Kai oxpaxr|yf|oa<; sv xfi Zdpcp xra 'AkKtPtdSp xdxs
SiTjvsxQtl, Kai 'Apioxapxoq, avfjp bv xotq pd/Uoxa Kai bK nksioxot)
svavxiog xco Sf|pcp, Kai nsiaavSpoc; Kai 'Avxupdiv Kai aXXoi oi
Suvaxcoxaxot, npdxspdv xs, bnsi xdxtaxa Kaxsaxriaav Kai S7tst8rj xa bv xfj
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Here st8o<^ refers to a whole course of action retrospectively. The reason why this
passage may support a rendering of sl8oc; with 'scheme' here is that before Thucydides
brands the proposals of the reformers as born out of self-interest alone, he refers to them
by saying (89, 3): fjv 58 TOUTO TO OX^IP-a rcoX,lTlKOV TOl) ^oyoo abxoiq, ...
. That was the political (or: constitutional) scheme of their proposal 218, ... . 'Scheme',
of course, is here used without any intended connotations of deviousness.219
2ti|icp cstpcov eg SripoKpaxiav d7t£axr|, 7rp6a|3stg xe &7t£oxeXXov ocpcov eg
xi^v AaKe5aipova Kal xfjv bpoXoyiav 7rpou0ujaouvxo Kal xo ev xf)
'Hextcoveia KaX.oupfevp xetxog 87t:oiouvxo, 7coAAcp xe pa>Aov ext, bteiSfj
Kal o't eK xf|g 2dpou rtpfeopeig ocpcov fj>.0ov, bprovxeg xoug xe noXXovq Kal
acpcov xoug 5oKobvxag 7tp6xepov rcioxoug elvat jiexa|3aAAo|i6voug.
"This, in fact, was mere political propaganda: it was for motives of personal ambition that
most of them were following the line that is most disastrous for oligarchies when they take over
from democracies. For no sooner is the change made than every single man, not being content
with being the equal of others, regards himself as greatly superior to everyone else. In a
democracy, on the other hand, someone who fails to get elected to office can always console
himselfwith the thought that there was something not quite fair about it. But what had the most
evident effect in urging on the dissident party was the strength of Alcibiades 's position in
Samos and the fact that they did not believe that the oligarchy would last. Each one of them
therefore tried to get in first as leader and champion of the people in general. (90, 1) Those
among the Four Hundred who were chiefly opposed to the idea of democracy were led by
Phrynichus, the man who had quarrelled with Alcibiades when he was in command at Samos,
Aristarchus, who had been for a long time a particularly bitter enemy of the democracy,
Pisander, Antiphon, and others belonging to the most powerful families. Even before this time -
in fact as soon as they came into power and the army at Samos revolted from them and
constituted itselfa democracy - they sent representatives of their own party to Sparta and did
all they could to make peace; and they had also been building the wall in Eetionia. But now,
after the return of their representatives from Samos, they became more active than ever, as
they saw that not only the people in general but also members of their own party who had
previously been regarded as reliable were turning against them."
218 For the present purpose it does not matter what exactly the connotations of Xdyoq are at this point,
whether it is what they reason or what they say to each other, or what they propose in a speech in public.
I do not, however, agree with Warner who seems to take XO oyf|pa 7toX.lXlKOV XOU A.6you as one
phrase and translates it with 'political propaganda'; perhaps he has inferred this alleged meaning from
the content of the next clause, which is, to my mind, the beginning of Thucydides' interpretation (as
opposed to his professedly objective account of events).
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Thucydides' choice of words may be determined by the principle of variation; on the other hand, the
whole chapter seems to have a more colloquial ring; so in the sentence immediately preceding the
passage quoted above, 89, 2, he states that some of the oligarchs just wanted to get rid of everything they
had let themselves in for:... Kal fjSfecog av inzaXXaftvxaq 7xtj docpaXcog xou Kpdypaxog
TCOXXcb Slj naXXov 87t6ppCOOav. "... would have been glad enough to get out of the business, if
they could do so safely." (Warner) - a rather loose use of 7lpdy)ia. - For 'scheme', cf. Hornblower on
III 62, 3, who suggests 'plan' as a translation of etSog in some contexts.
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The connections of Thucydides' method and diction with those of the Hippocratic
writings have been stated repeatedly; the particular use of elSoc; as 'way of acting' or
'scheme', however, seems to have been general Attic rather than a specialized usage
adopted by Thucydides for his own reasons. A passage in Aristophanes' Plutus which,
though undoubtedly later in composition than the last Book of Thucydides' history and
therefore potentially under its influence, is free from any medical or otherwise specialized
vocabulary confirms that: Chremylus has invited Plutus into his house and has sent off
Cario to fetch the old men from the fields, Cario summons them, and there is an
entertaining interlude in which the chorus of old men assume different roles from
mythology, and they and Cario mockingly threaten each other with punishments
associated with those mythical characters; they are acting as if they were a chorus, in one
case at least a chorus in a Satyr play; this goes on to mutual amusement until Cario puts
an end to it by saying (316): bXX sTa VIJV XCDV OKODjljltixCOV hna'kXaytvzsc,
f^5r| | bpteiq kn aXX' s!8o<; xp87ieo0', | eyed 8' 'icbv ... . But well now,
stopping with those jests right now, turn to another way of action, but I will go and ....
Cario tells the chorus to behave differently, to 'turn to another etSoc;'. Given that
Thucydides can use the phrase in the same way, I see no need to look for any
connections sl8o^ in that sense could have with acting a part in the passage quoted from
Aristophanes. We do not know how common a phrase STll / XOUXO /
XOIOUXOV sl8o<; XpSTC8(50ai was, but it seems to have been part of common Attic
220
usage.
With Thucydides, the first Attic prose author we have considered, elSoc; is fairly
consistently applied to actions, often qualified as 'this' or 'that' or 'another'; it seems to
denote a 'type of action', a 'way (of acting)', and then a 'scheme' or 'way or type of
action or acting'; that this usage may be colloquial Attic is confirmed by Aristophanes. It
could be shown that this development is a natural extension of application of st8o^ to an
220 The only other occurrence of sl8oq in Aristophanes is at Thesmophoriazusae 267, where it is said of
a man in disguise that 'in appearance', st8o<^, he is a woman.
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action instead of to a thing, facilitated by use of the word as denoting 'type' in addition
to appearance.
XIII.
Turning to Plato's own use of the word el8oc;, it is not surprising to find almost all the
shades ofmeaning, or all the various senses stboc^ had acquired over the centuries, given
that the dialogues vary so widely in tone, subject matter, and most of all interlocutors.
On the whole, though, sT8o^ is as frequent or as rare a word in Plato's early dialogues
as it is, on average, with Herodotus, Thucydides or the orators.
What we identified as the earliest Homeric usage, el8oc; as referring to a person's
appearance, used in particular in contexts of praise of a person, occurs naturally in the
aristocratic Athenian circles in which most of the early conversations of Socrates are set.
Praise of a youth's pleasing appearance is found at the beginning of more than one
dialogue. Thus when Socrates enquires at the beginning of the Lysis whom Hippothales,
an acquaintance of his, is enamoured with, and when upon that Ctesippus instead of his
unexpectedly bashful friend in answer supplies the name of Lysis, and Socrates confesses
not to have heard of a youth answering to that name, Ctesippus declares (204e3): ot>
yap Tttivu, ecprj, xi aircou xoftvopa Xeyouaiv, bX>f exi raxxpoGev
fe7iovopd^sxai Sia to ocpo5pa xov Tiaxepa yiyvcooiceoGai abxou. knEi
eft 615' 6xi tco>Aoi> 8ei<; to e15o<; dyvoeiv too 7iaiSo<;- iKavoq yap
Kal &7td jj.ovoi) xouxol) yiyvcoOK8O0ai. Not very much indeed, he said, do they
use his name, but he is still benamed after his father, due to his father's being so well
known. For I know well that you are farfrom not knowing the boy's guise; he is capable
indeed ofbeing recognized even from that alone.
A parallel instance of et5o(^ denoting guise or appearance is Charmides 154d5. The
setting is again a palaestra; this time Socrates, having just returned from a military
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campaign, had asked more generally whether there was any youth distinguished in
intelligence or beauty or both; when Charmides was announced and had entered,
Socrates reports, he seemed to him wondrous as to size and beauty, SKSIVOC; Sfiol
GaopaoTdg fetpavrj to is peyeGog Kai to Ka?^og (el). When all, old and
young, were overwhelmed, Chairephon addressed Socrates (dl): Tl OOl (paiVBTai 6
VSaviGKOg, ... , c5 SfDKpaTSg; ot)K eimpOOCCOTOg; How does the youth seem to
you, Socrates? ... Not handsome of face? And when Socrates agrees strongly,
Chairephon continues (d4): OUTOg peVTOl, ... , 81 808>.Ol dnoStvai, 56^81
ooi (mpooamog stvav ouTCog to el5og 7iayKaA,og sotiv. Yet, were he
willing too undress, he would seem to you to be without face: so all-beautiful of
appearance is he. To that, all agree. Charmides is to st8og TldyKa^og, all-beautiful
of appearance or guise; or maybe beautiful as to his whole appearance, not only as to
his face.221 Socrates gives a twist to that answer by exclaiming that Charmides would be
well-nigh invincible if only he were in addition TT^V \|/1)%T^V ... 80 7lS(pl)K(Dg, by
nature well endowed as to his soul (el). Kritias, aristocrat and uncle to Charmides,
eagerly asserts with aristocratic terminology that that is the case (e4): bXk\ ... , Ttdvi)
KaXdq Kal dyaGog 8GTIV Kai TaUTa. But, ... , he is very 'beautiful and good'
as to that as well. Thereupon Socrates suggests (e5): t! O0V, ... , O0K
&7te5ucapev ataou ai)to todto Kai 008aaajj.s0a 7ipoTepov too eiSoug;
What then, ... , wouldn't we rather undress ofhim just that and look at it before looking
at his appearance.
221 This is not to be taken as a suggestion to read TO BlSoc; 7tav Kak6g, though 'Ttay' for '7tav'
would be a common enough misspelling, or rather spelling variant. I rather think that given that the
whole appearance is contrasted with that of the face, the prefix need not qualify the adjective to which it
is attached alone. -1 will not here repeat the argument, set out at length in the discussion of Homer and
other early poetic passages, that there is no need and no justification to take sl8og to mean 'body' just
because the appearance of a person undressed is contrasted with the appearance of his face; that they are
looking at Charmides' body, head to toe, is implied by the mention of undressing; one could say it is a
matter of pragmatics, not semantics.
189
Just as in the case of this last example a person's appearance was contrasted with his
soul, so, on one occasion in the Protagoras, Socrates - in providing a model for how he
would like his discussion with Protagoras to proceed - sets a person's appearance against
xd XOU GCOjiaxoq spya, 'functions of the body', which are not necessarily purely
visible or physical (352al): dp' OUV, fjv 8' eyd), xf|8e 71T] Kaxacpavec; dv
f|piv yevoixo; coo7i8p el ziq avGpcortov okotkbv sk xou elSouc; f|
7ipd<; byleiav f\ 7tpog aXXo xi xcdv xou ooopaxoc; epyoov, 'iScov xo
7tpooco7iov Kal xag xs^Pa? dxpaq si7toi- "101 8f) pot d7ioKaX,u\|/ac; Kal
xd oxr|0ri Kal xo pexacppevov btlSei^ov, iva b7tioKsij/cojj.ai
oatpeoxepov", Kal eyed xoiouxov xi 7io0d> 7tpoq xi^v OK8\)/iv- ... . Now,
could things perhaps, said I, somehow become clear in the following way? Just as
somebody examining a man from his appearance with a view either to health or to
another one of the functions of the body, seeing his face and his hand 222 may say:
"Come on, then, undress and show me also your chest and your back, so that I may
examine you more clearly", so 7, too, long for some such thing for <our> examination:
... . This is an important example of Sl8o<^ clearly denoting appearance of a person as a
whole, comprising appearance of the face and the hands as well as appearance of chest
and back.
As with Herodotus, elSoc; can on occasion be applied to the appearance of an animal,
as in Meno's famous comparison of Socrates with the torpedo fish or electric ray whose
Greek name is 'numbness' (Meno 80a4): Kal SoK8l£ (J.OI 7tavxsA.C0C;, 81 8si XI
Kal oKco\|/ai, djxoioxaxoq etvai xo xe e!8oc; Kal x&'k'ka xaoxrj xrj
TtXaxsia vapKT] xf| GaXaxxla- Kal yap aoxr| xov del 7iXr|oidCovxa
Kal dlCXOpevov vapKdv 710181, ... . And you seem to me in everything - if
mocking, too, is in order at times - to be, both in appearance and otherwise, most
222 %8ip can mean arm or hand', the adjective CtKpO^ serves to disambiguate - Socrates wants to stress
that the person is fully clothed.
190
similar to that flat torpedo fish: indeed, that too makes whoever comes close and
touches be numb.
There is one instance of Sl8oc; as applied to the appearance of an object. In that section
of the Gorgias in which Socrates fervently discusses with Callicles what rhetoric really is,
he draws at one point a comparison between what the orator does and what craftsmen
do (503d6)223: cpepe yap, 6 hyaQdq frvfjp Kai fercl to PeXxioxov Xeycov,
a av A-syr] aXXo xi oi)K e'lKfj spsi, tiXX' &7iopX,87tcov npoq xi-224
©OTxep Kat o'l a?^oi navxsq 8rjptoupyoi p^ercovxet; npog xo auxcov
epyov bk(xgto<; oi)k s'lKTj SKXeyopevog 7ipoo(pepei <a 7ipoo(pepei>,
dncoq &v el86q xi abxat oxf) todto 6 spya^exai. olov e'l PouA,ei
\8eiv xoug C®Ypacpoi)<;, xoix; o'lKoSopoog, toCk; vauTiriyoug, xoog
tiXXovg navxag Sripioupyooq, 6vxiva PouX.8i abxcov, cbg s'lg xa^iv
xiva SKaoXOg 8Kaoxov xlGrioiv o av xiGfl, ... . Come, now, the good man
and the one who speaks to the best <end>, will, of course, say whatever he says not at
random, but looking at something: just as all the other craftsmen as well, looking at
their own work, each produces what he produces not selecting <things> at random, but
so that that which he is working at have a certain appearance. For example, ifyou want
to see the painters, the builders, the shipwrights, all the other craftsmen, whomsoever of
them you want, how each one of them puts whatever he deals with into a certain order,
... . The Greek phrase translated literally as 'just as all the other craftsmen' does, as
usual, not imply that the orator as orator is a craftsman. Those craftsmen listed
subsequently do all produce something, some object that can be seen. This object is to
have a certain appearance, StSo^ XI, and that appearance which is to be achieved is to
223 For the Gorgias, the edition of E.R. Dodds, Oxford 1959, whose notes are always worth consulting,
is used throughout. On p. 328, he translates 503elff. as "just as all other craftsmen, with an eye to their
own function, each of them applies the measures he applies, not at random but selecting them in order to
get the thing he is making a particular form", and has an elaborate note on previous discussions,
parallels, and possible implications of the sentence.
224 Here I am inclined to punctuate differently from Dodds.
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be envisaged and aimed at in the process of production. The knowledgeable craftsman
knows what the finished product will look like, he knows its etSoc^.225
There are, likewise, examples of sl5oc; as 'type' or 'way'. In his conversation with
Gorgias about Gorgias' profession, a conversation in which nothing is taken for granted,
Socrates had obtained a preliminary answer (454b5): xauxT|q XOlVt)V TieiGouq
Aeyco (sc. xf^v ^rixopiKfjv elvai xe^vriv), c5 ZcoKpaxeq, xf|<; fev xoiq
8ncaaxr|pioi<; Kai ev xoiq aAXoit; o^A-ok;, cboTiep Kai apxi eAeyov,
Kai Ttspl XOUXCOV a SOXl SiKaid XS Kai a5lKa. I say, now, Socrates, that
[rhetoric is the art] of that persuasion which <has its place> in the law-courts and in
other crowds, such as I have just mentioned, and which is about the things that are just
and unjust. Upon that, Socrates draws a distinction between ji8|O.a0TlK8Vai and
TtSTtlOXSUKSVai, having understood something and having gained trust in
something226, and when Gorgias agrees he continues (454el): &AAG JIT^V Of XS
225 That is all that can be asserted about this passage. I would therefore disagree with Dodds who
declares, loc. cit., after having adduced for comparison Euthyphro 6e4, Cratylus 389a-c, and Republic
596b: "Nothing, however, requires us to read the full-blown theory of Forms into the Euthyphro or the
Gorgias, though the striking similarity of language in all four passages is suggestive of how Plato may
have been led to it." - My point of disagreement, apart from the notion of a 'theory of Forms' itself, is
that either Plato had already thought for himself or discussed with his friends what he will say when
writing the Republic: in that case, the sentence in the Gorgias would be an explicit allusion to what
Dodds terms 'the full-blown theory of Forms'. Or else, Plato had not yet thought the thoughts he was
later to express in writing; in that case, it would indeed be wrong to 'read back the full-blown theory of
Forms' into this passage, but so to speak a fortiori, because in that case it would be wrong to read any
'theory of Forms' into the Gorgias. One cannot allude to something which has not been thought of yet.
Perhaps, however, that is what Dodds means when he says that "the striking similarity of language in all
four passages is suggestive of how Plato may have been led to [the full-blown theory of Forms]". In that
case my criticism would only regard the ill-chosen 'full-blown'. - A different question is what a reader
of the Gorgias, who had already read the Republic, would have thought while reading the passage at
hand; but that is not our present concern.
226 W. Hamilton, Plato. Gorgias, Harmondsworth 1960, reprinted, with revisions 1971, translates
'knowing' and 'believing' which is not wrong altogether, but eliminates the activity and the process
which lead to those states, something crucial to the argument; R. Waterfield, Plato. Gorgias, Oxford
1994, renders the words in his rather free translation of the dialogue as 'I've been taught' and 'I'm
convinced' - that will not do, because one can have been taught that the earth is flat and can,
subsequently, be convinced of it; the distinction Socrates is aiming at is blurred with this translation.
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ye227 |i8^a0r|k6x8(; 7i87ieionevoi e'toiv kal 01 7xstiiot81)k6t8(;. - eon
xauxcL - pou>-si oSv 8uo ei8r| Gcojiev neiOoix;, xo jisv Tiloxiv
rcapexojrevov &veu xot e'lSevai, xo 8' femox^fxriv; - 7iavu ye. But yet,
persuaded <of something> are certainly both those who have understood <something>
and those who have gained trust <in something>. - That is so. - Now, do you want us to
posit two types of persuasion, the one conveying trust without knowledge, the other
<conveying> understanding228 ? - Most certainly.
Later on in the same dialogue, Socrates alludes in irony to that differentiation in dealing
with Gorgias' pupil Polus, whose manners are much less dignified and refined than those
of his master. When Polus - after previously laying down the law on how to lead a
discussion - laughs off one of Socrates' representations, Socrates replies (473el): uXXo
a6 xouxo e!8o<; eXeyxou eaxiv, bieiStiv xlq xi Kaxaye^av,
227 Dodds notes (p. 206): "e 1. IS [ys]. This combination is decidedly rare (Denniston, 161). Here ys
has little point, and the omission of X8 in F suggests that TS and ye were originally alternative variants,
which have been conflated in BTW." - That is not necessarily so. In the sentence 'hXXd pf|V o'l XS
ys pepaOriKdTec; 7tS7tStop8VOt e'talv Kal O'l 7t87UOXei>K6xe<;', Socrates introduces a new
thought which contains in some sense a qualification to what has just been agreed upon; this is
expressed most of all by though or yet, which follows the generally contrasting ilkXd, but or
however, since, however, Socrates wants to obtain Gorgias' consent to that further statement as well, he
gives it the form of a generally accepted assertion; that is achieved by the particle ye, certainly. In a
hypothetical phrase OiXXd |if|V ye Ol X8 p8pa0T|K6xe^, there would be an accumulation of three
particles in sentence initial position -1 refrain from passing any judgement on whether that would have
sounded odd in fifth and fourth century Greek ears; it is, however, perfectly common for an enclitic y8
placed after a noun or adjective (here after the article depending on the substantival participle) not only
to qualify that word it leans against, but the whole phrase, clause or sentence; and X8 as connective must
have precedence as a matter of course; a connective correlative to the Kal later on in the sentence,
however, is to be expected. I should therefore accept the text of BTW.
228 It is difficult and awkward to find an appropriate translation for 87tlOXf|pT|, since knowledge,
learning, science, craft, profession, understanding would all do in certain contexts but not in others, all
capture aspects the Greek word had at some time in some dialect (cf. B. Snell, Die Ausdriicke fur den
Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophic, Berlin 1924, and J. Lyons, Structural
Semantics. An Analysis ofPart of the Vocabulary ofPlato, Oxford 1969); since I have just used 'having
understood' as a translation of JiSpaOljKSVai, I here use 'knowledge' for 87tiaxf|pr| because it is
more important to have distinct translations for these two words, and less important in terms of
Socrates' argument to differentiate between fe7llOXf|JXT| and s'tSsvat in the preceding clause (and the
substantivated infinitive 8l86vai is to my mind best rendered with 'knowledge'). - Fortunately, nothing
depends on any of that for the present purpose.
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sleyysiV 8s |JT|; Is that another type of proof29 again, when somebody says
something, to laugh it off, but not to disprove it?
This seems indeed to be an allusion and not just a chance repetition of sl8oc; in a
vaguely similar context; for although there is nothing surprising about the use of stSoc;
as meaning 'type' with either Plato or, if one is inclined to believe that Plato's Socrates is
using Gorgianic diction, Gorgias himself towards the end of the fifth century B.C., to
speak of 8bO St8Tj 7l£l0ot)£ or of an slSoc; S?\.SY5COU has something technical about
it.
Less confirmation than could be expected is found in the diction of that great follower
of Gorgias, Isocrates230. In his speech Against the Sophists, written about 490 B.C. and
at least implicitly alluded to elsewhere in the Gorgias,231 Isocrates explains in detail how
to compose speeches; learning the various elements by heart is not difficult (16), but
choosing from them and arranging them appropriately requires a good teacher and good
natural abilities (17), ... Kal Ssiv xdv p.sv ^aGrjxfjv Ttpog xtp xfjv cpuoiv
s)(siv oiav xpf\ xa psv ei8r| xa xcov A,oycov jiaGsiv, ... . and it is
necessary that the learner in addition to having the required nature learns the types of
229
SASyyo^ and 8X,syxeiV are voces mediae, meaning respectively proof or refutation and proving
or disproving, proving right or proving wrong, according to context and circumstances; here, it seemed
appropriate to translate the noun with 'proof in the first place, since that is what Polus was talking
about (and the word 'proof itself can in certain contexts in English be a vox media)-, the verb, however,
must be rendered 'disproving' or 'proving wrong'.
230 And in this context it does not necessarily matter if any one particular piece of Isocrates was
composed before, after, or simultaneously with any one of the dialogues of Plato. Cf., however, C.
Eucken, Isokrates. Seine Position in der Auseinandersetzung mit den zeitgenossischen Philosophen,
Berlin 1983; in a systematic investigation based on content and language, Eucken (cf. in particular the
summary p. 284f.) is led, if I understand him correctly, to posit more or less the following chronology of
selected works of Isocrates and Plato: Against the Sophists (390), Gorgias, Euthydemus, Meno, Phaedo
(?), Helena (385), Symposium, Panegyricus (380), Busiris, Republic (374), To Nicocles - Nicocles -
Euagoras (371-368/7), Phaedrus (ca. 370), Isocrates' Letter to Dionysius (369/7), Theaetetus (367/6),
Politicus, Timaeus, Areopagiticus (354), Antidosis (354/3), Philippus (346). Without endorsing
individual arguments for this particular sequence, I accept this chronology in so far as works published
after the Republic - and to a certain extent that includes Isocrates' Busiris which Eucken interprets as
written as a reaction to Platonic material related to the Republic circulated before its completion - cannot
be used as evidence for our purpose of investigating Greek usage potentially influencing Plato while
composing his early and middle dialogues. That excludes from consideration Euagoras 9, Antidosis 74
and 280; nevertheless, those instances could confirm semi-technical use of et80Q by the rhetorician.
231 Cf. Eucken, op. cit., pp. 36 - 43.
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speeches. This, however, refers to different types of speeches delivered for different
purposes and on different occasions.
A context similar to that is found in the Protagoras at that point where Socrates feels
he has to cut short his discussion with Protagoras because they cannot agree as to how
one should proceed with question and answer; in particular, Socrates proclaims that he
cannot cope with the long speeches, and he requests that since Protagoras claims to be
able to lead any kind of conversation, he should comply. Callias, Alcibiades and Critias
intervene, then Prodicus and Hippias, the other two famous sophists present, each give a
brief address to convince Socrates and Protagoras to continue. Hippias argues for a
compromise (337e2): fey© p8v ouv kgll Seopai Kat Ol)ppOuX,8ucd, c5
Ilpcoxayopa xe Kai HcoKpaxec;, oupPf|vai upaq ©OTisp imd Siaixr|xd>v
f|pcov oupPiPa^ovxcov e'lq xo peaov, Kai pf|xe 08 xo &KpiPsg xouxo
etSoc; xcdv SiaA-oyoov ^pxeiv xo Kaxa Ppa^u Mav, s'l pr\ f]8u
Ilpcoxayopa, hXX' fecpeivai Kai %a?udaai T&q f|via<; xoig loyoiq, \va
p8yax,OTtp87i8ox8poi Kai ebaxripoveaxepoi rjpiv cpaivcovxai, pfjx' au
npcoxayopav rcavxa Ka^cov bcxelvavxa, obpla fecpevxa, cpeuysiv s'tq
xo ntXayoc, xcov X.oycov d7XOKpo\)/avxa yf|v, hWa pteov xi
dpcpoxspouc; xspslv. Now, I for one ask and advise, Protagoras and Socrates, that
you come together in front of us who gather as arbiters, and that neither you seek that
extreme type of conversation with very short <questions and answers>, if that is not
pleasant to Protagoras, but to let loose and relax the reins for your words, so that they
seem to us grander and in better shape, nor again, I call upon Protagoras, may he,
stretching out everything, letting loose with a fair wind, flee to the sea of words, hiding
away the land, but that both somehow cut <through the sea ofwords>232 in the middle.
232 Cf. LSJ, s.v. TSpveiV VI 2 b, VI 3 a; Hippias is still in his extended metaphor of sea-faring
vocabulary; therefore this occurrence of the word should be listed under VI 3 a, unless one is of the
opinion that the phrase pfeoov TSpetV, of whatever origin, had become a standing phrase for 'striking
a deal, making a compromise, meeting in the middle', before Plato employed it in this passage; in that
case, Plato would in accustomed fashion reactivate a metaphor, i.e. make it apparent as metaphor, by
setting it into an extended quasi-allegorical context (for this standard practice of Plato's cf. C.J. Classen,
Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens, Munchen 1959, and
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to &KptPs(^ touto sT8oq tcdv 8iaA,6yC0V, that extreme type of conversation, is
set against a stretched out way of speaking, for SKXeivstV, the hinge on which Hippias'
metaphor hangs, can be used for drawing out one's speech. Since both Xoyoc, and
SttiA-Oyoc; are nouns closely connected to the verbs Xsyeiv and Sta^sysoGat which
express the actions of 'speaking' and 'conversing', those sl8r| tgov StaXoycov are
'types of conversation' and 'ways of conversing'; but whereas in translation the one pays
more attention to the nominal, static quality of a 8l&A,oyog as an event, the other more
to its verbal, dynamic quality as a process, there is no such differentiation in the Greek.
The next occurrence of sl80(^ to be considered may just be another instance of cl8o^
meaning 'type', but there are difficulties which oppose that neat solution. The Laches is a
report of a discussion about education between the two Athenian generals Nicias and
Laches; the two have been consulted by Lysimachus, son of Aristides, and Melesias, son
of Thucydides, who are uncertain as to how to educate their own two sons; when
Socrates is drawn into that conversation by Laches, he shifts the focus from particular
pieces and devices of education to why education takes place in the first place, and what
it is concerned with. They agree that education is concerned with the soul, with
excellence in the soul; and since the conversation arose from watching a display in arms,
Socrates suggests to look at &,vSpsia, courage, first. When Laches replies that 'courage
is fighting in battle without leaving one's rank', Socrates agrees but asks if there is not
courage in flight as well, as in the fighting techniques of the Scythians, or as Homer
reports of Aeneas in the Iliad. To that, Laches replies (19lb4): KOti KaX.CO£ ye, c5
HcoKpaxeq- 7iepi ftppaxcov yap eleye. Kat au xo xcov ZkuGcov 'uutecov
kepi A,8yst<;- to psv yap 'itctiikov [to £ksivcov] outcd paxsxai, to 8e
671X-itikov [to ye tcov 'EXX,f)vcov], cbq &yco X.8YC0. And rightly so, Socrates:
indeed, he spoke about chariots. And what you mention of the Scythians is about horse-
also id., Untersuchungen zu Platons Jagdbildern, Berlin 1960); the phrase as found in this passage,
however, is |i&OOV Tl TSpvstV, and the indefinite pronoun seems to me to suggest that Plato lets
Hippias indicate that he is coining a metaphor, rather than employing an already existing one.
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men. Indeed, cavalry fights so, but infantry as I said. After a brief modification of that
statement by Laches, Socrates resumes (191c7): XOUXO xoivuv O apxi eA,syov,
oil feycb alxiog prj KaXcbc, ce &7roKpivaa0ai, oxi ou KaA,a><; fpoptjv -
PovAopevoc; yap aou 7iD0eo0ai pfj povov xoug fev xtp drcX/txiKcp
dvSpeioix;, dXXd Kai xouq fev xcp i7t7tiKcp Kai sv auprcavxi xcp
7ioX,ejj.iKcp eiSsi, Kai prj povov xouq ev xcp TioXepcp, dXXd Kai xoug
fev xoiq Tipoc; xrjv 0aXaxxav KivSuvoiq dvSpeiouc; ovxag, Kai ooot ys
7ipo<; voooix; Kai oooi 7ipoc; 7ievia<; f| Kai Ttpog xa 7to^ixiKa
dvSpeioi eiaiv, Kai exi aS pfj povov oaoi 7ipdc; A,i37ta<; dvSpeioi
eiaiv f| cpoPoix;, dXXa Kai Tipog ferci0i)piac; f\ f|8ova<; Ssivoi pa^soOai
Kai pevovxeg Kai dvaaxpecpovxeg - e'lol yap Ttou xivst;, c5 Aaxn?>
Kai SV xoiq XOIOUXOI^ dvSpsioi. Now, that is what I said just now, that it is my
fault that you do not answer well, because I did not ask well - indeed, I meant to learn
from you not only those courageous in infantry fighting, but also those in cavalry
fighting and in the whole type offighting in war, and not only those courageous in war,
but also those courageous over against the dangers at sea, and those who are
courageous over against diseases, and poverty, and politics, and moreover again not
only those who are courageous over against griefs and fears, but also over against
desires and pleasures, strong infighting them both keeping in rank and turning around
against them - indeed, there are somehow those, Laches, courageous in such things,
too.
One could interpret this explanation by Socrates as containing a classificatory
scheme233 not too dissimilar in nature from those in the Sophist and the Politicus. This is
suggested in particular by the repeated use of nominalized neuter adjectives in -tKOV.
Now, in both those late dialogues, the nouns SiSoc; and yevoq are used with reference
233 See the diagram APPENDIX 2 below.
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to items at various levels of such classificatory schemes.234 Therefore encountering
el8oc; in the phrase fev cnjJtTtaVTl TCp 7ToA,8JJlKCp 8l8si does not surprise; to
7ioA.SfJ.lKdv el5oc; or to sl8oc; too 71oA.sjj.IKOO is one type of pursuit or
situation, here opposed to being faced with danger at sea, illness, poverty, politics; in all
those different types of situation men can be courageous or otherwise, courage in battle
is only one type of courage, and - as we learn subsequently - only one type of courage
over against hardships, as opposed to courage over against pleasures. Following that line
of thought and going back to the beginning of the passage, one realizes that showing
courage 8V TCp OTtA-lTlKCp, 'in infantry-fighting', 8V TCp ITlTtlKCp, 'in cavalry-
fighting', 8V TCp TTSpl dtpfJCtTCDV,'in chariot-fighting', are three different types, three
different 8l5T| of courage in three different types or 8l5lj of fighting in war.
If that were so, there would be some slight oddities in the structure of Socrates' picture
of where we find courageous men. The nominalized neuter adjectives are in themselves
not uncommon in late fifth early fourth century philosophical discourse.235 So there is
nothing unusual about Laches', not Socrates', introducing TO 171711KOV and TO
67XA.ITIKOV, nor in Socrates' picking up those terms. But Socrates does not speak
about courage * feV TCp 67tA,lTlKCp Kdl SV TCp 'l7l7UKCp KGtt 8V <xA,A,Cp Tivt
7loA.SjJ.lKCp SlSsi236 , in infantry-fighting and cavalry-fighting and any other type of
fighting in war, he calls TO 7toAsjllK6v an stSoc^ before naming anything else which
is another et5o<; of what TO 7ioA.8fJlKOV is an sISoc; of; he does not at all state
explicitly what fighting in war is supposed to be a type or way of; nor is the term stSo^
234 For a recent, brief discussion of this usage, adducing a number of relevant passages and some
pertinent secondary literature, see: C.J. Rowe, Plato. Politicus, Warminster , pp. 4-8: "Forms, classes,
and division."
235 For a collection, cf. A.N. Ammann, -IKOZ bei Platon. Ableitung und Bedeutung mit
Materialsammlung, Freiburg (Schweiz) 1953; for method and concept of Stu'tpsot^, or division, and a
collection of passages in early Platonic dialogues comparable to that at Laches 191, cf. C.J. Classen,
Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft Platonischen und Sokratischen Philosophierens, Miinchen 1959, pp.
78-84; cf. also in general H. Koller, Die diharetische Methode, Glotta 39, 1960, pp. 6-24.
236 Or... etSei too 7ioAe|iiKob; s.a.
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used again subsequently. Given all that, it is not really possible to translate 8V
Ol3p.7ia.VTl TCp JtoXspiKCp SlSsi as in the whole type (or: way) offighting in war.
It is not only difficult to translate el8o^, it is difficult to see why slSoc^ is introduced
here at all. In the most obvious parallel to our passage in an early dialogue, Gorgias
465f., an extended classification237 , abundant with words terminating in -IKO^.238 Yet
the only word which could be regarded as even a semi-technical term in that discussion is
popiOV, part (463a3 et passim)-, no mention is made of etSo^ or y8VO£. That is to
say, arrangements of pursuits and activities in the way of our passages in the Gorgias
and the Laches do not require the terminology of yevo<^ and sISoc;.
If that is accepted - and since on the basis of what can be known about sl8o(^ at the
time of composition of the Laches no satisfactory translation can be provided, no sense
be made of the phrase fev OUpTiaVTl TCp 7ioX,spiK(p eiSei - I do not see an
alternative to athetizing SlSei; a radical cure, but one which leaves a text consistent in
itself in terms of sense and diction. My suggestion is that a reader of the dialogue,
possibly at an early stage, detected the scheme, connected it with what hemew from the
Sophist and Politicus, or from reading Aristotle, or from an oral tradition which had its
origin in the Academy or the Lyceum, made a note that here we have a process of
division; in that note the word etSo^ was used; subsequently, it was incorporated in the
text in an apparently plausible way.239
237 Here as above, the term 'classification' is used with a pinch of salt; it is an anachronism and only to
be regarded as a convenient shorthand, as will be discussed in more detail in Section XIV below.
238 For Gorgias 462e5 - 466a3, see Dodds, op. cit., pp. 224 - 233, especially table and explanation p.
226f.
239 The text of the Laches as a whole, but of that and the preceding pages in particular, is not in a good
state. On the one hand, there are numerous places in which any two of B, T and W go against the
remaining one, leaving aside testimonial evidence; and no one manuscript seems to be significantly
more trustworthy than the others. On the other hand, there is a fair degree of consensus among editors to
athetize two phrases in Laches' statement 191b4 - 7; and with the repetition of dvSpeiOl e'lOlV at d6
and d6/7, there arises the question if some or all of the clause Kal oooi ye 7tpoq v6oot)£ KCtl
oooi 7tpoq rcevlaq f) Kal rcpoq xa tco/UxikcI avSpetoi e'loiv should go as well, especially
as it creates an odd imbalance of five types of courage over against griefs and fear-inspiring things; my
guess is that Kal oooi 7tpoq KEX'iaq f| Kal 7tp6q xa 7to/axiKa dvSpetol e'totv at least is a
later addition; but that need not detain us here. What is more relevant is that at 187e7, in a statement of
Nicias about Socrates, there is a form Y&VSI which defies explanation and has by common consent been
excluded from the text; was it in origin an annotation by the same early reader? - Finally, and just as an
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There is one other instance of eT8o<^ in the early dialogues which seems to diverge
from usage of the word discussed so far. Towards the end of the Lysis, and after
apparently going round in a number of intersecting circles, Socrates proposes to Lysis
and Menexenos the following conclusion to their investigation of (pl^la, friendship, and
in particular on who loves whom and who is loved by whom when two men are cpiA,Ol,
dear friends (221e7): KCtl e'l &pa TIC, STCpoq BXepOD fe7ll0l)fJ.8l, f|V 8' Syc6,
c5 naibsq, f\ epa, oi)K 6v Ttoxe 87ie0upei ot>8s rjpa ot>8e ecpi^ei, e'l pr^
o'nceiot; tctj xcp fepoopevco sxuyxavev cov f| Kaxa tt^v \|/ux^v f| Kaxa
xi xf|<; v|/uxfy; fj0oc; f) xpoTtouq f| etSoc;.
This has been rendered as: "'And boys,' I said, 'if one man desires another or adores
him, he 'd never desire or adore or love him, if he weren 't in some way in fact akin to
the man adored, either in his soul, or in some disposition of his soul, or in his conduct,
or in his looks.' "240 Translating the sentence in this way, taking the genitive xfj£
alternative thought to which I do not want to commit myself, there is a possibility that somebody who
had read the Republic read 'people courageous in infantry and cavalry', was reminded of the (pu^aKSg
or 'guardians' of the Republic and for some reason associated this stratum of society with post-
republican terminology of TO 7toA.spiK6v ClSo^, 'the warrior-class'; but I should stress that that
would strike me as post-Aristotelian.
240 D. Watt, Plato. Lysis, in: T.J. Saunders (ed.), Plato. Early Socratic Dialogues, Harmondsworth
1987. Cf. B. Jowett, The Dialogues o/Plato II, ed. R.M. Hare, D.A. Russell, London 1970: "And I say,
my boys, that no one who loves or desires another would ever have loved or desired or longedfor him if
he had not been in some way congenial to him, either in his soul, or in his character, or in his manners,
or in his form.". Cf. also M. Bordt, Platon. Lysis, Gottingen 1998, p.33: "Und wenn also irgendjemand
einen anderen begehrt, Kinder", fuhr ich fort, "oder in ihn verliebt ist, wiirde er ihn doch weder
begehren noch verliebt in ihn sein oder ihm freund sein, wenn er nicht eigentlich seinem Geliebten
irgendwie angehdrig ware, sei es in bezug aufseine Seele oder in bezug aufeinen bestimmten Charakter
seiner Seele, oder sein Verhalten oder sein Aussehen."; Bordt comments on 222a2f. (p. 227f.): "Die
Ubersetzung von TpdTTOl)^ mit 'Verhalten' (statt, wie es eigentlich iiblicher ware, mit 'Charakter')
[note 561: Vgl. z.B. Rep. 329d3.] legt sich an dieser Stelle deswegen nahe, weil Platon bei seiner
Aufzahlung von Dingen, in bezug auf die zwei Freunde angehorig sein konnen, zunachst bei dem
ansetzt, was einen Menschen innerlich bestimmt, und damit endet, wie ein Mensch auBerlich aussieht.
[note 562: Platon gebraucht eidos in 222a3 nicht als ein (sic!) terminus technicus fur die Idee, sondern
im Sinn der sichtbaren auBeren Gestalt, die ein Mensch hat.] Insofern wird man unter f|0OC hier am
besten den Character eines Menschen verstehen und unter TpbftOg die Art und Weise, wie sich dieser
Character nach auBen hin zeigt." - As can be seen, Bordt resembles Jowett closely both in taking the
genitive TT|<g Vj/uxf|<^ as depending on f|0O^ alone, and in translating TT|<g V[/Dyf|C; f|0oc f|
ipbTtOtx; f| Sl5o^ as "Charakter seiner Seele, oder sein Verhalten oder sein Aussehen", mirroring
Jowett's "in his character, or in his manners, or in his form".
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\|/l)Xf|<; in the phrase xf|<; ^6°? H TpOTlOUc; fj clSoq as depending on
and thereby qualifying only fj0O£ and not xpOTiOl)^ and sl8o^ as well, could make
sense if one thinks of Diotima's speech, reported by Socrates in the Symposium. There,
at 209b, c, it is indeed the case that the one who loves and desires, and therefore wants
to beget in what is beautiful, first looks at beautiful bodies, CCDjldXa, and then at
beautiful souls; this is repeated and extended in what follows; so one may be led to see
the same thought in reverse order in our passage in the Lysis, a dialogue paving the way
for the Symposium in more than one respect.241
There is, however, an alternative way of understanding Plato; Socrates says: And so, if
anybody desired anybody else, said I, children, or were enamoured, he would not ever
desire or be enamoured or love, if he did not somehow happen to be familiar242 to and
with the beloved, either as to soul or any habit of the soul or wonts or ways.243 This way
241 Cf. Symposium 207e2: Kal pf| 5x1 Kaxd to OCOpa, bX'ka KCll Kaxa ti^V V|/t>X^V o't
Tpdrcoi, xa fjOr|, Socat, 87U0t)piai, f|5ovai, Lvnai, tp6|3oi, xouxcov SKaaxa obSenoze
zd abxa TtdpSGTIV EKdoxrp, ... . - I do not know of anybody who does, but one could further
adduce a passage like Airs, Waters, and Places XXIV 38, discussed in Section VII of the chapter on
s!5oq above: Kal 'iStoyvtopovaq. okou yap at pexaPokai e'tat 7U)Kv6xaxat xcov
cbpfecov Kal nksioxov Stdcpopot abxal fecooxfiotv, feKei Kal xa slSea Kal xa rjGea
Kal xaq cpuotai; ebpf|aei<; 7tX.etaxov Stacpepoboaq. - peyioxat psv ouv e'laiv abxai
xf|<; cpbatot; at Stakkayal, 87ceixa Se Kal f| x^Pif fl <*v Tl? xpecprixat Kal xd
138axa. ebpfiostq yap fend xo TCXiiGoq xf)g Tfl ^P^ost dKokouGfeovxa Kal xd
SlSsa XG)V &V0pc6TCO)V Kal xobq Xp07t0t)^. Indeed, where the changes of the seasons are most
frequent, and <the seasons> most different from one another, there you will also find the appearances
and the characters and the natures as differing most widely. - These, now, are the greatest differences in
nature, then also the land in which someone is reared, and the waters. You will find, indeed, thatfor the
most part the appearances and the ways of the people follow the nature of the land. I would argue that
co-occurrence of xd StSea and xd fjOsu here, where the one clearly refers to external, physical,
outward appearance and the other to character, something internal, may have prompted Plato, or indeed
a philosophically inclined person preceding him, to talk of the 8lST| and fjOt] of the soul. - Note, by the
way, how my translation of XpOTtO^ in this passage differs from the one proposed for the passage in the
Lysis. It cannot be denied that there is an overlap of concept or an overlap of connotations between the
several words.
242 It is not here the place to justify 'familiar' as appropriate rendering of OIKSIOV, 'that which belongs
to the house, household and family'.
243 Cf. W.R.M. Lamb, Plato. Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias, Cambridge, Mass. 1925: "And in a case where
a person desires another, my boys, or loves him, he would never be desiring or loving or befriending
him, unless he somehow belonged to his beloved either in soul, or in some disposition, demeanor, or
cast ofsoul."', cf. also D. Bolotin, Plato's Dialogue on Friendship. An Interpretation of the Lysis with a
New Translation, New York 1979, p.50: ""And therefore," I said, "if someone desires another, boys, or
loves him passionately, he would never desire, nor love passionately, nor love [as a friend] unless he
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of construing the syntax is supported, to name only one instance in Plato's dialogues, by
connection of both fjGoc; and xporcoi with the soul at Symposium 207el. Diotima has
asked Socrates for the reason why man and all the animals would risk even their lives for
spco^, love and desire. She explains that behind that is a wish to be immortal; and that
this immortality can only be achieved through procreation, through leaving something
young in the place of what is old and passes away. Throughout life, a man is called the
same from early childhood to old age; and Diotima continues (207d6): ODTO^ j-tSVTOl
oI)5stcoxs xd abxa sxcov sv auxcp opcoc; 6 abxoq KaA,sixai, bX'ka vsoq
dsl yiyvopsvoc;, xd 5s hnoXXvq, Kat Kaxa xdq xplxaq Kai oapxa Kai
6axa Kai atpa Kat aufircav xd ocopa. Kai pr\ oxt Kaxa xo odopa,
dXX,a Kat Kaxa xr\v v)/Dxr\v o'l xpojtoi, xd f|0r|, So^ai, S7ii0i)plai,
f|5ovai, Xhnai, cpoPoi, xouxcov SKaaxa obSsrcoxs xd abxa 7tapeoxiv
SKdoxd), dAAa xd psv yiyvsxai, xd 5s &7l6X,A,UXai. That man who certainly
does not ever have the same <things> within himself is yet called the same, always,
however, becoming young, losing other <things>, as regards his hair and flesh and
bones and blood and the whole body; and not only as regards the body, but also as
regards the soul: its wonts, its habits, opinions and beliefs, desires, pleasures, pains,
happened to be akin in some way to his passionately beloved - either in his soul, or some of its ways, or
some aspect83 of it." " -1 agree with Bolotin on how to take the syntax of the final phrase, I disagree in
respect of semantics, not least the semantics of slSot;. Bolotin's note 83, p. 61, reads: "The word here
translated by "aspect" is eidos. See note 12. The three "parts" of the soul, as delineated in Book Four of
Plato's Republic, are also called eide of the soul. See, for example, Republic 440e8 - 441a3." Note 12, p.
54, on the occurrence of sl8o<^ at 204e, where Bolotin translates "the boy's looks", reads: 'To eidos,
which means primarily the "look" or "looks" of a thing, is the same word commonly translated by "idea"
or "form" in Plato's so-called "Theory of Ideas." For the kinship between the ordinary and the
philosophic uses of the word, see Jacob Klein, A Commentary on Plato's "Meno" (Chapel Hill, 1965),
pp. 49 - 51." - Bolotin is right in referring to the use of stSoc; in connection with the soul in the
Republic; I do see a connection between the usage of the two dialogues, albeit on lines slightly different
from his. St8oc, however, although it has retained its strong visual connotations in some contexts, does
not mean aspect. It is tempting to translate the word as that both at Lysis 222 and at Meno 72c7; but it is
only a necessary, not a sufficient condition that a certain translation, a certain assumed meaning, makes
sense in a context; it is necessary in addition to show how a word could have come to mean this or that;
and while it is correct that 'aspect' would make sense at the two places in question, the sense of 'aspect'
required in those contexts is not one which etSoc; seems to have acquired in fifth and fourth century
Greek, near enough though it may seem to be to 'look' and 'appearance'.
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fears - of all these each one never is by each one of us as the same, but the one comes
about, the other passes away. There are TpOTIOl and fj0r| of the soul; likewise at Lysis
222a, where the one who loves is said to be familiar to and with the one who is loved f|
KCtxd tt^v \)/U5c^v f| Korea ti if|<; v|/uxri<; fjOog f| xponoug f| elSog,
'either regarding the soul, or some habit of the soul, or some wonts of the soul, or some
way of the soul'.
What is 'a way of the soul'? - There are several ways in which a man can behave, act,
react to the world and to different situations he may be faced with. In different situations,
different parts of the soul are active and at work; but the concept of a part of a soul, a
soul with parts, is a complex one, and one which is, for example, not present in the
Phaedo; it does not seem to be present in the other early dialogues either. But the soul is
active in one way in one situation, in another in another. Different qualities of the soul
are required to cope with different things, and each one of those qualities is one sISoc^ of
the soul, one way; I believe that the notion underlying is that of an active soul, a soul that
is dynamic, not static.244 Whether or not this is so cannot be proved on the basis of the
Lysis; use of bI5oc^ on the lines sketched above, however, is frequent in the Republic.245
XIV.
At this point, it may be appropriate to reflect very briefly on the picture which has
arisen so far, on the one hand accentuating and summarizing previous usages of sISoc; in
early Greek literature, including Plato's early dialogues, on the other hand justifying
some of the choices hitherto proposed as suitable translations of the word in its several
contexts.
244 In that lies my objection to Bolotin's translation 'aspect' which is otherwise close to the sense of the
word.
245 Use of sT8oq in the Republic cannot be discussed in this context.
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For that, I will once more return to the etymological root which sl5o(^ shares on the
one hand with 'iSsiV, seeing, and l5sa, another word which must originally have meant
something like 'appearance' and which will be discussed in due course, and on the other
with s'lbevai, ol5a, knowing, I know. The Indo-European root behind all these
formations is *ueid-. Derivations from this root are preserved in many of the Indo-
European dialects, and though all matters concerning etymology contain an element of
speculation and have to be treated with caution, comparison of the Greek with semantic
developments of words of other languages derived from the same root in this case can
contribute to a better understanding of inner-Greek developments. To present the
material, together with some of the commonly accepted interpretations, here are some
extracts from pertinent dictionaries and lexica:
H. Frisk, Griechisches etymologisch.es Worterbuch, Heidelberg 21973:
"Sl8o£ n. 'species, Aussehen, Gestalt, Beschaffenheit, Gattung (auch
Liedgattung), Zustand' (seit II.) Als Verbalnomen zum Wort fur 'sehen',
\5eiV (s.d.), mit aind. vedas- n. 'Besitz, Erwerb' formal identisch; der bei sl5ov
'ich erblickte' = aind. avidam 'ich fand, ich erwarb' vorliegende
Bedeutungsunterschied kommt auch bei den zugehorigen Nomina zum Ausdruck.
Semantisch besser zu etSoc; stimmen aksl. vid (serb. vid) 'st5o£, 08COpia' aus
ueido(s)-), lit. veidas 'Angesicht' (wohl urspr. Langdiphthong) und das von
einem s-Stamm ausgehende ahd. wisa 'Art, Weise' "
C.T. Onions, G.W.S. Friedrichsen, R.W. Burchfield, The Oxford Dictionary of English
Etymology, Oxford 1966:
" wise1 waiz (arch.) manner, fashion. OE. wise (rarely wis) mode, condition,
thing, cause, occas. song, corr. to OFris. wis, OS. wisa (Du. wijze), OHG. wisa,
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wis manner, custom, tune (G. weise), ON. visa stanza, * vis in oSruvis otherwise
: - CGerm. (exc. Goth.) wison, wiso, f. *wit wit2; for the sense-development cf.
rel. Gr. eidos form, shape, kind, state of things, course of action. See -wise."
" -wise waiz terminal el. (suffix) descending from OE. wise wise1 as used (like
cogn. forms in other Germ, langs.) in various adverb, expressions meaning 'in
such-and-such a manner, way, or respect' and containing an adj. or an attrib. sb.
with or without a governing prep., e.g. OE. (on) opre wisan in another fashion,
otherwise, on scipwisan after the manner of a ship, like a ship. Several of these
have become permanent, as anywise, likewise, nowise. Sense-contact with -
ways, denoting direction, appears in late ME., and lengthways, longways,
sideways are contemp. in xvi with lengthwise, longwise, sidewise."
s.v. other: "... other-WlSE (OE. on opre wisan\ cf. ON. oSruvis)."
" guise gaiz style, fashion, xni. - (O)F. guise = Pr. guiza, Sp., It. guisa: - Rom.
*wisa - Germ. *wison wise1. Cf. disguise."
F. Kluge, F. Lutz, English Etymology, London 1899:
"guise ME. gise fr. OFR. guise 'way, wise', which is of Teut. origin; cp. wise."
P. Robert, Le petit Robert, ed. A. Rey, J. Rey-Debove, nouvelle edition, Paris 1991:
" GUISE [giz]. n. f. (v. 1050; germ, "wisa "maniere"). ♦ 1° Vx (dans en cette
guise, de telle guise). V. Facon, maniere, sorte. ♦ 2° Mod. a sa guise, selon
son gout, sa volonte."
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F, Kluge, A. Gotze, Etymologisches Worterbuch der deutschen Sprache, ed. W.
Mitzka, Berlin 171957:
"Weise/. Mhd. wis(e), ahd. wis(a), asachs. wisa, mnd. wis(e), mnl. ags. wise, nnl.
wijse, afries. wis, engl. wise 'Art', anord. visa 'Strophe, Vers', vis in oSru vis
'anders', norw. dan. schwed. vis fiihren auf germ. *wisa- n., *wiso(n)f. aus *uid-
to zu der unter wissen entfalteten idg. Wurzel *ueid- 'sehen'. Grundbedeutung
ist somit 'Aussehen, Erscheinung', woraus sich 'Beschaffenheit' usw. entwickelt
hat. Aus den westgerm. Nachbarsprachen entlehnt sind. frz. guise, prov. guiza,
ital. guisa. Vgl. Idee. - Als Adv.-Suffix in stuck-, teilweise hat sich -weise erst
im Nhd. ausgebildet; Wendungen wie mhd. in regenes wis 'wie Regen' gehen
voraus."
F. Kluge, A. Gotze, Etymologisches Worterbuch der deutschen Sprache, ed. E. Seebold,
Berlin 231995:
"Weise/. (< 8. Jh.) Mhd. wis(e), ahd. wisa, as. wisa aus g. *weis-/on f. 'Weise',
auch in anord. vis, ae. wis(e), afr. wis. Bezeugt ist das Wort zunachst einmal in
adverbialen Wendungen ('auf andere Weise' u. dgl.) in alien auBergotischen
Sprachen, althochdeutsch auch unflektiert, altnordisch in erstarrten Formen, dann
in allgemeiner Bedeutung 'Art und Weise' (1. modus m.); speziell 'Melodie'
(althochdeutsch und altnordisch, weniger deutlich auch sonst) und 'Sitte,
Gewohnheit, Ritus', 'Handlungsweise'. Zugrunde liegt offenbar ein dem gr. eidos
n. 'Erscheinung, Aussehen, Gattung' entsprechender s-Stamm zu (ig.) *weid-
'erscheinen, sehen, wissen' (s. wissen)-, dieser scheint in den endungslosen
Formen als Konsonantstamm bewahrt zu sein; im flektierten Simplex liegt eine
Erweiterung vor."
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"-weise Sujfixoid (zur Bildung von Adverbien). Gehort heute zu Weise,
doch ist die Entstehungsgeschichte der friihbezeugten Formen noch nicht
ausreichend untersucht."
From the material set out above, it can be seen at once that English, as a Germanic
language, has two words sharing the same root and part of the semantic developments of
stbo^, the s-stem derivatives246 'wise' and 'guise', going back to a proto-Germanic
*wisa. English 'wise' has not survived as part of common usage as a noun in its own
right; it is found, however, as the second part of compounds such as 'otherwise' or
'clockwise'; for although Seebold s.v. '-weise' suggests in a rare etymological joke247
that the etymology is not clear, the accumulated Old Norse, English and German
evidence, combined with the analogous development in Greek, point strongly in the
direction of an original connection with the noun.
The reason, or at least one strong reason, why 'wise' is no longer in active use is that in
certain contexts, notably again in compounds terminating in '-wise', there was a semantic
overlap with the similar-sounding 'ways' and '-ways'. Thus, a colloquial 'there is no way
of doing this or that' has supposedly replaced an earlier 'there is no wise of doing this or
that', or rather 'this cannot be done in any wise', with which it may have co-existed for
some time. There is no way of telling if a sentence like 'if it does not work that way, try
it in some other wise' is just wrong or merely very archaic. And even if we are told that
'several of these have become permanent, as anywise, likewise, nowise', I cannot recall
having heard 'anywise' or 'nowise' lately, and 'lengthwise and widthwise' are certainly
rare; 'otherwise', 'likewise' and 'clockwise' are probably the only ones to survive with
fair frequency.
246 No universal consensus has been reached as to the respective original noun-stems of 8t§0^ and
Germ. *wisa, but that need not detain us here.
247 Seebold, in the 23rd edition of Kluge's dictionary, has an entry '-oid', deriving that modern German
suffix from Greek -O-SlSqc.
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Thus to the statement that 'sense-contact with -WAYS, denoting direction, appears in
late ME., and lengthways, longways, sideways are contemp. in XVI with lengthwise,
longwise, sidewise', one could have added: 'and that, together with the fact that the
plural of the noun 'way' is similar in sound to the singular of the noun 'wise', is why
'way' and '(-)ways' have virtually replaced '(-)wise' in contemporary language.'
This, then is in part a justification for choosing 'way, ways' as an appropriate
translation of el8o^ in Thucydides. It has to be borne in mind that only a few centuries
back 'wise' could have served in its place. That is still the case in German, where the
word 'Weise' is part of the living language. Usage of German 'Weise' exhibits another
interesting feature. When referring to two actions of a different type, one could say about
the agents that they are acting 'auf unterschiedliche Weise', in different ways. (NB:
'Weise' in that phrase is in the singular.) In talking about the two agents and their
characters and motives which form the basis of their actions, one would say that the two
people of a different type are 'von unterschiedlicher Art'. This distinction between
dynamic and static is not made in fifth century Greek usage where the one word slSoc;
in the sense 'type' covers both notions; that is, of course, not to say that such a
distinction could not be made at all; and even without a detailed study, it may be stated
that (puoi^, nature, can come close in meaning to referring to the 'type' or 'Art' of a
thing or an animate being, in some of its uses at least; conversely, TpOTlO^, way,
manner, expresses the dynamic aspects of, on the one hand, an event, on the other, a
man's acting, and thereby often referring to the 'type' or 'Weise' of an action or a person
acting.
A word should be said on the choice of the English word 'type' in preference to words
which can in certain contexts be counted as near-synonyms. The disadvantage of 'type'
as a term chosen to render sl8o^ in this context is that it is in origin a loan-word,
ultimately going back to a Greek word other than the one it is used as an translation of:
TUTIO^, a blow, strike, impression (as a result of a blow or strike) does in itself not bear
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any visual connotations. The semantic development, however, which led to a meaning
'type', a development which can be traced back to the second half of the fifth century
and which came to completion in Hellenistic times,248 relies on the visual impact of the
physical impression that was, originally, the result of a physical blow or strike. At any
rate, in common English usage, specialised vocabulary of numismatics and printing apart,
'type' is first and foremost an abstract term, denoting "the general form, structure, or
character distinguishing a particular kind, group, or class of beings or objects"249 , or, it
should be added, something characterised by that distinguishing mark.
This last lexical definition provides a sound basis for demonstrating the advantages
which 'type' has over other possible English renderings of sIScx;. Perhaps, most
justification is needed for having avoided the word 'form' which would appear to be an
obvious translation of elSo^, if only because it is a traditional one. But while
conventions are convenient, they are not always helpful. In the case of 'form', two
reasons in particular speak against its employment: on the one hand, the word 'form' has
strong connotations of 'bodily form' and 'shape'. (As to its etymology, Latin forma may
be the same as a hypothetical Greek *(J.Opcp- pa, that is to say closely related to
popcprj, a word which does indeed denote 'form' or sometimes 'shape'; but this
etymology is of secondary importance only, when the usage of the English word 'form'
is concerned.) As has been shown, Sl8o£ does mean 'looks, appearance, guise', it does
not mean 'bodily form', 'shape', 'body', just as it does not mean 'beauty'. Of course,
physical objects do have 'shape' and 'bodily form'; those two concepts may even be
subsumed under the concept of 'appearance'; but just as 'appearance' in English does
not mean 'form' or 'shape', sl5o(^ in Greek does not mean the same as either popcptj,
form, or 0%f|{J.<X, shape.250
248 See LSJ s.v. XVKOQ.
249 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, ed. C.T. Onions et al., Oxford 31944, Reset with Revised
Etymologies and Addenda 1973, s.v. Type, 5.
250 For this and the following paragraphs cf. C.M. Gillespie, The Use of El§0^ and I8su in
Hippocrates, in: CQ VI (1922), 179 - 203. I find myself as often in disagreement with him as in
agreement.
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The second and perhaps even stronger reason for avoiding 'form' as a translation of
slSoc; - stronger, because one could argue that the English word 'form' does indeed in
some of its senses refer to what the Greek word 81805 refers to in some of its senses -
the second reason is that, without any attempt to define in what sense the English word
is employed, 'form'251 has so universally been used as a translation of the word el5o5 in
Plato that it has become wholly devoid of meaning; even if one were to suppose that at
some stage in the history of philosophy and Classical scholarship there was a true
understanding of what was meant by 'form'.
It would be wrong in principle to translate the Greek word S1805 into Latin as forma
whenever it occurs if in one or more, but not in all of its senses 81805 may correctly be
translated as forma; related to that, there is a danger in translating the Greek word
sl8oc; into English as 'form' without having checked which sense of the word St805 is
intended at any given passage. In the case of Plato, the most important task is to see how
and why SI805 came to be used to refer to something like 'the beautiful' or 'the good',
and in what sense it referred to them.
Going back to the lexical definition of 'type' as "the general form, structure, or
character distinguishing a particular kind, group, or class of beings or objects", or, as
said above, something characterised thereby, 'structure' may do as a translation of slSoc;
in some cases in which the word refers to a thing of a certain type; however, even if the
objection that the word 'structure' conveys the notion of 'construction' and 'being
constructed' is not universally valid, the range of applicability of 'structure' as translation
of etSog is far smaller than that of 'type'; only a small part of the instances of 8^805
that may correctly be translated with 'type' may correctly be translated with 'structure'
alternatively. Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to 'character'.
251 (and 'idea' which has of late gone out of fashion )
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One could argue on that basis that it is mainly on grounds of connotations that 'type' as
translation of St8o^ is preferable to the other words discussed. But since sl8o(^ is
sometimes translated as 'kind' or 'class' as well, it is important to point to a difference in
denotation often overlooked.252 Leaving aside strong claims to historicity of this
particular anecdote, 'class' is ultimately derived from Latin classis as denoting "each of
the six orders into which Servius Tullius divided the Roman people for purposes of
taxation"253 . In all its subsequent applications, 'class' denotes a group of people or
things, be it a division of society, of people, of animals or plants, or "of things according
to grade or quality"254. 'Class' denotes a plurality, a group, with the exception of a
derivative attributive usage, and of 'class' as a shorthand for 'class degree', distinct
senses which by their occurrence in specific contexts are unambiguous and will not be
considered here.
'Kind', as related to 'kin', is a Germanic word derived from an Indo-European root
*gen- that is also found in Greek Y£VO(^, kin, race}55 'Kind' originally refers to things
somehow related by birth or descent. When Milton says (.Paradise Lost VI 73): "As
when the total kind of birds came summond over Eden", he refers to a group of animals
related to each other, a kin-group, so to speak. Such a group can be compared and
contrasted with other groups; one kind can be set against another. Birds are one kind,
fish another; each bird is an animal that belongs to the one kind, each fish an animal that
belongs to the other. Both bird, collectively, and fish, collectively, are kinds; and they are
kinds of animals or kinds of animal, collectively.256 In all these combinations, and also in
'one kind of animal as opposed to another', 'kind' is a word denoting a group.
252 For the following cf. in particular Gillespie's reaction, op. cit., p. 183ff., to A.E. Taylor, The Words
slSog, l88(1 in Pre-Platonic Literature, in: id., Varia Socratica. First Series, Oxford 1911, p. 221 f.
253 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. 'class', 1.
254 Loc. cit., 5.
255 Cf. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. 'kind'.
256 Cf. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, loc. cit.: "Phrases. Kind of, in all kinds of trees - 'trees
of all kinds', this kind of thing = 'a thing of this kind'. As the original genitive phrase (see O.E.D. s.v.
Kin sb.] 6 b) was in attrib. relation to the following sb., the natural tendency is still to treat all kind of,
no kind of, etc., and, hence also, kind of, as an attrib. or adj. phrase qualifying the sb."
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Just as ysvog denotes a group, namely a 'family, clan, race', 'kind' in its original
application denotes any one of the groups of related animate beings. By nature, 'kind'
thereby refers to what may be termed 'count-nouns', words which refer to entities or
units which can be counted; as opposed to mass-nouns, nouns which refer to non-
countable entities such as water, gold, or heat.
Now, the phrase 'this kind of animal', meaning '(the) animal(s) of this kind (or kin-
group)', does by implication also mean: 'this kind of animal and not another kind of
animal' or '(the) animal(s) of this kind but not of another'. Talking of groups of related
things often occurs in a context where there are other things which are not related. In
stressing that aspect of relatedness versus non-relatedness, one can apply 'kind' not only
to countable but also to non-countable items. 'This kind of thing' as opposed to 'that
kind of thing' may be applied to, exempli gratia, 'metal' just as much as 'animal'. (And
here the use of the collective singular of count-nouns, here 'animal', instead of the plural
('animals'), may have played a role.) Thereby, 'this kind of metal' is virtually
synonymous with 'this type of metal'.
'Type', however, does not refer to a group; 'type' refers to "the general form,
structure, or character distinguishing a particular kind, group, or class of beings or
objects", that is to say 'type' is something a group of related things may have or display -
or something which has that general form, structure or character. And even if the
universal validity of this prescriptive-sounding definition of the English word is disputed,
the Greek noun sT5oc^, when used in the sense of 'type', does in none of the cases
discussed refer to a group, but always to a 'characteristic of a group' or 'a thing
characterised in a certain way'. Casual inspection of sISo^ and YSVO(^ in the Sophist
and Politicus and in Aristotle's writings on topics of natural history suggests to me that
in his usage as well, stScx^ does not refer to groups either, that is to say, a distinction
between sl5o^ and YSVO(^ in this respect is generally preserved.257
257 Cf. the seminal essay by D.M. Balme, rENOEand EIAOEin Aristotle's Biology, in: CQ (NS)
12 (1962), 81 - 98, whose statements, though, require some modification in this respect. In need of
modification is also C.J. Rowe, Plato. Politicus, Warminster 1995, pp. 4 - 8; in Section 2 of his
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I would, therefore, suggest that although the semantic development of sl8o^ from
meaning 'look, looks, appearance, guise' to 'type' and 'wise, ways, way' may have been
a prerequisite for scientifically conducted classification, it would be misleading to talk
about a classificatory sense of £t8o<; in pre-Platonic literature.258
introduction, entitled "Forms, classes, and division", Rowe seems to treat st5o^ and Y&VOC, as
synonyms and proposes that the words best be taken to mean 'class'.




\8sa may be as ancient a formation as stSoc^, but its first occurrence in extant Greek
literature is late. 'l8ea is not part of the Homeric dialect, and that not for metrical
reasons, as is shown by the first occurrence of a form of the word in a Theognidean
elegiac poem. On etymological grounds, one would expect 'l8sa, an a-stem derived from
the zero grade of the root *ueid-, to refer to the totality of a visual impression as given
or perceived in an instant.259 As usual, theoretical considerations of that sort are not
really helpful, especially when applied to a relatively late stage of a language. But even if
one leaves that last, likewise theoretical, consideration aside, were one to capture the
notion of 'the totality of a visual impression as given or perceived in an instant' in one
word, English equivalents would be something like 'look', 'looks', 'appearance', 'guise'.
For that reason, and because there is indeed a considerable overlap in meaning, elSoc;
and \8sa are often treated as, or explicitly stated to be, synonyms. Wherever that is
obviously the case, it is therefore not necessary to repeat what has already been stated in
the preceding chapter.260
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'Totality', if one believes in a 'collective' case as the origin of a-stems; 'in an instant', if the function
of the zero-grade of graded roots is just to state the verbal action, as witnessed in the aorist. A
comparison of the analyses of 'l8£a by two of the foremost historical linguists of the twentieth century
can show how little can be stated for certain at this remote level: P. Chantraine, La formation des noms
en grec ancien, Paris 1933, (nouveau tirage 1979), p. 91: "§ 70. De meme que le grec possede un suffixe
- la repondant au masculin - log, il existe une finale - 6(X reposant sans doute sur - SyCl a cote de la
finale -SOg -l8sa "apparence, forme" (ionien-attique) est tire de l'aoriste iSsiV qui repose sans
doute sur une contraction." By contrast J.B. Hofmann, Griechisches etymologisches Worterbuch,
Munchen 1950, p. 70, s.v. ElSo^: "stSoc; n. Aussehen, Gestalt : aus *ueides- ... . - 'l§£U f. auBere
Erscheinung, Gestalt, Anblick (wohl *Fl86oct),...." Hofmann's "wohl" signifies, in his own words, an
'uncertain assumption'; I believe Chantraine's 'sans doute' has the same force. (Given that the first two
instances of the word are in Theognis and Pindar, Chantraine's comment 'ionien-attique' may seem in
need of justification.) We cannot be ultimately certain about the word's formation, and connotations can
- if at all - only be gleaned from the actual contexts.
260 On related grounds, it seemed on occasion more practical to diverge from a treatment in
chronological order.
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The first instance of l8sa to be considered is found at the end of a poem by Theognis,
by scholarly consent considered genuine, which may be complete (119 - 128261):
Xpuoou Kip8f|A,oio Kal frpyopoo &vo%STd<; axr|
120 Kupve, Kal e^eupeiv paSiov &v8pl aotpco
s'l 8s cpiA-oi) vooq frvSpot; evl axr|0eoci A<eA,fj0fl
H/u8poc; ecov, So>aov 8' sv cppeoiv fjxop sxn,
xouxo 0ed<; KiP8r)^oxaxov 7iolr|oe Ppoxoioiv,
Kal yvcovai Ttavxoov xoux' frviripoxaxov.
125 ot>8e yap e'i88ir|<; frvSpoq voov ouxe yovaiKoq,
Ttplv 7ieipr|0elr|c; cikmep wio^uyloi),
ot>Se ksv e'lkaooai^ t®onsP ©piov feA.0cov-f
7ioX,Mki yap yvc6|ir|v s^a7iax©o' 'iSsai.
"False gold or silver is a threat that can be checked,
120 Cyrnus; an expert quickly finds it out;
but ifa comrade's secret disposition's false
and in his breast he has an untrue heart,
this is the basest counterfeit that God has put
before us, and it costs mostpain to test.
125 You cannot know a man's or woman's character
until you 've tried if it will bear a load,
nor can you judge as if inspecting merchandise:
so often the appearances deceive
251 Text and translation ofM.L. West, Iambi et Elegi Graeci I, Oxford z1989; and: Greek Lyric Poetry,
Oxford 1993.
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It looks as if this were just another case of contrasting a person's external looks or
appearance with his mind or thoughts of the sort familiar from Homer onwards.262
Cymus is warned to beware of a man's or woman's VOOC,, mind, character, disposition
- that is not known; what can be seen, and therefore known263 , is only the looks, the
external appearance of a person. One could point to Aristophanes' Plutus for an exact
parallel; Penia, or Poverty, claims that she produces better men than Plutus, or wealth, is
capable of producing (557 - 561): OKC071T81V neipa Kat KCQjXCpSeiv xou
GTtouSa^eiv frpeArjoat;, | oi) yiyvcooKcov oti toi; n^ouxou 7iapsxoo
PeXxiovac; av8pa<; | Kat xt^v yvcoprjv Kat xrjv 'iSeav. rcapa xcp pev
yap 7io8aypoc>vxec; | Kat yaaxpcoSeic; Kat 7ia%t3Kvrjfj.oi Kat Tuoveq
s'ioiv doe^ycoq, | Tiap' spot 8' 'ia%vol Kat ocpijKcoSeh; Kat xoit;
S/0poi£ dviapol. Try to mock and be funny, not concerned with being serious, not
realizing that I produce men better as to their minds and their appearance than Plutus
can. With him there are <men> gouty, with bellies, broad-legged, licentiously fat, with
me <there are men> thin and wasp-like, grievous to their enemies, yVCOpij and 'iSsa
are here contrasted in a different fashion, but the same opposition is presupposed by the
argument. It may further be noted that the features associated with \8sa all refer not just
to the 'appearance', but specifically to the 'figures' of the men compared. The same
opposition of 'mind' and 'appearance' or 'figure' could be assumed for Theognis.
However, especially if line 128 is supposed to be the end of Theognis' poem, it could
contain a gnomic statement, a conclusion in form of a proverb; 7loA,A,aKl yap
yVCOptjV S^anaxoaa' 'l8sai - Often indeed appearances deceive the mind. If that be
so, the \8sai need no more be the appearances of the individuals just mentioned than
they are in the standing phrase that 'appearances deceive'. Reading the line that way
would, of course, cover the particular interpretation that the people Theognis warns
262 Cf. e.g. Odyssey VIII, 164ff., Iliad III, 212ff., discussed in Section I of the chapter on slSoQ above.
263 There is a distinct possibility here that regardless of the precise meaning of't86(X Theognis felt an
etymological connection between 8l5sir|Q in line 125 and 'lSfettl in line 128; cf. note 119 in Section I of
the chapter on £l8o<^ above.
216
Cyrnus of give the appearance of reliability without being reliable, that is to say, \5sai
may refer to 'the individuals' appearing other than they are' in a non-physical sense.
From the context in Theognis alone one cannot say if in the sixth century B.C. l8sa
meant just 'looks (of a person)' or 'appearance' in general, with all the connotations
either of st8o£ or of the English word 'appearance'.
Other early fifth century instances of the word likewise just confirm that 'l8sa may have
meant just 'looks, appearance, guise (of a person)'; Pindar concludes Olympian X by
stating that he has praised Archestratos for his boxing victory some time ago as a youth
at Olympia (103), 'l8ea T8 KClXov | c5pa T8 KSKpajISVOV, ... , him, beautiful
with (or through, or by) his appearance, filled16* with youth, .... It is interesting that the
form of'l8ea is the dative rather than the accusative of respect so frequently encountered
with el5o<; in similar contexts; that may point to a difference, if not in meaning, so in
connotations; but again, the context does not allow to draw any further conclusions with
any degree of certainty.265
Close in time are the following lines by Xenophanes (Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata
V 109, 3 = DK 21B15): (ifX s'l xeipCXC^ &XOV Poeg <17X7101 x'>266 f]S
A,eovxe<; | f| ypti\j/ai Ka^ spya xeXeiv a7iep av5pe<;, | i7i7ioi
jisv 0' i7i7ioiai Poet; 5e xe Pouolv 6poia<; | Kai <K8> Gscdv 'i5ea<;
264
Literally: 'mixed'.
265 For an accusative of respect, cf. the first fragment of Eupolis' Golden Race, in which one person
accuses another of being KCtKO^ xf|V l8£uv, bad of appearance or bad offigure. - A passage in the
fables of Aesop (Fabulae Dosithei, ed. Hausrath and Hunger, Corpus fabularum Aesopicarum, vol. 1.2),
telling the tale of a stag discovering its image in the water of a spring, relates (1.3) how it encounters xf|
XOU OthpazOQ l8eq, the appearance of its body, and continues: Kal pdXtaxa psv £7lf|V8l xf|V
cpuotv xcov Kspdxcov dvaxsxapsvcov xe et^ nolvv depa Kal (bq Kdopog sir| rtavxl
XG) oaipaxi. And most of all it praised the nature of its antlers both for being stretched out high into
the air andfor being an adornment for the whole body. At whatever time this was written, l8eu did not
mean 'body' (a claim often made about elSoc by those who also state that etSoq and 'iSea are
synonyms); perhaps it is also significant that what is praised most of all, that is to say one part of what
was referred to by 'lSea, is distinctive in particular by its shape.
266 The rather speculative nature of this emendation, as well as the slightly difficult syntax of this and
the following line need not detain us here.
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eypacpov Kai acopax' ercoiouv | xoiauG' otov nep Kabxol Sspag st%ov
<£k(xoxol>. But if oxen and horses or lions had hands and could draw with those
hands and accomplish works men can accomplish, horses would draw the appearances
of their gods like horses and oxen like oxen, and would make their [i.e. the gods']
bodies such as they themselves each have their build. OCOjxa and SBJlCtg, it could be
argued, are variants, for metrical reasons, expressing the same concept; on those grounds
even 'l8sa might be included. However, although the evidence is by no means decisive,
the statement267 that S&pag denoted the 'living body' in the first place may be correct
and significant. If that be so, the animals named would craft their devotionalia, at once
works of worship and of art, on the model of their own living bodies; and they would do
that according to their chosen medium of production in three dimensions, the OCOfiaxa
or bodies of statues, or in two, the 'l8eai or figures in drawings and paintings.
Arguing strictly on the lines of investigation set out above in the chapter on fitSog,
'l8ea here would have to be translated 'appearance, looks, guise', because that would
make perfect sense, and therefore there is no need to posit a semantic development. It
may, however, be significant that 'figure' would do as translation in all cases looked at
so far, with the potential exception of Theognis 128; and not only that, it would add
something to the sense of each passage. This needs bearing in mind.
II.
Overall, assuming that sense of 'iSsa, certainly appearance, but more specifically
figure, is confirmed by a sufficiently large number of fifth century texts. Close in context
to Xenophanes is Protagoras, provided Diogenes Laertius quotes verbatim (D.L. IX 51 =
DK 80B4): Tispl pev 0£cov otnc ex® s'lSsvai, ou0' cog e'toiv od0 cog oi)k
267 LSJ s.v. 86pag.
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8'iaiv OU0' 6710101 XIVS£ 'tSsaV. About the gods I cannot know, neither that they
are nor that they are not nor again how they are as to their figures. With that may be
compared the final lines of the choral ode the Clouds sing at their entry in Aristophanes'
eponymous play. Having described to the audience their ascent from the sea to the sky in
adhortative subjunctives, they conclude, still out of view (288ff.): hXX
&7iooeiadjj.evai vstpoq opPpiov | &0avaxa<; 'i5sac; S7ii8c6pe0a |
TTjX,S0K07tCp 6|l|J.a,Xl yaiav. But having shaken the rainy mist off our immortal
figure, let us look upon the earth with ourfar-seeing eye.26S
Aristophanes' Clouds, as they appear on stage, are anthropomorphous - as Greek gods
were portrayed in literature and art also otherwise; and it is against that background that
Xenophanes and Protagoras can speak of the 'figures' of a god or gods. The human
figure, asserted, questioned or denied, is in the background of their arguments. This
usage is probably also found in the Hippocratic treatise Airs, Waters, Places. After a
detailed discussion on different environments and the differences in inhabitants which
result, the concluding lines of this work as we have it read (XXIV 49): dl jXSV
svavxicoxaxai (puaisg xe Kai 'i8eai s^ouoiv ouxax;- hnd 8e xouxecov
xsKfiaipopsvog xa X,oi7t<x evGupesoGai, Kal ot>x frpapxifofl. Such are the
natures and figures most opposed to each other: judging from those infer the rest, and
you will not go wrong. From the context, it is difficult to say if CpUOlS^ refers to the
different types of environment and nature in that sense, or if - as may seem more natural
at first sight - it refers to the different natures of man there are269 ; in either case, but in
268 For a discussion of the syntax, cf. K.J. Dover, Aristophanes. Clouds, Oxford 1968, commentary ad.
loc.; and for the sense A.H. Sommerstein, Aristophanes. Clouds, Warminster 1982, note ad. loc. 'l8£tt£
may well be genitive singular and nevertheless refer to each cloud's individual figure, just as 6|i|iGtTl in
the singular does not imply either that all the clouds had one eye collectively, or else that each cloud was
in possession of one eye only.
269 Cf. in general the discussion of the preceding pages in Section VII of the chapter on elSot; above;
note in particular the two occurrences of (pbot^ in Airs, Waters, and Places XXIV 36 - 45: OKOl) yap
at pexaPokal e'101 7U)Kv6xaxat xcbv (bpferav Kai rc^staxov Sidcpopot abxai
ecouxfiotv, 8Ksi Kal xa el8ea Kal xa fjOsa Kal xaq cpuotaq ebpf|oei<; Ttketoxov
Stacpspoboa^. - peytoxat pev ouv e'unv abxat xf|<; cpbatoc a'l Stakkayal, £7tetxa 8s
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the latter in particular, \8sa refers to the totality of what is perceived of a person by
inspection, a person's figure.270
III.
After Xenophanes, but not necessarily that long after Xenophanes271, Anaxagoras uses
the word 'iSea in a way significant for subsequent Greek philosophy. Simplicius tells us
Kal fi fl civ xiq xp£cpr|xai Kal xa DSaxa. ebpf|osic; yap stcI xo 7t^f|0oq
xfiq xcopriq xfj cpuost aKoXot)06ovxa Kal xa ei8ea xcov &v0pc67tcov Kal xobq
Xp67tOUq. Indeed, where the changes of the seasons are most frequent, and <the seasons> most
different from one another, there you will also find the appearances and the characters and the natures
as differing most widely. - These, now, are the greatest differences in nature, then also the land in which
someone is reared, and the waters. You will find, indeed, that for the most part the appearances and the
ways of the peoplefollow the nature of the land.
270 It may not be by accident that the rarer, more elevated, and perhaps also more comprehensive word
is used only at this point at the end of the treatise, a treatise in which the author frequently talked about
the etSoq or appearance of people, and in which it is not easy to decide if the extension in meaning
from 'appearance' to 'type' has already taken place or is approached but as yet to come. - Could it
therefore be that one should understand: Such are the natures and types most opposed to each other:
judging from those infer the rest, and you will not go wrong? - A decision cannot be reached for Airs,
Waters, and Places', for the general semantic development, however, see Section IV below.
271 For chronological matters concerning Xenophanes, cf. K. Reinhardt, PARMENIDES und die
Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, Bonn 1916, especially pp. 89-106, 155-158, 221-230.
Reinhardt's views concerning chronology were generally regarded as so quaint that refutation was not
deemed necessary; consequently, they are usually not considered at all in recent literature, despite
valuable arguments providing justification and additional support advanced by his pupil U. Holscher in
his collection Anfangliches Fragen, Gottingen 1968; to date, I know of no compelling refutation of
Reinhardt's chronology; it may be worthwhile drawing attention to the judgement of J. Barnes, The
Presocratic Philosophers, London 21982, bibliography, p. 650: "[Reinhardt's PARMENIDES is] for my
money, the most sparkling book in the whole field".
For Anaxagoras, I follow M. Schofield, An essay on Anaxagoras, Cambridge 1980, chapter I,
Appendix: Anaxagoras's floruit, p. 33: "In the previous section I have implied that the formation of
Anaxagoras's thought antedated the rise of the Sophistic movement, and that his book must be dated
significantly earlier than the treatise of Diogenes of Apollonia and the oldest treatises in the Hippocratic
corpus (I mentioned On the Sacred Disease and On Ancient Medicine in this respect, but the same goes
for Airs, Waters, Places [note 71]). This is not a controversial opinion. But it is worth while adducing
some reasons for putting the date of the composition of his book, as I incline to put it, at roughly 470-
460 B.C." Schofield then produces five distinct arguments for this dating, all but the last of which carry
sufficient conviction. He concludes (p. 35): "A floruit of 470-460 B.C. fits well enough with what little
we can say of the relation between Anaxagoras's thought and that of other fifth-century philosophers. It
is late enough for him to have taken profit from the reflection he evidently devoted to Parmenides' work.
It is early enough for his book to have antedated, as it probably did, the physical poem of Empedocles
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CPhysica 34, 28 = DK 59B4): A,eysi yap pel' 6AAya xf|<; dpxf]c; xou jcpcoxoi)
'Tispl cpuosoog' 'Ava^ayopaq ouxcoc;- "xouxcov Se ouxok; fe%6vxcov xpi}
Soksiv kveivai noXXa xe Kat Ttavxoia ev Ttaai xoic; ouyKpivojievoic;
Kat OTieppaxa Ttavxcov /pripaxcov Kal 'i8ea<; rcavxolag e^ovxa Kai
Xpoiaq Kat f|8ovdc;." Indeed, Anaxagoras, close to the beginning of Book I of On
Nature, speaks thus: "These things being so, it is right to think that there were, in all
the things that were being put together, many things, ofall kinds, and seeds ofall things
- [seeds] having figures and colours and savours of every kind".112 Leaving aside the
details of what little we have of the context of this statement, it sets out one of the
principles of the ontology and physics of Anaxagoras. The sentence was found close to
the beginning of his work about which Simplicius, giving his interpretation of the pre-
Socratic, declares {Physica 155, 23): ... 5r)A,Ol 8ld xou 7tpc6xoi) xo)v 'cpuaiKGOV'
A,eycov d;i' dpxfjg- "dpou xpripaxa ndvza fjv, a7ietpa Kal rcXfiGog Kal
apiKp6xr)xa." It is clear [that Anaxagoras says what has just been summarized] from
Book I of the Physics where he says: "All things were together, infinite as to amount
and as to smallness." If one gives a temporal interpretation to those fragments, there
was a state when nothing was distinct, when none of the composite bodies which
constitute our world had come into being, when all the seeds were in one mixture from
which nothing had separated off. Later, in our world, where there are OUyKpiVOpSVa,
composite bodies which somehow have separated off, they contain those seeds which are
the seeds of all things. These smallest and ultimate constituents are said to have Kat
'iSeaq rtavxotag Kai xpoidc^ Kai f|8ovd^, appearances, and colours, and tastes
and smells of all sorts. It is not impossible, as we have seen in the opening sections of
the chapter on etSoc^, that 'l8sai are in general the 'appearances' things can have, that
one aspect of appearance, is then highlighted by way of grammatical co-ordination, and
[note 86] and the work of Leucippus. It leaves the temporal relation of his thought with that of Zeno
[note 87] and Melissus appropriately obscure."
272 The translation of fragment 4 is a slightly modified version of Schofield's (p. 101) slightly modified
version of the version by D.J. Furley, Anaxagoras in response to Parmenides, in: Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, Supp. Vol. 2 (1976), p. 72.
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that - as if by way of an afterthought - fj8ovai , tastes and smells, are added. It is,
however, likewise possible, that the three words refer to three distinctive properties or
qualities of the seeds, their figures, colours and tastes. The l8eai, the 'figures' of the
seeds of all things may have been named first because they constitute their most
distinctive feature; but that is speculation.
A slightly different context, but nevertheless one in many ways dependent on
Anaxagoras is that of the physics of Diogenes of Apollonia as quoted and summarized by
Simplicius (Physica 151, 28 = DK 64B2-5).273 Diogenes attempts to prove that
everything is one, as can be seen from the interaction of things; that all things are ordered
by some sort of mind or understanding, for otherwise they would not have the measures
we see them having; that for all living beings it is air that is life and soul and
understanding. Therefore (B5), to Tljv VOr|OlV £5(ov, that which has
understanding, is what men call air. Everything has a share in it, and air displays as many
variations as understanding does. Air is at times warmer, at times colder, drier, wetter,
calmer, more agile, and changing as to taste and smell and colour in infinite ways. Yet,
differences are not complete, nor are similarities, for complete similarity amounts to
being the same. And he continues: axe o6v TCOA,UTp67TOU £oucjr|c; xf|q
sxspotcooioc; Tio^uxpcma Kai xa £cpa, Kal 7ioA,A,a Kal outs 'iSeav
&X,X,f|X,oiq coiKoxa outs 8iaixav outs vor|oiv (mo xou 7tA,f|0eo<; xcov
STSpOlCOOSCOV. Now, because alteration is manifold, manifold are also the animals,274
and many and neither like each other in figure nor in diet nor in understanding,
through the multitude of the alterations. Speaking of the 'tSsct, the figure of an animal,
is, as will be seen, common with Herodotus and therefore presumably within common
usage; with Diogenes, however, this is linked with physical theory, and since he is
arguing here from physics to biology, one may be justified in seeing changes in the states
of air - as to all the qualities mentioned, as to smell and taste, colour, and it may be
273 For a revaluation of the significance of Diogenes of Apollonia, and a sketch of his position in fifth
century philosophy, see M.C. Stokes, One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy, Washington,
D.C./Cambridge, Mass. 1971, pp. 238 - 244.
274 ^tpa are, of course, all living beings.
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added also as to figure - behind the differences in diet, understanding and figure of living
beings. Regardless of whether this is so, given that Diogenes of Apollonia clearly
depends on Anaxagoras for his physical theory, one can see from 64B5 how little there is
of terminological fixity in the use of l8sa at this stage.
Whether Empedocles' poem or poems preceded the writings of Anaxagoras or not, the
one occurrence of a form of 'l8sa in what is preserved of Empedocles is found in a
context very similar to that of Anaxagoras. At one of the extreme points in the struggle
of friendship and quarrel, quarrel is at the depth of the whirling rotation, friendship in the
middle; from there she begins with her work of composition, putting together what is
unmixed. At first, quarrel is still within the whirl and within some of the members and
parts of everything, but he is retreating to the outer edges, and friendship is spreading
(Simplicius Physica 32, 11 = DK 31B35, 14ff.): cd\\ia 8e 0vf|x' scpuovxo- xa
rcpiv pa0ov d0tivax' elvai, | f^oopa xe xd Tipiv aKprjxat275
SiaXM^avxa ksA,s\30oi)<;, | xcov 8e xs jjiayopsvcov yzxx s0vea jxupia
0vr|xd>v, | rcavxoiaic; \8er|ioiv dpipoxa, 0aupa 'i8sa0ai. But forthwith there
grew mortal beings: what previously understood to be immortal; [...] changing their
ways; but of the mixed things, there pouredforth innumerable species ofmortal beings,
fitted together, with all sorts offigures, a marvel to behold.
275 The phrase f^copd TS xd Tlplv &KpT|Xat of Plutarch's text does not make sense, for £cop6q is
something like 'strong, hot' , and the five passages contrasting ^Ct)p6xspoq and aKpClTO^ oTvoq in
Philumenus De Venenatis Animalibus (ed. Wellmann, CMG X 1, 1; ch. 2, 3; 4, 2; 14, 7; 23, 4; 37, 3),
does not prove what Kranz and subsequent editors suppose it to prove: 'rather strong wine' can indeed
be opposed to 'unmixed wine'; that does not stop 'strong wine' from being a synonymous expression for
'unmixed wine', as indeed it is from archaic to Hellenistic Greek literature. Cf. M.R. Arundel,
Empedocles, fr. 35. 12-15, in: Classical Review N.S. XII, 1962, pp. 109 - 111. As for the text, in
addition to the solution offered there, two possibilities worth considering are: either to read something
like ^copd XS Kal 7tpiv aKpT|Xa Siakkdqavxa KSkebGouq- ... , and what was strong and
unmixed before, changing its ways: ... - that is to say, a free-standing nominative, picked up by the
genitive of line 16; or: to read something like .): al\\ia 8s Gvf|x' SCpUOVXO* xd Ttplv pdGov
dGdvax stvai, I tjcpa XS xd Ttpiv dKpT|XC(, But forthwith there grew mortal beings: what
previously had understood to be immortal; living beings: what previously had been unmixed
<elements>.
223
Whoever came first, Anaxagoras or Empedocles, both share the Tispi/coprjaic; or
Sivoc; or SlVIj with Leucippus and Democritus; this whirling rotation has a central role
in their cosmology, roughly speaking as set off by VOU(^, mind, with Anaxagoras (cf.
Simplicius, Physica 300, 27 = DK 59B13); either just being there, or set off by friendship
and quarrel with Empedocles (e.g. B35); and coming about by chance and developing by
necessity with Leucippus and Democritus (Diogenes Laertius IX 31 - 33 on Leucippus =
DK 67A1). In all three cosmological systems, there are things smaller than and prior to
what we perceive around us. Democritus allegedly declared (Simplicius Physica 327, 24
= DK 68B167): 8ivov &7id too tiavtoq (nxoKpiGrivai 7xavTolcov 'i8ed)v,
that a whirling of all sorts of appearances was separated offfrom the all. What those
appearances are is impossible to say from this fragment alone, whether or not one is
prepared to accept Gomperz' emendation of s'lSscov to 'l8scov. They could be the
smallest particles which were floating about in the emptiness and are now separated off,
in ordered or as yet in unordered form (cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos
VII 116f. = DK 68B164). On the other hand, they could just as well be what results from
this process of separation, comparable with Empedocles' S0V8O, fiupla 0vr)tcov,
Tiavxoiaic; 'l8er|lolv 6prjp6xa of 31B35 quoted above; they could be the product
of that whirling separation.
There is evidence favouring the former interpretation, gathered by Diels and Kranz
under the heading of 68A57.276 Whatever else the passages collected there may entail,
276 "SCHOL. BASILn [ed. Pasquali Gott. Nachr. 1910, 196] A. 'iSsaq. [CLEM.] Recogn. VIII 15
[DOX. 250 de principiis] D. ideas. PLUT. adv. Colot. 8 p. 1110F x'l yap A.6ysi A.; obolaq
dusipoix; to 7tLf|0oq dxdpotx; xs KdSiacpdpotx;, sit 8' hnoiovq Kal aTtaQeic sv xro
ksvcd (pspsoGai SieoTtappfevag- oxav 8s TtsAdacootv dXXijXai<; f| oup7tsocootv fj
7rspi7r^.aK(Boi, cpaivsoGat xd>v dGpot^opbvcov xo psv bScop to 8s 7tbp xo 8s (poxov
xo 8' dvGpcoTrov- slvat 8s Trdvxa zdq dxdpovq \Skaq b7r' abxot) Kaxoupsvaq, sxspov
8s pr|86v- sk psv yap xou pf| ovxoq obK slvat ybvsotv, £k 8s xrov ovxcov pr|8sv
av ysvboGat xq> pijxs Trdoystv pijxs psxapdX^stv xa<; dxdpoix; h7t6 oTspp6xr|To<;:
oGsv ouxs xpdav 'sE, dxpcooxcov ouxs cpuoiv f| v|/uxijv sq d7ioicov Kal <d7ca0rav>
i)7rdpXSlV " Most of the passage from Plutarch is translated by R.D. McKirahan, Philosophy Before
Socrates, Indianapolis 1994, p.323: "What does Democritus say? That substances unlimited in
multitude, atomic and not different in kind, and moreover incapable of acting or being acted upon, are in
motion, scattered in the void. When they approach one another or collide or become entangled, the
compounds appear as water or fire or as a plant or a human, but all things are atoms, which he calls
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they seem to prove that 'l8sa was a word of some significance for Democritus; and it is
possible that Hesychius did think of Democritus when he glossed (68B141): 'iSsor f|
d^oioTriq, |iop(pf|, slboq. Kat to fe^axioxov ocopa.277 Direct,
incontrovertible evidence for 'l8sa as a technical term for the atoms in Democritus'
philosophy is not strong at all278 - yet, had the word not occurred in his writings, and
moreover in those sections concerned with atoms, it is difficult to see why anybody
should have introduced it in discussions of his philosophy, since in his description of
atoms there are plenty of other terms Democritus has either coined himself, or at least
used in his own peculiar way.279 If he should so have used it, he would have done so
presumably because 'appearance' or 'figure' is a sufficiently vague word for a body
which does have a certain extension and certain physical characteristics;280 but at the
same time sufficiently precise, since 'iSca was not a common word in frequent use and
because it had figured, albeit most probably in a less specialized sense, in Empedocles
and in particular in Anaxagoras. Democritus' atoms did not differ in solidity; they may
have differed in weight; but they definitely did differ in their figures, they differed as
figures, they were different figures: otherwise, Democritus' whole system of
forms; there is nothing else. For from what is not there is no coming to be, and nothing could come to be
from things that are because on account of their hardness the atoms are not acted upon and do not
change. (Plutarch, Against Colotes 8 1110F - 1111A)".
277 I will not attempt to translate this lexicon entry. - One could further think of TCSpl 'iSscov, given as
the title of one of Democritus' many books (DK 68B6), but this has convincingly been emended to 7C£pl
St8c6A,(OV. See J. Mansfeld, Die Vorsokratiker, Stuttgart 1987, p. 648. He groups 68A135, for which he
accepts Schneider's emendation of St8c0V to SlSc&kov, together with 68B6, for which he proposes
emendation of l8e<BV. For the whole question of the meaning of l86a with Democritus cf. also H.C.
Baldry, Plato's Technical Terms, in: Classical Quarterly XXXI (1937), pp. 141 - 150, p. 141 f., n. 4;
Baldry does accept the emendation of dxopot)^ tSscic; to dxojiOV)^ tS'tCO^ in the passage from
Plutarch and retains e'lSewv in B167. Of Hesychius, he says that the gloss may just as well refer to,
exempli gratia, Timaeus 54d f. While I do not agree with Baldry's assertion that el8o^ and iSfeu are
synonyms, nor with his suggestion that both terms or either one of them has developed to mean
something like 'quality' (p. 142ff.), it must be noted that if all emendations changing forms of'l8£(X into
something else, but not the one changing Sl86c0V to l8sO)V, are accepted, we are left with very little
evidence even for the occurrence of the word, let alone its significance or meaning with Democritus.
278 Thence K. v. Fritz, Philosophic und sprachlicher Ausdruck bei Demokrit, Platon und Aristoteles,
New York 1938, does not mention \86a at all in his section on Democritus, pp. 12 - 38.
279 Cf. the discussion of v. Fritz, loc. cit.
280 Cf. e.g. Simplicius In 'De Caelo', pp. 294, 33 - 295, 24 = Aristotle fr. 208 Rose = DK 68A37.
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conglomerates would no longer cohere. The difference in figure was the only reason
atoms stuck together.281
IV.
With Herodotus as well, 'l8sa can refer to the figure of a human being, an animal, or
even a plant. In Book IV, he describes the countries and people neighbouring Scythia
(lOOff.); the Tauri, Agathyrsi, Neuri, Man-eaters, Black-cloaks, Geloni, Budini, and
Sauromatae (102). Talking about the Budini and the Geloni (108), Herodotus gives a
description strongly resembling descriptions in the Hippocratic Airs, Waters, and Places.
BouSivoi 5s bGvcx; sov psya Kal jcoA,A,6v yX,ai)Kov xs 7iav 'ioxupa><;
scxl Kal 7tl)ppov. The Budini, being a people great and numerous, are all very
bright-eyed and ruddy. The Geloni are of Greek origin and speak a language mixed from
Greek and Scythian elements. BouSlVOl 8s oi) xf| at>xf| yX,COGOr| XpBCOVTai
Kai rsX,covol, ot>8s 8laixa fj at>xf|. (109) o'l psv yap BouSivoi sovxsc;
abxoxGovsq vopaSsc; xs e'ioi Kal cpGsipoxpaysouci pouvoi xa>v xauxfl,
TsXcovol 8s yf|q xb fepyaxai Kal oixocpayoi Kal Krj7iou(; EKxripsvoi,
ot>8sv xf^v 'i8sr|v opoioi ob8s xo xP®Pa- psvxoi ' E^X,f)va)v
KaX,sovxai Kal o'l BouSivoi TbXcovoi, oOk dpOdog KaX-sopsvoi. But the
Budini do not speak the same language as the Geloni, nor do they have the same diet.
Indeed, the Budini, being autochthonous people, are nomads and, alone of all the
people there, eaters ofpine-seed, but the Geloni work the soil and eat grain and have
gardens, being in no respect similar as to their figure, nor as to their colour. Yet the
Budini, too, are called Geloni by the Greeks - not being called correctly. And
281 The reason why 'appearance' will not do well as a translation in this context is that the atoms are
small beyond perception; that does not stop them from appearing, theoretically, but there would not be
anybody they could appear to. If it is accepted that 'l86a had at least connotations of 'figure' from its
earliest surviving occurrence onwards, it will appear more natural that Democritus should have adopted
the term in this context.
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Herodotus goes on to describe the land they inhabit. - Though it is possible that
Herodotus points to a difference in appearance generally, and then proceeds by stressing
one aspect of appearance, namely colour, the text can naturally be interpreted as stating a
difference between the two people in figure and in colour.
Just as Herodotus speaks of the slSoc^, the appearance, of an animal in the course of
his descriptions of foreign countries,282 so he also speaks of an animal's'l8sa. As with
the cases of the word's being applied to human beings or gods, 'appearance' is a possible
and acceptable translation, but 'figure' may seem more appropriate. When the Persian
army is arranged for the decisive battle against the Lydians, Harpagus the Mede advises
Cyrus to set up an ad hoc 'camel cavalry' in front of his army to disable the cavalry of
Croesus (I 80): xauxa psv Tiapalveoe, zdc, 8s Kapf|A.oi)<; sxa^s &vxia xf|<;
itxjtoi) xa>v8s sivsksv- kapt]A,ov innoq (poPssxai kal ouk ftvsxsxai
ouxs xi^v 'i8sr|v at>xf|<; 6pscov ouxs xf^v 65fj.r\v datppaivopsvoq. That, he
recommended - but he positioned the camels opposite the cavalry because of the
following: the horse fears the camel, and it can neither stand seeing its figure nor
smelling its odour. What the horse sees is, of course, the camel's 'appearance',
everything there is to see about the camel, the totality of its visual impact. But what it
perceives from the distance is the camel's 'figure', not any particular attribute, as the
eyes, or the colour, or the hair. And even if the horse is near enough to smell the camel,
what is most impressive in term of its appearance is its figure.
In Herodotus' description of Egypt, we read the following about hippopotami (II 71):
o'l 8s I'tcttoi o'i Ttoxapioi <sv> vopco psv xq> Ila7ipr|plxfl 'ipol e'toi,
xoioi 8s &A.A,oiai A'iyu7txioioi obK 'ipot. cpuoiv 8s 7taps%ovxai 'iSsriq
xoif|v8s- xsxpaTiouv soxi 8txf|X.ov, f 67i?wai Pooq, oipov, ^ocpir^v sxov
iTtTtoi), tpatvov, obpf^v ititiod kai (pcovfjv, psyaGoq ooov
282 See Section V in the chapter on et8o<; above.
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T8 poix; 6 Jisyioxoq. The hippopotami, however, are sacred under Papremitian
law, but not sacred for the other Egyptians. And as to the nature of their figure, they
present the following: it is a cloven-hoofed quadruped, f hooves of an ox, flat-nosed,
having the mane of a horse, visible tusks, the tail and voice of a horse, and as to size it
is like the biggest ox. Apart from voice - which is added as being like that of a horse
after it is stated that the tail is that of a horse - apart from voice, all features enumerated
are both visible and distinctive in terms of outline and contour. That agrees with a
meaning 'figure' for'lSsa in this context as well.
In II 92, Herodotus describes two types of lilies which grow in Egypt. One grows in the
water and is called Lotus by the Egyptians. He continues: SOU 8s Kal uXfa
Kplvea poSoiot fepcpepea, bv xcd 7toxajxcG ytvopeva Kai xauxa, e£, c5v
6 Kapttog ev aXAfl KaX,UKi 7tapacpuojievfl sk xf|g plcf|<; Ytvexai,
Krjpltp ocprpccov 'iSsrjv 6jioioxaxov- ev xouxcp xpcoKxa oaov xe 7tupfjv
eX,air]<; eyyivexat ou%va, xpcoyexai 8e Kai imaXa xauxa Kal aua.
"Other lilies also grow in the river, which are like roses; the fruit of these is found in a
calyx springing from the root by a separate stalk, and is most like to a comb made by
wasps; this produces many eatable seeds as big as an olive-stone, which are eaten both
fresh and dried."283 The phrase Kiplcp OtpTJKCOV 'l58riv OflOlOXaxov, most
similar to a comb ofwasps in appearance orfigure, displays the accusative of respect so
commonly found in constructions with elSoc;.
At first sight, II 76 is just another instance of 'l8sa in that sense: 8l5o^ 8e xfjq
ipioq xo8e- jj.eX.aiva 8eivco<; Tiaoa, CK&^ea 8e tpopeei yepavou,
TtpoocoTtov 8e feq xa pdX,ioxa fe7xlypi)7tov, peyaGoc; ooov Kpe^. xd>v
pev 8rj p8X.atV8ft)v xcov paxopevcov Tipoc; xouq otpit; fj8e 't8sr|284 . xcov
283 A.D. Godley, Herodotus I, Cambridge, Mass. 21926.
284 I am not absolutely convinced that our knowledge of the usage of Greek pronouns is sufficient to
justify the emendation [f|8s] 'l§£1j <at>T1j>. The sense of the clause is unambiguous.
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8' ev 7"cool |j.a^X,ov 8tX,8o^isvcov xoioi &v0pamoiai - 8i^al yap 8f)
e'tot ipieg - rj8e- \|/iA,fj xrjv Ke(paA,fjv Kal xrjv 8eiprjv 7iaoav,
X,8DK07ixspoc; ti^v KS(paX.ri<; Kat a8x&vo? Ka^ &Kpecov xa>v nxepuycov
Kal xou Tiuyalou aKpou - xauxa 5s xa sTtiov navxa psXava eoxi
Seivcex; - OK8^ea 8e xai 7ipooco7iov spcpep^c; xf) exepfl. xou 8e otpioc;
f| jxop(pi\ oiri Tiep xcov i38pcov, nxiXa 8s ob Tixspcoxa (popeei iiXXd
xoioi xf|g vi)Kxspi8o(; Tixspoioi paA-ioxa kt] fepcpspsoxaxa. "Now this is
the appearance of the ibis. It is all deep black, with legs like a crane's, and a beak
strongly hooked; its size is that of a landrail. Such is the figure of the black ibis which
fights the serpents. Those that most consort with men (for the ibis is of two kinds) have
all the head and neck bare offeathers; their plumage is white, save the head and neck
and the tips ofwings and tail (these being deep black); the legs and beak are like those
of the other ibis. The serpents are like water-snakes. Their wings are not feathered but
most like the wings of a bat.,,2&5 It is tempting to see Herodotus' style as governed by
the principle of variatio. He talks first of the appearance of a bird, then of that of a
snake. First he uses the term st8o^, then, referring to the description he has just given,
by way of variation the term'lSsa; finally, and only a few lines later, he employs jioptptj
to refer to the appearance of serpent and water-snake. I will not discuss in any detail the
meaning of |XOp(pf| here, but merely point out that in the case of serpent and water-
snake, it is specifically the form of the bodies of those animals which is said to be alike;
by contrast, the description of the appearance of the ibis contains a number of features
besides bodily form. As for el5o^, the word does indeed mean 'appearance', as is the
case with many like examples of animal descriptions in Herodotus.286 However,
regardless of the perceived textual difficulty, does 'l8sa just summarize what is said in
the three preceding lines? While that is perfectly possible since there is indeed a sufficient
semantic overlap between sl8o(^ and 'iSsa, it is to my mind likewise possible that
285 The translation is a very slightly adapted version of that by Godley, op. cit. He has a note explaining
'for the ibis is of two kinds': "Geronticus Calvus and Ibis Aethiopica".
286 See Section V of the chapter on stSoc; above.
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Herodotus introduces a new thought in the sentence in question and does not just
summarize what went before. The sentence X(DV JJ.SV 5tj |J.eA,aiVSCOV XCOV
|J.a/O|a8VC0V 7ipd<^ XOU£ OCpi£ r\§e iS8T( could mean: Now, that is the type of the
black <ibises> which fight against the serpents. That is to say, what is expressed in the
parenthetical clause Sl^al yap 8f| Slot ipi8£, indeed, twofold are the ibises, may
have been anticipated in the clause which points out that the description hitherto has
been that of one type of the bird.287 - As so often, it is impossible to come to a firm
conclusion on the basis of one instance.
To posit a meaning 'type' for'l8sa in Herodotus, though, does not depend on II 76.
Towards the end of Book I, on the occasion of the narration of Cyrus' expansion to the
north, Herodotus describes a number of Asian regions and peoples with their customs.
The Caspian sea, we are told, is a sea by itself, not connected with the Mediterranean,
the Atlantic and the Red Sea which are all one. To the west of the Caspian, there is the
Caucasus mountain range. And he continues (I 203): S0V8a 88 &V0po6KGDV TtoAAd
Kai navxoia ev scouxcp e/ei 6 KauKaooq, xa rcoAAa Ttavxa hn
dyplry; ^coovxa. fev xotai Kai SevSpea (puAAa xoifjoSs iSerig
Tiapexopeva elvai ^.eyexai, xa xpipovxac; xs Kai Ttapaployovxag
\38oop stbuxoioi eq xrjv so0rixa syypacpeiv- xa 8s obK
8KTl^\jVSa0ai, ... . The Caucasus has within it many and varied tribes ofmen, all of
them living from the wild forest. In the <forest>, there are said to be trees having
leaves of the following type: those who grind them, and mix them with water, paint
pictures with them on their clothing: and the pictures cannot be washed out, ... . There
is no question here of 'iSsa's meaning 'appearance' since there is no reference at all to
the leaves' actual appearance. Leaving the slight grammatical inconcinnity aside, what is
referred to in the following clause is the leaves' property and function. They are leaves of
287 For a more detailed analysis of the semantic development leading to 'type' cf. Sections IX - XI and
XIII of the chapter on ei8o<; above.
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an unusual sort. So, without repetition of how a word like 'tSsa originally denoting
'appearance, guise' may have come to mean 'type', it can be observed and stated that
here it does.
There is one more instance ofl8sa in Herodotus where the word may mean 'type'.
When his satraps had defeated and enslaved the rebellious Eretrians, Darius decided not
to punish them but instead to let them settle in a place called Ardericca of which we are
told (VI 119): ... &tco jiev Houccov SeKa Kai 8irjKooiou<; oxaSioix;
taie/ovxi, xsaoep&Kovxa 5s 6trco tou (ppeaxcx; to 7iapexexai
xpitpaaiaq 'iSeag. Kai yap aotpaA/uov Kal aXaq Kai sXaiov
dtpuooovxai 8^ abxoi) TpOTlCp XOlCp8s- its distance from Susa was two
hundred and ten stadia, and forty <stadia its distance> from the well which provides
three appearances. And indeed, asphalt and salt and oil is brought up from it in the
following way: ... . It is indeed the case that three types of stuff are produced from this
well; but that is not said. There is no qualifying genitive, we are not told three types of
what. In that, the use of l8sa here comes close to that of Democritus when he asserts
(Simplicius Physica 327, 24 = DK 68B167): SlVOV &7td TOO 7iavxd<;
&7lOKpi0f|Vai Ttavxoicov 'l8SGC)V, that a whirling of all sorts of appearances was
separated off from the all. If anything, Herodotus' usage is more definitely abstract,
since with Democritus the possibility remains that navxoiCOV 'l8sC0V is a descriptive
genitive: 'a whirl of many appearances' could be 'a whirl that has many appearances', 'a
whirl that appears now in one way, now in another'. That is not possible with Herodotus,
and so taking 'l8sa as a term referring to a material object with Democritus as well
becomes inherently more likely. The well produces three distinct 'appearances' or
'figures', if those terms can be stretched so as to accommodate any sort of physical
object.
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The one remaining occurrence of l8sa is interesting in a different respect. At the outset
of the campaign of the Persian against Eretria, the Eretrians ask Athens for help.
Nevertheless, Herodotus relates, the city was divided (VI 100): XCOV 8s EpexpiSCOV
fjv apa obSev byist; pouXeupa, o\ pexs7iep7rovxo pev 'A0r|valouq,
ecppovsov 8s Sicpaoiac; 'i8ea<;- oi pev yap abxcov kpouXeuovxo
8KXi7ieiv xf\v 7ioX.iv sq xa aicpa xf|g Ebpoirjc;, aXXoi 8e aOxcov I8ia
KspSsa TtpoaSeKopsvoi 7iapa xou riepaea) oloeoGai 7ipoo8ooir]v
SCKSUa^OVXO. Yet, the counsel of the Eretrians was not healthy, for on the one hand
they sentfor help to Athens, on the other they had in mind two schemes: indeed, part of
the citizens had decided to leave the city for the mountains of Euboia, but others,
thinking of the profitfor themselves from the Persian prepared to carry out treason. For
a detailed description of how a word like'lSsa, originally meaning 'appearance', 'guise'
or 'figure', then also 'type', can come to mean 'scheme', see the discussion of
Thucydides VI 77, 2 and at VIII 56, 2 in Section XIII of the chapter on stSoc; above.
'iSsa, at any rate, does here refer to what is in somebody's mind; in the clause
8(ppOV80V 8s 8l(paoia<; 'iSsac;, \8sac; is the direct object of a verb of thinking. It
would, of course, be an anachronism and incorrect to translate 'they had two ideas'; the
clause rather means something like 'they contemplated two ways of acting'; those two
ways are then narrated.
V.
'l8ea is not a term frequently encountered in early Hippocratic treatises.288 The one
instance in Airs, Waters, and Places has already been discussed.289 The other treatise to
be considered is The Nature of Man. Close to the beginning of that work there is a
288 For the selection of Hippocratic writings considered see Section VI of the chapter on SlSoc above;
cf. also Appendix I below.
289 See Section II above.
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reference to Melissus; in thought and terminology there seem to be echoes of
Anaxagoras; and as far as the subject matter set out in the opening paragraphs is
concerned, there appears to be a reaction to Diogenes of Apollonia.290 To all probability,
therefore, this Hippocratic treatise is also later than most or all of what we have of
Herodotus.
In Chapter I ofNature ofMan, the author, who professes to write about medicine only,
rejects the ideas of those writers on nature who claim that everything is one, and that that
one thing is everything; the one thing they cannot agree on, though, is what that one
thing is, air, fire, water or earth. They overthrow themselves with their arguments, and
this sctutov KaxaPd.xx.8lv is here attributed to Melissus rather than Protagoras,
perhaps because of Melissus' closer connection with the argument that everything is
one.291 In Chapter II, the author turns to the physicians, some of whom, he says, say that
man is blood, others that he is bile, yet others that he is phlegm. And comparing these
medical men with those writing on nature, he continues (II, 4): ETtlXoyov 8e
Ttoisovxai Kai ouxoi Ttavxsc; xdv abxov- sv yap stval tpaoiv, o xi
EKaoxoq abxcov PotiXexai dvopaaag, Kai xouxo pexaXXaoaeiv xrjv
i8sr|v Kai xrjv 8t3vap.iv, dvayKa^opevov (mo xs xou 0eppo(3 Kai xou
v|/u%pou, Kai ylvscGai yxuku Kai TtiKpov Kai Xeukov Kai psXav Kai
Tiavxoiov. fcpol 8e ot>Ss xauxa Sokei c58s e^siv TioXXa yap saxiv
fev xcp acopaxt feveovxa, a, oxav (m' dXXrjXcov 7iapa (puoiv
290
Compare in particular Nature ofMan II with Diogenes 64B2 and 5; cf. e.g. G. Plambock, Dynamis
im Corpus Hippocraticum, Wiesbaden 1964, pp. 12 - 16, especially p. 14, n. 1: "Die Verwandtschaft mit
Gedanken des Anaxagoras und des Diogenes von Apollonia ist natiirlich auffallig genug, vgl. etwa Vors.
59B4, 8, 12, 15 und 64B5, ... cf. also M.C. Stokes, loc. cit. (note 15 above) - Stokes' view that
Diogenes is the first explicitly to name and posit one substance as underlying all fits well with the other
features of Nature ofMan reminiscent of the eclectic. For a brief recent survey on the date of The Nature
ofMan cf. also G. Rechenauer, Thukydides und die hippokratische Medizin, Hildesheim 1991, pp. 175 -
178, with whose views on the date of some of the other Hippocratic writings I do not necessarily agree;
see also Appendix I below.
291 I am inclined to disagree with the interpretations of the significance of the mention of Melissus at
this point in the text offered by W.H.S. Jones, Hippocrates IV, Cambridge, Mass. 1931, p. 5, n. 1; and
by J.-H. Kiihn, System- und Methodenprobleme im Corpus Hippocraticum, Wiesbaden 1956, Ch. 3:
'Hypothesis und Wissenschaftssystem von De Natura Hominis', p. 70.
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Gsppalvsxat xs Kai i|/bxr|tai, Kai £;r|palvsxai kat bypatvsxai,
vouaouc; xIkxsv cqoxs noXXai psv \8sai xcov vouor|paxcov, 5b
Kat f] irjoig saxtv. 6l^io5 5b Bycoys xov cpaoKovxa aipa stvai pobvov
xov av0pa)7iov, Kai aXAo pr|8sv, Sbikvosiv abxdv pr^ psxa>Aaooovxa
xr^v 'i8sr|v prj8s ytvsoGai Tiavxoiov, &XV f| o6pr|v xiva xou sviauxob
p xf|<; fiX-iKirjq xf|<; xou dvGpcoTtou, sv f| aipa fevsov cpaivsxai pouvov
bv xcp dvGpamcp- b'ikoc; yap stvai piav xiva d&prjv, fev f\ cpaivsxai
ai)xo Sep' sauxou svsov- ... . But those as well all make the same postscript:
indeed, they say there is one [viz. 'one thing'], whatever each one of them wants to call
it, and this, they say, changes its appearance and its force, compelled by the warm and
the cold, it becomes sweet and bitter and white and black and of all sorts. But to me, it
does not seem to be so Indeed, there are many <things> in the body, which, when
against nature they are warmed or cooled or dried or wetted by each other, engender
diseases: so that there are many appearances of illnesses, but there is also many a
healing. I ask the one who says that man is blood alone, and nothing else, to show me
that he [viz. man] does not change his appearance and does not become of all sorts, but
show me either a certain season of the year or a certain age of a man< 's life> when
there seems to be only blood in a man: indeed it is plausible that there be one such
season in which it appear as being in itself by itself. And summarizing that part of his
work, he declares in Chapter V (V, 5): (pT|pi 8f^ stvai Kai cp^sypa Kat X°^1V
£avGf|v xs Kat psX,aivav. Kat xouxscov Ttpcoxov psv Kaxa vopov xa
obvopaxa SioptoGai cprjpt Kat ot>8svt abxscov xcouxo ouvopa stvai,
BTtBixa Kaxa cpriaiv zdq 'iSsaq KsxcoplcGai, Kat ouxs xo cp>u3ypa obSBv
soiKBvai xcp aipaxi, ouxb xo atpa xf| X°^fl> °^T8 TT1V X°^11v T(P
cpXsypaxi. n&q yap av soiKoxa strj xauxa dX,A,f)^oiaiv, c5v ouxs xa
Xpcopaxa opoia cpatvBxai xcpoaopcopsva, ouxs xf| x8lPt yauovxi
opoia Sokssi stvai; obxs yap Gsppa dpotcoc; feoxlv, obxs \|/i)xpa, obxs
^rjpa, obxs bypa. &vayKr| xolvuv, oxs xooobxov 8ii^A,aKxai
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dA,A,f|A,cov xf^v 'i8er|v xs Kat xr^v 5uvajj.iv, \it\ sv abxa slvai, slrcep pr\
7iup xs Kal u5cop sv xs Kat xabxov eoxiv. yvovr|<; 5' av xoia5s, oxi
oi)x sv tauxa navxa saxiv, tiXX' SKaoxov abxsov s%si 8uvajj.lv xs
Kal (puoiv XT^V SCOUXOU" ... . Therefore I say that there also is phlegm and yellow
and black bile. And of those I first claim that their names are defined by custom and
that to none of them there is the same name [viz. as to another one of them], then that
the appearances are separate by nature, and neither is phlegm in anything like to blood,
nor blood to bile, nor bile to phlegm. Indeed, how should those <things> be like each
other of which neither the colours appear similar to look at, nor do they seem to be like
to the touching hand? Indeed, neither are they alike warm nor alike cold nor alike dry
nor alike wet. Now surely there is a necessity, when they differ so much from each other
in appearance and force, that they are not one, if really fire and water are not one and
the same. So you may know with that, that those are not all one, but that each one of
them has its own force and nature: ....
The first occurrence of \5sa in Chapter II refers indisputably to the appearance of
whatever is posited as the one stuff of which man consists.292 With the second
occurrence in that chapter, TtO^Aai \5sai XGDV VOUar|jJ.dxCDV, there is a good case
for arguing in favour of many types of diseases', yet, since the actual appearances of the
diseases are different, there is at least a possibility that the transition from one meaning to
the other, from straightforward 'appearance' to 'type' in the sense defined in the
preceding chapter, has as yet not taken place; not much rests on that for our purposes,
but the qualifying indefinite TloA,^al may point to a meaning 'type'. In Chapter V, the
author states that of the things which are in the body, not only the names are different by
convention, but also Kaxd (puaiV xd(^ 'l5sa^ KS/COploOai; from the emphasis on
lack of SOlKSVai or being like in the following clauses, it is clear that it is again the
appearances of the things which are distinct: that their appearances are separate by
292 For these two passages, and in particular for the meaning of 'l8sa and 86vapic; therein, cf. G.
Plambock, loc. cit., whose interpretation of Chapters II and VI follow to a large extent.
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nature. Then colour is named as an obvious element of appearance, warm, cold, dry and
wet, what is sensed by the touching hand, as primary 5uvd|lStc; or forces.
While the word l8sa, meaning 'appearance' and perhaps on one occasion 'type', is
confined to those two places in the first half of the work, there are three occurrences of
s!5oq towards the end. In Chapter IX, the author states that diseases must be cured with
a treatment which is the opposite of their causes.293 to 8s OUflTtav yvcovat, 8ei
xov 'njxpov fevavxlov loxaoGai xoiai KaGeaxecDGi Kai voofjpaai Kal
slSeoi Kai a>pr|oi Kal fjXiKlpoi, Kal xa ouvxeIvovxa Xosiv, Kal xa
A,sXl)JJ.SVa GOVTSlveiV ... . But to know all, it is necessary that the physician
positions himself opposite the prevailing diseases, types, seasons and ages, and must
loosen what is tight and tighten what is loose: ... . There seems to me a measure of
rhetoric in this prescription: the disease is the general object of concern for the physician,
to an extent independent of the patient; the patient's appearance and type are what the
physician sees himself with any given case, the time of year is again independent of and
external to the patient, the age internal. The theory of treatment by opposite is
consistent: one can loosen what is tight: but how does one treat a young person or a
ruddy person on that principle? - A little later in the same chapter, it is repeated that for
those diseases which depend on regimen, treatment should be preceded by examining
too dvGpcimoi) xrjv cpuaiv xfjv xe fjX,iKirjv Kal to el5o<; Kal xr\v
dSptjV too sxeoq Kal xri<; VOUGOl) XOV xpOTCOV, a man's nature and age and
type and the time of year and the way of the disease. Here the order of things to
consider is different in that everything pertaining to the person is enumerated first. Age,
season, type and disease, in that order, are mentioned again two lines later. Finally, in
Chapter XV, the last section of the treatise, we learn: Ol 7tXsiOXOl XCOV 7tl)pSTOOV
ylvovxai into si$ea 8s atpsoov feaxl xsaaapa, ... . Most fevers
come from bile: there are four types of them. We then learn that those types are the
continued, the quotidian, the tertian and the quartan.
293 The abstract language is mine, not the author's.
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VI.
In all, there are 14 instances of the word l8ea in Thucydides. The word appears in all
the various senses discussed so far. It denotes 'appearance' or 'figure' on one occasion,
'appearance' potentially on another one. The context of VI 4, 5 is an excursus on the
history and geography of Sicily. In fair detail, the foundations and affiliations of the
various colonies are listed. Among others, we learn about the foundation of Zankle from
Kyme, itself a Chalcidian town in Opikian territory; this settlement was later called
Messene, but, we are told: ovopa 8e to pev TipffiTOV ZtiyKX,r| f|V brcd TO>v
ZikbA-gciv KXr|0eiaa, on 8pe7tavoei8e<; tt^v 'i8eav to xcoplov feoxi - to
88 SpSTtavOV o'l zlkexol ^aykx,ov kax-ouolv ... . At first, the name was
Zankle, <the city> being called so by the Sicilians, because as to its figure the place is
like a sickle294 - and the sickle the Sicilians call 'zanklon' ... . l8sa does refer to the
'appearance' of the land, but more specifically to its 'figure'.
'l8ea in that transitional stage in meaning between 'appearance' and 'type' can be seen
at II 51,1. At the end of his description of the epidemic which befell Athens in the
summer of 430, a description in the style of professional medical treatises of his time,
Thucydides has this concluding sentence295: TO pev OUV VOOr|pa, 7ioA,A,d Kai
294 For adjectives in - Sl5tj<; and their meaning, cf. Section II of the chapter on elSoc^ above.
295 Cf. the discussion of slSo^ in the preceding passage in Thucydides in Section XI of the chapter on
sISoc; above: "By II 50, 1, Thucydides has given a detailed account of the way the epidemic of 430 B.C.
affected people, giving both the symptoms of the disease and in particular the order in which they
occurred. Those who survived an attack did so only with loss of limbs or of eye-sight or of memory. He
continues: yevdpevov yap Kpeiooov Xdyov to s!8o<; xr\c, vdoou, xd xs aXXa
Xaks7xcoxfepco(; f| Kaxa xtjv dv0pco7tsiav cpoaiv 7tpoc67ti7txev eKdaxtp Kal ev xcpSe
s5f|kc0oe pdz-toxa aXXo XI OV f| xrav ^l)VXp6cpa)V xt- ... . Indeed, the way of the disease
having become greater than could be said, it also otherwise befell everybody harder than is fit for
human nature, but in the following <respect> it was most clear that it was something other than any of
the indigenous <diseases>:... . [...] The el8o<^ of the disease is here on the one hand the 'way' it took,
on the other hand its 'appearance' in the sense of its manifestation in the various symptoms so vividly
and visually described by Thucydides in the preceding paragraphs. [...] It would perhaps not be
absolutely incorrect to translate to 8tSo^ xf|<^ vdoot) as the type of the disease; one would have to
bear in mind, though, that 'type' on the whole is a much more abstract term in English than sl8o^ is
here."
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aXXa Tiapa^iTcovxi hioniaq, cog sKaaxcp exuyxavs xi Siacpepovxcog
sxspco Tipog sxepov yiyvopsvov, xoiouxov f|v stiI rcav xijv 'i8eav. Now
- leaving out a number of peculiarities as would befall any one person in a way
different from any other - such was the disease on the whole with regard to its
appearance. With 'iSca, Thucydides refers to the totality of the appearance or
appearances the disease had with all the people it had befallen; that does involve
appearance over time, but most of all 'l8ea refers to the appearance of the disease
collectively. This collective use of 'l8s<X may be seen as an intermediate stage between
'appearance (of a single object)' and 'type', since it does contain, at least implicitly, an
abstraction from the particular instance whose appearance can be observed as such.
To be considered next is a number of passages where \8sa means 'type', either as 'type
(of an event)' or as 'type (of an action)'. On five occasions, the word is part of a phrase
kclgcl \8sa Kaxsaxr| / noXXai \8eai Kaxeoxrjoav (with genitive), every type /
many types (of something) obtained. Not found in that constellation before Thucydides,
it seems to be a standing phrase with him. Its first occurrence is at I 109, 2.296 There,
296 It will suffice to give that one example. It is discussed, and the others are listed, by S. Hornblower, A
Commentary on Thucydides I, Oxford 1991, note on Thucydides I 109, 1, whose note I quote in full,
since on the one hand he gives an accurate summary and apt criticism of previous views on the matter
(G. Rechenauer, Thukydides und die hippokratische Medizin, Hildesheim 1991, was published
simultaneously but does not discuss the word l86a or its uses at all), on the other hand he serves as a
good backdrop against which my sketchy discussion may be read; Hornblower writes (p. 172ff.):
"7toX.^al iSsat 7loX,epa)V KaX80XT|0av: 'they experienced the many different forms and
fortunes of war'. As the scholiast noted, both notions (forms, fortunes) are probably conveyed
by 'l§6ai, lit. 'kinds'. Phrases like this one, often expressed in the words 7taoa 'l86a
Kdx6oXT|, 'there was every form of...', are frequent in Th., esp. with words meaning death
(Oavdxot), 6A.60pOD). Cp. iii. 81. 5, 83. 1, 98. 3; vii. 29.5; also ii. 19. 1. Th.'s fondness for
the locution has not interested commentators, though Classen/Steup do give parallels. It has
been studied by K. Weidauer, Thukydides und die hippokratischen Schriften (Heidelberg,
1953), 26f. As he says, the Hippocratic corpus of medical writings uses \8sa with the genitive
to differentiate particular instances of a general phenomenon, e.g. four kinds of fluid (blood,
bile, etc.): xfeooctpeg iSsttl ^OAOD, On Diseases, iv. 32. Cp. 'all the discharges of bile' to
which doctors have given names, &JtOKtt0dpGStg xo/.f|C Ttdottt, at Th. ii. 49. 3 (though
this is really a way of disclaiming excessive technicality; cp. Thucydides, 97, 134). Note also ii.
51. 1, in the description of the plague, where we have 87tl Ttdv Xtjv iSsav, 'in all its forms',
used of the plague itself. These Hippocratic usages are discussed in C.M. Gillespie, 'The Use of
El8oq and I8sa in Hippocrates', CQ 6 (1912), 179ff., a sensible reply to some needlessly
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Thucydides describes the situation of the Athenian contingent in Egypt towards the end
of the Egyptian Expedition of 454: Ol 5' 8V if) A'lyUTTTtp 'AGrjvaiOl Kai o't
^up.(iaxoi 87i8ji£vov, Kai aircoic; rcoAAal 'i8sai 7io>.8fj.cov Kaxeairjoav.
But in Egypt there remained Athenians and allied troops, and for them many types of
warfare obtained. It is to be noted that the verb KaT80TT|Gav is employed like (if not
as) an auxiliary, with the same construction otherwise used with sivat, viz. verb plus
nominative of the thing 'had' plus dativus commodi of the person / people 'having'. The
noun in the genitive, TtoX&flCDV, is here in the plural, indicative of the early, pre-
rationalised stage of semantic development. What was experienced were many different
situations of the sort one experiences in war, and that plurality is expressed - in what
complicated pages of A.E. Taylor, Varia Socratica, I (Oxford, 1911). (Note Gillespie, 202. 'in
Thucydides, 7tdoa 'l86a has become so much a formula that it does not matter whether we
translate form, mode or kind'.) Taylor is, however, useful for his collection of all (but see
below) relevant passages in Th. and other relevant fifth-century authors. He points out that Th.
uses K(Zx6oxT| only with l8su, not with the closely related word 8lSoc. Of KCIXSOXT] Taylor
claims (189) that it is 'itself a word of medicine' and concludes (190) that 'the repeated
conjunction 7taoa 'l8£a TIVCK^ Kaxfeoilj points to a borrowing by Thucydides from the
language of medicine'. Taylor gives no authority for the claim about KUXfeoXT] (nor does
Weidauer, quoting Taylor), nor does it seem to be particularly 'medical' (the treatises
sometimes use the verb in the special sense 'recover', but that is not relevant here). Perhaps
Taylor is thinking of the undoubtedly medical connotations of the related noun KUXdoiUOl^,
'constitution' (three instances in one Hippocratic paragraph at Epidemics, iii. XVI (Loeb
Hippocrates, I. 256)). Even if KaX80XT| could be shown to be frequent in the Hippocratic
writings, it is too common and favourite in Th., as are the other parts of the verb from which it
comes, for this to mean much (there are over five pages on KU0lGxdvui in Betant's Lexicon
Thucydideum). Equally, 'l86a is clearly not a recherche word, though it was perhaps a
fashionable one: see below (it is relevant that Hdt. anticipates Th.'s use of 'l86a, vi. 119. 2:
xptcpao'tai; 'i86a<;).
Weidauer (above), discussing l86(X and KGtx£oXT|, says that Th. and the Hippocratics use
some of the same language not because of any borrowing but because they are both fond of
tracing divergent phenomena. One can perhaps go a little further than this (though less far than
Taylor wanted): if Th.'s language in the present passage sounds semi-technical, or rather -
given that the context is warfare, not death or disease - a little pretentious, that is perhaps
because such terms as he uses were the small change of philosophical or rhetorical discussion.
Cp. Demokritos, DK 68 B 11, 'there are two kinds, iSflttl, of knowledge, yvc&jil"|, one genuine,
the other bastard [or 'obscure'].' (I do not know why Taylor's section on sophists and
Presocratics omits this interesting passage, which is quoted by Sextus Empiricus); and the Hdt.
passage cited above. See above, 1. In. on d^iokoycoxaxov for the indebtedness of both Th.
and the doctors to the language and methods of rhetorical debate.
But what of Th.'s fondness for the whole phrase 7taoa \8£u KaXBOXT] or the similar phrase
found here, 7loAAal \86ai Kaxsoxijoav? This seems, despite Taylor, to be an idiosyncrasy
of his own." (sic!)
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could be called a constructio ad sensum of a sort common, at a colloquial level, with
words denoting 'type' or 'sort' or 'kind' in many a language - through use of the plural
of both the noun denoting 'type' and the noun typified; a purely logical construction
would demand the singular for the latter. On the four occasions later on in his account,
the phrase has - disregarding the tense of the verb - the form Ttaca 'l8sa KaX80XT|, so
that the question does not arise.
A closely related use of'l8ea is found at III 112, 7. The phrase KOLGOL \8ea
Kaxsoxr) just discussed is employed with nouns like Gavaxoi), ofdeath, 6X,80pOU, of
disaster, and, on one occasion (III 98, 3), nCLGCL XS 'l8ea K0tX8OXr| XX\q (puyr|<;
kat xou 6Xe0pOU xcp oxpaxojteScp xrov 'AGrjvaiCOV, there was every type of
flight and disaster for the army of the Athenians. Shortly afterwards, and still as part of
the description of events of 426, the sixth year of the war, that is to say, to all probability
written at more or less the same time, we read of the defeated forces of the Amprakiots
(III 112, 6): 7ipoKax8iX,rip.p.8vcov Se xcdv 68a>v, Kal apa xa>v pev
'AptpiXoxcov eprtetpcov ovxcov xfjg eauxcov yf\q Kal yiXcov Tipoq
bn'kizaq, xcov 8s (nieipcov Kai (tv87tioxr|p6vcov OTtr) xpa7tcovxai,
feo7xiTtxovxs(; sq xs xaP^Spa<; Kat xa<; rcpo^s^oxiopevaq eveSpac;
SistpGelpovxo. Kai feq 7taaav 'i8sav x®piloavxs(; xijq fexpaTtovxo
XlVSq Kal 8<; Xfjv Ga^aaaaV Ot) 7XOXO) (UTieXOUOaV, ... . With the roads taken
in advance and, at the same time, the Anphilochians being acquainted with their own
land and fighting in light armour against hoplites, but them (= the Amprakiots) being
unacquainted and not knowing whither they should turn, they perished, falling into
gullies and prepared ambushes. And giving way to any type offlight some even turned
to the sea which lay not far off. The phrase sq 7taoav iSsav %COpf}oavxsg xfjq
cpl)yf|<;297 should, to my mind, not be looked at in isolation, even if one were to agree
that 'sq naoav 'l8sav xrjc; (puyfjc; depends solely on X®plfaavxsg and not
297
Hornblower, op. cit., ad loc., translates: "They tried every means of escape."
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somehow also on 8Tp(X7lOVTO. Behind the phrase there are common expressions like EC,
cpuyriv Tp87l8O0ai, turn to flight;298 a hypothetical and, I think, plausible line of
development moves from 'turn/rush/give way to flight' to 'turn/rush/give way to any
type of flight'; from there it is but a short step to isolating the phrase 'turn to any type
of; that may be at the origin of the phrase fe7ti 6Xko / TOUTO TO elSo^
Tp87lSO0ai.299 There is, of course, the alternative possibility that a collocation of the
noun St8o<; and the verb Tp87l8O0at arose from the closeness in meaning of the noun
SlSoc; in the sense of 'way, manner' and the noun xporcoc;.
Returning to Thucydides' use of 'l88(X, the word can be translated as 'way' or 'ways'
on four occasions,300 including III 62, 2, where the Thebans accuse the Plataeans of
'atticizing', demonstrating that they have behaved like that on one occasion, namely
when they alone of all the Boeotians did not medize solely because the Athenians did not
- while the Thebans did - ... xf| fXSVXOl at>xf| 'l8s$ UGTSpov 'lOVTCOV
'A0r|vaicov 87il xou<;"EXAr|va(; povoix; au Boicoxcov dxxiKioai. xaixoi
oKs\|/ao0e sv oico eiSei eKtixepoi r||iftjv xouxo S7tpa^av. ... in the same
way, though, they later atticised again alone of all Boeotians when the Athenians went
against the Greeks. Yet look in what way each of us did that. And there follows the
distinction of acting voluntarily and acting against one's will forced by circumstances. -
Seeing Thucydides as guided by the principle of variatio seems preferable to attempting
to detect differences in connotations between'l8ea and sl8o<^ here.
298 Cf. ec; (puyr|V expdftOVXO Herodotus VIII 89; cf. Xpa7t6|iSVOl stpeuyov Thucydides III 98, 1;
cf. also the immediately preceding paragraph in Thucydides, III 112, 5: Ol 8s koi7tol KUld pa
6pr| 8C cpuyriv 6ippr|Oav, the rest rushed to flight in the mountains.
299 At Thucydides VI 77, 2 and VIII 56, 2, and at Aristophanes, Plutus 316f. Cf. Section XI of the
chapter on si8o^ above.
300 For III 62, cf. the discussion in Section XI of the chapter on cl8o^ above. IV 55, 2 7iapd xf|V
UTCdp/OUOav ocpcov i86av xf)C 7lupaOK8l)f|c; - against their accustomed way offighting. VI 76, 3
xfi 8e abxfi 't8sa SKeivd xe eoxov Kal xa bv0d8e vuv 7teipcovxai - in the same way they
got hold of those, they now also try here; note the use of the phrase STtl XOUXO XO sISoq
XpS7rop6vot)C; (hoxs in VI 77, 2 - another case of variation as with III 62? VII 82, 1 xauxr| XT| 't86a
- in that way; the phrase refers to a way of acting described in the preceding clauses.
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In the two remaining passages to be considered, 'l8sa seems to mean something like 'a
way of acting' or 'scheme' in more or less the same way stSoc^ does at VI 77, 2, VIII
56, 2 and VIII 90, 1, and at Aristophanes' Plutus 317.301 At II 19, 1, Thucydides
describes the devastation of Attica at the hands of the Peloponnesian forces. Before
destroying the crops, they tried to take the garrison Oinoe: £7t£lSr| }i£VTOl
7rpooPaXovx££ xf| O'lvop Kal Ttaaav \86av 7t£ipaoavx£c; otnc feSuvavxo
£X£IV, ... , kokfiaXov kg Tl^V 'AxxtKf|V. But when in attacking Oinoe and trying
every scheme they were not able to take it, ... , they invaded Attica. TCCLOCl 'iS&a is
either 'every way', namely of 7tpooPaA,£lV, of attacking, or it is - in absolute use of the
phrase - 'scheme', that is to say 'device', 'plan', 'way of action' as such, without
reference to the preceding phrase.
The second context of 'iS&a in the sense of scheme is very similar indeed. The
Peloponnesians are attacking Plataea; their efforts fail and they think of encircling the
whole city with a wall (II 77, 2): 7ipoT£pov 8£ 7tupi eSo^ev abxoit; 7i£ipaaai
e'l Suvaivxo 7iV£U|j.aTO<; y£voji£voi) £7ti(pX&;ai xr^v 7toX.iv ouaav ot>
pEyaXriv naaav yap 8r\ \86av £7t£voouv, £i Ttcog acpioiv av£u
SaTtavric; Kai TtoXlopKiac; TtpoaaxOelr). But before <resorting to> that, it
seemed to them <good> to try it with fire, if, with a breeze setting in, they could set
alight the city, which was not a big one: indeed, they thus thought of every scheme - if
only the city could be taken by them without expenditure and siege. In both cases, the
attacking forces try in every way to take the place they attack. A shift in meaning, if
there is a shift, is effected by the fact that the action under consideration is not actually
carried out and completed but attempted and thought of only. A 'way of acting' which
has its existence only in somebody's mind is a 'scheme' or 'plan'. If a Greek native
speaker would have perceived that application as semantic extension cannot be answered
with confidence.
301 For a discussion of these passages cf. Section XII of the chapter on et8oq above.
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VII.
With Aristophanes, the word l8sa has the same semantic range as with Thucydides.302
Besides denoting 'appearance' and 'figure', it can also mean 'type', as at Frogs 383f., an
'exhortation to invoke Demeter'303 , preceding the actual hymn to the goddess by the
chorus: ays vuv sxspav tpvoov \8sav xf^v Kaprcocpopov PaclA.siav, |
Afjprjxpa 0sav, tTciKoapotvxsc; ^aGsaic; poA,7iai<; KsAa8sixs. Come now,
exalting the fruit-bearing queen, the goddess Demeter, sound another type of hymn with
reverend dancing-songs.
'l8sa means 'type' once, and once 'figure', at Birds 992 - 1003, where a pun may be
intended: Meton: fiKCO Ttap' fipac; - Pisthetairos: SXSpOV at xouxl KaKOV. |
xl Sal at Spaacov; ziq \Ssa Pou?cstpaxo<;; | xig f|rctvoia, xic; 6
xoGopvoc; xf|<; 68ot; | M: yscopsxpf|aai potA,opai xov dspa | ujj.iv,
8isA,siv xs Kaxa ytac;. P: upoc; xoov Gscov, | at 8' si xlc; dvSpcov; M:
oaxic; sip' syco; Msxcov, | ov otSsv ' E?cA,d<; x© Ko^covoc;. P: sItxs poi,
| xauxt 8s aoi xl scxi; | M: Kavovsg dspoq. | atxtica yap dip saxi
xf^v \Ssav oXoc, | Kaxa Ttviysa paXiaxa. TipoaGstc; otv syco | xov
Kavov' avcoGsv xouxovi xov KaprctA-ov, | tvGslc; 8iapfjxr|v -
pavGavsic;; P. ot pavGavco. M: I come to you - P: This is yet another evil. So, what
are you doing? What type of plan? What is the thought? What is the buskin of your
way? M: I mean to measure the airfor you, dividing according to land-measures. P: By
the gods. And who of all men are you? M: Who I am? Meton, whom all Hellas knows
and Colonus. P: Tell me, what is it you have there? M: Measures of the air. First,
indeed, air as to its figure is as a whole most like an baking-oven. Now, attaching from
above this curved measure, I, setting in this compass - do you understand? P: I don't
understand. There cannot be any doubt that in this quick stichomythic, and sometimes
302 For Aristophanes Plutus 557 - 561 ('appearance') and Clouds 288ff. ('figure'), cf. Sections I and II
above.
303 K. Dover, Aristophanes. Frogs, Oxford 1993, commentary ad. loc.
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even semi-stichomythic exchange, repetition of \8sa would have been intentional, and
noted as such by the audience. It is more difficult to say what significance that repetition
had, and in particular if there was an implied joke relying on two different senses of the
word.
A 'way' of doing something is denoted by 'iSea at Thesmophoriazusae 434 - 439,
where the chorus of women praises Mikka, the woman who has just finished her speech:
OD7ico xauxTjt; fjKouoa | TtoA-imA-OKCOTspac; yuvaiKdg | ob8e Seivoxepov
X-syouoriq. | rcavxa yap A-eyei Siicaia- | ndcaq 5' 'iSeac; fe^xaaev, |
7tavxa 8' sPaaxaos (ppevl tiukvocx; xe | tioikIXoix; Xoyoix; &vr|bpev |
8U SlS^XjXTjpSVOU^. Not ever have I heard a woman more versatile or more able to
speak than that one. Indeed, everything she says is right: she has tried out all figures
and ways <ofspeaking>, and she has put to proofeverything in her mind and shrewdly
found out varied expressions, well searched out. It seems as if 'iSsa, used in a rhetorical
context, but by laymen, could either just denote the various ways of speaking open to the
orator, a usage which need not presuppose any specialisation in vocabulary, or
conversely \8sa could be a semi-technical term of rhetoric theory, a rhetorical 'figure',
as it will be in the fourth century. However that may be, the word comes in naturally, and
the uncertainty as to whether technical usage is intended or not is in itself indicative of
how technical terminology proper could naturally arise from common usage.
A slightly more complicated context is that of Clouds 545ff. In this part of the
parabasis, the chorus as the poet's mouthpiece mildly scold the audience for not
awarding the first version of the Clouds first prize despite his innovative and inventive
way of writing. He does not bother the audience with vulgar common-place jokes, and
he does not reproduce over and over again a joke which was successful once: K&yco
pev xoiouxoc; ftvrjp Gov 7tor|xf|<; ob Kopoo, | ob8' bpag ^rjx© '^a7iaxav
8iq Kai xplg xaux' e'loaycov, | tiXX' a'lei Kaivat; 'iSsag e'tacpepcov
oocpl^opai | obSev &^A,fj^aioiv 6polag Kal nacac, Se^iac;- ... . And
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being such a poet, I nevertheless don't think too highly ofmyself, nor do I try to deceive
you by producing the same things twice and thrice, but I, always introducing new
schemes, devise them in nothing similar to each other and all alike clever. There are, I
think, two possible ways of reading this passage. Alternatively to the translation just
given, one could take Kdivtic; \8scxc; as referring to what Aristophanes provides in the
lines immediately following, namely an assembly of personages he introduced and treated
or mistreated, but only until his purpose was served, not ad nauseam as his colleagues.
The named individuals Aristophanes then enumerates can be regarded as the 'new
figures' he introduces on stage. In favour, however, of the translation proposed above,
adhering to the traditional way of interpreting this passage, one could adduce the first
fragment of Eupolis' Autolykos, in which one character accuses the other: £7lt
KaivoxBpaq \5ea<; froePcov ptov, (5 jioxGipot;, STptPec;. Worthless one,
being impious, you wasted your life on newish schemes. Here KdlVOTSpO^, rather
new, means 'new and therefore bad', as does VSCOTCpo^ elsewhere; nevertheless,
although this connotation is clearly absent from Aristophanes, it is not impossible that
Katval 'l5sai, new schemes, was something like a standing phrase, with positive or
negative overtones according to context.304
VIII.
\5sa in early Plato is as rare a word as it is in the fifth century authors discussed so far.
There are two dialogues in which the word is used in an aristocratic context with
reference to the figure of a beautiful youth. The three occurrences in the Charmides may
be counted as one, as it is in a recurring context that first Critias and then Socrates refer
to Charmides' 'l8sa or figure. At the beginning of the conversation, Critias is full of
praise for his nephew and assures Socrates (157dl): X&ycx) JISVTOI OOl Oil
304 In fifth century oratory the word t86a is very rare. On the two occasions it occurs it denotes a human
being's figure, without any connotations of beauty (Andocides, On the Mysteries 100, 5; Lysias II4, 8).
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XappiSr|<; xcov f|^iKicoxd)V ob povov xf| 'i8sa Soksi Siacpspsiv, hX'kd
Kai abxqj xobxcp, 06 ob cpr^g xr\v sticoSt^v s%siv- cpflg 8s oco(ppoobvr|<;-
T| yap; For sure, I tell you that Charmides appears to differ from the youths ofhis age
not only in his figure, but also in that very thing of which you say you have an
incantation: and you mean temperance, don't you? As at its earliest occurrence, i8sa or
figure is in some way contrasted with qualities of the mind. Taking up this praise by an
uncle for his nephew, Socrates begins a conversation with the youth by praising his
descent and states (I58a7):... xd psv ouv dpcopsva xf|g i8saq, c5 cpiXe nal
rXauKcovoc;, Soksic; poi ob8sva xd>v Ttpo 00b bv ob8svi
brcoPsPrjKsvai- s'l 8s 81^ Kai Tipoq aco(ppoo\3vr|v Kai 7ipd<; xdXka Kaxa
xov xobSs A,oyov iKavdx; rcscpuKag, paKapiov os, fjv 8' syco, c5 cpiXs
XapjllSr), fj jj.Tjxr)p sxikxsv. As far as what is visible ofyour figure is concerned,
dear son of Glaucon, you seem to me not to lag behind any of your forbears in
anything: thus, if, as this man says, you are also naturally fit as regards temperance
and the other things <mentioned>, I said, your mother has born you a lucky man. Both
reference and context are virtually identical. - Finally, at a point in their discussion when
Socrates' arguments and concerns have produced an aporia, he scolds Charmides
(I75d6):... t>7isp 8s oob, fjv 8' syc6, c5 XappiSr), Ttavu dyavaKxco, s'l ab
xoiobxoc; cov xr^v \8sav Kai txpoc; xobxcp xf^v \|/ux^v oaxppovsoxaxoc;,
pr|8sv 6vf)afl dnd xabxpq xf|g ococppoobvrjq but on your behalf, I
said, I am rather annoyed, Charmides, that you, being such <as you are> as to figure
and in addition to that very temperate as to your soul, should not benefit at allfrom that
temperance....
The context in the Protagoras is less elaborate, but otherwise similar. In describing the
scene they encountered when they entered the house of the rich Callias, Socrates says
while talking about those gathered around Prodicus (Protagoras 315d7):
7iapSKd0r|vxo 8s abxqj brti xaiq ttAtigiov K^lvah; Ilauoaviat; xs 6 bK
Kspapsoov Kai psxa nauoaviou vsov xi sxi psipaKiov, (bq psv
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8yc5|j.ai Kalov tb K&ya0dv xrjv cpuoiv, xrjv 5' ouv 'i8eav 7iavi) Ka^oq.
By him, there sat on nearby benches Pausanias from Kerameus, and with Pausanias a
young man, still a youth, as I think noble and good as to his nature, but certainly very
beautiful as to his figure. Without entering into a discussion if 'l88(X in these four
instances is supposed to refer to the 'figure' of the two youths or to their 'appearance' in
general, Plato employs 'l8sa in his early dialogues to bestow 'heroic praise' in
aristocratic circles; the term refers to the external, visible figure as opposed to the mind
or nature of the young men described.
IX.
At the end of the discussion of Thucydides' use of sl8o^ it was stated that305 , with
Thucydides, sl8o<; is fairly consistently applied to actions, often qualified as 'this' or
'that' or 'another'; it seems to denote a 'type of action', a 'way (of acting)', and then a
'scheme' or 'way or type of action or acting'; that this usage may be colloquial Attic is
confirmed by Aristophanes. It could be shown that this development is a natural
extension of application of el8o<; to an action instead of to a thing, facilitated by use of
the word as denoting 'type' in addition to appearance. That can now be supplemented
and modified. We have seen that, with Herodotus, the word 'iSea has a range of
meanings and applications, beginning with what was, to all probability, the original
meaning and application, the 'appearance' and 'guise', with the connotations of 'figure',
of a person; that the noun was then applied to animals, probably again with connotations
of 'figure'; that there is an extension from that to 'type', applied to animals and plants. In
a different direction, there is the same extension as with Democritus: a certain particular
object or thing or entity can be referred to as an 'iSea. Lastly, there is an instance of
'l8sa referring to a 'way of acting' or 'way of action', where 'l8sa could be translated as
305 Section XII of the chapter on 8l§0^ above.
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'scheme', since the way of action is presented as envisaged, as being present only in the
mind as yet.
A remarkable aspect of this usage is that if one assumes that Herodotus had written at
least part of his account by the mid-forties, a number of semantic extensions which 'l8sa
apparently shares with sISck^ seem to have taken place with 'l8sa first; and that at a time
of which it is doubtful and uncertain which of the medical treatises on which Thucydides
is sometimes said to depend in his style had yet been composed. It is, of course, possible
that the Ionian Herodotus of Halicarnassus was familiar with the parlance of the medical
men from the neighbouring island of Cos, in which case this must serve as a warning not
to rely too heavily on what has by chance survived; it is, however, likewise possible that
the semantic extensions 'type', 'way of acting' and 'scheme', as a sense of elSoc; at least
also found with Aristophanes306, was common fifth century Greek rather than specialized
vocabulary of one particular profession.307 That, of course, has serious consequences for
an evaluation of the semantic development of sl8o(^. While both the actual respective
meanings and the reasoning behind the development can be retained as valid, the
arguments which have been outlined above for underlying any one particular
development should be transferred to the corresponding instances of 'l8sa. In the
semantic development of SlSo^, a preceding parallel development of \8sa will have
played a role. Since there is an original semantic overlap between the two Greek words,
there is always the possibility that subsequent extensions of connotations and in
application of one of the two terms will be transferred to the other.
If a conclusion can be drawn from the one definitely early medical treatise in which
'tSsa and st8o<; co-occur, The Nature of Man,308 it is perhaps the following: both
306 See Section VII above.
307 If Herodotus VI 119 can really be taken as evidence for'l8sa as 'appearance' or 'figure' in the sense
of 'a certain thing' must, I fear, be left undecided; the sentence is, to my mind, not sufficiently clear and
unambiguous.
308 See Section V above.
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Greek nouns can mean both 'appearance' and 'type'. The author speaks of TtoAAai
'l8eai VODOr||J.(XTCOV, many types of diseases, and of TEOOapa SlSsa TlupetCOV,
four types offevers. However, as we have seen, the iSsai in Chapter II may refer more
closely to visible manifestations.309 Otherwise, the author uses 't8sa when he talks about
what we would call physics and chemistry, when he discusses pre-Socratic philosophical
theories and their application to medicine. He employs SlSoc; when he talks about the
appearance of a person or the type of person the physician is dealing with. It is
conceivable that this is not so by accident. It is possible that there was a large semantic
overlap between stSoc; and 'iSsa, but that the latter word was more closely associated
with physical theory.310
309 Cf. Plambock, op. cit., p. 15, n. 1.
310 Note that on the one surviving occasion Democritus distinguishes between two types of something,
68B11, he uses the word 'tSEGL. - Just as the author of The Nature ofMan uses 'l86a for 'type' in that
section of his work in which he otherwise discusses things and their 'l86a, but uses Et8o<^ for 'type' in
that section in which he otherwise discusses the EtSoc of something; i.e., on the assumption that both
elSot; and'lSea could be synonyms when they meant 'type', the author's choice of one or the other may
have been determined simply and solely by earlier use in the same work or section of a work of either
noun in any of its senses; if an author happened to have used the word t86a with any of its senses, and
then had to use a word for 'type', he would use 'l86a rather than bISoc;; that, however is a subjective
impression rather than anything I should like to attempt to prove.
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PART in
PHAEDO 100b - 105e
I.
Many of the claims generally made concerning the ontology of Plato's middle dialogues
are based on the report of Socrates' last hours by Phaedo of Elis, a report Plato makes
Phaedo give to Echecrates and his friends at the town of Phlius in the Peloponnese. By
the end of the first ten lines of page 100 of the Phaedo, a dialogue that occupies pages
57 to 118 of Volume I of Stephanus' edition, Socrates, who saw fit to relate some of the
thoughts and attitudes he had held in his earlier years, has described how, as part of a
general interest in natural phenomena, he had come across a book by Anaxagoras; in that
book, Anaxagoras had submitted that mind, ordering the world, is the cause and reason
(alxioq, aula) of things' being as they are (97c); Socrates was attracted by that
proposition as he hoped therewith to see how everything was ordered for the best,
thinking that he would no longer yearn for another type of cause and reason, C0<^
OUKSTI rcoOeoofievoc; aiziaq alko elScx; (98a2); but he was dissatisfied when
he discovered how Anaxagoras adduced as causes and reasons airs and aethers and
waters and many other such unlikely things, tl&p&C, 8s KClt (X'l0£pa^ KCll \38(XTa.
a'mcojievov Kai aXXa noXXd Kat (XTOTta (98cl). Socrates proceeds by making
a distinction between 'cause and reason' and 'that without which a cause and reason
could not be cause and reason' (99b), and then declares that because he could not find
that 'cause and reason' which would have provided an explanation in terms of what is
good and best, it therefore seemed to him to be necessary to escape into the JtOyoi and
to search and look in them for the truth of the things that are, sSo^S Sf| JIOl
250
Xpfjvai sic, xobg Aoyoug Kaxacpbyovxa ev SKsivoig 0K07ieiv xoov
ovxcdv xt^v &A,f|0eiav (99e4). As is explained in the following lines, these Aoyoi
are arguments which proceed from the strongest, that is to say most accepted and
plausible, assumption, and which are in agreement with each other. Socrates expresses
his concern that what he has said is perhaps not quite clear to Cebes and the others, and
when Cebes agrees, he clarifies:
100bl &AA', fj 8' oc„ c58e Aeyco, obSev Kaivov, &A.A,' anep del xe
aAAoxe KCti sv xcp 7iapeAr|A,u06xi A,oyco obSev 7iS7tau|iai Asycov.
epxopai yap 8i^ STiixsipcov ooi S7ti8ei£ao0ai xrjg aixiag xo el8og o
7t87ipaypdxeupai, Kai eipi TtaAiv sk SKeiva xa 7ioAi)0pbAr|xa Kat
apxopai hn' sksIvcdv, b7to0epevo<; elvai xi KaAdv abxd Ka0' abxd
Kal &ya0ov Kal peya Kal xaAAa navxa- a si poi 8i8cog xe Kai
ouyxcopeig elvai xabxa, bA,7tl^co ooi sk xobxcov xf\v a'lxiav b7uSei£eiv
Kal &veupf|oeiv cog &0avaxov f| vi/dxi^.
c &AAa pfjv, scpr^ 6 Ke(3r|g, cog SiSovxog ooi oi)k av (p0avoig
Tiepalvcov.
okotcsi 8f|, scprj, xa e^f|g SKeivoig eav ooi odvSokti coo7iep spot,
cpatvsxai yap poi, si xi soxiv aAAo KaAdv 7iAf\v abxo xo KaAov,
obSe Si' sv aAAo KaAov sivai f| Sioxi psxsxsi bKsivoo xoi) KaAou-
Kai navxa 5fj obxcog Aeyco. xf| xoia8s aixia ouyxcopeig;
ouvxoopd), ecprj.
ob xoivuv, f) 8' og, sxi pav0avco obSe Sbvapai xag aAAag aixlag
xag oocpag xabxag yiyvcooKeiv &AA' eav xlg poi Aeyi] d 8i' oxi
KaAov soxiv 6xiobv, f| XP®Pa sbav0eg sxov r| ox^ipa f| aAAo 6xiobv
xcov xoiobxcov, xa psv aAAa x°ripstv eco, - xapaxxopai yap bv xoig
aAAoig 7iaoi - xobxo 8s ditAcog Kai dxexvcog Kai iocog sbr|0cog sx©
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nap' bpauxco, on obK aXAo xi tioisi abxo KaX,ov ft f] sksivou xob
KaX,ob sits Ttapouola sixs Koivcovia sixs 07113 Sr| Kai O7icoc;
7ipoaayopsuopsvry ob yap sxi xobxo SnaxupiCopai, dXX' oxi xco
KaXco 7iavxa xa KaX,a KaXa. xobxo yap poi Soksi &ocpaX.soxaxov
sivai Kal fepaoxcp &7ioKpivao0ai Kai aXAcp, Kat xobxou fe%opsvo(;
r|yobpai obK av tiots tisgsiv, dXX' 6ocpaA.sc; stvai Kai spoi Kai
dxcpobv aAAcp &7toKplvao0ai oxi xco Ka?icp xa KaA,a yiyvsxai KaA,a-
f| ob Kai aoi Soksi;
Soksi.
Kai psysGsi apa xa psyaXa psyaA.a Kai xa psi£co psi^co, Kai
opiKpoxryui xa sX,axxco sMxxco;
val.
101b10 xi 8s; svi svoq TtpooGsvxoc; xr\v 7ipoo0soiv aixlav stvai c xob
8bo ysvsoGai f\ 8iaoxioGsvxo<; xi^v oxiaiv °^K ebA.aPoio av A.sysiv;
Kai psya av Pocpiy; oxi obK otoGa dXXcoq ttcoc; SKaoxov yiyvopsvov
f) psxaoxov xf|c; iSiag obolag sk&otou ob av psxaoxn, Kai bv
xobxoic; obK sxeig aAAriv xiva aixiav xob 8bo ysvsoGai 6A.A.' f| xf^v
xf\q SoaSoq psxaoxsoiv, Kai 8siv xobxou psxaoxsiv xa psAAovxa
8bo sosoGai, Kai povaSog o av psAAfl sv sosoGai, xa<; 8s oxiasig
xabxaq Kai 7tpooGsosi<; Kai xdq aXXaq zdq xoiabxaq Kopij/slag booiy;
av xaips^v, 7iapsi<; &7ioKpivao0ai xoi<; osauxob oocpcoxspoic;- ...
102a2 6X.r|0saxaxa, scpr|, A,sysi<;, o xs Zippiag apa Kai 6 KsPry;.
EXEKPATHZ vr\ Aia, c5 <I>al8cov, siKoxcoq ys- Gaupaoxroq yap
poi Soksi dig bvapyax; xta Kai opiKpov vobv sxovxi s'i7isiv bKsivog
xabxa.
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OAIAQN Tiavu pev ouv, 'ExeKpaxeg, Kal Tiaai xoig 7iapoboiv
sSo^sv.
EXEKPATH2 Kal yap r|piv xoig tmovoi, vbv 5s dKobouoiv.
&AAa xiva 8f\ fjv xa psxa xabxa A,ex0evxa;
<I>AIAQN cog pev eydo olpai, sttsI abxcp xabxa auvexcop^Grj, b Kai
a>poA,oyeixo elval xt sKaaxov xcov siScov Kai xobxcov z&XXa
pexaX,apPavovxa abxcov xobxcov xr\v eTicovoplav laxeiv, xo 8r\ pexa
xabxa fipcbxa-
el Sr(, fj 8' og, xabxa obxoog Xeyeig, fip' obx, oxav Zipplav
ZcoKpaxoog cpf|g pet^co etvai, Oai8covog 8e eA,axxco, X,ey8ig xox' eivai
sv xcp Zippla dpcpoxepa, Kal peyeGog Kal opiKpoxrjxa;
eycoye.
h'k'kd yap, fj 8' og, 6poA,oyeig xo xov Zippiav UTispexeiv
HcoKpaxoug ot>x pr|paai Xeyexai obxco Kai xo c &A,ri0eg
sxsiv; ob yap tiod K8(pi)K8vai 2ippiav imep&xeiv xobxcp, xcp I!ippiav
eivai, dXAa xcp peyeGei o xuyxavei excov- ob8' ab ZcoKpaxoug
UTcepexeiv oxi ZcoKpaxr|g 6 ZcoKpaxr|g soxlv, 6AA,' oxi apiKpoxrjxa
exei 6 HcoKpaxrig Ttpdg xo ^ksivoo peyeGog;
dX-riGfi-
102d5 X,eyco 8f^ xob8' eveKa, PoiAopevog 8o£,at ool 07tep bpol. spol
yap cpalvexai ob povov abxd xo peyeGog obS&Tiox' eGeXeiv apa peya
Kal opiKpov stvai, dXXd Kal xd ev b|piv peyeGog obSenoxe
TcpooSexeoGai xo opiKpov ob8' bGsXstv bTispexsoGai, &AAa 8ooiv xo
exepov, f| cpebyeiv Kal brceKxcopeiv e oxav abxcp Tipooir] xo evavxiov,
xo cpiKpov, f| 7ipoaeX-G6vxog SKelvou &7ioXcoA,evai- brropevov 8e Kai
8e£,apevov xf^v apiKpoxiyra obK kGe?ieiv slvai exepov f| 07iep fjv.
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cocmep byco Se^tipevog Kai bjtopeivac; xfjv opiKpoxrjxa, Kai exi cov
oojcsp eipi, obxot; 6 abxdg opiKpog e'ipi- eKeivo 8e ob xexo^pijKev
peya ov opiKpov eivav cbq 5' abxcot; Kai xo apiKpov xo ev fjpiv
oi)K eOeXei 7ioxs peya yiyveo0ai ob8e eivai, oi)8' aX,X,o ob8ev xtbv
evavxicov, exi ov oiiep ify, apa 103a xobvavxlov ytyv8o0at xe Kai
eivai, d>»A,' fjxoi drcepxexai f| dTioAAuxai ev xobxco xcp 7ta0fjpaxi.
[Somebody objects that it had previously been said that opposites come out of
opposites. Socrates replies that there is a difference in context.]
103b2
xoxe pev yap bA,eyexo bK xob bvavxiou Tipaypaxoq xo bvavxiov
Tipaypa yiyveo0ai, vbv 8e, oxi abxd xo bvavxiov bauxcp evavxiov
obK av 7XOX8 yevoixo, obxe xo ev fjpiv obxe xo bv cpbaei. xoxe pev
yap, ftj cpiA,e, Tiept xcbv b^ovxcov xa bvavxla bA.eyopev,
87tovopa^ovx8(; abxd xfj bKeivcov bmovupia, vbv 8e rcepi bKeivcov
abxcbv gov bvovxcov e^ei xrjv bncovuplav xa dvopa^opeva- c abxd 8'
8K8iva oi)K av noxe tpapev b0eA,f|aai yeveoiv dA,A,f|A,cov 8e^aa0ai. ...
103e2
eoxiv apa, fj 8' og, 7iepl evia xcov xoiobxcov, cooxe prj povov
abxo xo eiSog d^iobo0ai xob abxob dvopaxog ei<; xov del xpovov>
dA,A,a Kai aXXo xi o eoxi pev obK bKeivo, exei 8e xfjv bKeivou
popcprjv del, oxavrcep fj. exi 8e sv xcp8e toax; eoxai oacpeaxepov o
A,eyco- xo yap nepixxov del 7iou 8ei xobxou xob dvopaxoq xuyxdveiv
07t8p vuv ^eyopev- fj ob;
Ttavu ye.
apa povov xcov ovxcov - xobxo yap bpcoxcb - rj Kai a'k'ko 104a xi o
eoxi pev obx OTtep xo rcepixxov, opcoq 8e Set abxo pexa xob eaoxob
dvopaxoq Kai xobxo KaA.eiv del 8ia xo obxco necpuKevai cooxe xob
7ieptxxob pr[8e7toxe d7ioA,ei7ieo0at; Aeyco 8e abxo eivai oiov Kai fj
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xpiaq 71STCOV0S Kai aXXa noXXa. oko7isi 5s 7ispi xr\q xpidSog. dpa ob
Soksi ooi x© xs abxfjg bvopaxi dsi 7ipoaayopsi)xsa sivai Kat x©
xob Tispixxou, ovxoq ob% OTisp zr\q xpiaSog; dA,V op©<; obx© ticoq
nscpuKs Kai f) xpiac; Kai f| 7rsp7xxd<; Kai 6 ripiooc; xob dpi0pob b
anaq, ©oxs obK ©v OTisp xo Trsptxxov dsi SKaoxot; abx©v scm
7ispixxo<;- Kai ab xd 5bo Kai xsxxapa Kai anaq 6 sxspog ab oxi%o<;
xob dpi0pob oi)K ©v oxcsp xo apxiov op©<; SKaoxoq abx©v apxioq
boxiv dsi. auyx©psic; f| ob;
7r©q yap ob; s(pr|.
o xoivov, scpr), PobXopai 5r|X©oai, a0psi. scxiv 5s xo5s, 5xi
(paivsxai ob povov SKSiva xd svavxia aXXr\Xa ob Ss^opsva, bXXd
Kai ooa obK ovx' dA,A,f|X.oi<; svavxia s%si dsi xdvavxia, ob5s xabxa
soiks Ssxopsvoi^ bKsivriv xr|v 'iSsav f\ av xf| bv abxoig obar]
svavxia fj, hXX' S7Uobor|<; abxrig rjxoi c d7ro}^bpsva f|
b7iSKX©pobvxa. f| ob (prjoopsv xd xpia Kai &7io^sio0ai npoxspov Kai
aXXo 6xiobv 7rsloso0ai, 7tpiv b:iopsivai sxi xpia ovxa apxia
ysvso0ai;
7idvi) psv obv, scpr) 6 Ks(3r|c;.
ob5s pf)v, fj 5' oq, svavxiov ys boxi xd apxiov+xpiaSi.
ob yap obv.
obK apa povov xd s!5r| xd svavxia ob% b7iopsvsi bmovxa aAArjX-a,
dA,A,a Kai aXX' axxa xd bvavxla ob% bTiopsvsi s7iiovxa.
d^r|0soxaxa, scpr^, Xsysiq.




104c5 TO apTlOV Stokes : Soaq mss.
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d dp' ouv, ecpr|, c5 Ksprig, xaSe eir| av, a on av Kaxaoxn \ir\ povov
dvayKa^et xf\v abxou 'tSeav auxd ioxstv, hXXa Kat evavxiou^ del
xivog;
txocn; A,eyei<;;
rooTisp apxt feA,eyopev. oloGa yap 8r|7too oxi a av f] xcov xpioov
\8ea Kaxdoxt), dvayKp abxoi<; ob povov xpiaiv elvat dAAa Kal
nepixxoig.
Tiavu ye.
fe;ii xo xoiouxov 5fj, cpapev, f] evavxia 'i8ea feKeivfl xf| pop(pf| f\ av
xouxo dTiepyd^pxai oi)Se7iox' av eA,Goi.
ot> yap.
e'lpya^exo 8e ye p Tiepixxfy
vat.
evavxia 8e xauxrj f| xou dpxiou;
vai.
e krci xa xpia apa f| xou dpxtou 'i8ea ouSenoxe fj^et.
oi) Sfjxa.
apoipa Sr^ xou dpxiou xa xpla.
apotpa.
dvapxioc; apa f| xpiaq.
vai.
105b5 Tia^iv Sfj pot, ecpr|, dpxf)? A,eye. Kal pf| pot o av fepooxoo
dTioKplvou, hXXd pipoupevoc; fepe. A,eyco 8r^ Trap' f]v xo rupcoxov
eA,eyov dTioKptotv, xr^v docpaA,f| eKeivrjv, feK xoov vuv A,eyopevcov
^ I04d3 svavxioo del xivoc; scripsi: svavxioo abxcb del xivoq B : kvavxiou del xivoq
abxcpW : evavxiou 5ei abxra xivog T
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dXXr\v 6pcov &o(paA,siav. ei yap spoio ps cb av xi bv xcb ocbpaxi
feyysvr|xai Gsppov soxai, ot> xr^v &ocpa^f| c aoi fepcb dnoKpioiv
bKsivr|v zi\v &pa0f|, oxi <p av Gsppoxrig, dXXd Kopyoxspav bk xcbv
vuv, oxi <p av 7iup- ot>86 av spfl q> av ocbpaxi zi feyysvr|xai vooi^obi,
o()k bpob oxi cp av voooq, &AA' <p av rcupExog- oi)8' cp av dpiGpcp zi
Byysvrjxai Ttspixxdg soxai, ot)K spa) cp av 7ispixxoxr|g, dXX' <p av
povag, Kai z&XXa ouxax;. dXX' opa si rj8r| iKavax; oioG' oxi
|3ouXopai.
dXXd tc&vd iKavcoq, ecprj.
6t7ioKpivoo 5fj, fj 8' og, <p av xi ByyEvrpai ocbpaxi £,&v soxai;
(5 av i|/uxr|, scprj.
d oi)Kobv dsi xobxo ouxcex; s%si;
rcdcx^ yap otxi; § oq.
\)/i)%f\ apa oxi av abxr^ Kaxdo^T], dsi f|K6i bti' kKsivo cpspouoa
Ccopv;
f|K6l pBVXOl, 6(pr|.




oukouv \\fZ)xA T° evavxiov (5 abxf^ bucpspsi dsi ot> pf| ttoxb
86£r|xai, cbc; kx xcbv 7tpoo06V cbpo^oyryrai;
Kai paX-a ocpo8pa, ecpr| 6 K&prig.
xi oov; xo pf^ 8s%6psvov xr^v xob dpxiou 'iSsav xi vov8r\
cbvopa^opsv;
dvapxiov, Bcpr).
xo 8s SiKaiov pf^ 8s%opsvov Kai o av pouciKdv pf^ Ss^sxai;
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e
apouoov, scpr), to 5e <x8ikov.
etev o 8' &v Gtivaxov 8exr|xai xi KaXoopev;
&0avaxov, e(pr|.






But, said he [Socrates], I mean it this way, nothing new, but what I have not ever
stopped saying both at other times and in our preceding conversation. Indeed, I am
therefore going to try to show you the type of cause and reason which I am and have
been concerned with, and I go again on to those things much talked about and start
from them, assuming there to be something beautiful itself by itself and something good
and something big and all the other things: and ifyou grant me that and agree that they
are, I hope, out of them, to show you the cause and reason, and to find out that the soul
is something immortal.
c But certainly, said Cebes, don't hesitate to proceed to the end, since I grant you that.
So see, said he, if you agree, as I do, to what comes after that. Indeed, it seems to me
that if anything else is beautiful other than the beautiful itself, that it is beautiful
through nothing else than because it has of that beautiful: and all else accordingly, I
say. Do you agree to such a cause and reason?
I agree, said he.
Therefore, said he, I do not any longer understand, nor can I come to recognise, the
other clever reasons and causes: but whenever someone tells me wherefore whatever it
may be is beautiful, be it that it has nice colour or shape or something else of that sort,
I let go everything else - indeed, I get disturbed with everything else - but retain this for
myself, simply and unsophisticatedly and perhaps naively, that nothing else makes it
beautiful than, of that beautiful, the presence or community or however and whatever it
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be called: indeed, that latter I do not insist on in addition, but </ do insist> that
through the beautiful all things beautiful are beautiful. To give that as an answer to
myselfand to everybody else seems to me to be safest, and having of thate I trust never
to fall, but to be safe in answering to myself and to whomsoever else that through the
beautiful things beautiful become beautiful: or does it not seem to you to be so?
It does.
And thus through largeness large things large, and larger things larger, and through
smallness smaller things smaller?
Yes.
101bl° what about this: would you not be on your guard not to say that when one is
added to one, the addition is the cause and reason of there coming to be two, or in the
case ofdivision the dividing? And say with loud voice that you do not know with regard
to each and everything that it come to be in any other way than having of the very own
being of each and everything which it has of, and in those matters you do not have any
other cause and reason of there being two than the having of twoness, and that it is
necessary that whatever shall be two has of that, and of unity whatever shall be one, but
those dividings and additions and other such elaborate <causes and reasons> let go,
leaving <them> to those more clever than you to answer <with>:...
10232 jyjost truiy spoken^ said Simmias, and with him also Cebes.
ECHECRATES By Zeus, Phaedo, plausibly so: to me it is indeed wonderful with what
evidence, even to one with a small mind only, that man has said that.
PHAIDON Very much so, Echecrates, and so it seemed to all present.
ECHECRATES Indeed, also to us who are absent and hear it now; but what was then
said after that?
PHAIDON As I believe, when that was granted to him, b and it was agreed that each
one of the £i8t| is something, and that, by coming to have of them, the other things
acquire their benaming of those themselves, after that he asked this:
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If, then, said he, you say that that is so: is it not the case that when you say that
Simmias is larger than Socrates, but smaller than Phaedo, you thereby declare that both
are in Simmias, both largeness and smallness?
It is.
But indeed, said he, do you agree that 'Simmias' exceeding Socrates' does not in that
way have the truth as it is said in words: indeed, it is not that, 'being Simmias by
nature', he exceeds through that, through 'being Simmias', but through the largeness
which he happens to have; nor again with the 'exceeding Socrates': it is not because




Now, I am saying that because of the following, wishing that it seemed to you as it
does to me. Indeed, it seems to me that not only largeness itself is never willing to be
large and small at the same time, but that also the largeness in us does never admit of
the small, nor is it willing to be exceeded, but one of the two <obtains>, it either flees
and recedes e when(ever) the opposite, the small, approaches it, or, as it [the opposite]
comes on, it perishes: but it is not, enduring and admitting of smallness, willing to be
something other than just what it was; just as I, admitting and enduring the smallness,
and still being just who I am, am small as this same man: but that thing, being large,
does not dare be small; and, in the same way, the small, that in us, is not ever willing to
become or be large, nor does any other of the opposites, still being what it was, at the
same time 103a become and also be its opposite, but it either goes away, or it perishes in
that situation.
[Somebody objects that it had previously been said that opposites come out of
opposites. Socrates replies that there is a difference in context.]
i°3b2 jhen, indeed, it was said that an opposite thing comes to be out of an opposite
thing, but now it has been said that the opposite itself would never become what is
opposite to it itself, neither that in us nor that in nature. Indeed, then, my friend, we
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talked about the things which have the opposites, benaming them with the benaming of
those, but now we talk about those themselves of which the named things have their
benaming while those are in them: c and we say that those themselves would not ever
want to admit becoming each other. ...
103e2
Now, it obtains, he said, with some of the things of that sort, that not only the
st5oc; itselfdemands the same name for all time, but that another as well, which is not
that <thing>, but always and forever has the JJ.opcpf| of that <thing>, as long as it is
<, demands its name>. But perhaps what I mean will be yet clearer in the following:
indeed, somehow the odd always requires to have that name which we call it now; or
does it not?
It certainly does.
But it alone of all things there are - that, indeed, is what I ask - or is there also some
other l04a thing which is not just what the odd is, and nevertheless it is necessary to call
that thing as well with its name <, i.e. the name of the odd,> always, because it is by
nature such that it never falls short of the odd? I mean that it is such as happens with
threeness and many others. But consider threeness. Does it not seem to you that, in
addition to its own name, it must always also be called with that of the odd, <the name
of the odd> not being just what that of threeness is? But nevertheless, threeness and
fiveness and one half of the numbers altogether is by nature such b that - not being just
what the odd is - each of them is always and forever odd: and again the two and the
four and so the other series of number altogether, not being just what the even is,
nevertheless each of them is always andforever even. Do you agree or not?
Indeed, how could I not agree? said he.
Now see, said he, what I want to make clear. For it is the following: that it seems that
not only those opposites do not admit of each other, but also the things which are not
each other's opposites but always have the opposites; they as well do not seem to admit
that 'l5s(X which in each case is opposite to the one in them, but were it to approach,
they would with certainty either perish or recede. Or do we not say that the three will
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rather perish or suffer whatever else, before it endured, while still being three, to
become even ?
Very much so, said Cebes.
And that though the even is certainly not the opposite of three, said he.
Indeed not.
So, not only the opposite S18t| do not endure each other when approaching, but also
certain other things do not endure the opposites when they approach.
Most truly spoken, said he.
Do you now want, said he, if we are at all capable, that we determine of what sort
those things are ?
Most certainly.
d Is it now, said he, Cebes, that they be those, which - when they possess something,
they do not only force it to have its own l8sa, but also, through it, to have of some
opposite.
What do you mean?
As we said just now. Indeed, you know that whatever the \8sa of the three possesses,
for those things it is necessary not only to be three but also odd.
Very much so.
And it was thus upon such a thing, we said, that that 'l8s(X would never come which is
opposite to that |_l0p(pf) which brought that about.
Indeed not.
But certainly the odd <J!Op(pf|> brought it about.
Yes.
And the one opposite to it is that of the even.
Yes.
e
So, upon the three, the 'l8sa of the even will never come.
Certainly not.
For the three is withoutpart in the even.
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Without part.
The three is thus uneven.
Yes.
105b5
Now, tell me again from the beginning, said he. And do not answer me in the terms
I ask, but doing as I do. Indeed, I declare that because besides the answer which I first
talked about, that safe one, I see another safety from what has now been said. Indeed, if
you asked me: for whatsoever, when what comes to be in its body will it be warm?', I
will not give you that safe and unlearned answer that for whatsoever warmth <will
come to be>', but a more elaborate one from what has now been said, that for
whatsoever fire <will come to be>'; nor if you asked: for whomsoever, when what
comes to be in his body will he be ill?', I will not say for whomsoever illness' but for
whomsoever fever <comes to be in his body>'; nor again, 'when what comes to be in
whatever number will it be odd?', I will not say 'in whatever <number> there comes to
be oddness', but 'in whatever <number> there comes to be oneness'; and likewise in
other cases. But see ifas yet you know sufficiently what I want.
Sufficiently indeed, he said.
So answer, said he, for whomsoever, when what comes to be in his body will he be
living?
For whomsoever soul <comes to be in his body>, he said.
d
Now, does that always obtain ?
Indeed, how not, said he.
So soul, whatever it possesses, it always comes upon it bringing life?
That is certainly so, he said.
And is there any opposite to life, or none?




Now the soul will never admit of the opposite to that which it always brings with it, as
was agreedfrom what was said before?
And very certainly so, said Cebes.
What then? What did we call just now that which would not admit of the 'l5sa of the
even?
Uneven, he said.
But that which would not admit of the just or of the musical?
e
Immusical, he said, and the other unjust.
Well. But what do we call whatever does not admit ofdeath?
Immortal, he said.
Now, the soul does not admit ofdeath?
No.
So the soul is immortal.
Immortal.
II.
The overt purpose of the discussion which Socrates has with his friends in the last hours
before his death is to prove the immortality of the soul, and - although there is a brief
subsequent exchange in which the soul's indestructibility is asserted in addition - this aim
seems to have been achieved by the end of 105e.
This is after 100b, where Socrates had announced that he hoped to be able to show that
the soul is something immortal, if Cebes granted him that 'the beautiful by itself and the
good by itself and the large by itself existed. What is odd in that enumeration is not so
much the phrase 'by itself; that is familiar from earlier dialogues, if not necessarily with
the same application; and it was introduced in the Phaedo at an early stage.311 What is
311
Lysis 220c; Meno 88c, and especially 100b; Phaedo 64c, 65c, 66a, 67a, c, e, 70a, 78d, 79d, 81c, and
especially 83b. In terms of content most closely related is, of course, Phaedo 74a - 75d. For a discussion
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odd is the inclusion of 'the large' alongside 'the beautiful' and 'the good'. It will become
clear shortly afterwards why 'the large' is introduced here, but it is worth noting that in
whatever terms Socrates may, in earlier dialogues, have talked about the good or
goodness, the beautiful or beauty, the just or justice, the holy or holiness, the moderate
or moderation and temperance: the large had never been one of his concerns. The
statement at 75c,d, in which the equal, the bigger and the smaller and all such things
were grouped together with the beautiful itself and the good itself and the just and the
holy and all things of which it is said that they 'are', came likewise unexpected, again
partly because the equal, the larger and the smaller are not usually things Socrates talks
about, while the beautiful, the good, the just and the holy are. The Phaedo is thus from
the start a dialogue in which Socrates does unusual things.312 But these unusual things
are embedded in customary conversation on matters concerning good life and the soul in
a way which makes their introduction unobtrusive. So, the example discussed in detail at
100c is that of the beautiful, a topic which we are not surprised to find Socrates
discussing.
As yet, we do not know what relevance exactly Socrates' long account of his reaction
to Anaxagoras will have in the proof of the immortality of the soul; we can guess,
though, that his request that Cebes grant him the existence of the beautiful, the good and
the large is connected with the discussion of favd{J.VTjOl(^, recollection, at 72e - 78b,
since it was there that 'the equal itself and the other things 'which are' were introduced.
At 100c2, Socrates indicates that he carries the argument one step further. Not only is
there a 'beautiful itself: if there is anything else beautiful, it is beautiful because 'it has of
that beautiful', potentially together with other things which also 'have of that beautiful -
that is implied in |l£T£/etV.
of the phrase ablO Ka0' (IDT6 and related phenomena, cf. G. Vailati, A Study of Platonic
Terminology, in: Mind XV (1906), 473 - 485.
312 One may also think of his exercises in composition (60c - 61c).
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As we have seen,313 JJ.£T8%SIV had been used by Plato in connection with the good
before he composed the Phaedo. At Gorgias 467e, it had been said of actions like
sitting, walking, running and sailing, and of materials like stones, wood, and other such
things, that they were neither good nor bad, as opposed to good things like wisdom,
health, riches and other such things; the 'neither good nor bad' was characterised as a
evloxe pev pexexei tou dya0oi>, fcvloxe 8e xou KotKou, evioxe 8c
oi)8exspoi). It was left open if stones and wood belonged to the last category only, in
which case SVIOXS would not have a strictly temporal meaning, or if stones sometimes
had of the good, sometimes of the bad, and sometimes of neither, probably according to
what use was made of them. It was definitely left open what we had to understand by
'the good', which first seemed to refer to things 'had' by the mind, the body internally
and the body externally, but then, probably, to something more abstract, something in
which stones and wood could have a share. The same ambiguity as to what 'the good'
could be, it will be remembered, is again encountered at Gorgias 497ff.314
peXB^SlV, however, is also encountered in a pre-Socratic context quoted above
(Simplicius Physica 164, 25 = DK 59B6)315: KCtl OX8 8e toai potpcd s'lOl XOU
X8 peyaXoi) Kai xou opiKpoi) 7iX,f|0o<;, Kat ouxax; av eirj ev tiavxi
Ttdvxa- oi)8e xcopiq eoxiv eivai, tikla Ttrivxa Tiavxoc; poipav pexexei.
6x8 xouXdxioxov pr^ eaxiv eivai, obk av Suvaixo xcopioGfivai, ob8'
av ^cp' sauxou yeveoGai, bXX on;cooTisp dpxr^v etvai Kai vuv rcavxa
6poi). ev Tiaai 8e 7io^X,d eveoxi Kai xcov dnoKpivopevcov ioa 7iA,ri0oq
kv XOl<^ Jiei^oai X8 Kai 8X,doooai. And when there are equal parts of the large
and the small, as to their amount, also in that way everything would be in everything:
nor is there being apart, but everything has a part of everything <together with
everything else>. When there is nothing which is the smallest, no 'being parted' is
possible, nor coming to be by itself, but as it was in the beginning, so now everything is
313 Sections IV and V of the chapter on pSTS/eiV and psiaXapPdvstV above.
314 See Section IV of the chapter on 7tapot)oia, Tcapsivat and 7rapayiyveo0ai.
315 Section III of the chapter on eveivai, eyytyvcoOat.
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together. And in everything there are many things of those separated off, equal in
amount in the bigger and the smaller <things>.
It is Anaxagoras who declares about the large and the small that equal parts of them are
in everything and that everything has of them, that they cannot be separated, and that
they cannot come to be 8(p' so.utou, by themselves. That is to say, whatever it was
Anaxagoras meant, he did speak about 'equal parts', 'large', 'small', things being, or as
it is the case not being, 'by themselves'. Because Anaxagoras' KOOpo^, his universe,
was despite the mention of vouq or mind an entirely and thoroughly physical world,
anything in it which 'has of something 'has part of something', poipav pST8X8l,
because that is the only way in which anything can 'have of something purely physical.
What Plato does, therefore, is to let Socrates use Anaxagorean terminology, or at least
Anaxagorean usage, and combine it with Socratic thought as expressed for example in
the Gorgias and the Protagoras. The Protagoras in particular displayed a large number
of instances of 'having of, where this 'having of referred to matters concerning the
mind;316 the phrase pex&XEl TOD dya0OD as such figured in the Gorgias. Socrates
supplies what he said he missed in Anaxagoras' account: he supplies what is KaA,OV
Kal dya0OV to an account of the world in terms of distinct constituents in which the
things as we know them 'have of other things. Anaxagoras had said (Simplicius Physica
164, 24 = DK 59B12): xd p8V akfa navxdc, poipav psxexei, VOD<; 58
ecxtv arceipov Kal abxoKpaxec; Kal pepeiKxai ob5evl xP^M-axi, iiXXd
povog abxog 87t' eatuxob feoxtv. e'l pr| yap bcp' eauxob fjv, hXXa xsco
kpepeiKxo a>Acp, pexetxsv av dtxavxcDv xPHP^tcdv, 81 kpepsiKxo
xscp" sv Ttavxl yap Ttavxot; poipa eveoxtv, dSo7t8p fev xoi<; Ttpoo0sv
pot X.8X,8Kxai- Kal av ^kc6X.dsv abxov xd ouppepetypsva, cooxs
pr)5sv6<; xpf|paxo^ Kpaxeiv 6polcoq cb<; Kal povov feovxa fecp' eauxob.
Now, everything else has a part of everything else, but mind alone is undelimited and
self-governed and mixed with nothing, but is alone itself by itself. Indeed, if it were not
316 See Sections IV - VI of the chapter on pexfexstv and pexakap|3dV8lV.
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by itself, but were mixed with something else, it would have of all the things, if it were
mixed with anything: for in everything there is a part of everything, as said by me in
what went before; also: what would be mixed with it would prevent mind from
governing any <one> thing in the same way it can when being alone by itself
Anaxagoras had introduced mind and postulated that it was itself by itself, but he had
not done anything with it; his mind is in everything and governs everything, but at the
same time is not mixed with anything; we are told that it is mind who or which governs
all, but we are not told why and how; 'large' and 'small', on the other hand, are on a par
with all the other physical things, thin and dense, cold and warm, dark and light, moist
and dry (B12); considering all that, it does not become clear in what way, if any, mind is
distinct from physical stuff, nor, according to what principles or considerations mind
governs and rules; it almost seems as if mind just observes the process of cosmogony
described in B12.
With the introduction by Socrates of the beautiful and the good, and by extension of the
large and the equal, as existing by themselves, Anaxagoras' picture is completely
subverted, not only modified in one respect, despite adoption of Anaxagorean
terminology on a large scale. A plurality has taken the place of the one mind, and at least
some of the things explicitly said by Anaxagoras to have a share in each other have
apparently been elevated to a status of independence and self-government.
The most fundamental change introduced by Socrates, however, is the introduction of
the beautiful and good: what he had said an explanation of things in terms of mind
amounted to. The connection of the beautiful with matters of the mind is implicitly
strengthened by Socrates in the next paragraph, when he says that if there is anything
beautiful in this world, that nothing else makes it beautiful than, of the beautiful, the
presence or community or however and whatever it be called: indeed, that latter I do
not insist on in addition, but </ do insist> that through the beautiful all things beautiful
are beautiful, f) kKSlVOD TOD KOlA,OU BITS 7tapODOia BITS KOlVCQVia SITS
268
otct| 8rj Kai oncog 7tpooayopeix)nsvTj- oi> yap exi xouxo
8iio%upiCopai, oxi xcp icaA,cp 7ttivxa xa Ka?ax KaX,a. Both
Tiapouaia or Tcapsivai of the beautiful and the good and the construction with a
vaguely instrumental dative occurred at Gorgias 497ff. in a context in which the good
life was at stake. TtapODOta XOU KdXob to beautiful things around us therefore
suggests a relation like the one which things can have to the mind or the mind to things.
The discussion at Lysis 217f., on the other hand, prevents the reader from being
confused by a sophism based on the ambiguity of Ttapouoia depending on the nature of
things present, but also the difference of 'presence' intended.317
III.
While the associations which TCapOUOla evokes enrich Anaxagoras' physical
discussion by the introduction of non-physical things connected with the soul,
KOlVCDvia seems to have a slightly different function. KOlvcovia is not a very
common word; by itself, it signifies any sort of community between things which are, for
the specific purposes of specific contexts of discussion, considered to be on one level; in
the majority of cases, however, KOlvcovia refers to communion between people,
sometimes in allegorical passages between animals or things which stand for people,
occasionally between gods and men.318 In the Phaedo in particular, however, the one
instance of KOlVCOVia is embedded in the also otherwise philosophically significant
context 64c - 66a; there, it was stated that death is something, xi XOV G&vaXOV
etvai. It was then defined thus (64c5): Kat etvai xouxo xo xeGvavai, people;
317 Cf. Section VII of the chapter on TCttpOlxfia, TlttpSlVUt and 7iapayiyV£C0at.
318 For detailed discussion of KOlVCOVia in Plato and in pre-Platonic authors, albeit on lines not
applicable to the present context, cf. P. Impara, Aspetti Semantici delta Filosofia Platonica, Roma 1978;
in appendices to his general interpretations, Impara gives collections of pre-Platonic (p. 155f.) and
Platonic (pp. 87 - 104) testimonia. His very useful collection of material is slightly impaired by his
tendency to see, as governing Plato's thought, "una potenza misteriosa e soprannaturale"
("Conclusione", p. 147).
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psv &7io xf|<; hna'kXaytv a()x6 Ka0' abxo xo ocopa yeyovsvai,
%coplg 8s xt^v ij/i)%fjv hud xou ocopaxoc; frnaAAayeioav auxrjv Ka0'
al)Xf|V stvai; And is not this 'being dead': that the body is separated on its own,
away from the soul, itself by itself, and the soul separated on its own, away from the
body, 'herself by herself' ? Next, it is stated that one must not devote oneself too much
to clothes, jewellery and physical adornments in that there is no great necessity to have
of them, Ka0' ooov pfj 7toX,A,rj ftvayKTj fiexsxeiv abxcov (64el). When that is
granted, Socrates characterizes the philosopher as (65al) &7loA,UCDV OXl jldAlOXa
xrjv \|/uxrjv (mo xf)c; xou acopaxoc; Koivcoviag, loosening as much as
possible the soul from community with the body. Subsequently, both KOIVCOVSIV and
the phrase abxrjv Ka0' abxfjv are repeated, just before it is stated for the first time in
the Phaedo that 'the just itself 'is something', and likewise 'the beautiful' and 'the good'
and 'largeness' and 'health' and 'strength' and the being of all other things, whatever
something happens to be, xcov aXXcav ... &7ttivxcov xf|g oixriag o xuyxdvsi
SKaoxov OV (65dl3), and that we perceive those things with something other than the
senses of the body, with the soul 'herself by herself.
That is the only previous context in which there was talk of KOlVCOVia in the Phaedo\
there, the human soul was envisaged as doing things 'by herself, somehow taking leave
of her community or communion with the body; what was under consideration was 'an
individual human body' and 'an individual human soul', at a particular time and in a
particular place on earth; it is the beginning of the discussion between Socrates and the
Thebans; therefore it would be wrong to declare that KOlVCOVia at 65a2 refers to a
relation of asymmetry. 1 The differentiation in ontological status of body and soul
respectively is introduced only later on.
What is suggested, though, by the use of KOlVCOVia as an alternative to Ttapouoia at
lOOd is specifically that - with everything we have heard about the soul since the
beginning of the conversation - the relation of the beautiful to a beautiful thing may be
319 Pace Impara, op. cit., pp. 24ff., 145.
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parallel to that of soul to body. It is to be noted that KOlVCOVia is the more specific
word in this context, directed more particularly at a specific point earlier on in the same
discussion; Tiapouoia, although used in earlier dialogues in not altogether dissimilar
contexts, is the more general term.
One aspect of the usage of KOlVCOVia, however, seems to have been overlooked in its
potential significance for the structure of the Phaedo. Despite frequent assertions of the
Phaedo's being a Pythagorean, or at least Pythagoreanizing, dialogue320 , and despite the
fact that 'community' played a significant role among Pythagoreans321, KOlVCOVia as a
term is not usually associated with fifth century Pythagorean philosophy; there is, indeed,
no firm evidence that it was. I should nevertheless suggest that Stobaeus, Eclogae I.
proem 3,322 whether it is pre-Socratic or not, and if pre-Socratic whether it is by
Philolaus or not, may contain echoes of original terminology (I do not adopt a number of
emendations, however possible or plausible they may be, which let the passage appear
more Doric than the manuscript of Stobaeus warrants): OlA.oA.doir Gsoopeiv 581
id spya Kat xf\v otioiav xcdv dpiGpoov Korea Sdvapav axiq eoxiv kv
xa SeKaSi- peya^a yap Kat Travxe^fjc; Kat Tcavxoepydc; Kat Getco Kat
obpavlco pta) Kat dvGpccmiva) dp^d Kat dyepcov Koivcovouoa [
] Suvapiq Kat xaq 8eKd5o<;. aveu 8s xouxaq 7idvx' aneipa Kat
aSr\ka Kat depavf) It is necessary to contemplate the works and the being of
320 All standard commentaries abound with references to Pythagoreanism on a general level; cf. e.g. C.J.
Rowe, Plato. Phaedo, Cambridge 1993, p. 6f.; but cf. in particular the recent excellent essay by T. Ebert,
Sokrates als Pythagoreer und die Anamnesis in Platons Phaidon, Mainz/Stuttgart 1994
321
Impara, op. cit., p. 52, n. 19 cites specifically Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos IX 127,
who alleges that Pythagoras and Empedocles and the whole Italic bunch postulate not only a KOlVCOVia
of men amongst each other and with the gods, but also with XCt dkoytX TCOV ^GXDV, non-rational
animals.
322 1. 16. 20 Wachsmuth = DK 44B11 = F 11 Huffmann; cf. C.A. Huffmann, Philolaos of Croton.
Pythagorean and Presocratic, Cambridge 1993, pp. 347 - 350, who follows Diels-Kranz closely in text
and translation; he comments (p. 349): "There is a great deal both in the style and content of the
fragment that links it to the philosophy of the Academy and the later tradition of Platonism, while
virtually nothing that accords with what one would expect from a Presocratic author or with fragments
1-7 of Philolaus. It must be regarded as almost certainly spurious."
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the numbers according to the power which obtains in ten-ness: Great indeed and all-
fulfilling and all-working, and of divine and heavenly life, and of the life of humans, is
beginning and leader in community and communion [ ] power also of the ten-
ness. But without this: all things unlimited and unclear and non-apparent Of
course, the passage may be post-Platonic, in which case the author could, and to all
probability would, have read the Phaedo\ that would explain the occurrence of obcla,
repeated a few lines later, in the sense of 'being' usually attributed to Plato.323 It would
also explain, a little later in the text, the assertion that \|/eu8o<; 8s oi)8sv Ss^exai d
xco 6tpi0p.cc) cpuoic; ot>8e dppovia- ot> yap o'ikbiov abxou; feaxi. The
nature of the number, and also harmony, do not admit any falsity: indeed, it would not
be familiar to them - use of ot) Ssysxat is strongly reminiscent of the Phaedo passage
under consideration. Likewise, xd Ttpdypaxa X& XS ajieipa Kal xa
7tspaivovxa could be taken from the Philebus.
It is, I think, nevertheless a strange use the author makes of the Phaedo, and potentially
other dialogues by Plato, or of what was known about discussions in the Early
Academy.324 The words are there, but their combination strangely distorts any original
Platonic meaning beyond recognition. -1 should not wish to maintain that, therefore, this
passage quoted by Stobaeus is pre-Platonic; I do think, however, that regardless of the
time of composition, it is best understood as containing Pythagorean material, and to a
large extent the same material which was at Plato's disposal when he wrote the Phaedo,
namely: importance of the role of dpjiovla; of mathematical considerations; of the soul;
also of things which do, and things which do not admit each other; things which are, and
things which are not in harmony with each other; certain G/loei^ or dividings; and so
on.
323 Cf. in particular the excellent 'EXCURSUS I. Obola AS A PHILOSOPHICAL TERM IN PLATO (on 72 B
22) by E.S. Thompson, The Meno ofPlato, London 1901, pp. 255 - 258; and C.J. Classen, Sprachliche
Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens, Miinchen 1959, pp. 158 - 164.
324 Cf. Huffmann, op. cit., p. 350.
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Be that as it may, as soon as the word KOtVCOVia is pronounced in the Phaedo, it is
taken back, or at least relativized, in two ways, first by addition of sits Otit) Stj Kai
O7tco<; 7ipooayopsDO|isvri to sits 7xapouoia sits Koivcovia, and then
explicitly by the assertion: ol) yap stl touto 8llO%upi^OjJ.ai - that latter phrase
should be taken to mean indeed, I do not insist on that in addition, namely what the
precise nature of the presence or community or communion is; alternatively, one could
translate: 'indeed, that I insist on no longer'; that would imply that there was a time
when he insisted on the precise choice of word, and therefore probably also on a specific
type of relationship; assuming that, would be puzzling in more than one respect: we are
left to guess whether Socrates insisted previously on KOlVCOVia, or whether he insisted
on Tiapoixria, or whether there was a time when he insisted on one of the two terms,
and another when he insisted on the other; clarification would have been welcome; the
other consideration is that Plato's device to have Socrates declare that he has always
talked about the things discussed here is just about acceptable when the existence of the
just, the good and the beautiful are concerned, since these issues did indeed figure in
earlier dialogues; but to claim in addition that there were times when Socrates insisted on
one or other specialized terminology in addition, when there is evidently no trace of that
in any of Plato's earlier writings, would go too far. In writing fiction, Plato always took
great care to give his fiction some air of plausibility.
IV.
As for the choice of an unattested 7TpoaayopSUOpevr| in preference to
Ttpoayevofisvri or 7tpOOyi(y)VOpsvr|, J.C.G. Strachan's decision to adopt
Wyttenbach's conjecture in the new Oxford Classical Text is wholly plausible since, as
we have seen,325 TtpooyiyvsoOai denotes a 'coming to be in addition'; it is doubtful if
325 Cf. the chapter on KpOOStvat and 7ipooylyvSO0at, passim.
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that could be said of 'the beautiful itself, that it comes to be in addition to what is there
already - it can definitely not be said of 'the presence of the beautiful' or 'the community
of the beautiful' that either of them come to be in addition to what is already there; and
that does not depend on which form of the verb 7tpooylyveo0ai is chosen. On the
other hand, casual inspection of instances similar to OTtT) 8l^ Kal OTtCO^ in Plato's
early dialogues shows that a verb of naming is usually in the place of the predicate
introduced thus; besides 7ipooayop8f)8O0ai, Kd>»eiO0ai and 6vopd^8O0ai are
frequent. Socrates' meaning would then be that while he thought the relationship
expressed through the instrumental dative in clauses like ICO KaA,Cp id KaAd
ytyveiai KaAd essential, the precise nature of that relationship, and therefore in
particular what it was called, is of secondary importance; what matters is the recognition
of the existence of the beautiful and the good and the like. That is what Socrates does
not get tired of stressing.
V.
After that has been granted, Socrates adds (100e5): Kal fisys08l dpa id psyaAa
peyaAa Kal id pel^co, Kal opiKpoirjii id eAdna) kAdiicD. And through
largeness the large things are large, and also the larger ones, and through smallness
the smaller things smaller. What surprises with that addition is again the insistence on
seemingly un-Socratic concerns, but also in particular the introduction of the
comparative beside the positive in the case of the large, in place of the positive in the
case of smallness. The attentive reader will not fail to notice that that may make a
difference to the validity of subsequent arguments. The immediate positive gain,
however, is the fact that the difference in root of apiKpov and sAailOV demonstrates
that Socrates' point is not on the level of punning sophism.
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Next, after dealing with the beautiful and the big, Socrates returns to relations between
numbers, what could be called simple arithmetic. From 10 lb 10 onwards, the metaphor of
|leTS^SlV is again prominent, the word OOOla, being, is employed, and besides the
aorist forms p.exao%OV, pextiaxfl and pexaaxeiV, the noun pexdoxeaic; is
introduced, a noun perhaps coined on this occasion. As yet, it seems as if there were one
'thing itself for every one 'name for a thing in the world; in terms of explanation by
a'lxia, 'with reason and cause', this would, of course, already be a significant reduction
of explanantia, since for all the instances of 'two' in the universe there would be one
or twoness, for all the instances of 'one' there would be one fiova^ or 'unity' or
rather 'oneness'.
In 101d3, Socrates employs the rather rare construction of the simple verb 8%® with
genitive, 81 8s Xiq at>xf|<; xf|q fc>7lO08O£CO<; 8XOlXO, if (only) someone had a hold
on (or: had mastered) this assumption, one should continue with the enquiry, and
building on the first and subsequent assumptions in agreement with it,326 one may
eventually reach the best, that is to say a sufficient assumption.
VI.
It is at this point, after the introduction of a mathematical example and the repeated
emphasis on the method of tiTTOOsatc; or assumption, a method introduced in a
mathematical context in the Meno, that Echecrates of Phlius intervenes with the
enthusiastic assertion that even somebody with OfltKpoc; VOliC; would see the clarity
and conviction the argumentation of Socrates carries. The choice of words, the
modification of VOUV S/COV to OjllKpov VOtJV 8X®V, is an implicit mockery of
Anaxagoras and his Noi)£. The applause itself, however, is appropriate at this point
326 I do not attempt to set the text right at this place, but I believe that %aipetv 8CpT|C; av at d4 has
somehow entered the text on the model of SCOpC dv yuipSlV in c8f.
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because Echecrates, a Pythagorean himself,327 would be on familiar territory when it
comes to mathematics. (He may well have been puzzled by some of what Socrates had
previously said on the beautiful and the good.)328
Echecrates asks Phaedo to resume his narration of what was said. Phaedo, however,
does not resume narration in the accustomed fashion. Instead, he summarizes the next bit
of the conversation before reverting to his previous form of report. It is in this summary,
that Phaedo of Elis, guest in a Pythagorean community, states (102al 1): CO^ JJ.8V fey(b
olpai, 87isi ai)Tcp xauxa oi)vexcopr|0r|, b Kai co|j.oA,oyeixo elvai xi
sicaoxov xcbv eiScov Kai xouxcov zdiXXa jiexaA,ajiptivovxa afcxcbv
xouxcov xfjv smovuplav loxeiv, xo Srj psxa xauxa fipcbxa- ... . As I
believe, when that was granted to him, b and it was agreed that each one of the Sl8r| is,
and that, by coming to have of them, the other things acquire their benaming of those
themselves, after that he asked this: ... . This is the first place in Plato's dialogues at
which the 'being itself by itself of certain things is explicitly asserted and at which - at
the same time - those things are then called SlSlj.
It is difficult to find a translation for 8lSr| at this place without begging the question.
Apparently, nothing new in terms of subject matter is being introduced here by Phaedo.
He seems more or less to summarize what he had reported already; perhaps there was
some additional generalizing statement by Socrates which has not been reported
verbatim-, but not even that need be assumed. From what has been said on slSoc;
above,329 the noun should be expected to mean Took, looks, appearance, guise' or 'type'
or 'way, ways' or else perhaps 'scheme'. In the Phaedo itself, elSoc; occurred previously
327 Cf. Rowe, loc. cit.; apt criticism of the views there submitted, and a good summary of what we know
and what we can conclude about Echecrates and other personae in the Phaedo, is found in Ebert, op.
cit., pp. 4-20 (on Echecrates see pp. 5 - 8 with notes).
328 Whether there is a punning allusion to Pythagorean (IKOUGpuXU in Echecrates pronounced
assertion that for them, the absent recipients of this report, Socrates' arguments are plausible 'while we
listen' (102a9) may be left aside. Cf. also 88c9, where it is again Echecrates interrupting: Kat yap
abxdv ps vuv dKouoavxa aou ....
329 See in particular Section XIII of the chapter on el8oQ.
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on several occasions in one or other of its senses.330 From the syntactical context at
103e5, it is clear that in whatever sense St8o(^ is used, we are dealing with an absolute
application of the noun, that is to say 'an appearance' as 'a thing that appears', or the
like. To my mind, none of the translations established above suggests itself immediately.
There is, however, one instance of Sl8o£ in pre-Platonic literature not considered as
yet, Philolaus B5, and I believe that it may form the missing link, in the sense that it can
be shown how and why st8o^ had come to be used in that pre-Socratic Pythagorean
context, and it can also be shown why Plato would then want to adopt it. It is again
Stobaeus who reports (Eclogae I 21, 7c)331: O yet ^tdv dplG^toq S^Sl 86o p8V
I8ia 8i8r|, 7iepiaaov Kal apxiov, xptxov 8s tin djKpoxepcov
jj.8ix0evxcDV dpxiotxepixxov SKCtxspot) 8s xa> elSeoq 7toA,X,al poptpat,
aq SKCtOXOV Cti)TO arjpaivei. Now, number has certainly two types, odd and even,
and mixed from both of them as a third even-odd; and of each of the two types, there
are many shapes or forms which each one itself indicates. A number of points
concerning text, translation and interpretation of this fragment are controversial. It is,
however, generally regarded as genuine, and if it is genuine, there cannot be any
reasonable doubt that Plato must have read it; and, to the modem reader of the Phaedo,
it cannot be controversial either, that Plato in the long subsequent discussion of the
example of the odd and the even not only had Philolaos in mind and reacted to Philolaos,
but also that every educated and philosophically interested reader was supposed to see
330 'This human appearance' at 73a2; 'a boys appearance' at 73d8; 'a man's appearance' at 76cl2; 'this
appearance', absolutely, with reference to man's existence on earth, at 87a2; 'a man's appearance and
body' at 92b5; EtSo^ means 'type' at 79a6, b4, dlO, for discussion of which see below; 'type (of cause
and reason)' at 98a2, 100b4.
331 1. 188. 9 Wachsmuth = DK 44B5 = F5 Huffmann; for a recent discussion of different ways to read
the lines see Huffmann, op. cit., 177 - 193, whose text I adopt for the purpose of the present, limited
investigation. For questions of authenticity, see ibid., p. 178. As can be seen from my translation, I do not
agree with Huffmann's note on how to construe and therefore translate SKCIOTOV (p. 192): "SKCtOTOV
is confusing at first sight. The only antecedents immediately available are the two "kinds" of number.
However, these were picked out by SKClTSpco ("each of the two") at the beginning of the sentence and it
would be odd now to use SKaOTOV " I do not think that 'it would be odd' at all.
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that this is a conscious dialogue of Plato with the Pythagorean. That much is, in general,
not disputed.332
With regard to the meaning of sISoc; in Philolaus B5, there is no difficulty in translating
the word as 'type' on its first occurrence. A close parallel from the Phaedo is 79a6, when
Socrates suggests: Gcojiev o6v pou^ei, scprj, 8uo ei8r| xcov ovtoov, to jisv
6paxov, to se dl8ec;; Do you now want us, he said, to posit two types of things that
are, the one visible, the other invisible? This usage was, of course, perfectly common
with the medical writers; one need not, therefore, assume that anybody reading the
sentence at 79a6 would have thought of any particular significance as to terminology. It
was the case that besides mathematics, including astronomy, it was medicine that
Pythagoreans concerned themselves with; philosophers frequently connected with
Pythagoreanism were Alcmaeon and Empedocles who are both medical men by
profession; but there need not have been any special influence on philosophical
terminology in this particular case since we have seen that by the end of the fifth century
a meaning 'type' for slSoc; is well enough attested.
What is interesting is the second occurrence of the term in Philolaus B5. sl8o^ has the
same point of reference; it has a qualifying adjectival pronoun attached to it, in that way
parallel to expressions like 6X"ko stSo^ or tiavtct td £lSr|; there is, however, no
qualifying genitive; that is, of course, not absolutely necessary, since the point of
reference is in close proximity, and the context does not create any ambiguity in sense;
nevertheless, Philolaus B5 is a precedent for the absolute use of et8o^, where sISoc^
refers to an abstract, philosophical notion (for number theory is - and always has been -
as much part of philosophy as it is of mathematics; or rather: at that level of abstraction,
the distinction between the sciences and philosophy has disappeared).
332 In discussion, I will leave aside the interesting but for our purposes not centrally relevant question of
the dpil07t6ptTTOV; see M.E. Hager, Philolaus and the Even-Odd, in: CR XII (1962), pp. 1 - 2; cf.
also Huffmann, op. cit. ad loc., and the review of Huffmann by P. Kingsley in CR XLIV (1994),
294 - 296. - It is worth noting, though, how Plato introduces and re-introduces pdvctc;.
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Yet more can be said about the use of el8o^ here. Pythagoreans were interested in
numbers. For that we have the direct evidence of fragments. But they were not interested
in numbers in isolation, as witnessed by reports like that of Aristotle at Metaphysics A5,
985b ff. At 986al5, his report comes close to summarising Philolaus B5. Then, a few
lines later, he resumes (986a22): exepoi §8 XCDV abxGDV TOUTCDV xaq frp/d?
8eKa Xeyoixnv etvai zdq Kaxa ouoxoixiav ^eyopevat;- ... But others of
those same people say that there are ten principles, gathered in columns:™ ...
Tispaq Kai dTieipov limit and unlimited
TCSpiXXOV Kal apxiov odd and even
SV Kal 7iX,f|0oc; one and multitude
Se^iov Kal ftpiaxepov right and left
appev Kal 0flXu male and female
fjpepouv Kal Kivoupevov still and moving/moved
et>0u Kal Kap.7iuX,ov straight and curved
(pax; Kal okoxck; light and dark
fryaGdv Kal KaKOV good and bad
xsxpaycovovKal exepopriKS^- ... square and oblong: ...
For our purposes it does not matter which group of Pythagoreans had exactly this table
of opposites, if any; it does not matter if all of the pairs were included for any one group;
it does not even matter if the 'good and bad' were included for Philolaus or Echecrates,
although that would make things more readily comprehensible for them from the start.
What matters is that just as with numbers, one could say that there are two types of
animals, male and female; two types of line, straight and curved; two types of
quadrangles (or geometrical numbers), square and oblong. It is true, Aristotle does not
mention the term el8oc; in connection with this list of tipfCLV, but Aristotle uses his own
333 For the arrangement of the opposites in columns, I follow G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, M. Schofield, The
Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge 21983, p. 337f.
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terminology throughout, and he did not mention el5oc; before, when he was either
writing about Philolaus himself or about someone holding virtually identical views on the
odd and even.
If it is correct that there were two types of all those things, Philolaus' use of elSoc; in
an absolute application for one or other of odd and even is understandable; the same
term will have been applied beyond the one attested example. What was listed in tables
of opposites were the primary constituents of the KOOflO^ or universe; they can be
called 'opposed, or opposing, principles', but one can also talk about them as 'two
types', of whatever it happens to be; the next step is to speak of 'each type', without
qualification of what the type is supposed to be a type of. And that is exactly what
Phaedo does in summarizing the discussion for Echecrates and the other Pythagoreans
(102bl): cb|lO>.6Y£lTO elvai XI SKCtOTOV TGOV s'l8d>V, it was agreed that each
of the types is something; in the same way it had previously been agreed that 'death is
something' and that there are a number of things to which we give the predicate: 'it is'.
Phaedo's use of etSoc; is best understood in that Pythagorean context.
VII.
If it is accepted that it is Philolaus, and indeed this particular part of Philolaus'
philosophy, whose terminology is adopted here, another issue receives clarification. At
103e, Socrates advances the argument by summarizing what he had said about warm and
cold, and fire and snow: 8GTIV &pa, fj 8' og, 7iept 8Via toov TOIOUTCOV, (DOTS
prj jiovov abxo to slSoq &%iouG0ai xou auxoo bvopaxog e'tc; xov del
Xpovov, iikXa Kal aAAo xi o eoxi pev obic eiceivo, s^ei 8e xi^v
feKslvou poptpr^v &ei, oxavTisp fj. exi 8e ev xcoSe loco;; eoxai
oacpeoxspov o X&yco- xo yap Tispixxov &sl 7tod 8si xouxou xoo
6vopaTO<; Xl)y%dV8lV 07iep vtv X,syop8V- f) Ob; Now, it obtains, he said,
280
with some of the things of that sort, that not only the £l8o£ itself demands the same
name for all time, but that another as well <demands its name>, which is not that
<thing>, but always and forever has the jiopcpij of that <thing>, as long as it is. But
perhaps what I mean will be yet clearer in the following: indeed, somehow the odd
always requires to have that name which we call it now; or does it not? Scholarly
opinion as to the relevance of the term fioptpfj besides stSoc; is divided.334 The majority
view is that eISoc;, 'l8sa and jJ.opcpf| are synonyms. A minority suggests that there is a
distinction between eISo<; on the one hand, poptpfj and 'iSsci on the other, with
fiopcpf) and 'iSsa being used synonymously here. Without endorsing all the arguments
and conclusions connected with that latter view,335 I suggest that the following
considerations may lend support for upholding a distinction between sl8o£ and the other
two nouns.
Thinking in terms of opposites, there are two types of number, odd and even; there are
two types of temperature, hot and cold; those types themselves have their names for all
time. Then there are also other things - and it is not specified if they are physical and
corporeal or otherwise - which have the 'shape or form' of those types which are the
opposites; examples are fire, one of the hot things, snow, one of the cold things, three,
one of the odd things, and two, one of the even things. In the sentence f| xpid^ £%£!
Ttjv fioptprjv TOO 7T£piTTOb, threeness [or, for that matter, the triad or the number
three or a collection of three items] has the shape or form of the odd, popcpfj refers to
the 'shape or form' in its concretion: if it is correct that what prompted the use of £l8oc;
in this context was application of the term in the sense of 'type', where on some
occasions at least - as in the case of odd and even, or of right and left - 'type' referred to
334 For a selection of modern views on the meaning and significance of pop(pf| at 103e5f., see
APPENDIX 3 below. For the earliest extant instances of the word in Greek literature, see APPENDIX 4
below.
335 R.S. Bluck, (Plato's Phaedo, London 1955, p. 17, n. 7) and R. Hackforth (Plato's Phaedo,
Cambridge 1955, p. 150, n. 1) connect the distinction in reference of stSo^ on the one hand, pop(pf|
and t§8Ct on the other, with the question of the 'immanence of forms'.
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something which does not have a physical appearance, then a different word was needed
if something like 'appearance' or 'shape' or 'form' or 'figure' was to be denoted.
In the case of Philolaus B5, o ya }ldv frplGfldt; 8%8l 8i3o pev iSia si5r],
Tiepioodv Kai apxiov, xplxov 8e hri frjixpoxepcov peixGevxcov
frpxicmepixxov- SKaxepco 8e xcd el8eo<; 7ioA.X,al poptpal, aq eicaoxov
auxo oripaivsi, now, number has certainly two types, odd and even, and mixed from
both of them as a third even-odd; and of each of the two types, there are many shapes
or forms which each one itself indicates, the several particular instantiations of the two
types, all the odd and even numbers, are metonymically referred to as 'shapes or forms'
which the types, odd and even, signify or characterize. The difference between Philolaus
B5 and Phaedo 103e5 is apparently that in the case of the Pythagorean, the 'things
characterized by a type' are called popcpfj, in an absolute way, while Socrates' usage
suggests that the 'types' have poptpfj. This difference may be more apparent than real
since, as we saw in the case of sTSoc;, any word denoting something like 'appearance' or
'shape' may easily shift in applicability from 'appearance (of a thing)' to 'an appearance',
taken absolutely. In the realm of non-corporeal, non-physical things, such a word may be
applied to things at different levels, that is to say, one could use poptpfj with reference
to 'the odd' just as well as with reference to 'three'; they both have their peculiar 'shape
or form'; the word popcpf| lends itself to such application as even at its earliest
instances, Odyssey VIII, 170, and XI, 367, and Empedocles B21, the term does not refer
to 'physical shape'.336
The difference between stSo^ and poptpf) in this context would thus be the following:
when, exempli gratia, the odd is referred to with reference to its ontological status, it
will be referred to as an sl8o^, i.e. a 'type', one of those primary things underlying
reality; when the odd is referred to with reference to its characteristic nature, it is
referred to as having a certain 'shape or form', or being a 'shape or form'; the various
particular 'odd things' in the world may likewise be denoted with this latter term, since
336 Cf. APPENDIX 4 on "pop(pf| in Archaic Greek Literature" below.
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they, too, have this 'shape or form'; however, those things, numbers like three and five,
etc., do not belong to the 'types', they would not be called 'sIScx^'.
This distinction, I think, is borne out by the subsequent instances of the two Greek
terms, and the interpretation receives further support from the way l8sa is introduced at
104b9 and employed thereafter. At 104b7, Socrates is still elaborating on the same
phenomenon of things which are not opposites of anything themselves but have in them
something that is an opposite to something else: ... (paivBXai ob povov SKSlva
xa fevavxta aA,^r]X,a ot> Ss^opsva, hXXd Kai ooa obK ovx'
svavxia 6%si &ei x&vavxia, obSs xabxa soikb 56/ojj.Bvoiq SK6ivr|v
xr^v 'iSbav f\ av xfj sv abxoic; obafl svavxia fj, bjuioborjc; abxf|<;
rjxoi c &7ioA,A,bpsva r) bTtBKXcopobvxa. f| ot> (pfjoopsv xa xpia Kal
6t7ioX,sio0ai Ttpoxspov Kai 6xioi5v TCBiosaGai, Tiplv imopsivai
sxi xpia ovxa apxia ysvBoGai; ... [ob] povov xa 6i8r| xa svavxia obx
UKopBVBi bjuovxa a^XrjA,a, bX'ka Kai aX.X,' axxa xa bvavxia ot>x
UTtOpBVBl BTtlOVXa. ... it seems that not only those opposites do not admit of each
other, but also the things which are not each other's opposites but always have the
opposites; they as well do not seem to admit that \8sa which in each case is opposite to
the one in them, but were it to approach, they would with certainty either perish or
recede. Or do we not say that the three would rather perish or suffer whatever else,
before it endured, while still being three, to become even? ... \not\ only the opposite
BtSri do not endure each other when approaching, but also certain other things do not
endure the opposites when they approach.
When something 'becomes even', it displays the nature of 'what is even', 'the even'; one
of the characteristics of 'three' is its 'oddness'; this 'figure', the oddness of the three, is
opposed to that other 'figure', the 'evenness'; 'figure' here suggests something concrete,
characterised, plastic, graphic. \bECL, figure, seems to refer to oddness, evenness, three,
two, etc., in the same way poptpf), shape or form, does. Whether l8sa at 104b9 refers
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to 'the oddness of a particular group of three, five, etc., things' or rather to 'oddness'
itself need not be determined, and, as far as the text goes, cannot be determined.
Whatever is 'odd' will not admit 'even'. The two 'figures' are incompatible, in whatever
context. That is conditioned by the fact that the 'types', 'the odd' and 'the even', are
opposed. As stated above, that does not imply that there are two things, 'the odd' and
'the even', which are 'types', and two other things, 'the figure of odd' and 'the figure of
even'. However, 'the figure of odd' is peculiar to both the 'type' and any of its particular
instantiations. That can also be witnessed in the subsequent passage, 104dl ff.:
dp' ouv ... xtiSe eirj av, a oxi av Kaxaoxr] pf^ povov dvayKa^ei xr^v
auxou \8eav abxo laxsiv, dXXd Kat evavxtou abxcp del xivoq; ... .
olcrOa yap SrjTiou oxi a av t\ xcbv xpioav \8ea Kaxaoxfl, dvayicri
abxoiq ob povov xpialv elvai dXXd Kai 7ispixxoiq. ... kni xo
xoiooxov Sf), cpapev, f| evavxia 'iSea kicelvfl xf| poptpfj f[ av xouxo
&7iepyd^r|xai oi)8e7iox' av bX,0oi. ... e'lpya^exo 8s ye f| 7iepixxf|; ...
evavxia 8e xauxri f| xou dpxlou; ... e e7ii xa xpta apa f| xou dpxiou
\8ea ol)8eTtOXe fl^ei. Is it now, ... , that they be those, which - when they possess
something, they do not only force them to have their own 'iSea, but also, through it, to
have of an opposite Indeed, you know that whatever the 'iSea of the three
possesses, for those things it is necessary not only to be three but also odd And it
was thus upon such a thing, ... , that that l8ea would never come which is opposite to
that poptpfj which brought that about. ... But certainly the odd <pOpcpf|> brought it
about. ... And the one opposite to it is that of the even. ... e So, upon the three, the
'l8ea of the even will never come.
'That which possesses' may refer to one of the 'types', which forces a thing to have its
figure, it may - to employ Philolaus' usage - refer to one of the popcpal, the 'shapes or
forms' of that 'type'; that is the case with the 'figure of three' upon which the 'figure'
opposite to that 'shape' which has brought it about that what is 'three' is also 'odd'
would never come; that is the 'odd shape', as seems to be implied by fj Tiepixxf) in
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104dl2. It is opposite to the 'shape of the even', so that the 'figure of the even would
never come upon the three'. After phrases such as XX|V XOl) ftpllou, xf|v XOU
TiepiXXOU (twice), xr\v XOU O^OU, in 105a, b, Socrates speaks of 7ispixx6xr(g in
105c, and again of XT^V XOU &pxiou 'iSeav in 105dl3. The one occasion, however,
where one of two opposite 'types' is referred to qua 'type', el8o^ is used again
(I06d6): 6 8e ye Geoc; ofyai, scprj 6 ScoKpaxriq, Kal abxo xo xf|<^ C,cor\q
eTSog Kal si xi aXX,o &0avaxov soxiv, Tiapa 7tavxcov av 6|xoX,oyr|0elr|
jJT|SsTEOXS 6t7t6A.A,\X50ai. 7 believe, said Socrates, that the god and the 'type' of life
and if anything else is immortal, that would be agreed upon by all to be indestructible.
Death was established as the opposite of life at 105d9; there are, therefore, the two
opposing 'types' life and death, and the phrase abxo XO xf|<; sl8o^ is in
concord with that.
It is one thing to claim the existence of a distinction in meaning and to show that this
distinction is consistently observed by an author in a particular context: that is the case
with slSoq, 'iSsa, and popcpf| at Phaedo 100b - 105e; it is a different matter to
demonstrate what the terms involved actually mean, and why they are chosen for a
particular context. In the case of e!8oc;, Pythagorean, and more specifically Philolaic
origin could be established, and it could be shown how etSoc; as a word for 'type' could
have come to be applied for certain, specified opposed 'types' which were the
fundamental realities of this world order. It could then be shown in what way Socrates,
speaking and behaving on the day of his death like a Pythagorean, could adopt this
terminology which was applied first in a context Pythagoreans themselves would have
had an interest in, but then more widely to what were for Plato the fundamental realities
of this world order. It should be stressed that the meaning of Sl8oc^ among Pythagoreans
which I propose was 'type', in common Greek fashion; the meaning of etSo^ was not
'smallest constituent', 'fundamental reality'; it was through a thinking in polarities, in
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pairs of opposites, that 'type' could be applied, as is the case in Philolaus B5, to those
opposing principles which did, for some, underlie this world order.
Philolaus B5, on the other hand, O ya pav frpiGpdg e%8l 8bo pev tSia Sl8r|,
Tieptooov Kal apxiov, xplxov 8s tin frpcpoxepcov pei^Gevxcov
&pxi07ispixxov* SKaxspco 8s xco st8so<; 7ioX,X,al poptpai, aq sicaoxov
abxo aripaivsi. Now, number has certainly two types, odd and even, and mixed from
both of them as a third even-odd; and of each of the two types, there are many shapes
or forms which each one itself indicates, also provides poptpf|, shape or form, as the
word which may be applied to all the things characterised by those principles, or perhaps
initially just to their shape or form; popcprj thereby refers to something more concrete,
more characteristic, while sl8oc; points rather to the status the principal realities
337
occupy.
There may be an early reflection of Pythagorean popcpf) in the sense indicated here: As
far as we can reconstruct it, the second half of Parmenides' poem was designed to
counteract other systems of belief, other cosmogonies, other scientific explanations of
the world. Parmenides claims that his account is better than any other provided by men;
and he goes on to report what men believe. One puzzling feature of the common beliefs
of men is how elaborate a system is potentially presupposed. Parmenides commences his
exposition of this system with the words (B8 , 51)338: ... * So^Ct£ 8' &7TO XobSe
Ppoxeiag | pavGave Koopov bpcov feTiecov &7raxr|X,dv &koucdv. |
jiopcpac; yap KaxsGevxo 8uo yvcopac; 6vopti£siv, | xcov piav ob /pecov
saxiv- bv c5 7T87tX.avrip.svoi e'lolv. | frvxia 8' bKplvavxo 8spa<; Kai
orjpax' 80svxo | &X,X,riX.cov- xf| pev (pX.oyoc; aiGeptov Tibp, |
337 For a similar relation between sl8o^ and poptpf), ef. the discussion of Airs, Waters, and Places
Xm, in Section VII of the chapter on P.t8o^.
338 For discussion of a number of points of detail, and general remarks on Jioptpij in this fragment, see
Appendix 4 below.
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f]7iiov ov, pey' eX-acppov, ecouxco tkxvtoos xcotoxov, | xco 8' exepcp prj
xcobxov- dxdp k&ksivo Kax' abxo | xdvxla vukx' d8af|, ttukivov
8epa<; bpPpi0s<; xs. | xov goi feyco SiaicoGpov feoiKoxa 7idvxa cpaxt^co,
| cot; oi) prj tioxs ziq os Ppoxcov yvcoprj Trapsldoor].....- but from here on
learn the human belief and opinions, listening to the deceptive order ofmy words. They
laid down as their cognitions to name two shapes, to name one ofwhich is not right: in
that, they have gone astray. But they judged them as opposite things as to build, and
posited signs separated from each other. For the one <shape> aetherial fire of the
flame, being mild, very light, in every way the same as itself, not the same as the other
one: again also the other one for itself, as opposite, unknowing night, of dense and
heavy build. I report to you the whole order as it is likely; thus not any one cognition of
mortals will ever drive past you. It may not be the place here to discuss at what stage
Pythagoreans were influenced by non-Pythagorean philosophers; but Heraclitus (DK
22B40; 81; 129) is witness of Pythagoras' notoriety at the time of Parmenides. If,
therefore, Parmenides speaks of 8uo popcpal, and then goes on to specify that one of
them is light, the other one night, that may echo Pythagorean thought and usage;
likewise, ofjpax 80svxo %COpt^ &7l' &XA,V|A,COV does not only indicate a
separation of first principles from each other and from everything else, the fact that these
principles are referred to as of|paxa may in some way be connected with Philolaus B5,
SKaxep© 8s xd> ei8eot; noXXai popcpai, aq sicaaxov abxo or|paivst;
what exactly is meant by the relative clause is difficult to determine with precision,339 but
if popcptic; is here direct object to Gtjpaivst, they could supposedly be referred to as
GT^paxa with Philolaus as well.
339 For discussion of some of the difficulties, cf. Huffmann, op. cit., p. 192f.
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VIII.
While poptpr} is thus part and parcel of Pythagorean terminology taken over by Plato
for the purposes of exposition of his thoughts in a Pythagorean setting, 'iSsa is not, to
the best of our knowledge. On the other hand, ISect is the word associated above all
with the discussion of ontological matters in the Republic and the Phaedrus; and 'iSsa is,
of course, also the word introduced in the Euthyphro side by side with etScx;, in a
context which is at least anticipatory of some of the aspects of Plato's ontology of the
middle dialogues. All that could not be said about fioptpij, a word which does not occur
at all in the early dialogues. That is to say, judging from the early and middle dialogues
other than the Phaedo, Plato seemed to have an interest in introducing the term \Ssa,
while he does not make use of pop(pf|.
As we have seen,340 'iSsa, other than etScx^, was a word associated in some way with
natural science, physical theories and speculations; it was used there in the sense of
'figure'. Anaxagoras, 59B4, had declared that the OTteppaia, seeds, or smallest
particles, have all sorts of 'lSsa^. Subsequently, Democritus, 68B167, stated that SlVOV
&7td tod navzoq &7iOKpi0f|vai 7iavTola)V 'iSeoov, a sentence which at least on
one reading, a whirling was separated off <consisting> of all sorts offigures, yielded
'iSsai or 'figures' as the ultimate constituents of the world; but 'iSsa seems also
otherwise to have been not only of significance, there is evidence that it was a standard
term employed for denoting his atoms.341
Given that Plato never mentions Democritus,342 but that there are clear traces of
Democritus' thoughts in Plato's later dialogues, it is inherently unlikely that Plato had
340 Cf. Sections III and VIII of the chapter on'l86u.
341 For discussion of 68A164 and 68B141, see end of Section III of the chapter on'l86(X.
342 While there may be agreement that Plato reacted to Democritus in his later dialogues, absence of
direct references usually excludes Democritus from modern discussions of early Platonic dialogues. Cf.
e.g. J. Stenzel, Platon und Demokritos, in: NJbKlassAltPad 1920, 89ff., repr. in: id., Kleine Schriften,
60-71. The situation has not changed dramatically since.
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not come in contact with Democritus' work at all at the time of composition of the
Phaedo. However, if Plato had decided, for whatever reason, not to mention the name of
Democritus, one way of discussing his views is to let Socrates talk about Anaxagoras
who was - apart from Leucippus - the one pre-Socratic who influenced Democritus
most; what was Anaxagorean and what Democritean could have been discerned easily by
a contemporary readership. I therefore suggest that in amongst a discussion starting from
Anaxagoras and directed towards a readership with knowledge of things Pythagorean,
Plato introduced a term that had its significance in the atomistic theory of Democritus.
The reason for that will have been the same as with Anaxagoras and the Pythagoreans: In
dealing with the most powerful and plausible ontological theories of his time, Plato
singles out what he considers usable in terms of subject matter; he then adopts, at least
for the purposes of discussion in this dialogue, items of the terminology with which those
views were presented; in applying those terms selectively and, where necessary, with
modifications as to the point of reference, Plato at once accepts and acknowledges
achievements of his predecessors, criticizes and, where necessary, implicitly refutes their
opinions, and speaks in a language a contemporary readership of some education would
at least have been prepared for.
IX.
What is at stake in this section of the Phaedo in particular is the nature of the ultimate
constituents underlying this world-order, since if we know the make-up of the universe
we will be in a better position to answer questions concerning the nature and the fate of
the soul. Anaxagoras had posited a mixture of small bodies of all sorts, but had
introduced besides something 'itself by itself; some of the Anaxagorean examples of
those 'seeds', like 'the big' and 'the small', 'the warm' and 'the cold', Plato uses as
examples in his discussion; whatever he makes of this vote; or mind - and we do not
have to decide here if Socrates' criticisms are justified - the notion of something 'itself by
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itself is useful; so are the verbs expressing the relation among the 'seeds', and between
the 'seeds' and 'mind'; Plato adopts, at least in this part of the Phaedo, svsivat, being
in, and Ji8T8%£lV, having of, the latter was particularly suitable for his purposes since
he uses [isxe/eiv frequently in his early dialogues to denote the soul's or mind's
sharing in some virtue or vice, non-physical things, and since in the Phaedo the soul is in
some way likened to those non-corporeal, invisible things which are 'themselves by
themselves'; that is to say, because [-18X85(81V was familiar from both an Anaxagorean
and a Socratic context, it could serve as a link and point of departure for an integration
of Anaxagorean into Platonic views.
This connection with 'Socratic' terminology lies behind the use of TtapouoiOL The
noun, and the verb rcapstvai, had formed part of Plato's own considerations of how
attributes, in particular in the moral sphere, are connected with their bearers; in the
Gorgias and in the Lysis, various possibilities of how things present can influence or
determine that to which they are present, had been explored; there had, as yet, not been
any theoretical discussion as to the ontological status of those things; they are here in the
Phaedo given the independent status, almost, of Anaxagoras' mind.
KOlVCOVia, community or communion, was offered as an alternative relation
obtaining between the visible objects of this world and the invisible constituents; it served
the double purpose of implicitly suggesting a relationship between physical and non-
physical things parallel to that of body and soul - for it was in this context that the term
had been used in the Phaedo before - and at the same time of introducing a word
probably connected with Pythagorean physical theories; and that was the area Plato
wanted to turn to next; it is to be noted that nothing is made of KOlVCOVia as a term for
the relation between Slblj or \8sai and particulars subsequently; it is therefore safe to
say that the word was primarily chosen ad hominem, viz■ ad Pythagoram.343
While for Anaxagoras the ultimate constituents of the world were 'mind itself by itself
and 'mixed seeds of all other things', the ultimate constituents of the Pythagoreans were
343 Note that the use and application of KOtVCOVia in Republic and Sophist are quite different from
what we find here in the Phaedo.
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certain opposites; these opposites were arranged in pairs; for some fundamental things
underlying reality, there were 'two types' of those things; these types could not be
reduced further; they were the principles of reality and existence. These principles were
also called eiStj, 'types', in an absolute use of the word. Plato adopts the word elSo^
for what he considers as ultimately underlying reality, and he says of these Sl5rj that
they are 'themselves by themselves', just as Anaxagoras said of his 'mind'. The
Pythagoreans also spoke of p.op(pf|, signifying with that term the nature, character and
characteristics of the 'types' they posited; popcprj is a word Plato does not make use of
in other contexts; it seems to be introduced in the Phaedo because it is an integral part of
Pythagorean terminology. But it is, within the same context, gradually replaced by
another word which was in some of its senses a near-synonym of Jiopcpfj in some of its
senses. That word is \8ea.
\8ea is introduced, to all probability, because it was the word which denoted the
smallest particles, the ultimate constituents of the cosmological system of Democritus.
Unlike Anaxagoras' seeds, Democritus' 'atoms' in a sense existed 'themselves by
themselves'; the flaw in Democritus' system was, from Plato's point of view, on the one
hand the elimination of 'mind' altogether, on the other the fact that Democritus' ultimate
constituents were corporeal. Nevertheless, since Plato wanted to posit a plurality of
ultimate constituents, existing 'themselves by themselves', independent from corporeal
stuff and to some extent independent of each other, and since he did not necessarily want
to adopt such independent entities for all opposites, nor for opposites alone, Democritus'
term l5sa, figure, a term also otherwise familiar from physical-cum-ontological theories,
was suited as denoting something concrete, full of content, plastic, and as graphic as is
possible for a word referring to something invisible.
With all three parties Plato addresses, his main innovation is what he chooses as
ultimate constituents more than what he calls those constituents or which precise
ontological status he assigns to them. For Anaxagoreans, Pythagoreans - despite the fact
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that one of the pairs of opposites in the table reported by Aristotle is actually 'good and
bad' - and Democriteans, it was not in the first place 'the beautiful', 'the good', 'the just'
and 'the moderate' which were underlying the world; and while Plato talks in the Phaedo
about 'the equal', 'the big' and 'the small', 'the odd' and 'the even', those un-Socratic
items are not considered in the Symposium, the Republic and the Phaedrus.
In a sense, therefore, Plato's innnovation does not lie in the field of language and
terminology, but wholly in the field of subject matter. However, it would have been
impossible even to state that much before the origins of the terminology or terminologies
he adopts had been investigated. Conversely, once the origin of a particular expression
has become apparent, it is easier, or in some cases only then possible at all in the first
place, to determine in exactly what way Plato diverged from his predecessors; to see to
what extent his philosophy adopted content together with form, and to what extent he
introduced new ideas of his own.
X.
Up to now the Phaedo has been discussed as if there were no transition between the
early Socratic dialogues and the Phaedo, Symposium, Republic and Phaedrus. That, of
course, is not the case. The Euthyphro and Meno form a transition, linking some of
Socrates' ways of asking questions with some of the answers Plato is prepared to give in
the middle dialogues. Especially and in particular, the words el5oc^ and 't5sa are
introduced, stboc; alone in the Meno, both words in the Euthyphro. It would go too far
to discuss Euthyphro 5c - 6e and Meno 72a - 73a here in detail. Suffice it to say that the
terms are there employed in a way which could not possibly be understood from earlier
Greek usage. Occurrence of the terms in question there does therefore not invalidate
what has been said about the Phaedo. It does suggest, though, that rather than producing
his newest doctrines in writing before discussing them in the Academy, there was
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discussion, so that the words would have been familiar to those present. What Plato does
in the Phaedo, then, is providing for a larger audience the origins of his thought and
diction; perhaps because the need was felt to provide the information withheld in the
transitional dialogues. This, however, is speculation.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study has been to provide preliminaries for a better understanding
of central parts of Plato's philosophy. Its method is a combination of traditional
diachronic semantics and the study of the literary and social contexts of words which
may be termed pragmatics. Its justification, it is hoped, is provided by an application of
the results of those studies to a portion of Platonic text which is, in parts, reinterpreted in
the light of some new findings.
The point of departure of the investigation undertaken is a passage from one of the
dialogues of Plato's middle period which is generally assumed to contain the essence of
his thoughts on matters ontological at the time of composition: Phaedo lOOd - 105e.
From this text, a number of significant terms, most of them recurring in other dialogues
of similar date, have been selected: (J.£TS%eiV, 7iapeivai, 7lpOO£tVai, fevsivai,
stSot;, 'l8sa and some of their cognates; the histories of these terms have been traced,
from their earliest occurrence in extant Greek literature, usually Homer, through the
various authors and genres of epic, lyric and tragic poetry, historical, philosophical,
medical and rhetorical writings, to the early dialogues of Plato himself. In the course of
investigation it seemed appropriate to study the nouns 8t§0£ and 'l8sa in greater detail
and to a degree approaching comprehensiveness, for two reasons: on the one hand, their
semantic development is more marked and variegated, and therefore deserved more
careful scrutiny; on the other, scholarly opinion is more divided as to the meaning and
senses of these two nouns than with any of the other terms selected. For the same
reason, it was deemed necessary to translate by far the majority of pre-Platonic
occurrences of the two nouns in their contexts, a measure not required in the case of the
verbs under consideration. That in itself is a first result: nouns are more readily employed
with extensions in meaning than verbs; they are more likely to acquire a fixity in
application which may amount to a technical terminology. The difference in status and
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importance of the nouns over against the verbs is reflected in the separate arrangement of
the material in Parts I and II.
Part III consisted of the application of some the results yielded by the semantic studies
of the individual words in Parts I and II. It is in the nature of the exercise that many of
the developments traced in Parts I and II are not made use of in Part III; however, it was
felt that unless a complete study of all the various actual contexts prior in time were
undertaken, it would not be possible to determine with certainty the meaning and
connotations of any given term in any given text. What may at first have seemed to be
mere diversion from the proper task proved to be indispensible; without it it would not
have been possible on the one hand to show what the words could not mean, on the
other, it would have been impossible to be sure what is relevant and what not before
such an investigation was carried out. Had one been content with Anaxagoras and
Pythagoreans in general as the background to the Phaedo, one or two essential elements
would be missing. The effort was not in vain, as it could be shown with fair precision not
only what the terms selected actually meant with Plato but more importantly, which
literary and intellectual contexts Plato derived his philosophical terminology from: being
able to determine to whom Plato reacted in his thoughts, and with whom he was in
dialogue in his writings, is more important than bare linguistic reconstruction of
'meaning'.
We see Plato in the central philosophical passage of the central dialogue Phaedo in
interaction with three at least partly distinct parties of pre-Socratic philosophers:
Anaxagoras and his followers, the Pythagoreans, and Democritus. While most of that
conforms with received opinion, reaction to Democritus at that early a stage in Plato's
writing career is not usually assumed. That in itself, and the use Plato makes of the
thoughts of his predecessors in fusing and correcting their assumptions while adapting
their language to his own purposes may prompt us to reconsider some commonly held
views on Plato's ontology.
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However, the study here attempted is intended to be preliminary in nature; the
application to a Platonic text in Part III is to be understood as one example only of how
the semantic investigations of Parts I and II may be applied to the dialogues of Plato and
other near-contemporary philosophical texts, and how this may change our perceptions
of aspects both of the authors studied and of the history of Greek philosophy.
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APPENDIX 1
On Ancient Medicine and the Hippocratic Corpus
On AncientMedicine has received attention in connection with Plato's philosophy for a long time. Cf.
in particular Taylor's comment, op. cit., p. 214: "a work indispensable to the serious student of the
theories about L)7tO06osi£ expounded in the Phaedo." And a little further, p. 214ff.:
"The riepl apxairiq tT|XplKf]C; is, as I have already hinted, of the first importance for the
whole history of Greek Philosophy, so important indeed that no one who has not made a study
of it should be esteemed competent to speak or write on the subject. It supplies us with the key
not only to the conception of "hypotheses" which is fundamental for the understanding of the
Phaedo and Republic, but also to the Platonic conception of the connection of pleasure and pain
with &va7t^f|pCD0l^ and KSVCDOtc^, and to the "Aristotelian" doctrine of the "mean". But no
passage in the work is so important as the lines now before us. [On Ancient Medicine 1,15.] Of
themselves they are sufficient to destroy the whole current theory of the origin of the "doctrine
of 8l5r|." For they show that the terms slSoq, abxd Stp' SCOUXOl) (Plato's abxo KC10'
abx6), Koivtovia already had a known and definite meaning in the medical science of the
fifth century. In other words, the technical phrases of the Phaedo are not Plato's invention but
belong to fifth-century science, and science of a kind with which we have already found that
Socrates was familiar. Exactly what the phrases mean may briefly be explained thus. The
writer, who shows his knowledge of the work of Empedocles by his repeated reference to just
those four "opposites" which correspond most closely to the four Empedoclean "roots", is
arguing against physicians who try to base a doctrine of diet on one of the philosophical
theories (the i)7CO08O8t^ he calls them) about the elementary "body" or "bodies" of which man
and other things are made. To these cosmological theories about the primary body or bodies he
gives the name 1)71008081!^, clearly a technical term in this sense, and his illustrations show
that it is specially the Empedoclean b7t608Gl£, that man, and everything else, is made of four
such "roots", with which he is specially concerned. His own object is to show that medical
knowledge has grown and will continue to grow best when it is based on careful knowledge of
empirical facts, and unencumbered by any speculations about the ultimate forms of body. He
argues, therefore, against those who insist on treating Empedoclean cosmology as a proper
basis for medicine, that you cannot, I in actually prescribing for a sick man, order him to take
"something hot" or "something cold." That is, you cannot prescribe a diet which consists of
absolutely pure "elementary" matter. You have to prescribe one or more of the articles with
which we are all familiar, and none of these is a pure st8o^; none of them is an "element" with
a single specific property, "hot," "cold," etc.; all of them are compounds and therefore exhibit a
"combination" of "opposites" (a KOlVCOVla of Sl8r|). For, as he goes on to say, if you prescribe
"something heating," your patient will at once ask "what thing?" and the moment you specify
the "heating thing," you find that to be "heating" is not its only characteristic. It may be
0sp|iov Kal oxpu(pv6v or 0eppdv Kal 7iA,a8ap6v or Oeppdv apa8ov s"/ov; it will
never be merely 0Spp6v. ([note 1] Compare the exactly similar argument of Anaxagoras (7l&C,
yap av 8K xpixoq yevoixo 0pl^ Kal oap^ £k aapKdq; Fr. 10, Diels),
where the facts of nutrition are employed in exactly the same way against the belief in a finite
number of simple "elements".) If we ask exactly how we are to translate etSo^ in this
connection, the answer is instructive. As the example shows, 08pj_l6v, V(/l)Xp6v, and the rest
of the "opposites" are sIST|, but also each of these "opposites" is looked on, in the fashion of
Empedocles and Anaxagoras, as a substantial thing, not as an attribute to some still more
ultimate body. The discussion belongs to the time after the criticism of Parmenides and Zeno
had destroyed, for men who could think, the old notion of a single primary body, but before
anyone had grasped the notion that a thing could be real without being a body, ([note 2] As
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Professor Burnet has shown, exactly the same ambiguity affects Anaxagoras' use of the word
XplUtaTa. It is wrong in principle to ask if the 7tdvxa which are "in all things"
are simple qualities. The distinction had not yet been felt. TO 0epp6v is at once what we
would call a simple "quality," and a simple body which is a "bearer" of the quality.) Hence
sl5o^ here means at once an ultimately simple body, and an ultimately simple sense-quality,
and is, as for Plato, an exact equivalent of (puotQ. The conception of the things of the actual
world as constituted by a KOlVWviu of several St8r| is, in fact, exactly that which Plato
ascribes to Socrates, I except that it has not yet been suggested that the simple "reals" are
incorporeal."
I have quoted the two pages in full since although many if asked today would deny links between their
own and Taylor's view most would employ the terminology and conceptual framework here used by
him. Now, I do, of course, not dispute Taylor's assertion that the language of the Phaedo was "not
Plato's invention but belong[s] to fifth-century science" in the sense that many terms found in the
Phaedo were used there with more or less specific meaning and that Plato was familiar with that usage.
As to the position of Ancient Medicine within that context, however, Taylor simply assumes that its
date is pre-platonic, and does not react to the converse suggestions by F. Z. Ermerins, Hippocratis ...
reliquiae I - III, Utrecht 1859 - 1864, II, p. 28f., who is quoted approvingly by F. Poschenrieder, Die
platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhaltnisse zu den hippokratischen Schriften, Metten/Landshut 1882,
pp.12, 52 (p. 37f., n. 5, Poschenrieder seems to argue only for dependence of Ancient Medicine on
Nature of Man, and not, in addition, for a dependence on Plato - pace H. Herter, Die Treffkunst des
Arztes in hippokratischer und platonischer Sicht, Sudhoffs Archiv fiir Geschichte der Medizin und der
Naturwissenschaften 47 (1963), pp. 247 - 290, p. 262, n. 2), nor does Taylor answer the stylistic
arguments for a date of composition in the fourth century advanced by F. Blass, Die attische
Beredsamkeitl2, Leipzig 1887, p. 89.
The present situation is not dissimilar to that in 1911. The arguments for a post-platonic date of
composition of Ancient Medicine by H. Diller, Hippokratische Medizin und attische Philosophic,
Hermes 80 (1952), pp. 385 - 409, adduced in addition to what had been said by Ermerins,
Poschenrieder, and Blass, are to my mind in their essence not sufficiently refuted by J.H. Kiihn, System-
und Methodenprobleme in Corpus Hippocraticum, Wiesbaden 1956, pp. 40 -56, especially p. 46ff., and
H. Herter, op. cit., especially p. 261ff. - pace H. Diller, Das Selbstverstandnis der griechischen Medizin
in der Zeit des Hippokrates, in: La collection Hippocratique et son role dans I' histoire de la medecine,
Leiden 1975, pp. 77 - 93, p. 92f.; nor by F. Heinimann, Eine vorplatonische Theorie der T£%VT],
Museum Helveticum 18, 1961, pp. 105 - 130, p. 112, n. 32 - pace G. Rechenauer, op. cit., pp. 176, n.
154.
A date of composition in the fourth century, perhaps between 390 and 380, but perhaps after 380, is
suggested by C. Lichtenthaeler, Chronologische und gedankliche Bezugssysteme in und um "Uber die
alte Medizin", Hippokratische Studien XI, Genf 1980, p. 26ff., who supposes that the treatise was
written by a sophistically trained author.
J. Jouanna, Hippocrate. L'ancienne medecine, Paris 1990, pp. 76f. and 85, interprets methodological
remarks on medicine in the Gorgias as going beyond anything said in this context in Ancient Medicine;
his conclusion that therefore the Hippocratic treatise must antedate the Platonic dialogue would be
convincing only if one assumes that the author of Ancient Medicine, if writing after the composition of
the Gorgias, would by necessity have read the dialogue, and in addition that he would have reacted to
Plato's distinction when writing on related subjects; that, however, need not be the case. Since Jouanna
himself regards the remarks at Phaedrus 270c,d as inconclusive so far as the relation of the dialogue to
any of the Hippocratic writings is concerned (cf. his concluding remarks p. 81, n. 3.), his dating of the
treatise as pre-Platonic is not conclusive either. The same is true of his remarks on Ancient Medicine
and Empedocles (p. 84f.), since we do not know and cannot say in what circles any of the pre-Socratic
philosophers enjoyed what sort of influence and recognition.
A final decision on the relative and absolute chronology of Ancient Medicine would, in my view,



































































































































































On JiOpcpfj at Phaedo 103e ff.
Different commentators hold different views on how to understand |aopcpf| at Phaedo 103e; in
particular, there is no agreement as to whether or not the term is used there synonymously with 'l86(X, or
with s!5o<; and'lSsu, or with neither of the two:
R.D. Archer-Hind, The Phaedo of Plato, London 1883, commentary ad loc., TT]V 8K81VOI)
pop(pT|V] On this Wyttenbach observes 'notatur alius verborum usus: quo et8o^ ut universalius
habetur, (J.op(pf| minus universale et quasi communio TOP 8l8oi)C; : veluti numerus impar StSo^
dicitur, tria autem illius popcpf|V habere'. But this distinction cannot be maintained; for as Wyttenbach
himself points out, 104 D Plato says f| evavxia \8sa SKSiVT) xf| popcpf) f| av XOUTO
&7t8pyd^sxai, where popcpfl = XCp 7t8plXXCO. In fact pop(pf|, £l8o^, and l86a are in the present
passage interchangeable words. 'The species has the |iOp(pf| of the genus present, with whatever else
that |!Op(pf| may be combined', says Prof. Geddes, rightly."
H. Williamson, The Phaedo ofPlato, London 1904, commentary ad loc.: "Here |iOp(pf| is used as a
synonym of el8o<; and \8fea, as is proved by 104D fl evavxia \8sa SKSlvp XT) popcpf): 'snow is
not the same as "cold" (EOXl |ISV oi)K SKStVO) but always contains the Idea of cold' (£X£l XT|V
biceivou poptpfjv)."
J.Burnet, Plato's Phaedo, Oxford 1911, commentary ad loc.: "XTJV 8KSIVOO JiOp(pTjV : i.e. xf|V
SK81VOI) \88av, XO SKS'lVOU sl8o^. The three words are synonyms. Observe how the doctrine is
formulated. There are things, not identical with the form, which have the form as an inseparable
predicate (del, OXaV7t8p fl)."
R.S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo, London 1955, 'Introduction. 2. The theory of Forms in the Phaedo', p.
17f.: "It has been supposed [note 6: "Cf, e.g. Professor Dorothy Tarrant, the Hippias Major, introd. pp.
lvii.-lviii."] that here [i.e. Phaedo 99ff.] and in the course of the proof of immortality that follows Plato
must be thinking of the Form itself (in its capacity as the principle of existence) as entering and leaving
sensible objects - that when a thing is beautiful, for example, the Form itself is somehow 'immanent' in
it, when it ceases to be beautiful, the Form literally 'withdraws' - and that this absurdity is due to a
confusion of metaphysical with logical values. Now here and there (e.g. 102B, 103B-C, 104B) Plato
might appear to mean that the Form itself resides in particulars, but elsewhere a clear distinction is
drawn between 'Tallness Itself and 'that tallness which is in us' (102D), and in general between 'that
which is in us' and 'that which exists in nature' (103B); and the alternative 'perish' and 'withdraw'
could hardly apply to Forms themselves, which cannot move or change, still less perish. That alternative
must be regarded as presenting itself to copies of Forms that inhere in sensible objects, [note 7: "The
extent of the ambiguity is lessened if we take the terms jlOptpfj and 188(1 alike to mean Form-copy or
'character', as in the Timaeus, and reserve the translation 'Form' for the word st8o<^ (cf. Cornford,
Plato's Cosmology, p. 184 with n. 1). But even so, and in spite of the above-mentioned phrases (102D -
103B) distinguishing 'that which is in us' from 'that which exists in nature', Plato's language is still in
places liable to be misleading on the point (e.g. 102B, E, 103B-C, KMC). (In fact, I avoid rendering
'l86a 'Form'simply because that would imply that the soul must be a Form, cf. 104D2-3; and the term is
not necessarily technical.) Plato was enjoying using metaphorical imagery (cf. 102B, 104B, 106A), so
that to speak as though Forms themselves were 'in' particulars would be in keeping with his mood; and
the distinction between Forms and Form-copies was not relevant to his immediate point (viz., the
incompatibility of opposites - whether they be Forms or merely Form-copies - when one of the opposites
concerned is what we should call an essential attribute). This conception of what I have called Form-
copies seems to recur in the Timaeus (50C), where 'things that enter into and pass out of the
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'Receptacle' are described as 'copies of the etenally existent, modelled from them in a fashion hard to
explain and marvellous'."] Such a Form-copy will be what we might call I the 'quality' or 'character' of
a thing; like the Form it represents, it cannot take upon itself the nature of its opposite (if it has one)
[note 1: "102D, 103B."], but unlike the Form - presumably because of its lower ontological status,
inasmuch as it appears in this world of sense and imperfection - it is capable of perishing (so that a
particular manifestation of the Form may simply cease to exist) or else of 'withdrawing'.
R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, Cambridge 1955, p. 150, n. 1 (on 103e): "At first sight it might seem
natural to take crt)TO TO F.lSoc in E3 and SKSIVO in E4 to mean the transcendent Form, and this
would make the words 8/81 TI^V 8K8lvot) |JOp(pf)V easier to understand. But it is immanent forms -
characters like TO \J/I)%p6v which can approach and reside in concrete subjects that Socrates has been
and still is concerned with; and although when he needs a noun (rather than the adjective evaVTiov) to
denote the immanent form he mostly uses tSfiu (104B9, D2, 6, 9, El), yet 8tSlj is used at 104C7, where
ob/ bnopbvei 87Cl6VTtt <DAr|A,a rules out reference to transcendent Forms.
The 'something else' (uXXo Tl) which 'always bears the form's character' is, in terms of the example
just given, the concrete lump of snow which always has 'cold' immanent in it. The words 8/81 TT|V
SKeivOD |iOp(pf|V are, strictly speaking, illogical, since 8K81VO (in the example, TO V|/0/p6v) is
itself a |iOp(pf| (character); they are loose for 8/81 8K81VO sv6v. That poptpf) and l8ea are
synonymous is evident from 104D9 - 10 "
D. Gallop, Plato. Phaedo, Oxford 1975, note ad loc., refers to his note on 65d4 - e5 (p. 93 - 97), where
he comments i.a. on "the terminology of the Theory" (p. 93): "Two of Plato's commonest semi-
technical terms for Forms are eidos (102bl, 103e3, 104c7, 106d6) and idea (104b9, 104d2, 104d9,
104el, 105dl3). Both derive from a common root which appears in the Greek verb 'to see', and they are
thus connected with the visual appearance of a thing. Ordinarily, they connote 'shape' or 'figure', and
also 'sort' or 'species'. These associations are preserved in the conventional translation 'form', which
has been adopted for both words in Form-referring use. A third word, morphe, also normally meaning
'shape', has been translated 'character' (103e5, 104dl0). As used for Forms, the three words seem
interchangeable. See note 72." Note 72 on 104d9 reads (p. 236): "No clear distinctions seem marked by
Plato's usage of St8o^, 'l86a, and poptpf). At 104d9, as at 104b9, 104d2, 104d6, and 105dl3, 'l8£u
appears to be used as a variant for et8oc; as used at 104c7. Bluck (17, n. 7) and Hackforth (150, n. 1),
both with reservations, suggest that S.tSo^ on the one hand, and \8s(X and jiOptpf| on the other, may be
alligned with 'transcendent' and 'immanent' Forms respectively. But no safe inferences can, in fact, be
drawn from the use of any of these expressions."
C.J. Rowe, Plato. Phaedo, Cambridge 1993, comments on 102bl: "eiStOV: P. here unobtrusively
brings in one of his standard terms for 'form'." On 103e: "e3 ttUTO TO eiSoQ 'the form itself
(nothing can be true of 'the F in us' SIC TO 6tsl /p6vov, but only OTaVKSp fjl, 'whenever it
exists', as in the case of the category about to be mentioned: e4 - 5) e4 - 5 dXXd Kdl KtA.. 'but
also something else which is not that [the form itself], but which always has its character, whenever it
exists'. |iOp(pf|, like 8l8oQ, is used in a special meaning, but one that is clearly deducible from the
immediate context (both terms usually range between 'visible form' and 'class') " On 104b: "b9
Ol)8e xavza ... cl imSK/COpoOVTO. 'neither do these resemble things which admit [i.e. neither do
these seem to admit] that character (l86a), whichever it is that is opposite to the character which is in
them, but when it advances, they [clearly] either perish or get out of the way' (...). 'l86a is here
synonymous with 103e5 )JOp(pf| (see d9 -10 fj fevavxiu 'l86a SKSivi] TT[l J-lOp(pf)l); in other
dialogues it is used, like slSoc, in the sense of (Platonic) 'form'."
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APPENDIX 4
On poptpVj in Archaic Greek Literature
pop(pf| is a word of uncertain etymological origin. Its original meaning and subsequent early semantic
development are not, and perhaps cannot be, sufficiently explained. In what follows, I do not attempt to
give a full history of the word, but rather to establish some fundamental features of its early usage.
pop(pf| occurs twice in the Odyssey and not at all with Hesiod. In Book VIII of the Odyssey, when in
Scheria Odysseus, guest of the Phaeacians, is taunted by Eurylaus (164): ob8 d0X,T|xf|pi EOIKGL^, you
are not like a fighter, Odysseus retorts (167): ouxcoq ob 7tdvX800t 0SOl xap'lsvxa 8l5oboiV |
dvSpdaiv, ouxe tpu^v oux' ap' cppbva<; obx' dyopr}xbv. | aXXoq pev yap e!8ot;
dKiSvdxepoq 7C8X.SI dvfjp, | fiXXa Oeoq popcpi^v stcsgi oxbcpei, oi 5b x' eq abxov |
xep7c6pevoi aeuogoogiv- 6 8' docpaAeco^ dyopebei | a'i8oi pEtXr/ti], pexa 8s Kpenei
dypopbvoioiv, | epxdpevov 8' dva aoxo 0eov co<; e'loopdraoiv. | aXXoc, 8' aC e!8o<;
pev d/(tyKioq dOavdxoiotv, | alX' ou oi ydpit; dptpiTCSpicxbcpexai E7tbeaatv, | cb<;
Kal aol elSoc; pev dpt7tp£7rb<;, ob8b kev aXXtaq | ob8b 0eo<; xeb^eie, v6ov 8'
a7«xpc6/U6q scat. Not in one way do the gods give pleasing things to all men, neither growth nor yet
mind nor eloquence. One man, indeed, is weak in appearance, but god wreathes shape around his
words, and the other men look at him, delighted; but he speaks unfailingly with soothing reverence; he
finds favour with those who are gathered, just as if they looked at a god walking through the city. Again,
another man resembles the gods as to his look, but for him, no grace is wreathed around his words, just
as you are very stately as to look, a god could not fit it otherwise, as to mind, however, you are
useless.344 'Oeoc; pop(pf|v e7ceoi CX&psi, god wreathes shape around his words'345, seems to be
connected with: 6 8 &0(paA.6co^ dyopSUSl, but he speaks unfailingly; and it seems to be in contrast
with: vdov 8' b7CO(pc6A.l6q SOCl, as to mind, however, you are useless. That this would be a
simplified acount of the situation shows a comparison with the related passage three books later in the
Odyssey.
In Book XI, Odysseus recounts his errands to the Phaeacians. When he has finished, Arete, the queen,
addresses her people (336): <I>atr|KS<;, 7td><; bppiv dvf|p o8e cpaivsxai slvai | eI86^ xe
psysfidt; XS 'i8s tppbva^ Sv8ov sloat^; Phaeacians, how does this man seem to be to you, as to
look and size, and also equal wits within? When Alcinous, the king, is asked to speak as well, he
promises Odysseus gifts and a safe conduct home, provided he continues with his tale. Odysseus agrees
to that request and does not fail to stress the need of copious gifts in order to establish his position as
king on his return home. To that, Alcinous replies (363): c3 08lXJ8t), XO psv OU xi o' ElGKOpsV
Eioopocovxeq | f|7r8po7tf)d x' spev Kal ekik^otiov, old xe KoXlofq | pdoKei yaia
ps^aiva 7coXua7cep6a<; dv0pdmou<; | \|/eu8ea x' dpxuvovxaq, o0ev Kb xu; obSs
ISoixo- | ool S'stci pev popcpi^ s7cstov, evi 8e (ppbveq eo0X,al, | pu0ov 8' foe, ox'
aoiSoq 87ClOXapbvC0(^ Kaxb/.8qa^, ... . Odysseus, looking at you, we do not liken you to a cheater
and swindler, such as the black earth nourishes many man scattered all over the world who compose
their deceits whence one would not see it: but with you, there is, surely, the shape ofyour words, and in
you, there are noble wits, when you tell your tale with insight like a singer, ... . pOp(pf| ETTECOV, the
shape of your words, may not seem to be a satisfying translation; in order to make it look less
paradoxical, 'shapeliness' and even 'comeliness' have been suggested;346 but that seems to evade rather
344 Other aspects of this passage are discussed in Section I of the chapter on sISoq.
345 Rather than: 'god crowns his <deficient bodily> shape with words', as has been suggested.
346 Even U. Holscher, Die Odyssee, Miinchen 1988, p. 219, translates 'Schdnheit', and builds part of his
interpretation, not only of this particular passage, on that notion.
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than further interpretation. (iOptpf), I think, is not a distinction of Odysseus's words that implies truth.
'Shape' is a property also of the liar's words which deceive O0SV k6 Tiq ob86 ISoiXO, whence one
would not see it. The external shape of Odysseus' words would not guarantee their truth; but 'to him',
there also is understanding, insight like that of an &Ot56<;, a singer, whose office it is to tell the truth.
What Odysseus is praised for by the queen is his own outward appearance and his wits inside; that latter
praise is taken up by the king who grants him 'shape of his words', but adds that he also has wits within
- that is what makes himself and his story valuable rather than just deceptively pleasing. In this passage
at least, |iOp(pf|, shape, seems to refer to something external, something from which one cannot see,
and therefore cannot deduce, what the thing having this shape is like, in this case, if the words are, or
are not, true.
In like wise, in the first passage, Odyssey VIII, 167ff., Odysseus starts off with 'what is pleasing'. That
can be physical growth, in the broad sense of that word, wits, that is something mental, and, on this
occasion, eloquence. (iyopT)Xl)^ is derived from the verb Ctyop8l)(0 and signifies 'speaking-in-public'.
Though 'speaking well in public' can be contrasted with 'looking good', it could also be contrasted with
'having understanding', just as 'having understanding' could be contrasted with 'looking good'. In
Odysseus' statement, the tertium comparationis is 'pleasing', not 'good' or 'true'. At Odyssey VIII, 170,
poptpr) is that shape which words must have if they are to be pleasing, so that Odysseus, in speaking
about the man whose words do not have that shape, can declare in paraphrase (175): h'X.X' OO Ol
X&plC, &(I(pi7l8piOx6(pSXai S7T8SOGtV, but for him, no grace is wreathed around his words. That is
not to be interpreted as if X^pl? is a synonym of |iOp(pf|, just as little as 8tSo^ could be said to be a
synonym of pop(pf| here. e.TSo^ is the 'look', the 'appearance' of a person, pop(pf| is the 'shape': and
here it is the shape of the words, the 87X1), which are in the text as a necessary complement, just as
&vf|p, the man, is that 'to which there is' stSoc;. If the shape of words is pleasing, those words can be
said to be pleasing, to have ^dpl^, and if the look of a man is pleasing, that man can be said to be
pleasing: 'in that respect', as the dialectician Odysseus does not fail to emphasize.347
A similar use of (ioptpt) can be seen with Empedocles (Simplicius Physica 159, 13 = DK31B21):
bXX ays, xov5' 6tipa>v 7tpox6pa)V 87U|adpxupa SepKeu, | si xi Kal 6v 7ipox6poiai
XlTtdquXov 87lX8XO jaopcpf), I ... . Well then, look at this witness ofmy earlier words, if in them
anything at all was incomplete in shape 348 We do, of course, not know what exactly had come
before this passage, but for the present purpose that is probably not relevant. Whatever it was,
Empedocles presumably did not mean to say that his former words were incorrect or false; they were in
some way insufficient. They were lacking in shape. This use of poptpVj is the same as that of Alcinous
who says that Odysseus' words have shape, or that of Odysseus who speaks more generally about
someone who is capable of speaking pleasingly since his words have shape. Additional information
about Empedocles' use of the word, however, can be derived if one compares B21 with B71 (Simplicius
Decaelo 529, 28): s'l 56 xi ooi Tispl xcovSe enXexo 7rioxi<;, I ... . But if for you,
persuasion was incomplete in anything with regard to those things, I ... . In both cases, the four
elements are afterwards mentioned as that which Empedocles is going to explain. In both cases, he
347 So it is slightly misleading if B. Mader declares in Lexikon des friihgriechischn Epos II, Gottingen
1991, col. 424, s.v. sl8oC: "Austauschworter: 8t(5oQ ... wird aufgenommen von: jiOpcpf) i3- 170,
Xdpiq 6) 175.
348 Pace Diels - Kranz I, p. 319, who - in translating "Doch wohlan, schaue auf folgenden Zeugen
meiner friiheren Worte, falls etwa noch in meinen friiheren ein Mangel an ihrer (der Elemente) Gestalt
geblieben war: ... ." - let JJOpcpt) refer to the apparition of the elements rather than the shape of the
words; they probably think of piopcpt) as somehow synonymous with 'l86a or St8o^, which two words
are reported to have been Democritus' names for the elements (cf. DK68B141; A57).
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employs the adjective A.t7t6<;iAo^, incomplete, literally, lacking wood.349 But whereas in the one case
something in or with the words is incomplete in shape, in the other it is the words' power to persuade
which has this predicate. Incomplete 7t'lOXtC and incomplete (iOp(pf| alike require further explanation;
one seems to go together with the other. TtioxtC, however, does not imply &X.f|08ia, truth, as can be
seen from Parmenides DK28B1, 30, when he says that not only the truth must be learned, but also the
belief and opinions of mortal men, ... XoTl^ obK SVl 7tioxi^ &A.T|0f)^, in which there is no true
power and cause ofpersuasion. That seems to imply that there could be a 7tioxl£ oi)K (rXlj0f|^;350
Parmenides does not declare that there is no 7tioxt(^ in what men say. On the contrary, if he thought
that there were none, there would not have been any need to contrast his own doctrines so sharply with
common belief, let alone a need to construct an elaborate system of human belief and opinions which are
not true but nevertheless valid or accepted belief, SotcifiCOC; (Bl, 32).
Parmenides commences his exposition of this system with the words (B8, 51): ... • 86^aC, 8 CXTtO
xobSe Ppoxf.iaq | pdv0avs k6ojaov epcov S7t£cov dTtaxijXdv dKobcov. | poptpag yap
Kaxe0evxo 56o yvc6pa<; ovopd^eiv, | xcbv piav ob xPec&v boxiv sv
7t87t/.avr])ibvot s'loiv. j dvxia 8' eKp'ivavxo 86|aa<; Kal af||aax' s0evxo | x®Pk an
dX^fjXtov- xf) psv cpXoyd<; a't06piov 7tbp, | ifaiov ov, pby' bXacppbv, ecooxcp
7tdvxoos xcobxdv, | xco 8' exfeptp xtobxdv- dxap k&Keivo Kax' abxo | xdvxia
vukx' &8af|, tcukivov 86pa<; epPpi06<; xe. | x6v oot 'eyed SidKoopov eoiKdxa 7tdvxa
(paxi^Ct), | cbq Ob |if| 7cox& xi<; OS PpoxWV yVCOpri TtapeX&OOT]. ... : but from here on learn
the human belief and opinions, listening to the deceptive order of my words. They laid down as their
cognitions351 to name two shapes, to name one ofwhich is not right: in that they have gone astray. But
they judged them as opposite things as to build, and posited signs separated from each other. For the
one <shape> etherial fire of the flame, being mild, very light, in every way the same as itself, not the
same as the other one: again also the other one for itself, as opposite, unknowing night, of dense and
heavy build. I report to you the whole order as it is likely, so that not any one cognition ofmortals will
ever drive past you.
It is to be noted that 801k6^, likely, in line 60, is i.a. a term of rhetoric. In the absence of facts, one
produces arguments from what is likely, s£, SOIk6xC0V, in order to achieve persuasion. That fits in well
349 It would be interesting to know how widespread the use of /\.l7t6^t)Xo^ was. The word is not
attested in pre-hellenistic Greek apart from these two instances. Its etymology points to the sphere of
wood-working crafts as place of origin. If that be so, one would like to know if Empedocles modelled
B21 on B71 or the other way round. If A,l7l6^U^OV |lOp(pf| is earlier than XlTt6qt)Xo^ 7tioxi^,
could JiOptpf) have been applied to the shape of a wooden structure? - We know too little about either
word.
350 A 7ricxi<; which leads to 86qa, not dX.f|08ia, is mentioned by Socrates, Phaedrus 274e7 - 275b2.
351 On YVCOjiTj in early Greek literature, cf. B. Snell, Die Ausdriicke fur den Begriff des Wissens in der
vorplatonischen Philosophic, Berlin 1924, pp. 31 - 39; on Parmenides' usage in particular, vid. p. 37
with note 2. I am not sure, however, if Snell's interpretation of Parmenides' usage as revaluation of
yvcopr) as S6^a is correct in this instance. For mortals, what they posit is cognition and insight; they
lay down that 'there are two shapes' as insight, as if they knew. When in B8, 61 other systems of
thought are classed under the general term of PpOXCOV yvcoptj, that is 'what humans call yvcopT)'
rather than simply 'human opinion' in contrast with 'divine opinion'. Cf. also J. Lyons, Structural
Semantics. An Analysis ofPart of the Vocabulary ofPlato, Oxford 1969, p. 176, n. 4. It is tempting to
take Kax60evxo ... yvcojta^ as 80evxo yvc6(iT|V. While the prefix does not present a problem, it
perhaps remains difficult to account for the plural of yvOJjaa^. Pace e.g. E. Heitsch, Parmenides. Die
Fragmente. Miinchen 1974, 21991, p. 180: "In Vers 53 ist yvc6|JTlV Kaxaxl08O0at [sic!] (vgl.
Theogn. 717) zu verstehen wie yvc6|it]V xi0SO0ai: 'seine Meinung im Sinne einer WillensauBerung
kundtun' (Herodot III 80,6; VII 82; VIII 108,2)." The places adduced all have yvC0jiT|V in the singular.
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with Parmenides' earlier mention of 7tioxiQ 6tXlj0f|<^ in connection with his exposition, and in
particular with B8, 38ff.:... | ovXov &Kivr|x6v t e|aevav icq k&vt' ovojj' eoxai | dooa
PpOTOl KUXSObVTO 71871O106x£^ stvUl cxat|0f|. (Being) is whole and unmoved: so that everything
will be <mere> name, <everything> laid down by mortals, persuaded of its being true. Here the
goddess says explicitly that something which is not true has Tcioxi^, power and cause ofpersuasion?52
The verb employed by Parmenides for 'the laying down' of a name is Kaxaxl0T||ll, a verb used in legal
context in the sense of decree; the same verb used in B8, 53: (XOptpd^ yap KaX808VXO 86o
yvcapa^ ovop&^eiv, they laid down as their cognitions to name two shapes. Men decree to name two
shapes, etherial fire and night. From the point of view of the goddess, these two shapes are not real, but
only apparent; just names. As names and in their outward shape they are manifest. JiOptpai is the
characterisation given by the goddess. pop(pf| here refers to the opposite of what something really is, its
mere outward shape. That is in agreement with the usage of Empedocles who contrasted the content of
his exposition with the shape he had given it, and also in agreement with the use of the word in the
Odyssey, where words which are true and spoken with insight can have the additional predicate of
having shape, that is to say good shape which makes a speech pleasing in addition to its being true in
content.353
This contrast is also found with Empedocles in another context. Sextus Empiricus and Origines, in
discussing Pythagorean abstinence from meat, and metempsychosis which by Origenes (Contra Celsum
V 49) is termed XOV 7l8pl xf|q VJ/Uxf|C; |JSX8VO(Ojiaxoi))i8Vr|i; pi)0OV, the myth about the soul's
being reembodied, adduce verses of Empedocles. Sextus quotes (Adversus Mathematicos IX 129 =
DK31B137): popcptjv 8' aAAtiqavxu 7taxf|p (pi>.ov u'tov asipaq | acpd^ei 87tsi)yv6p8voq
... . The father, lifting his dear son who has changed his shape, slaughters him praying. The point of
the thought expressed here is that the soul which is re-embodied remains the same; and that thereby the
continuity of the person, in the modern sense of that word, is guaranteed. What changes is only the
outward shape, a shape which does not determine what, or who, somebody or something really is.
This is the background against which other early passages containing the word (J.Op(pf| can be
understood.
352 That is not contradicted by Parmenides' use of the adjective 7UGx6^ in B8, 50, for the goddess
herself, from her position of universal insight, declares only the one truth as trustworthy, regardless of
the persuasiveness of any other view.
353 Pace e.g. A.H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides, Assen/Maastricht 1986, p. 219f., who asserts
that "the word poptpf| in its earliest use signifies beauty of form, or external form or shape generally,
usually as an attribute of a person or of a thing but sometimes, as here, denoting the person or thing
itself. ... . P[armenides] uses the word in the plural to refer to a pair of homogeneous, unchanging
substances with both sensible and non-sensible characteristics." The passages adduced by Coxon in
support of this usage are Aeschylus Prometheus Vinctus 209f., Sophocles Electra 197f., and Euripides
frg. 484, 2. - For some further instances, cf. LSJ s.v. |iOp(pf|.
Cf. also A.E. Taylor, Varia Socratica I, Oxford 1911, p.252f., who would translate "they have made up
their minds to give names to two bodies, whereof one should not receive a name"; he supposes that
Parmenides' "reasoning throughout turns on the assumption that if you admit that empty space is at all,




A.M. Adam Platonis Protagoras, Cambridge 1893
T.W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie I/II, ed. R. zur Lippe, Frankfurt 1973/74
D.J. Allan Introduction, in: J. Stenzel, Plato's Method ofDialectic,
translated and edited by DJ. Allan, Oxford 1940
A.N. Ammann -IKOS bei Platon. Ableitung und Bedeutung mitMaterialsammlung, Freiburg
(Schweiz) 1953
R.D. Archer-Hind77ze Phaedo ofPlato, London 1883
M.R. Arundel Empedocles, fr. 35. 12-15, in: CR N.S. XII (1962), 109 - 111
F. Ast Lexicon Platonicum, Leipzig 1835 - 1838, repr. Bonn 1956
H.C. Baldry Plato's "Technical Terms", in: CQ XXXI (1937), 141 - 150
D.M. Balme TENOSandEIAOS in Aristotle's Biology, in: CQ (NS) XII (1962), 81 -98
J. Barnes The Presocratic Philosophers, London 1979,21982
Early Greek Philosophy, Harmondsworth 1987
W. Beck f|£pOSl8f|<5, in: Lexikon des friihgriechischen Epos I, Gottingen 1979, col. 898
F. Blass Die attische Beredsamkeit I2, Leipzig 1887
R.S. Bluck Plato's Phaedo, London 1955
Plato's Meno, Cambridge 1961
D. Bolotin Plato's Dialogue on Friendship. An Interpretation of the Lysis with a New Translation,
New York 1979
M. Bordt Platon. Lysis, Gottingen 1998
L. Brandwood A Word Index to Plato, Leeds 1976
P. Brommer EIAOSet IAEA. Etude semantique et chronologique, Assen 1940
C.D. Buck A Dictionary ofSelected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages,
Chicago 1949, repr. Chicago/London 1988
J. Bumet Platonis Opera Omnia, Oxford 1900 - 1906
Plato's Phaedo, Oxford 1911
Plato's Euthyphro, Apology ofSocrates and Crito, Oxford 1924
L. Campbell The Sophist and Politicus ofPlato, Oxford 1867
On Plato's Use ofLanguage, in: B. Jowett, L. Campbell, Plato's Republic II,




















Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens,
Miinchen 1959
Untersuchungen zu Platons Jagdbildern, Berlin 1960
La formation des noms en grec ancien, Paris 1933, (nouveau tirage 1979)
Thoughts on the Pragmatics ofAncient Greek, in: PCPhS 1989, 1 - 13
The Fragments ofParmenides, Assen/Maastricht 1986
Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker I - III, Berlin 61951/52
FUppokratische Medizin und attische Philosophic, in: Hermes 80 (1952),
385 - 409, repr. in: id., Kleine Schriften zur antiken Medizin
Ausdrucksformen des methodischen Bewufitseins in den hippokratischen Epidemien,
in: Archiv fur Begriffsgeschichte 9 (1964), 133 - 150,
repr. in: id. Kleine Schriften zur antiken Medizin
Kleine Schriften zur antiken Medizin, ed. G. Baader, H. Grensemann,
Berlin/New York 1973
Zum Gebrauch von sISoC und tSfct in vorplatonischer Zeit, in: Medizingeschichte
in unserer Zeit, ed. H.-H. Euler et al., Stuttgart 1971, 23 - 30
Das Selbstverstandnis der griechischen Medizin in der Zeit des Hippokrates,
in: La collection Hippocratique et son role dans /' histoire de la medecine,
Leiden 1975, 77 -93.
Plato. Gorgias, Oxford 1959
Plato' Phaedo: An Interpretation, Toronto 1982
Aristophanes. Clouds, Oxford 1968
Aristophanes. Frogs, Oxford 1993
Sokrates als Pythagoreer und die Anamnesis in Platons Phaidon,
Mainz/Stuttgart 1994
The Terminology of the Ideas, in: HSCP XX (1938), 17 - 51
Hippocratis ... reliquiae I - III, Utrecht 1859 - 1864
Isokrates. Seine Positionen in der Auseinandersetzung mit den zeitgenossischen
Philosophen, Berlin/New York 1982
Hippocrate. L' ancienne medecine, Paris 1948
On Ideas, Oxford 1993
Platon. Ion, Stuttgart 1988
Griechisches Etymologisches Worterbuch I/II, Heidelberg 1960/1970
307
K. v. Fritz Philosophic und sprachlicher Ausdruck bei Demokrit, Platon und Aristoteles,
New York 1938
M. Fuhrmann Platon. Apologie, Stuttgart 1986
N. Fujisawa 'E^SIV,Msi^SlV, and Idioms of "Paradeigmatism" in Plato's Theory ofForms,
in: Phronesis XIX (1974), 30 - 58
H.G. Gadamer Die Unsterblichkeitsbeweise in Platos 'Phaidon', in: Wirklichkeit und Reflexion.
Festschrift fur Walter Schulz, Pfullingen 1973, 145 - 161; repr. in: H.-G. Gadamer,
Gesammelte Werke 6. Griechische Philosophie II, Tubingen 1985, 187 - 201
























Platon. Lexikon derNamen undBegriffe, Zurich/Miinchen 1975
The Use ofEtdogand TSfd in Hippocrates, in: CQ VI (1912), 179 - 203
Herodotus I, Cambridge, Mass.21926
A Historical Commentary on Thucydides I, Oxford 1945
Homeric Epithetsfor Things, in: CQ41 (1947), 112.
Plato's Phaedo, Cambridge 1955
Philolaus and the Even-Odd, in: CR XII (1962), 1 -2
Plato. Gorgias, Harmondsworth 1960
Eine vorplatonische Theorie der t£%V7], in: MH 18, 1961, 105 - 130
Parmenides. Die Fragmente. Miinchen 1974, 21991
Wrestling Metaphors in Plato's Theaetetus, in: NIKEPHOROS (1995), 77- 109
Die Treffkunst des Arztes in hippokratischer undplatonischer Sicht, in: Sudhoffs
Archiv fur Geschichte der Medizin u. der Naturwissenschaften 47 (1963), 247 - 290
A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey II, Oxford 1989
Anfangliches Fragen, Gottingen 1968
Die Odyssee, Munchen 1988
Griechisches etymologisches Worterbuch, Munchen 1950
A Commentary on Thucydides I, Oxford 1991
Philolaos ofCroton. Pythagorean and Presocratic, Cambridge 1993
Aspetti Semantici della Filosophia Platonica, Roma 1978
Plato. Gorgias, Oxford 1979
Hippocrates I, II; IV, Cambridge, Mass. 1923; 1931
The Dialogues o/Plato II, ed. R.M. Hare, D.A. Russell, London 1970
308
C. Kahn Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, Cambridge 1996
E. Kapp The Theory of Ideas in Plato's Earlier Dialogues, in: id., Ausgewahlte Schriften
Berlin 1968, 55- 150
M. Kardaun DerMimesisbegriff in der griechischen Antike, Verhandelingen der Koninklijke
Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks,
deel 153, Amsterdam/New York/Oxford/Tokyo 1993




















D. Mannsperger Physis bei Platon, Berlin 1969
J. Mansfeld Die Vorsokratiker, Stuttgart 1987
E.C. Marchant Thucydides I, London 1905
R. Marten OYZIA im Denken Platons, Meisenheim am Glan 1962
E. Martens Platon. Charmides, Stuttgart 1977
Platon. Parmenides, Stuttgart 1987
Review of C.A. Huffmann, Philolaos of Croton. Pythagorean and Presocratic,
Cambridge 1993, in: CR XLIV (1994), 294 - 296
The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge 21983
Die diharetische Methode, in: Glotta 39, 1960, 6-24
Platon. Protagoras, Stuttgart 1987
System- und Methodenprobleme in Corpus Hippocraticum, Wiesbaden 1956
(eds.), Index Hippocraticus, Gottingen 1986/89
Griechische Grammatik II. Syntax, Hannover 1888
Plato. Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias, Cambridge, Mass. 1925
Platon. Euthyphron, Stuttgart 1978
A Greek-English Lexicon. Revised and augmented throughout
by H. S. Jones with the assistance ofR. McKenzie, Oxford91940
The Hippocratic Question, in: CQ (NS) 68 (1974), 171 - 192
Structural Semantics. An Analysis ofPart of the Vocabulary ofPlato, Oxford 1969



























Platon. Thedtet, Stuttgart 1981
Griechische Sprachwissenschaft I, Berlin 1991
Le developpement du verbe "avoir", in: ANTIAQPON. Festschrift Jacob
Wackernagel, Gottingen 1924, 9-13.
Teilhabe bei Platon, Freiburg/Miinchen 1968
Platon. Der Sophist, Stuttgart 1990
Fragmenta Hesiodea, Oxford 1967
Index Graecitatis Platonicae, Oxford 1832
Das Wort Dialektik bei Platon, MH 1 (1944), 152 - 168
Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie geometrique des Grecs, Paris 1958/59
0eoet8f|c;, |itAosi8f|^, in: Lexikon des friihgriechischen Epos II, Gottingen 1991,
coll. 281,996
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford 31944
(Reset with Revised Etymologies and Addenda 1973)
Lexique de la langue philosophique et religieuse de Platon, Paris 1964
Dynamis im Corpus Hippocraticum, Wiesbaden 1964
Hauchdissimilation im Mykenischen, in: MSS 48 1987, 187-193
Die platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhaltnisse zu den hippokratischen Schriften,
Metten 1882
Hippocrates V - VIII, Cambridge Massachusetts/London 1988 -1995
Thukydides und die hippokratische Medizin, Hildesheim 1991
PARMENIDES und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophic, Bonn 1916
The Apology ofPlato, with ... a Digest ofPlatonic Idioms, Oxford 1857
Neue Untersuchungen iiber Platon, Munchen 1910
Review of J. Lyons, Structural Semantics, in: CR XXI (1971)
Plato's Lysis. The Structural Problem, in: ICS XI (1986), 63 - 83
Homeric (piA.O^, in: E.M. Craik (ed.), Owls to Athens, Oxford 1990
Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford 1951,21953
Plato. Phaedo, Cambridge 1993
Plato. Politicus, Warminster 1995
La notion de la forme en Grec ancien, Fribourg 1972
310
M. Schofield An essay on Anaxagoras, Cambridge 1980
J.H.H. Schmidt Synonymik der Griechischen Sprache I - IV, Leipzig 1876/86
E. Schwyzer Griechische Grammatik I -II, Miinchen 1939, 1950
P. Shorey Review of A.E. Taylor, Viaria Socratica, in: Classical Philology VI (1911), 361 - 365
Plato. Republic I/II, Cambridge/Mass. 1930/35
R. Smith Mass Terms, Generic Expressions, and Plato's Theory ofForms, in: JHP 16 (1978),
141 - 153
B. Snell Die Ausdriicke fiir den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie,
Berlin 1924
(et al., eds.) Lexikon des friihgriechischen Epos, Gottingen 1979 -
A.H. Sommcrstein Aristophanes. Clouds, Warminster 1982
J. Stenzel Die Methode derDialektik von Sokrates bis Aristoteles, Leipzig/Berlin 21931
(trans, as: Plato's Method ofDialectic, D.J. Allan, Oxford 1940)
Platon und Demokritos, in: NJbKlassAltPad 1920, 89ff.,
repr. in: id., Kleine Schriften, 60-71
Uber den Einflufi der griechischen Sprache aufdie philosophische Begriffsbildung,
in: NJbKlassAltPad 1921, 152ff., repr. in: id., Kleine Schriften, 72 - 84
Kleine Schriften, Darmstadt 1956
M.C. Stokes One andMany in Presocratic Philosophy, Washington, D.C./Cambridge, Mass. 1971
A.E. Taylor The Words SlSog, tSfct in Pre-Platonic Literature, in: id., Varia Socratica. First
Series, Oxford 1911, 178 - 267
A. Teffeteller-Dale abxd xa laa, Phaedo 74cl. A Philosophical Perspective, AJP 108 (1987),
384 - 399
E.S. Thompson The Meno ofPlato, London 1901
W.H. Thompson The Gorgias ofPlato, London 1905,
Thucydides Book I. Part II, ed. W.H. Forbes, Oxford 1895
G. Vailati A Study ofPlatonic Terminology, in: Mind XV (1906), 473 - 485
G. Vlastos The Individual as Object ofLove in Plato. Appendix I: Is the Lysis a Vehicle of
Platonic Doctrine?, in: id., Platonic Studies, Princeton 1973, 35 - 37
G. Vlastos An ambiguity in the Sophist, in: id., Platonic Studies, Princeton 1973
A. Walde,
J.B. Hofmann Lateinisches Etymologisches Worterbuch I/II, Heidelberg
311
J. Pokorny Vergleichendes etymologisches Worterbuch der indogermanischen Sprachen I - III,
Berlin/Leipzig 1930- 1932
R. Waterfield Plato. Gorgias, Oxford 1994
D. Watt Plato. Lysis, in: T.J. Saunders (ed.), Plato. Early Socratic Dialogues,
Harmondsworth 1987
W. Wayte Platonis Protagoras, Cambridge41883
K. Weidauer Thukydides und die Hippokratischen Schriften, Heidelberg 1954
H. Wersdorfer Die 01AO2O0IA des Isokrates im Spiegel ihrer Terminologie, Bonn 1940
M.L. West Hesiod. Theogony, Oxford 1966
Hesiod. Works and Days, Oxford 1978
Iambi et Elegi Graeci I, Oxford 21989
Greek Lyric Poetry, Oxford 1993
W. Wieland Platon und die Formen des Wissens, Gottingen 1982
H. Williamson The Phaedo ofPlato, London 1904
